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MEETING POINT 
Michael Aaronson 
Michael Aaronson 'caught the bug for 
working in Africa' in Nigeria where he 
was employed, after leaving university, 
by the large UK-based NGO, 'Save the 
Children'. He went on to spend 16 
years in the British Foreign Service, 
before returning to the non-
governmental sector to take up a 
senior position with his old employers. 
Earlier this year, he was appointed 
Director-General of 'Save the Children'. 
In conjunction with our Dossier on 
NGOs, we asked Mr Aaronson for his 
views about the work of development 
NGOs, the challenges they face in an 
unstable and changing world, and the' 
important, but not always comfortable 
relationship that they have with their 
public sector partners. 
pages 2 to S 
COUNTRY REPORTS 
BELIZE 
Belize is a Central American country 
that throws up a succession of 
surprises. Mother nature is responsible 
for some of these, including the 
second largest coral reef in the world, 
delightful offshore islands, a diverse 
and fascinating wildlife, and a tropical 
forest, four fifths of which has been 
spared the ravages of humankind. 
Another surprise is the beauty of its 
towns (notably Belize City which is a 
'tropical Venice'). Then there is the 
country's deep-rooted democracy and 
its unconventional history. It was 
independent at a time of colonialism 
and then a colony until the early 
1980s. Finally, this nation of 200 000 
souls enjoys relative economic 
prosperity as well as racial harmony 
despite the recent arrival of more than 
60 000 refugees. For all that, Belize in 
not paradise. It has its problems — 
some recent ethnic tensions, economic 
difficulties linked to global recession 
and the pernicious growth of the drug 
trade. 
Pages 12 to 32 
MALAWI 
In May 1994 Dr Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda, one of the most brutal 
dictators Africa has seen this century, 
was defeated in a presidential election 
In Malawi. He had ruled the country 
for 30 years. The Courier visited 
Malawi in May, one year after the 
historic change. We found a much 
happier nation, where multi-party 
democracy is taking root, and where 
the government Is grappling, In a 
remarkable manner, with the serious 
economic legacies of Dr Banda's 
regime. 
Pages 33 to 55 
EUROPE 
The future shape of the EU 
The 'great debate' has resumed. 
Readers will recall the tortuous 
passage of the Maastricht Treaty 
which we covered extensively in 
previous issues. This was followed by a 
relative lull in the discussion about 
'deepening' the Union as attention 
turned to the somewhat simpler task 
of enlargement. But 1996 — the date 
set for the next Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) — is fast 
approaching. The focus will be on 
improving the way the EU's system 
works, rather than on substantive 
competences, but it will be no mere 
technical exercise. Already, there are 
signs of a struggle developing 
between competing, and largely 
incompatible visions of what the Union 
should be. We report on the European 
Commission's initial contribution to the 
debate and analyse some of the key 
issues. 
Pages 56 to 60 
DOSSIER 
NGOs 
Recognised as vital actors in the 
development process, many NGOs 
today are undergoing something of an 
'identity crisis'. Key issues of current 
concern include a fear of losing their 
independence, the need to redefine 
the partnership between civil society in 
the North and in the South, doubts 
over their respective roles, competition 
for funds, problems In coordinating 
their work, and the continuing tension 
between 'development' and 
'emergency' activity. In the Dossier we 
examine how NGOs are tackling these 
questions as the 21st century 
approaches. 
Pages 63 to 90 
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see closer to home. That there is a squeeze 
on aid to Africa seems therefore to be a 
direct consequence of the fact that there is 
no additional funding being made avail-
able. That's the real issue. All this stuff 
about whether a bilateral programme is 
any better than a European one is just a 
smokescreen. Obviously, it appeals to 
nationalistic sentiment in a country like 
Britain where knocking anything European 
is fashionable. I think it is utterly depressing 
how, in British politics, there is so little 
serious consideration of the potential 
benefits to this country of working with 
our European partners to try to achieve 
more together than we can achieve 
separately. The debate is never on those 
terms. It is always conducted in purely 
negative terms of what are we going to 
'give up' and I find that hugely depressing. 
Interestingly, in the NGO sector, 
the British have a much better reputation 
in Europe. Representing British NGOs, I find 
that our work is highly appreciated and 
welcomed by our European colleagues. 
This is because we are in an area where we 
are all conditioned to think in terms of 
'how can we achieve more by working 
together?' It is part of the culture and 
ethos of NGOs, and I think that stands out 
in strong contrast to the negative, inward-
looking, narrow-minded and depressing 
attitude of politicians in this country : 
politicians of all parties, I have to say. We 
have a bit of a 'little England' problem 
here, I am afraid. 
■ There is a proliferation of organisations 
of varying types under the broad 'NGO' 
heading. And whenever there is a crisis, in 
somewhere like Rwanda for example, they 
all descend on the place, presenting 
problems of coordination. What is your 
view of this phenomenon ? 
— The longer-established, and 
what I would regard as more professional 
NGOs (I hope we can count ourselves as 
one of these), have been very alarmed at 
this relatively recent phenomenon of 
mushrooming NGOs. Rwanda was an 
appalling example. There were something 
like 130 organisations working in the 
refugee camps in Zaire and another 100 
trying to set up shop inside Rwanda. And 
frankly, many of them were thoroughly ill-
equipped. They had very little real contri-
bution to make and seemed to be there 
solely to raise their own profile and attract 
funding. They certainly showed no desire 
to take part in any coordinated plan of 
action. So those of us representing the UK 
platform on the EC NGO Liaison Commit-
tee would put our cards firmly on the table 
on this issue. We need, as an NGO 
community, to begin trying to impose 
some standards of our own, for example, 
by developing codes of conduct. The good 
name of NGOs is at stake and I think that 
we have to do something about it. 
I
We have to be 
careful not to 
impose our own 
models of civil 
society on the South' 
■ What about Southern NGOs. Do you 
see their emergence as an aspect of the 
development process ? 
— It is a very important aspect of 
our work, although I have to say that in 
recent years, I think it has become a bit of a 
fad. There are also very real dangers 
attached to it in that we have to be very 
careful not to impose our own external 
models of civil society on the countries of 
the South. For Save the Children, for 
example, to go around setting up little 
local branches in Africa would seem to me 
to be completely inappropriate. The ques-
tion of what sorts of NGOs emerge as part 
of the civil society in developing countries is 
a matter for the people of those countries. 
It is not for us to force the pace or impose 
our own models. I think we also shouldn't 
forget that NGOs form only a limited part 
of the whole spectrum of civil society. 
People talk about NGOs in a very un-
discerning way, failing to distinguish be-
tween local NGOs and community-based 
organisations. The latter may truly rep-
resent particular communities in a way that 
local NGOs do not. Local NGOs may 
represent élites, philanthropists or what-
ever. That's not necessarily a bad thing, of 
course — its how Save the Children came 
into being — but obviously, the develop-
ment of civil society is very important. Local 
NGOs undoubtedly have a role to play in 
that but we, as outsiders, need to be 
sensitive to the local context and not allow 
ourselves to be seduced by the latest 
fashions. 
■ The balance appears to be tipping 
away from traditional development assist-
ance towards humanitarian activities. Is 
that something which you have seen 
within your organisation ? 
— It is certainly a phenomenon 
that we are concerned about. This refers 
back to one of your earlier questions. What 
seems to be at stake at the moment is the 
extent of the North's commitment to long-
term development in the South. There 
seems to be some sort of disillusionment 
with it. We see a much tougher attitude on 
conditionality together with a feeling that 
we will get involved where we have to, 
because the scale of suffering is so great, 
and it is being shown on our television 
screens. If we don't react, we will look bad 
with our own constituency. In practice, 
that means a lot of funding that might 
otherwise have been available for develop-
ment work is now being channelled into 
humanitarian activity. In fact, it is not even 
'humanitarian', strictly speaking. It is really 
emergency relief with a strong political 
flavour to it. 
■ Isn't there some merit in this approach 
given that, after 30 years of attempted 
development assistance, the number of 
success stories doesn't appear to be very 
great. 
— Well my response would be 
'whose fault is that?' Are we really 
justified in penalising Africans. Maybe we 
should look more at our own practices and 
ask ourselves if we have been doing it the 
right way. Obviously, there are faults on 
both sides. Africa has done itself no good 
at all by failures of governance, corruption, 
civil war and so on, but I think for us to sit 
here and pass judgment from on high, 
ignoring the historical and contemporary 
context of Africa, is a bit rich. It is very easy 
to use that as an excuse. Let me give you 
what I think is a good recent example. 
After the Kibeho massacre in Rwanda, the 
Commission announced that it was sus-
pending all aid through the Kigali govern-
ment. I actually think that said more about 
feelings of inadequacy in Europe than 
about anything that is happening in 
Rwanda. I believe that it was a reflection of 
European guilt at its failure to engage in 
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Rwanda in anything more than a super-
ficial way. There has really been only a very 
half-hearted involvement in the process of 
reconciliation, the justice process, and in 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Instead, 
we have seen huge sums being poured into 
unsustainable refugee camps along the 
border. 
You also asked whether that has 
been a problem in Save the Children. One 
of our corporate goals is that we will 
continue to provide emergency relief — 
but in the context of long-term develop-
ment. In other words, we not interested in 
becoming a sort of flying squad for 
humanitarian assistance. We are commit-
ted to long-term development. Obviously, 
we also try to provide relief where 
children's lives or well-being are under 
threat but we will always keep our eye on 
the longer term perspective and won't 
allow ourselves to be diverted from that. 
■ Broadening the discussion a little, can I 
ask about your views on structural adjust-
ment. There are those who regard it as the 
great hope — or even the panacea — for 
genuine and sustainable development. Do 
you agree with that analysis or do you 
think that it is ill-founded ? 
— I think there are no panaceas 
in development; certainly no economic 
panaceas. I believe that the whole ap-
proach to structural adjustment reflects a 
misplaced obsession with economic models 
and a view that development is about 
economics when it is actually about peo-
ple. Economic growth is a means to an end, 
not an end in itself. Properly applied, it is a 
way of achieving greater wealth and, more 
crucially, greater well-being for a greater 
number of people. At the macro-economic 
level there may be perfectly sound argu-
ments for structural adjustment — al-
though they have been disputed — but 
there is no doubt that at the level of the 
ordinary people, particularly in Africa, 
adjustment policies have led to greater 
suffering and hardship. Nor is there any 
guarantee that any economic gains result-
ing from adjustment will be applied to the 
benefit of the population at large. There 
are some very well documented cases. 
What has happened to the health service in 
Zimbabwe under structural adjustment is 
just one example. I think that development 
is too important to be left to economists. 
■ Another big change which, on the face 
of it, ought to be very encouraging, is the 
démocratisation process in Africa. Working 
in an NGO, has that change made it any 
easier for you in your dealings with local 
administrations ? 
— There are many encouraging 
things happening in Africa but I think that 
the perspective of an organisation like Save 
the Children is always going to be a bit 
different in this area. Even in countries 
which suffered most under non-democ-
ratic regimes, it has always been possible 
for us to find people to work with : people 
who are committed to improving the lives 
of children. One thinks, for example, of 
Ethiopia under Mengistu. We worked 
there quite happily for many years and 
made absolutely no compromises to the 
authorities. Whatever else their faults, 
they were intelligent enough to know that 
they needed us to be there and, therefore, 
they were prepared to allow us to carry on 
working according to our own lights. Now, 
obviously, we have a very good, close and 
ultimately more productive relationship 
with the new Ethiopian regime because, if 
you have a democratic system, there are all 
sorts of possibilities that weren't there 
before. I suppose what I am really saying, 
without wishing to sound arrogant about 
it, is that organisations like Save the 
Children are able to reach the parts that 
others can't as you yourself said. That 
makes a difference as to how we view the 
countries in which we are working. 
I
'Children are 
important social 
actors in their 
own right' 
■ What about the proposition that there 
can't be development without democ-
racy? There are those who argue the 
opposite — that if you try to set up a 
democratic system, it is more difficult to 
get the economy sorted out because of all 
the competing interests. 
— Well there can't be develop-
ment without human rights. I would 
certainly agree with that. But I think that is 
a slightly different proposition. The trouble 
is that when we talk about democracy, we 
are really talking about our own particular 
models. I don't think the case is proven 
that the Westminster form of governance, 
for instance, is necessarily the most ap-
propriate to the needs of Africa. I think 
that remains an open question. We would 
regard it as a bit insolent if Africans told us 
how we should run our democracy here. 
They have every right to feel somewhat 
insulted if we judge them only by their 
failure to operate our system. I think we 
should be a bit more open-minded about 
that. 
■ Finally, with specific reference to Save 
the Children, where do you see your 
organisation going as we approach the 
next millennium. 
— What we want to do is 
promote the role of children in develop-
ment. One of the reasons for this is to do 
with human rights. Our Charter is that of 
the rights of the child, which are now 
reflected in a UN Convention. This sets out 
the values that underpin all our work. For 
us, there is therefore an obligation to try to 
address the needs of children as part of 
securing their rights. But we think there 
are also quite substantial practical argu-
ments for doing that. Children are import-
ant social actors in their own right. In many 
countries, they make up more than half the 
population. They also, in many cases, 
contribute quite significantly to household 
economies. But their position is usually 
defined only in relation to adults so that 
one never really has any insight into their 
situation or role in the development 
process. We think that it is very important 
to try to redress that. There is a parallel 
here with the debate about the role of 
women. The role of children in the thinking 
of policy-makers today can be compared to 
that of women 20-25 years ago. It is now a 
commonplace that women are crucial to 
the development process and that policies 
and programmes should pay particular 
attention to their situation. What we are 
saying is that there is a comparable case to 
be made with regard to children. So one of 
the key things we want to do is to promote 
the children's agenda in development, as a 
genuine means of promoting more effect-
ive development programmes. wm 
Interview by Simon Homer 
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development 
Does aid have a future? 
by J.M. Perille and J.M. Trutat * 
The complexity and sensitivity of development aid is well known —in particular in 
less-favoured areas, where nature's balance is fragile and many constraints are in 
operation. Many theories about aid have been elaborated together with numerous 
strategies, but so far the anticipated effects have not materialised. Hence the 
questioning and debate. At a time when bilateral and multilateral aid bodies are 
reviewing their approach and involvement, we asked the Head of the European 
Commission Delegation in Mauritania to give us his analysis of the Community's 
approach — one which he has been seeking to implement 'in the field'. In 
particular, we sought his views on institutional development aid—an area where 
the European Union has only recently become involved. Here, the authors pose a 
fundamental question —just how effective is aid ? — drawing on experience of a project 
carried out in the Mauritanian Planning Ministry. 
Several decades of development 
aid, delivered in widely varying forms, have 
demonstrated the limits of our hopes and 
ambitions. Founding principles, innovative 
concepts, and human and financial re-
sources have all been applied to the 
problem but the results have been disap-
pointing. True, there have been some 
successes, but only time will tell whether 
they will prove to be lasting. However, 
despite its weaknesses, foreign aid clearly 
does make some contribution to develop-
ment in the countries at which it is 
targeted. What is being called into ques-
tion is not its usefulness but its effective-
ness. For this reason, it is now time to get 
to grips with the realities and work to 
achieve the achievable. We need to 
dispense with magic 'formulae', sweeping 
condemnations and received wisdom. 
What we need instead is a brand new 
approach — a radical rethink as to how we 
can tackle the situation. 
Critics fail to recognise 
realities 
Initially, traditional 'institutional' 
aid was given a rough ride by many in the 
* Jean-Michel Perille is Head of the EC Delegation 
in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Jean-Marie 
Trutat is an AEC Technical Assistant. 
development field. There was criticism of 
the size and complexity of macroeconomic 
intervention by major development insti-
tutions in their capacity as bilateral spon-
sors. The approach, moreover, seemed to 
conflict with the microeconomic view of 
development favoured, in particular, by 
the NGOs. 
Benefiting from more media co-
verage, with a commensurate increase in 
their political 'clout', these organisations 
find themselves beset by difficulties related 
to their very raison d'être. Their objectives 
entail operating flexibly and close to the 
ground, and hence within narrower con-
fines. Lacking an overview, or an in-
tegrated approach, they find themselves 
acting disparately and inconsistently. 
Moreover, their distance from decision-
making centres makes it difficult to 
evaluate their actions, whilst the absence 
of any system of reference considerably 
restricts the extent to which they can 
become involved. 
They also have a tendency to 
deviate from their initial vocation to 
become 'macro-organisations' subject to 
the same constraints as the so-called 
institutional sponsors. They do not, how-
ever, have the resources, know-how or 
historical 'memory' that can only be 
accumulated by decades of actual presence 
in the field. 
A second point is that national 
financial authorities have been the subject 
of justified but sterile criticism. As long as 
there is a lack of will within government to 
determine and enforce national policy, the 
authorities will be prone to apathy. Low 
salaries for civil servants mean low motiv-
ation and recent attempts at professiona-
lism remain limited. In defence of national 
administrations, it may be added that 
outside involvement tends to lead to 
substitution rather than complementarity. 
Declarations of intent are all very well, but 
they seldom hold their own against an 
objective interpretation of day-to-day 
realities. 
Structural adjustment, which has 
oft been decried, at least has in its favour 
the fact that it has brought about a return 
to the basic premise that development is 
only possible if the interested parties are 
involved in decision-making and in the 
organisation of their own evolution. Those 
receiving development aid, too long de-
prived of power, are now resuming a 
central role in the decision-making and 
operational process through the concept 
of 'internalisation'. This is an essential 
notion which tends to promote respons-
ibility and national action as opposed to 
fixed ideas imported from outside. 
We therefore need to compare 
shortcomings on the part of the authorities 
and to assist them, through positive 
actions, in regaining their position at the 
heart of those processes which condition 
development, be they interventionist or 
liberal in character. Without this readap-
tation, too many fundamental decisions 
will still be based on external analyses, too 
many decisive actions will be based on 
outside intervention, and too many stra-
tegic interactions will be stillborn, with the 
'centre' cut off from its 'periphery'. 
With these premises in mind, it is 
clear that a vital aspect of the develop-
ment process must be the institutional 
factor, the key element of which is, and will 
continue to be, the authorities. 
Shortcomings 
Through observing the difficul-
ties experienced by central financing au-
thorities in defining and implementing 
development strategies and policies, a 
number of donors have been seeking 
appropriate ways of lending support to 
them. This assistance is directed in a variety 
of ways and comes in various forms : 
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— expert outside help in analysing situ-
ations and proposing structural reorganis-
ation or functional improvements ; 
— external training to increase prof-
essionalism and technical expertise ; 
— financing of material requirements and/ 
or the support of operational costs ; 
— creation of back-up, coordinating, pro-
gramming or monitoring bodies; and, 
(perhaps above all), 
— technical assistance to facilitate im-
plementation. 
It would be exaggerating to 
suggest that such assistance has had no 
beneficial impact, but it would also be 
unrealistic to say that it has had any 
significant impact on the process of 'inter-
nalisation'. Results have fallen well short of 
expectations. Moreover, in a time of 
increased scarcity of resources, where 
national authorities have to put the aid 
they receive to best use, it is far from clear 
that this is the best way to obtain the 
desired results. Such support is, too often, 
offered in haste, the aim being, above all, 
to remedy human and material shortfalls. 
Virtually all of it has ended up as assistance 
involving substitution or compensation. 
Additionally, when the decision has been 
made to boost structural support, the 
result has been an increase in independent 
bodies operating on the fringe of or 
outwith national structures, so as to be less 
rigid or to escape dysfunction. Rarely 
coordinated or monitored, this support has 
made scant contribution to solving basic 
problems. Indeed, it has generated new 
problems through the lack of involvement 
which generally results from such attempts 
to paper over the cracks in the system. 
The principal difficulties, that 
everyone can see, are that administrative 
structures lack the capacity to think and 
act, owing to shortcomings in standards, 
technical knowledge, methods, organis-
ation and experience on the part of their 
staff. The institutional support mobilised 
to remedy the situation has self-evidently 
not had the desired result : it has not 
prompted 'readaptation' on the part of 
those for whom it was intended. 
Finding solutions by 
observing what is 
actually happening 
This brief overview leads us to 
propose other solutions more likely to have 
the desired effect but which are, first and 
foremost, more 'internalised'. Although 
one might have doubts, given the accumu-
lation of problems, about the feasibility of 
'changing course' and genuinely embark-
ing on a new direction, recent, yet 
different, approaches suggest that it is 
feasible. The proviso is that the received 
wisdom needs to be radically rethought 
and an innovative strategy proposed in the 
sphere of institutional development aid. It 
must be based on a methodology of 
structured support so as to enable the final 
recipients of aid to adapt their procedures. 
The success of a new approach depends 
largely on the responses to three basic 
questions : what should be done, why 
should it be done, and how should it be 
done? 
As regards what should be done, 
the issue is one of identification. In many 
cases, owing to a lack of time, the actual 
problem is not even mentioned. In fact, 
state structures, which depend on both 
internal and external policy (the donors' 
own aims), are unable to meet the 
challenge. The diagnosis must therefore be 
in terms of remedying shortcomings in 
know-how and ability in the principal areas 
under consideration : design/formulation, 
organisation/management, support/ 
maintenance, monitoring/ assessment, etc. 
The question 'why should it be 
done' relates to the aim and will obviously 
involve justification. All those involved 
must clearly understand that they must 
move away from dependency towards 
taking a leading role. Priority must go to 
promoting independent ability for reflec-
tion and negotiation, towards achieving 
quality in terms of both productivity and 
time management, and to consolidating 
skills, initiative and a sense of responsibility 
on the part of those representing the 
'state' in the widest sense. 
As to how should it be done, this 
will involve giving support in real terms. It 
must be based on the essential idea of 
'getting things done' using a functional 
'planning department' strategy which 
precludes any notions of substitution or 
compensation. This entails focusing sup-
port on the outcome or final 'product' 
rather than on purchases and consumables 
regarded as necessary to obtain the 
product. It must be geared to making 
existing structures work : improvement 
and consolidation rather than radical and 
wholesale change. 
The concept is designed to rep-
lace the approach of traditional technical 
assistance which concentrates on substi-
tution. The aim of the support will be to 
guide processes of intemalisation and 
readaptation by applying a kind of 'ap-
prenticeship' strategy to the methods and 
techniques of the recipients. The key 
element is to invest in the people one has 
by appointing them, in the first instance, to 
the positions they are able to occupy. The 
next stage is to put the people one needs 
into the positions that need to be filled. 
This can only happen through rational and 
dynamic management of human resour-
ces, and it will take a considerable amount 
of time to implement. 
To summarise, the intention is to 
demonstrate that the renewal of the 
'institutional support' approach should 
fundamentally consist of intervention 
aimed at achieving tangible results, 
summed up in the phrase 'getting things 
done'. The goal is to make the operators 
internalise policy and adopt procedures 
within their own structures, basing their 
actions on transparency, exchanges of 
views and heightened awareness. 
Support for self-
development 
The aim of this type of support is 
to enable a country's authorities to in-
crease their own ability to determine and 
manage their evolution, until they have 
the financial means to take over their 
responsibilities and have been able to carry 
out the often essential task of reorganising 
the public service. Concrete support can, 
therefore, only be in the form of specific 
and short-term external measures. In order 
to be consistent and effective, it goes 
without saying that such a policy requires 
not only the establishment of reference 
guidelines but also the definition of an 
action programme specifying content, 
deadlines, monitoring measures and 
means of finance. 
In principle, greater consider-
ation must be given to the authorities' 
ability to absorb the new development/ 
coordination burden resulting from the 
evolution of their tasks. The additional 
costs generated by the improvements 
which are being sought must also figure in 
the equation. As far as guidance is con-
cerned, in order to consolidate the impact 
and forestall possible dysfunction, the 
support must be provided within a coordi-
nated framework, with the recipient 
country taking the initiative and its part-
ners participating only in follow-up 
schemes and evaluation. In terms of 
support, preference should go to aspects 
which favour the development of national 
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'know-how' and 'capability'. Initial inter-
vention should involve the powerful finan-
cial authorities with a view to guaran-
teeing improved regulation of the 
economy, a more consistent focus on 
development and better control of pro-
jects. 
Support for self-
enhancement 
In operational terms, the use of a 
functional 'planning department' strategy 
(i.e. achieving the goal, whether it is 
delivery of a service or acquisition of a 
product), will result in the recipient assum-
ing responsibility for both quality and 
output at the production level. The re-
cipient would have the incentive of having 
to meet his commitments so as to continue 
receiving institutional aid. In the back of 
the mind, there would be the prospect of 
an interruption to the flow of operating 
capital should there be a drop in produc-
tion, since the resources would be payable 
in stages as the plan evolves. Unlike the 
current situation, the organisation would 
be free, once its costs had been covered, to 
allocate resources as it saw fit. Other than 
maintaining the obligation to submit 
regular accounts, donor control would be 
removed. Moreover, on the basis of the 
multiannual plan set up, the organisation 
would, in agreement with its sleeping 
partner (the donor), make provision for 
the production of an annual work pro-
gramme. This would identify needs, allow 
for account to be taken of new develop-
ments and permit any reorientation that 
might be necessary. Finally, an indepen-
dent external assessment should be carried 
out half way through the programme in 
order to redefine targets for the allocation 
of resources or make corrective adjust-
ments in deployment. This would be 
designed to tackle any drift away from the 
original goal or indeed a complete break-
down in operations. At the end of the 
project, there would be a review from 
which it should be possible to assess 
whether or not it is worthwhile continu-
ing. 
Guiding self-organisation 
This would take place through 
technical assistance in the field for the 
redefined tasks and would include an 
obligation to achieve a result. Within this 
context, the assistance would have to 
contribute : 
— to improving the donor/authority inter-
face in terms of information and advice ; 
— to the intemalisation of procedures by 
the recipient institutions, the latter being 
enabled to take on these responsibilities 
thanks to study and development projects 
using a combined organisational and 
procedural approach ; 
— to the enhancement of human re-
sources in terms of both competence and 
responsibility, through individual and col-
lective 'training/action' ; 
The innovative 'training/action' 
approach involves two elements : training 
officials in the 'know-how' and 'capabi-
lities' required by their positions within 
their organisation and practical advice, 
when they are actually performing their 
tasks. The latter would entail alternating 
individual and collective 'apprenticeship' 
actions designed to achieve progressive 
development and would be agreed with 
the head of the organisation in question on 
the basis of specific cases. 
'Training/action' aims to develop 
both 'vocational know-how' (formulation 
and identification, follow-up and assess-
ment techniques, input and processing 
methods) and 'behavioural competence' in 
terms of communication, encouragement 
and negotiation. 
The principle underlying this ap-
proach should favour a particular type of 
technical assistance, with a trainer (just like 
one for a sports team) acting both as 
individual coach and team leader, who is 
capable of making officials more profes-
sional and responsible. Implicit from the 
outset in such an approach is a commit-
ment to achieving the recipients' object-
ives. 
It would appear that this involves 
a need for reorienting technical assistance 
profiles. Such assistance should henceforth 
be: 
— oriented, above all, towards strategic 
considerations, procedural and structural 
organisation and practical advice; 
— more diversified in terms of horizontal 
skills in order to cover a more diverse range 
of activity (through active project studies 
and development which can be usefully 
applied to the organisations) ; 
— more geared towards effective transfer 
of 'know-how' and 'capabilities' based on 
apprenticeships in the various positions 
and services ; 
— better directed in terms of its public 
profile, maturity and adaptability, in order 
to establish its credibility. 
Finally, the management of this 
'new' form of technical assistance requires : 
— more selective recruitment and closer 
supervision of results obtained ; 
— improved initial definition of the re-
lationship with the beneficiary authorities 
and donor representatives in situ (such as 
the EC Delegation) ; 
— a genuine policy to establish, assess and 
redirect the approach ; 
— more flexible and far-sighted manage-
ment. 
By way of conclusion, the central 
idea in this innovative approach is to help 
countries help themselves. To achieve this, 
it is not enough to renew the framework 
or to redistribute roles : the rules and the 
approach must also be modified. 
The organisational effect will be 
all the greater if thought precedes action, if 
aims take reality into account, if objectives 
take constraints into consideration, if 
operators are motivated and if decision-
makers assume their responsibilities. 
The analysis and proposals set 
forth here are the result of an experiment 
currently being carried out at the Maurit-
anian Planning Ministry. Although not 
definitive, initial mid-term results are 
sufficiently conclusive to offer the con-
ceptual bases underlying the approach and 
which have guided implementation of the 
steps we propose to examine in greater 
depth within the context of wider and 
more generalised 'institution building'. ■■ 
J.M.P. and J.M.T. 
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Africa 
by Aida Opuku-Mensah Brako* 
'While the First World races into 
the information age on the inform-
ation superhighways,' says a 
recent report for the United 
Nations, 'nearly four billion of the 
world's five billion people still lack 
the most basic access to simple 
telecommunications.' Gemini News 
Service reports on African attempts 
to catch up. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has about the 
same number of phones as Tokyo and is in 
danger of being left even further behind as 
the industrialised world cruises into the 
information superhighway. Even though 
the role of telecommunications has often 
been left out of the development debate, 
studies by the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU) and the World Bank 
show a direct link between telecommuni-
cations and economic growth. 
LeonardSubulwa, Zambia's Min-
ister for the Western Province, points out 
that to communicate with officials in his 
constituency, 'I have to drive 250 kilomet-
res because the country's telecommuni-
cations network does not serve this dis-
trict.' 
A World Bank study in Uganda in 
1983 showed that 2000 local government 
officials made 40 000 trips a year to handle 
administrative matters that could have 
been dealt with by mail or telephone if 
these services had been available. The 
study estimated that about 250 person-
years of government time were wasted 
every year, at a cost of some $600 000. 12 
years later, the situation is no better. 
Inadequate telecommunications services in 
Uganda still translate into high costs in 
time and transport. 
Lack of coherent 
strategy 
Africa's telecommunications in-
stitutions have failed to develop coherent 
strategies. This is partly because PAN-
AFTEL, the continental body created by 
the ITU, has been headquartered in Zaire 
— a country that has been in virtual 
anarchy for years. Furthermore, decades of 
under-investment have caused the de-
terioration of existing systems, which, in 
any case, are hardly available outside 
towns. 
Most national telecom organis-
ations are running at a loss. Employees 
sometimes ask for bribes to connect lines 
rather than instituting a proper billing 
system. The Swedish Embassy in Lusaka 
recently received an itemised bill totalling 
17 million kwacha, including a four-hour-
call to London on an unconnected line I 
Almost all equipment is imported 
and technical assistance is uncoordinated. 
The effect, says Zambian télécoms en-
gineer Edwin Hanamwinga, is networks 
with a mish-mash of incompatible equip-
ment. He continues: 'Our international 
network is made up of Swedish and 
Japanese systems whilst our transit centres 
have French and Japanese. Our rural areas 
have Norwegian crossbar systems. How-
ever, you cannot interface either the 
international or transit systems with the 
rural ones. The equipment is not com-
plementary.' 
The failure of telecommuni-
cations monopolies to meet even basic 
needs has resulted in a huge unmet 
demand for telephones. Lusaka resident, 
Irene Phiri, has a child with cerebral palsy 
and an invalid mother, both of whom 
occasionally need emergency medical 
treatment. Yet she has been unable to get 
a phone and so has to make frequent trips 
home during office hours. 'I've applied for 
a telephone since 1991,' she says. 'When-
ever I chase up my application I'm told : 
'Well madam, there are people living in 
The Stock Market in London 
Europe is racing into the information 
age but Africa risks being left behind 
* Southern Africa regional director at the Panos 
Institute in London. Article from the Gemini News 
Service, 9 White Lion Street, London, N1 9PD. a c ρ 
your area who have been waiting for a 
phone since 1977. So why are you so 
impatient ?" 
The situation is repeated else-
where in Africa. Ghanaian businessman 
Kwabena Akunnor says his business as-
sociates have no phones, so he is forced to 
drive round to their offices in Accra on the 
off-chance that they will be there. 
To the World Bank, the root of 
the problem is clear : state monopoly. And 
its answer is equally clear: privatisation. 
Already, the supply of handsets by private 
companies has been introduced in many 
countries on the continent. The Bank is the 
largest multilateral financier of telecom-
munications projects in Africa, and has 
made reforms and restructuring of the 
sector a condition for lending. 'Telecom-
munications is increasingly seen as a vital 
component of the structural adjustment 
process,' says the Bank. 'Efficient inform-
ation flows are essential to the success of 
efforts to liberalise and consequently to 
expand.' 
Restructuring 
Restructuring includes separation 
of the postal and telecommunications 
services and their conversion into in-
dependent business entities. For instance, 
Ghana's former Posts and Telecommuni-
cations Corporation is now two organis-
ations, Ghana Posts and Ghana Telecoms. 
But though restructuring is 
geared towards enhancing competition, 
efficiency and attracting foreign invest-
ment, it is proving a turbulent process. For 
a start, there is no guarantee that foreign 
investment will increase because Africans 
are competing with Asia, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. The continent's debt 
burden discourages capital flow, and in any 
case, most African states have weak, or 
non-existent, capital markets. In addition, 
restructuring needs to be supervised by an 
independent body capable of developing 
effective regulatory mechanisms. Many 
countries are still grappling to establish 
such a regulatory framework, which re-
quires a delicate balance of technical, 
economic and legal factors. But multi-
disciplinary expertise is exactly what Africa 
lacks. \WU A.o-M.B. 
Caribbean beaches 
The sands of time are running out 
by Nancy McGuire* 
The sandy beaches of the Eastern 
Caribbean have always been regarded as a 
free and limitless resource. Not any more. 
Governments, reports Gemini News Service, 
are realising that sand-mining is a major 
cause of erosion. 
Caribbean beaches still deliver 
the sun and sea promised in the tourist 
brochures, but they can no longer always 
boast of endless sand. Beaches are being 
eroded by natural processes and human 
activities. The phenomenon has been 
ignored by governments — falsely con-
fident of a resource that would never run 
out — but now severe damage has 
occurred, politically unpopular decisions 
are required and huge costs look likely. 
A decade ago, Telescope Point on 
Grenada's east coast was a beautiful 
beach. It has been virtually destroyed. 
Heavy sand mining, indiscriminate removal 
of mangroves, strong north-east trade 
* Freelance journalist living in Grenada. 
winds and a jetty expansion which da-
maged the reef have done the job. What 
remains is uprooted coconut trees, mud 
and a narrow strip of sand. Monitoring 
shows that the beach is eroding by 
between three and four metres a year. 
Destruction of the beach has 
disrupted the habitat of snails, crabs and 
other creatures, and scientists warn that 
this will have a long-term effect on the 
marine food chain. Telescope was once a 
nesting ground for leatherback turtles. The 
largest of the turtle family and now an 
endangered species, leatherbacks used to 
return to the place of their birth to nest in 
the sand. They no longer do so. 
Beaches are being eroded by natural 
processes and human activities 
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About 85% of sand for use in 
Grenada's construction industry is taken 
from the island's beaches. There is no 
monitoring, and regulations controlling 
which beaches are open for mining are 
often ignored by residents and the author-
ities. 
Concrete is preferred to wood all 
over the region because of its resistance to 
weather and termites. Traditionally, priv-
ate citizens have regarded beach sand as 
freely available for house construction, but 
in terms of quantity, governments have 
often been the biggest culprits in removing 
sand for public works projects and filtration 
systems. 
Counter-measures are not always 
appropriate. Valerie Isaac of the natural 
resources management unit of the Or-
ganisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) recalls a workshop in St Vincent at 
which the government's director of plan-
ning indicated that all beaches would be 
closed to sand mining. The result, she says, 
'was a rush on the beaches — people were 
stockpiling like crazy.' 
Tackling the problem 
St Vincent has now constructed 
facilities to handle imported sand from 
Guyana, Dominica and other places. Local 
sand is taken from a river and also made 
from pumice, a light volcanic rock. Such 
attempts to tackle the problem are part of 
a response to recommendations by 
COSALC (Coast and Beach Stability in the 
Lesser Antilles) working with the OECS. 
COSALC was founded by UNESCO in 1985 
after erosion in the Eastern Caribbean had 
become visibly more serious. It has drawn 
up recommendations for coastal zone 
regulations, which several countries have 
found helpful. The British Virgin Islands 
used the regulations to introduce man-
grove management, as the extensive 
mangrove root systems play an important 
part in marine life and in the sustainability 
of beaches and rivers. 
Most sand in the British Virgins is 
obtained from offshore dredging. Some 
countries have been slower in finding 
alternatives. The OECS estimates that 
regionally, 16% of sand consumed is 
imported, and 20% is taken from local 
beaches. Restricting removal of beach sand 
is unpopular because alternatives such as 
crushed stone from quarries cost money. 
But in 1992, Montserrat introduced strin-
gent regulations, closing all beaches to 
sand mining. 
Beaches are continually moni-
tored, and barriers control vehicle access. 
Construction with quarry sand required 
remedial work on some new buildings but 
the government has kept all but one beach 
closed to sand mining, and gives training 
on efficient ways of using quarry sand and 
avoiding siltation. 
In St Lucia, sand for government 
projects is imported from Trinidad and 
even from Canada. Sand dredged from 
offshore is also used, and river mouths are 
open at certain times of year to local 
villagers. Pumice is extracted from private 
mines and crushed. 
Other causes 
Beach mining is not the only 
culprit. Other human causes of erosion 
include construction of port facilities that 
interfere with the movement of water, 
and pollution. Tropical storms and the 
endless pounding waves have brought 
about significant long-term changes to the 
coastlines of the Lesser Antilles. Sea 
defences are expensive and can create new 
forms of erosion. 
Manufacturing bricks in Grenada 
Concrete is preferred to wood all over 
the region because of its resistance to 
weather and termites 
Eastern Caribbean governments 
are gradually realising that halting erosion 
and rebuilding beaches are complicated 
and costly challenges. Dr Gillian Cambers, 
COSALC's programme coordinator based 
at the University of Puerto Rico, who has 
studied beaches for several years, told 
participants at a recent workshop in 
Grenada that when sewage controls are 
inadequate, algae competes with coral 
reefs for light, and ultimately grow over 
the corals. 'If the reef is under stress from 
pollution such as excessive siltation,' she 
said, 'the complex reef ecosystem will be 
less healthy and produce less sand. In turn, 
the beach will suffer because the supply of 
sediment is reduced or cut off.' She stressed 
that many factors contribute to the 
disappearance of beaches in the Eastern 
Caribbean. 'It is not always just waves. It's 
not necessarily sand mining. It's not 
necessarily only sea-level rise. We also have 
to look at other factors such as pollution. 
It's like anything to do with the environ-
ment : there's no simple cause and effect. 
Its causes and effects', she emphasised. ■■ 
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unknown as Belize is that this makes it very 
easy to keep a few surprises in reserve. 
Belize is certainly not stinting in its charms. 
To the traveller, this continental country 
feels like an island or an archipelago. 
Anyone preparing to land at Belize City 
Airport is first of all struck by the coral reef, 
which is the second largest in the world and 
which lines the entire coastline, forming a 
number of islands and myriad islets. He will 
have constantly before his eyes the spec-
tacle of a country which always has associ-
ations of sand and coral lapped by water 
which is so clear that the shadows of 
aeroplane wings are seen on the seabed. 
Belize reveals itself in a succession of 
surprises. 
Covering 22 000 square kilomet-
res, Belize is a small country but its 
population of 200 000 gives it quite 
another dimension. It is easy to find on the 
map, just below the Yucatán Peninsula on 
the eastern coast of Central America. It is 
separated from Mexico in the North by the 
Rio Hondo, from which it got its earlier 
name of British Honduras. Guatemala is 
situated to the west and is separated by a 
straight line delineated by colonial sur-
veyors. To the east, there is the Caribbean. 
Belize City is on the coast and legend has it 
that it is floating on the bottles of rum and 
logs of mahogany which are the reasons 
for its foundation. With 60 000 inhab-
itants, it is by far the largest built-up area in 
the country — essentially a very pretty 
small town with its feet in the water. It 
would not be going too far to call it a 
tropical Venice. And yet it is not the 
capital. 
Nature's contribution 
Tiny Belmopan has this privilege. 
It is certainly one of the smallest capitals in 
the world. Thirty-five years after its 
foundation, it still has fewer than 5000 
inhabitants. Situated 80 kilometres from 
Belize City in the foothills of the Mayas 
mountains, it is a garden city made up of 
official buildings. Those who work there, 
that is to say ministers and top civil 
servants, continue to live in Belize City or in 
some other colonial town such as the 
magnificent San Ignacio. Foreign diplomats 
have not chosen to settle in the small 
capital, apart from the British. The decision 
to move the capital was taken in the wake 
of Hurricane 'Jeannette' which ravaged 
Belize City and resulted in almost 300 
deaths in 1955. The coastal town was held 
to be too vulnerable to tidal waves. In 
1931, it suffered an even worse disaster in 
which 1000 people died. 
Belize has a good road system. 
The network is composed of four main 
routes which take in all the important 
centres and construction of which is still 
supported by aid from the European 
Union. The question which quickly occurs 
to anyone who is starting to get to know 
this country is how can a territory, which is 
almost the same size as Belgium, be 
effectively occupied by just one sixtieth of 
the population of the latter. It is not an 
uncultivated country and the vast ex-
panses of forest form a coherent geogra-
phical framework. The forest and Belize's 
wider environment, ranging from jaguars 
to rare ants, are a source of pride to the 
Belizeans. The appetite of the foreign 
companies engaged in exploiting the 
forests, especially from Malaysia, is, on the 
other hand, a source of concern for many 
of the inhabitants. Governments have long 
^ 
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resisted encroachments of this kind but 
there are signs that things are changing. 
With its coral reef, Belize is also a re-
nowned location for diving. Recent ar-
chaeological discoveries are increasingly 
turning it into one of the most important 
centres of Maya civilisation, if not the most 
important. 
Other pleasant surprises offered 
by Belize are the well-established de-
mocratic system (elsewhere in the region, 
democracy is taking its first, halting steps), 
the relative economic prosperity, the good 
road infrastructure (relatively speaking) 
and the very good state of the telecom-
munications service, intensive use being 
made of portable telephones. Per capita 
income was $2000 in 1993, and the figure 
has remained stable in real terms in recent 
years. Economic growth has averaged 3% 
to A%per annum over the past three years. 
In 1993, it was 3.8%, down from 5.3% in 
1992, while inflation runs at about 1.5% — 
not a bad performance at a time of global 
recession. During the 1980s, growth rates 
in excess of 10% were recorded, with 
inflation averaging 2.5%. There are also 
other favourable indicators: an average 
life expectancy of 69.5 years, average 
school attendance of 4.6 years (1990 
figure) and a 95% literacy rate. Belize 
comes 82nd (out of 173 countries) in the 
UNDP's Human Development Index. 
A real country with real 
problems 
The ongoing dispute with 
Guatemala, which one cannot avoid hear-
ing about, soon shows the visitor, once he 
has finished marvelling at the splendours 
which first attract his attention, that Belize 
is a country like any other, with similar 
problems. This may perhaps come as the 
biggest surprise to those expecting a 'fairy-
tale' country. At the moment, the main 
causes of concern stem from economic 
difficulties which lie at the root of the 
relatively high unemployment rate, espe-
cially in Belize City. The election of June 
1993 saw the United Democratic Party 
(UDP) return to power, taking over the 
reins of government from the People's 
United Party (PUP). The incoming Prime 
Minister, Manuel Esquivei took the deci-
sion to support the Belize dollar, come 
what may. Having been aligned with the 
US dollar for some twenty years, the local 
currency is strong and is not subject to the 
kind of buffeting experienced by other 
Central and South American currencies. For 
ten years, the exchange rate has been 
maintained at B$2 = US$1 although there 
has been a depreciation of about 10% 
against the stronger European currencies 
which has caused some difficulties. Regard-
ing the control of exchange rates, the 
arrangements that exist between Belize's 
Central Bank and the commercial banks are 
fairly representative of the pragmatic spirit 
which prevails. Officially, the Central Bank 
has authority in monetary affairs, but in 
actual practice it is the commercial banks 
which operate the policy, using the market 
as a reference point. 
To take action against a high 
level of external and internal debt and a 
chronic balance of trade deficit, Prime 
Minister Esquivei decided to adopt a policy 
of restraint which provoked public dis-
content. The government ascribes respons-
ibility for the economic problems to the 
over-optimistic forecasts of the previous 
administration which, it says, overesti-
mated income and underestimated ex-
penditure. The opposition, for its part, 
criticises 'ill-considered' promises made by 
the current team during the elections. This 
is a claim backed by a number of other 
commentators. 
Stuart Khrone, a journalist and a 
director of Great Belize Productions, which 
runs a private television channel offering 
news and reports, is stinging in his criticism 
of the 'U-turns' of those in power. 
Belmopan, the tiny capital 
Mainly occupied by official buildings 
An economy 'high' on 
oranges 
The Prime Minister is keen on less 
government involvement in the economy, 
a policy first adopted by his predecessor 
who sold off the Banana Control Board and 
Belize Telecommunications Limited and 
partially privatised Belize Electricity Lim-
ited. The state currently controls only the 
major public authorities and employs 
14.5% of the workforce. 
Belize's economy is based essen-
tially on fishing (mainly lobsters), and 
agricultural production, especially of citrus 
fruits, bananas and sugar. The decision to 
diversify agriculture in favour of citrus 
production was taken in the 1980s by the 
first Esquivei government. The central 
region of the country (Orange Walk), 
which was chosen for the experiment, is 
currently planted, as far as the eye can see, 
with citrus fruit trees of all kinds, but with 
orange trees predominating. Some people 
have expressed concern that this policy has 
Teenager at work 
A real country with real problems increased US influence. When the decision 
to focus on citrus products was made, Coca 
Cola purchased an option on 350 000 
hectares, and the country benefited from 
an $80m investment by the company. 
Citrus production gave a real fillip 
to the country's economy. At first, the 
sector was largely operated by small 
producers, but the latifundia are now 
becoming increasingly dominant. Belize 
exports most of its citrus fruit to the United 
States in the form of concentrates. America 
is a useful market, as these products enjoy 
the benefits of exemption from import 
duty under the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) instituted several years ago by the 
Reagan administration. 
Belize has approved a large 
number of investments in the agriculture 
sector over the past few years, especially in 
banana production. The country has made 
full use of the provisions of the Lomé 
Convention allowing free access of many 
Belizean products to the European market, 
in addition to penetrating the American 
market in a number of areas. But there are 
constraints. Export markets for agricultural 
products are generally governed by quotas 
Lobster fishing boats in Haulover Creek, 
Belize City 
(this is the case for bananas, sugar, citrus 
fruits) and for practical reasons (the local 
market is too small) most of the output has 
to be exported. 
The new arrangements 
governing banana imports into the EU 
have also hit the country hard. Paradoxi-
cally, much of the investment in this sector 
has been made with assistance either from 
the Union, through the EDF and the 
European Investment Bank, or from the 
UK. With a quota of 40 000 tonnes in the 
EU, a figure which is to be increased 
slightly, Belize is forced to limit its produc-
tion, which currently amounts to 90 000t, 
although capacity is much higher than this. 
Clearly, the economy suffers from a prob-
lem of scale. Belize's small size and 
population compel it to concentrate on a 
small number of products, making it very 
vulnerable to external factors. Another 
example of the fragile nature of the 
position is provided by the export of fabrics 
Transporting sugar cane to the factory 
For a long time, the lynchpin of the 
economy 
to the USA. This market has collapsed as a 
result of competition from Asian products. 
This has led to renewed agricultural 
diversification in favour of fruits such as 
papaya, and rice. 
Virgin territory 
Belize's economy has a number 
of 'virgin' areas which have not yet been 
brought on stream. Despite its outstanding 
beauty, the country sees few visitors other 
than diving enthusiasts, a few researchers 
who are interested in Mayan sites and an 
even smaller number of so-called ecotour-
ists. Indeed, many Mayan sites are still 
completely unexplored. Those that have 
been opened up attract groups coming 
mainly from North America and Europe. 
However, politicians and cultural author-
ities are very cautious about the restor-
ation of structures. They are inclined to 
favour limiting restoration to a few facades 
of monuments and a few sites, while public 
access will be strictly limited. In most cases, 
the absence of facilities and access routes is 
expected to deter tourists, allowing re-
searchers to continue their work in peace. 
To ecotourists, Belize can offer a 
vast expanse of virgin forest which is rich in 
species of rare trees and is intersected by 
slow-moving rivers broken up by waterfalls 
and inhabited by a very varied fauna. The 
Keys (islands) are just as suitable for lazing 
around as the Caribbean countries and you 
do not have to be a diver to appreciate the 
shallow emerald-green water lapping 
against the shelves formed by the coral 
reef. But the infrastructure does not yet 
match nature's splendours. Outside the 
larger Keys, where the infrastructure has 
been developing very rapidly, there is a 
shortage of hotel rooms and many of those 
that are available leave a lot be desired in 
comfort terms. This is clearly something 
that needs to be rectified. Most of the 
roads are in a good condition and internal 
air links are provided by small and ap-
parently well-maintained private aircraft 
offering competitive prices. By contrast, 
international air links are infrequent and 
they often entail inconvenient detours and 
stopovers. Because of the coral reef, the 
sea is not deep, and this make it difficult to 
deal with large cargo vessels. This has a 
negative effect on trade (as well as country report — Belize 
tourism). For example, bananas have to be 
taken to deep-water ports in Honduras for 
transshipment — with all that this entails 
in terms of transport and storage costs. 
Fishing is underexploited and is 
mainly concentrated within the passage 
bounded by the reef. Expensive equipment 
and well-trained workers would be 
needed to exploit the fishing resources 
beyond this limit. A number of joint-
venture projects with foreign shipowners 
are currently being studied. As regards 
forestry resources, it is mainly primary 
products, such as boards, that are being 
produced. Production of semifinished pro-
ducts such as plywood or finished items 
such as furniture is very limited. On the 
energy side, hydroelectricity could be a 
significant power source and the govern-
ment is facing strong criticism for having 
abandoned a project in this sector which 
had been set up by the previous adminis-
Tourism : still virgin territory 
The Keys, which are just as good for 
lazing around as the Caribbean islands 
tration. Oil prospecting has not yielded 
much, but in a country which is marked by 
the beauty and purity of its natural 
resources, it is difficult to say whether this is 
a good thing or not. 
'Belize breeze': a lot less 
benign than it sounds 
There is certainly no cause for 
rejoicing over the fact that there were 
1500 drug-related crimes in 1994 alone, 
according to statistics released by the legal 
authorities. Even if most of these cases 
involved no bloodshed, the figure is 
Road building 
The roads are frequently in good 
condition, but there is a lack of 
connections to other countries 
worryingly high for a country of only 
200 000 inhabitants. All the leading per-
sonalities whom The Courier interviewed 
saw drugs and the insecurity engendered 
by them as the curse of the country. Press 
reports are revealing. Not a day passes 
without stories from the 'front' in this 
undeclared war between the forces of law 
and order and the traffickers. Convers-
ations are peppered with names of gang 
leaders who claim to be untouchable. 
Belize may be small but the police raids 
described in the press sometimes sound like 
only slightly scaled-down versions of oper-
ations from Apocalypse Now. In January, a 
night-time air and sea operation was 
carried out jointly by the Crime Squad of 
the Belize Police, the Belize Defence Forces, 
the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
and British forces. Helicopters and boats all 
converged on an estate where no less than 
650 kilogrammes of cocaine was dis-
covered. The wholesale value of this huge 
haul was estimated at $40 million. Also 
seized were chemicals used to camouflage 
the smell of the drug, weapons and 
technical equipment. The owner of the 
estate had judiciously decided to leave 
Belize and a follow-up operation involving 
four countries was required. The announ-
cement in the same article, of a seizure of 
120 kilogrammes of cocaine, in the posses-
sion of Belizeans, sounds insignificant by 
comparison. Drug trafficking and produc-
tion are increasing, as is consumption. The 
need to use so many resources to track 
down so few offenders reveals the scale of 
the challenge. For the traffickers, a state of 
lawlessness is desirable — for the author-
ities, it is very costly to prevent. In the areas 
close to the Mexican border, stories are 
told of executions having been ordered, 
with detailed corroboration. The high 
quality of the roads, in this region in 
particular, makes them suitable for the 
landing of small aircraft. Aware of this, the 
British forces placed stakes strategically 
along the roads prior to their departure. 
Removing them became a popular pastime 
of the 'small fry' in the drugs trade, and the 
stakes have all now disappeared. 
In 1983, at the instigation the 
United States DEA, a massive programme 
was launched involving the destruction of 
marijuana plantations using herbicides 
(paraquat). Unfortunately such operations 
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cultivated as a single crop and other 
products are destroyed at the same time. 
The result of the programme was that 
honest farmers also suffered losses al-
though hundreds of traffickers were ar-
rested . It was at about this time that Belize 
became Latin America's third largest pro-
ducer of marijuana. The 'Belize breeze' 
label is said to be very much in demand 
among 'connoisseurs'. 
Small and large-scale drug-re-
lated crime is on the increase and there are 
some unexpected alliances in this war 
between the State and the traffickers. One 
such example is the fact that one of the 
country's senior politicians also acts as 
lawyer to a number of major traffickers 
who currently are in prison. It should also 
be understood that marijuana cultivation is 
something of a smokescreen. The really big 
drug money comes from cocaine dealing, 
large quantities of which have been passed 
on from Belize to other countries over the 
last decade. Though the insecurity gene-
rated by drugs is regarded as a curse, many 
people accept that the circulation of large 
amounts of 'dirty' money helps the count-
ry's economy. This is thought to be the 
main reason for the prosperity of the area 
close to the Mexican border. 
Ethnic diversity: 
advantages and 
disadvantages 
Belize's multicultural society in-
cludes Creoles (people of black and white 
ancestry), Mayas, people of mixed Indian 
and white ancestry, Garifuna (black In-
dians) and Mennonites, who are of Euro-
pean origin and are members of a Christian 
sect living in a small community in the 
mountains. Chinese, Arabs and people of 
other nationalities should also be added to 
this fabric and the result is a wide variety of 
hues and textures. The last people to 
arrive, considerably upsetting the ethnic 
balance in the process, were the refugees 
from El Salvador and Guatemala. Several 
thousand Salvadoreans fled to Belize 
during the civil war in their country, while 
Guatemalans are still arriving, joining 
60 000 of their compatriots (almost a third 
of the total population) already in the 
country. 60% of the population is Catholic 
and 30% adhere to one or other of the 
Protestant denominations. The remaining 
10% include Bahai's, Muslims, Buddhists 
and others. It is a minor miracle, and 
another of Belize's surprises, that despite a 
certain degree of friction, which is in-
evitable, there is no implacable rivalry 
between the religious communities, and 
certainly no hatred. The reason for this is 
probably that the usual victims in such 
situations of racial mixing, that is to say the 
Amerindians and former slaves, became 
literate very early this century and have 
been able to acquire a certain social status. 
The welcome extended to recent 
refugees can only be explained by re-
ference to the hospitality and openness of 
spirit of this society, where people have 
few 'hangups'. Their contribution to the 
agricultural workforce, and especially to 
that part of it involved in growing citrus 
fruits, has proved very useful. On the other 
hand, these people are in a weak position. 
Wage reductions in the citrus fruit — and 
construction — sectors could prove to be a 
source of discord. The trade unions ne-
gotiate with employers on their behalf but 
take care not to highlight their position for 
fear of arousing hostility. Mainly based in 
the areas close to Guatemala and Mexico, 
the immigrants are becoming better in-
tegrated all the time. There are concerns 
about the number of immigrants involved 
Frontier region between Belize and 
Mexico. In the background there is a 
Mexican military camp 
An area in which drug traffickers are 
treated as virtual outlaws 
in drug trafficking but here, too, there is no 
sign of the development of a xenophobic 
mania. Most Belizeans continue to believe 
that 'ethnic harmony' is not under threat. 
It is at a political level that problems may 
arise. Which side will the immigrants or 
Belizeans of Guatemalan origin take, if 
positions harden in the trial of diplomatic 
strength over the location of the frontier 
between the two countries ? The opening 
of a Guatemalan consulate close to the 
frontier, in the areas inhabited by a large 
number of citizens of that country, points 
to a desire to look after their interests. But 
many Belizeans say that they are not 
fooled by this apparent willingness to treat 
the matter on a diplomatic level. 
Another good sign is the increas-
ing degree of mixing among ethnic groups, 
both through marriage and in housing. A 
relatively short time ago, people originat-
ing from Mexico generally lived in the areas 
of Corozal and Orange Walk, Black and 
Mayan Indians occupied the South, while 
Creoles tended to be concentrated in 
Belize City. This division is still marked, but 
communication facilities and the melting 
pot created by state education have 
encouraged mixed marriages on the one 
hand and internal migration on the other. 
The claims made by Guatemala 
have paradoxically created an opportunity 
for Belize, by encouraging integration. The 
aggression shown by Belize's western 
neighbour during the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s seems to have led to greater 
national cohesion and even to a pride in 
being Belizean, helping to inculcate a 
desire for independence. M Hégei Goutier 
"t 
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Although Belize's history is similar 
to that of several countries in 
Central America and the Caribbean, 
it is also full of the unexpected. The 
country gained its independence 
on 21 September 1981, remaining a 
member of the Commonwealth 
with the Queen as Head of State. It 
has a bicameral Parliament. The 
Senate's members are appointed 
by the government or co-opted by 
MPs, with a guarantee that the 
opposition will be represented. The 
lower house is dominated by two 
parties which have traditionally 
alternated in power. This democ-
ratic interplay began well before indepen-
dence. British forces remained in Belize until 
September last year, when the last units 
finally left the country. This withdrawal was 
accompanied by a promise that forces 
would be redeployed in the event of a 
threat to the sovereignty of Belize. Their 
presence had constituted a guarantee in this 
troubled area, particularly vis-à-vis 
Guatemala which has always held that it 
had been deprived of territory in order to 
create the state of Belize. The British 
presence was also a source of income 
estimated at approximately 4% of GDP. 
Independent in a colonial 
world 
Let us go back in time. Between 
2000 and 1000 BC, two million Mayas lived 
in Yucatán. At the beginning of the first 
millennium, the population of what now 
constitutes Belize was 750 000. Wheat 
plantations stretched as far as the eye 
could see. Extended towns and enormous 
religious centres appeared throughout the 
empire. 
A thousand years ago, the Maya 
world collapsed. The arrival of the Spanish 
was followed by the disappearance of 
virtually all the indigenous population 
which fell victim to massacres and disease 
from outside. The survivors were concen-
trated in Guatemala. Campeachy wood 
(logwood) and mahogany invaded the 
land and took firm root in the vaults of 
ceremonial sites. For various reasons, the 
Spanish lost interest in Belize and the 
territory was abandoned. The English 
arrived at the end of the seventeenth 
century to exploit the Campeachy wood 
and, somewhat later, in the eighteenth 
century, the mahogany which had become 
an important commodity in Europe. This 
reawakened Spanish interest — the old 
reflex of the toy abandoned by the 
capricious child. They made five attempts 
to dislodge their adversaries, but all were 
unsuccessful. A treaty was signed, giving 
the British permission to exploit the 
forests, with the exceptions of commercial 
agricultural production and military con-
struction in an area between the Hondo 
River (the Belize/Mexico border) and the 
Belize River which flows through Belize 
City. The British loggers became known as 
the 'Baymen, and they appear in an 
engraving which forms part of the Belize 
coat of arms. Shortly before the agreement 
was signed, the Baymen called upon the 
British government to come to their aid in 
the face of a Spanish threat but peace was 
restored shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, a 
British admiral sent to Belize overstepped 
the limits imposed in the agreement and, 
in 1765, promulgated an embryo consti-
tution for the territory which had been 
allocated to the Baymen. This pseudo-
independence lasted until 1862 when the 
population voted to become a colony. This 
period saw several reversals of fortune for 
the British. There was the loss of the 
American colonies in which Spain and 
France supported the American revo-
lutionaries, while Spain went on to dis-
mantle a number of British settlements, 
sending most of their occupants to Mexico 
or Cuba. 
Supreme Court in Belize City 
Democracy in the British style 
The 1847 Mexican revolution, 
begun by the Maya population, saw the 
first great flood of Mayan refugees arrive 
in Belize, alongside mestizo and even some 
Spanish refugees. The Belizean population 
doubled in a short space of time. This was 
also the period when sugar cane was 
introduced. Backed by popular demand, 
Belize approached London to ask for the 
status of a colony, and the request was 
duly granted in 1862. The colony was given 
the name British Honduras. 
It was only after the Second 
World War that a big change in attitudes 
occurred. Many Belizeans had been re-
cruited into the Allied armies and they 
returned to the country with new ideas. 
The UK Government's unwise decision to 
devalue the Belize dollar in 1949 set the 
powder keg alight and the word 'in-
dependence' began to be heard. 
An incongruous colony 
From 1961 onwards, the British 
authorities acknowledged that the count-
The Altún Aa Maya monument 
At the beginning of the first 
millennium, the population of Belize 
was 750 000 country report — Belize 
down to the colony's independence had 
begun. Administrative autonomy was 
granted in 1964 although the tide of 
decolonisation taking place at that time 
did not reach this corner of the Caribbean. 
Belize had to wait until 1981 for full 
independence. The main reason for this 
was the fact that the British had no 
intention of handing the territory to 
Guatemala, which was threatening to 
invade. 
In 1823, the United Provinces of 
Central America proclaimed their indepen-
dence. Fifteen years later, the federation 
broke up into five states. One of these was 
Guatemala, which took the view that 
Belize ought to be returned to it since it 
had been recognised by the Spanish 
administration as forming part of the 
Captaincy General of Guatemala. Many 
historians believe, however, that under 
Spain, Belize had been linked to Yucatán. 
In any case, the Spanish were not in Belize 
before the independence of the Central 
American countries and had never oc-
cupied the territory. In 1860, influenced by 
the United States, a treaty between Britain 
and Guatemala was signed, recognising 
the current frontiers between the two 
territories. By way of compensation to 
Guatemala, a road and/or river route, 
Maya stele at the Bliss Institute, 
Belize City 
linking the Guatemalan capital to the 
Atlantic near Belize, was to be built by the 
two parties. Because this route was never 
constructed, Guatemala repudiated the 
treaty in 1940,80 years after it was signed. 
According to their interpretation, the 
Treaty had not been a ratification of 
frontiers but an exchange or contract 
which had not been fulfilled. Thereafter, 
Guatemala regularly threatened its neigh-
bour although, over time, its territorial 
claims became more modest. Ultimately, 
their demands came to be restricted to just 
a quarter of the territory but the dispute 
left Belize isolated for many years. The 
advent of civilian government in 
Guatemala did not solve the problem but 
at least it opened the way for progress. 
Jorge Serrano, Guatemala's second civilian 
President, recognised Belize in 1991 and 
established diplomatic relations. Only then 
was it possible for Belize to become a full 
member of the Organisation of American 
States (OAS). The country was now out of 
quarantine. Despite this, Guatemalan dip-
lomats still occasionally demand the expul-
sion of Belize's delegates at international 
meetings. Guatemala has opened an 
embassy in Belize and there is a consulate 
in the zone where new Guatemalan 
immigrants live, but Belize's diplomatic 
mission in Tegucigalpa had to wait three 
years before it could open its doors. In 
1993, the threat of a military takeover in 
Guatemala, just as the British were an-
The arrival of the Spanish was followed 
by the disappearance of the Maya 
population. The 1847 Mexican 
revolution saw the return of their 
descendants 
nouncing the forthcoming departure of 
their troops, rekindled old fears. For-
tunately, the new Guatemalan president, 
Ramiro de León Carpio, is a staunch de-
fender of human rights. His government 
continues to demand land concessions, but 
the risk of an invasion has greatly dimini-
shed and, although the Belizeans still 
purport to be fearful of conquest by their 
neighbour, this is probably a continuing 
historical reflex rather than something 
founded on any realistic threat. 
Central America has once again 
found the road to peace and attempts to 
play on national sentiment to conceal 
domestic difficulties are less likely now-
adays. In any case, it is difficult to see how a 
country such as Belize, where American 
interests are so extensive, could fall victim 
to a show of force in the current climate. 
Moves are under way to find a diplomatic 
solution. Belize's long isolation made its 
participation in the Caribbean Common 
Market (CARICOM) very important even 
though, in economic terms, such member-
ship has not always been to its advantage. 
It had, for example, to lower import duties 
to come into line with its partners, without 
the advantage of increased exports. Such 
was the price of diplomatic status. Mi 
H.G. 
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black Amerindians 
At every international meeting on the defence of indigenous peoples, there are 
always some journalists who are surprised by the presence of black Amerindians. 
They have obviously never had the opportunity to meet Felicia Núñez. Although 
they might not recall everything they were told about the origins and history of 
this group, after one hour in her company, they would certainly have heard a great 
deal about it. What they would remember, without doubt, would be the warmth, 
passion, commitment and fighting spirit of this woman. They would learn that 
there are a considerable number of publications in Garifuna, including the Bible, 
books of poems, collections of songs and dictionaries, full of soldiers and folk 
heroes. This literature, crucially, forms the basis of the aspirations of a small 
population which has overcome fate despite the many attacks made on it. 
Felicia Núñez is an employee of 
the Social Development Department. In 
her work, she helps underprivileged fam-
ilies cope with their day-to-day existence 
and enables them to meet their re-
sponsibilities. She deals particularly with 
women who have been left as head of the 
family and who are out of work, of which 
there are many in Dangriga and through-
out the rest of the country. She acts as 
vocational adviser, teaching sewing to 
some and the rudiments of administrative 
organisation to others, and she also has a 
role as social assistant. She is a strong 
feminist and devotes her time fully to this, 
her professional work coinciding with the 
task she has set herself of improving the 
conditions of deprived women. When she 
is not with one of these women, she works 
in her small wooden colonial house, which 
is still sound despite the ravages of the 
humid climate. She is wholehearted in 
commitment to all of her activities but 
what really inspires her is speaking about 
the Garifuna people, recounting their 
history, defending their pride and speaking 
fighting words when she recalls their long 
suffering. 
The Garifuna people, (the black 
Amerindians in Belize), are also to be found 
in Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, as 
well as in their original land, the Caribbean 
island of Saint Vincent. However, it is in 
Belize that their future is to be found. This 
is because they are relatively numerous 
there, numbering about fifteen thousand. 
They also represent a sizeable proportion 
of the country's population and have been 
relatively successful within the society and 
in organising themselves. Right or wrong, 
the Garifuna suspect the current govern-
ment of being unsympathetic to their 
cause, seeing evidence of this in the fact 
that the monument to their people, 
erected under a previous government, 
together with the neighbouring land, (in 
principle an integral part of the monu-
ment), were the subject of a government 
real-estate operation in favour of the 
Creole population. They have condemned 
acts of vandalism against the monument 
and have sharp words about the apparent 
laxity in dealing with the perpetrators. 
They imply that enquiries made were not 
followed up. 
Theodore Aranda, one of the 
main leaders of the Garifuna cause, and 
one of its most dynamic representatives at 
international meetings, was an influential 
minister in the previous government. In 
considering the merits of some of their 
complaints, one must, of course, take care 
to remain objective. 
Gender in speech 
It is not entirely correct even to 
speak of a 'Garifuna people'. The word 
'Garifuna' refers only to the language, the 
inhabitants being Garinagu, a word de-
rived from a Caribbean expression mean-
ing 'manioc eater'. However, we will take 
the liberty of using the word 'Garifuna' 
since this is what appears in the press even 
in Belize. Language is currently the battle 
horse of those who defend the people's 
cause. The Garifuna Language Workshop 
has set itself the target, firstly, of re-
establishing Garifuna as the mother 
tongue in the six Garifuna communities in 
Belize. At present, only one of these 
communities really speaks the language on 
a daily basis, although language-linked 
culture is still alive and well in the others. 
Secondly, the Workshop aims to promote 
it in other Garifuna communities abroad. 
1995 is an important year for them, being 
the bicentenary of what they refer to as 
the assassination of the Chief of Chiefs, 
Joseph Chatoyer, founder of the first 
Caribbean republic on the island of Yure-
mein (the old name for Saint Vincent). 
The earliest traces of the two 
Amerindian peoples who were to populate 
the Caribbean, the Arawaks and Caribs, 
date from the pre-Christian era. They first 
settled in the north of South America, 
along the Orinoco and Magdalena rivers. 
During the second century AD, the 
Felicia Núñez, adviser, social assistant 
and feminist but, above all, a Garifuna 
Arawaks migrated towards the Caribbean 
islands and principally towards the Greater 
Antilles (Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica and 
Puerto Rico). In the 13th century, the 
Caribs used to invade islands in the south of 
the Archipelago, wiping out the male 
Arawaks and taking the women captive. 
The unions formed as a result of these 
abductions gave rise to the 'Caribbean/ 
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Arawak' language, but, above all, to the 
bizarre phenomenon of the genderisation 
of the language. With the possible excep-
tion of Japanese, where male-female 
speech differentiation essentially is found 
in the accent, this is a unique phenomenon. 
Men and women speaking Garifuna are 
mutually intelligible but use different 
words and turns of phrase to denote the 
same meanings. Thus, for example, de-
pending on whether the speaker is male or 
female, the word 'woman' is either 'wuri' 
or 'hiyaru', while the subject pronoun 'we' 
will be either 'amuru' or 'buguya'. 
The arrival of Christopher Col-
umbus put an end to the Carib raids to 
Monument to the Garifuna people 
A focus of discord with the current 
government 
capture Arawak women, the people 
having, then, to concentrate their energy 
against the new enemy. As pacifists, the 
Arawaks and their descendants, the 
Tainos, were to disappear entirely. The 
much more bellicose Caribs survived, al-
though in limited numbers. Having at-
tacked the Caribs several times, up to the 
beginning of the 16th century, the Spanish 
subsequently left them in peace. The 
French also became discouraged and, in 
1660, signed a treaty, acknowledged by 
the English, granting these indigenous 
populations perpetual sovereignty over 
the islands of Dominica and Saint Vincent. 
Shortly afterwards, the English reneged on 
the treaty and mercilessly hunted down 
the Caribs. This was to last for over a 
century, ending in the death of the Carib 
chief, Joseph Chatoyer. This episode soun-
ded the death knell for the Carib presence 
in the islands which still bear their name. 
'The last of the 
Mohicans' 
A quarter of a century before the 
1660 treaty, two Spanish vessels carrying 
slaves from Africa, principally from Nigeria, 
were shipwrecked on the shores of Yuru-
mein (Saint Vincent). The prisoners who 
escaped were taken in by the Indians and 
ended up adopting their language and 
culture, retaining only a few religious 
practices and their music, together with 
the colour of their skin. 
After the British victory in 1795, 
five thousand Caribs were deported to a 
small island off Honduras. Only two 
thousand survived the voyage to arrive at 
their destination. It is their descendants 
who are now to be found in Belize and the 
neighbouring countries, having moved to 
the mainland some years later. Today, 
there are probably about 300 000 of them 
worldwide. Their long suffering in recent 
years is marked, above all, by two huge 
massacres in Honduras, the more recent 
having occurred in 1937. It has principally 
been the benevolence of the Jesuits that 
has saved Garifuna culture. They were 
quick to begin teaching the new arrivals 
and, from the beginning of this century, 
they allowed members of the Indian 
community to instruct their own com-
patriots. It was one of these instructors 
who was to set up the first Caribbean 
cultural society in Central America, which 
began to crystallise Garifuna claims. In 
1941, the 19th of November, which is the 
anniversary of the arrival of the Caribs in 
Belize, was made a Day of Celebration in 
the district of Stann Creek, where most of 
the people currently live. In 1977, the date 
was declared a national holiday. Currently, 
the Belize National Garifuna Council jeal-
ously monitors the community's interests. 
'The last of the Mohicans' have sur-
vived. ■ H.G. 
"t 
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'We need to correct a situation that has 
ι gone terribly wrong. In the process, 
everybody will have to make sacrifices' 
For the second time, Manuel Es-
quivei finds himself presiding over 
Belize's destiny following the vic-
tory of his UDP at the polls in July 
1993. He first gained office in 1984 
during the economic 'golden age' 
of this small Central American country. But 
things are different nowadays. Belize may 
still be in an enviable position relative to 
many of its neighbours in the region, if one 
considers the social indicators and the 
strength of its democratic system, but it has 
not been able to avoid the negative effects 
of the global economic crisis. This is not 
perhaps surprising given its dependence on 
its powerful neighbour, the USA, which was 
also recently battered by recession. Manuel 
Esquivei wants, at all costs, to maintain the 
value of the Belize dollar and has decided to 
'roll back the frontiers of the state'. This 
entails a dose of strong medicine which he 
must persuade his fellow citizens to swal-
low. Thus far, he has at least some results to 
show for his efforts in the form of a 
significant reduction in inflation. 
Unfortunately, growing unem-
ployment and the people's reduced purchas-
ing power threaten to undermine what has 
been achieved. There is also the problem of 
public discontent prompted by the govern-
ment's austerity policies, not to mention 
potentially destabilising disputes within the 
government itself. On top of all this, despite 
a general feeling of harmony among the 
different groups who make up Belize's 
population, discontent has emerged within 
the Garifuna (black Amerindian) com-
munity. Members of this ethnic group, who 
are well organised, are resolutely opposed 
to government policies which they regard as 
contrary to their interests. Another area of 
worry is the ongoing diplomatic dispute 
with Guatemala which concerns no less than 
the legitimacy of the Belize state itself. 
Belize may not be the best known ACP 
country but this does not make it any the 
less interesting, as we discovered when we 
spoke to Prime Minister Esquivei. In a wide-
ranging interview, we discussed the above-
mentioned problems as well as some of the 
notable achievements of this relative haven 
of prosperity in the region. 
■ What are currently the main concerns 
of Belize and what are your most import-
ant goals ? 
— Our main concerns are within 
the government itself. We are very con-
cerned about the size of the government 
deficit so we are putting a lot of energy 
into finding ways of reducing and indeed 
eliminating it by next year. In that connec-
tion, we have several difficulties. In par-
ticular, our debt servicing has ballooned. 
This problem began last year and debt 
servicing will continue to be very high for 
at least the next two years. This is due to 
the fact that in the early 1990s, Belize 
entered into a number of credit arrange-
ments with commercial banks. These are 
now having to be repaid and, as a result, 
debt servicing now absorbs about 20% of 
our recurrent revenue. 
■ So you consider that these problems 
result from actions of the previous govern-
ment? 
— As regards these commercial 
loans. We try to confine our commitments 
to official loans for obvious reasons, but 
there was a departure from this approach. 
The result is a new stock of commercial 
debt that has caused our debt servicing to 
increase by about 30%. That will remain 
the case for the next two or three years. 
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■ Some newspapers and people in the 
opposition argue that the economic situ-
ation was good when you took over but 
now the economy is in decline. What is 
your answer to that accusation ? 
— I would say that the situation 
appeared to be good at the time because 
there was a lot of government spending. 
But this was creating a deficit which was 
unsustainable. At the outset, that deficit 
was sustained by privatisation. Shares in 
the telephone and electricity companies 
were sold off. But obviously, that kind of 
financing cannot sustain a deficit in the 
longer term. It can only alleviate the 
problem from year to year. So the deficit 
has built up. There were also commitments 
made to the unions representing the 
teachers and the public service to increase 
salaries at a rate of 12.5% per annum over a 
three-year period. This has meant that our 
wage bill now exceeds 50% of government 
revenue. When you put the wage bill and 
debt servicing together, you find that 
more than 70% of the state's income is 
being absorbed. This has created a tremen-
dous problem with cash flow and with 
financing the deficit that has built up. 
What we have done is severely to 
reduce government capital expenditure to 
try to restrain the growth of the deficit. 
Additionally, we are trying to find ways of 
restraining the growth in the wages bill. In 
practice, this means we are not able to 
meet all the heavy commitments entered 
into by the previous government. We 
provided half of those payments in 1994. 
The policy also involves proposing to the 
unions at this time that there should be a 
freeze on wages for the next two years. 
The private sector is performing 
very well. Our exports are up. Because of 
various monetary measures, our imports 
have been reduced slightly, so we have 
reduced the trade deficit. But the govern-
ment deficit remains the big headache. The 
government cannot function, cannot 
supply services, and cannot provide capital 
expenditure, so long as its domestic debt is 
the size it is. I am not talking here about 
foreign debt which has always been in 
deficit. I am talking about domestic capital 
expenditure which, in the past was sus-
tained by government's own revenues. In 
the last two years it has been sustained, as I 
said, by a combination of asset sales and 
domestic borrowing. And this is a quite 
crippling situation. 
'A commitment to the 
entire economy must 
take precedence' 
■ When you came to power, you prom-
ised lower taxes and held out the poss-
ibility of higher wages. Do you not find 
yourself in an awkward position with the 
electorate now that wages are frozen and 
taxes seem to be increasing ? 
— We have, in fact, reduced 
income taxes for everyone and have 
eliminated them altogether for people 
who earn less than B$200 a week. So we 
have kept that promise. The essential point 
here, however, is that the public service is 
just one segment of the economy. We 
believe that a commitment to the entire 
economy must take precedence over any 
previous commitments to just one sector, 
particularly where the effect is that the rest 
of the economy is being hurt. High 
government wages, even in times of 
prosperity, are unsustainable. They even-
tually do damage to the wider economy. 
The government should not be the most 
expensive organisation in the country. It 
has to be as efficient as possible and pay 
realistic wages. When the government 
increases wages by almost 40% in three 
years, that has repercussions for the rest of 
the economy. There are pressures for other 
employers to do the same and that causes 
inflation, creates difficulties for invest-
ment, dries up investment capital and 
generally sends everything into a tailspin. 
■ What about the impact of your policies 
on private business. They are paying an 
extra 1% in tax. The same is true for the 
professions — doctors, engineers and so 
on. They have to pay 2% more and they 
can't pass this on to the consumer. Is this 
not likely to hit them hard in a situation 
where competition is fierce ? 
— Obviously. But the question is, 
are we going to undergo the pain now and 
solve the problem, or will we do nothing. If 
we choose the latter, many of them will 
eventually be bankrupted. There will be a 
devaluation with all the negative con-
sequences that flow from that. The point is 
that we need to correct a situation that has 
gone terribly wrong. In the correcting 
process, everybody will have to make 
sacrifices. The choice is between making 
the sacrifice to achieve the results, and not 
making the sacrifice in which case, we can 
just watch the economy go down the 
drain. 
■ What measures does your government 
plan to take to encourage investment in 
the country ? 
— The first thing is to make clear 
that one of our primary objectives is the 
stability of the currency. We think that an 
unstable currency creates an atmosphere 
that is least conducive to investment. 
Secondly, we have to make sure that 
capital is available for investment at 
reasonable cost. It cannot be made avail-
able so long as the government is the 
principal borrower in the economy. The 
state absorbs funds that are needed for 
investment and puts them into non-
productive activities. This effectively depr-
ives investors of the capital they need. And 
we certainly want to encourage domestic 
investment in the economy. That is why, in 
the short term, we have to take measures 
to eliminate the government debt, freeing 
up the banking system so that it can begin 
to finance investment in the country. As far 
as foreign investment is concerned, we 
have had for a long time, a programme of 
development incentives which includes tax 
holidays and freedom from import duties 
for export businesses. 
■ It seems that the authorities have 
cancelled some of the commitments 
entered into by the previous government. 
Two examples I have come across are the 
'Hydro-electricproject'and the 'Milk plan'. 
Is there not a danger that this kind of 
action might affect the credibility of the 
country, and prove offputting to foreign 
business people who might be considering 
investing here ? 
— Let me explain what we have 
done. The arrangements that the previous 
government made in respect of the two 
projects you mention were, in fact, quite 
disgraceful. In the case of the hydro 
^ 
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project, we have managed to rewrite the 
terms more — although not completely — 
to our satisfaction. As a result, we estimate 
that over the life of the project, which is 40 
years, the country will save about $100 
million overall. We think it was worth the 
fight to get that changed. As regards the 
milk project, the arrangement was essen-
tially that the government should pay for 
it. The government was to reduce excise 
duties on beer by 50% to allow a company 
to produce milk. We certainly do not see 
any reason why the government should be 
paying for the project. I should say we have 
done nothing to stop it. They have a 
development concession which includes 
tax breaks and exemptions from import 
duties. But at the end of the day, it is a 
private business and it is for them to make 
the investment, not the government. 
■ There are apparently some disagree-
ments within the government: reports of 
a dispute between Hubert Elrington and 
the Deputy Prime Minister Dean Barrow. 
Are you worried that this lack of unity 
might be damaging to the administration ? 
— I don't know that it is neces-
sarily a bad thing. In all political parties and 
all governments, people have differing 
opinions. If everyone had the same view, 
we would stagnate. So I think in fact it 
illustrates the openness and democracy 
that exists within the government. People 
are able to express their ideas freely and to 
put their points of view forward. I don't 
see that as a bad thing at all. 
■ Turning to foreign policy, what is the 
current status of the dispute with 
Guatemala. Is it now over ? 
— No, because while Guatemala has 
accepted our independence, they still do 
not recognise our borders. Until they are 
prepared to do that, we will have a 
problem. The situation at the moment is 
calm and there are friendly relations 
between us. In fact, the current govern-
ment in Guatemala is something of a 'lame 
duck' for two reasons. It was not elected 
and, in any case, its term of office expires 
towards the end of this year. Because of 
this, we do not foresee anything significant 
happening towards solving the problem, 
at least in the short term. 
■ But don't you have the support of 
virtually all the countries in the region who 
accept the position of Belize ? 
— No they don't 
■ Are you saying that some have sup-
ported Guatemala ? 
— No, but they have no view on 
the border issue. None of them has come 
forward, including the United States, to 
say that they accept the territorial boun-
daries of Belize. Yes, they support our 
independence. That is very clear. So does 
Guatemala. But when it come to 'what is 
Belize', there is no agreement. And I am 
not sure that we can count on support 
from anyone on this issue, in the way that 
we could for our independence. I don't 
think anybody will get involved in the 
question of what is Belize's territorial 
boundary. 
■ So how do you think the matter can be 
resolved ? 
— From our point of view, the 
territorial boundaries of Belize are not a 
matter for discussion, so I don't know how 
it will be resolved. I think it can only be 
concluded by a change of attitude in 
The frontier between Belize and 
Guatemala — which Guatemala still 
disputes. 
'I don't think anybody will get involved 
in the question of what is Belize's 
territorial boundary' 
Guatemala City. Having accepted our 
independence, it should follow that they 
accept the boundaries as set out in our 
independence constitution. 
■ And do you think the fact that the 
British forces have left will make it more 
difficult for you ? 
— I think at the moment that 
everything is on a diplomatic rather than a 
military level. So I don't see that the 
departure of the British is going to have 
that effect. The effect it does have, 
however, is to encourage adventurism on 
the border because people may feel we are 
unable to react. We expect there will 
incursions of civilians from time to time, 
and that this will be supported by political 
elements within Guatemala. There was a 
case in point last year. We were engaged 
for the greater part of six months in 
getting Guatemala to assist in removing a 
hundred Guatemalan families from our 
territory. But I think we have dem-
onstrated that we will be very firm where 
that is concerned. 
■ In similar situations, a solution has been 
found through the United Nations or the 
International Court of Justice. Do you not 
think you could use this possibility to reach 
a solution more quickly — pushing 
Guatemala to accept your boundaries. 
— Firstly, I don't think 
Guatemala sees that as an option. They 
consider it a constitutional matter on their 
side and therefore would not subject 
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themselves to that. Secondly, I don't think 
anybody really cares about this kind of 
border issue. They care about indepen-
dence, but as to where a country begins 
and ends on a map is not of much concern 
to anyone. 
■ For Belize what are the most important 
areas of foreign policy — your relations 
with the United States, Central America, 
Caricom, Europe or what ? 
— Obviously, relations with the 
USA will always be of great importance to 
us and everyone else in this hemisphere. 
Events like the Summit of the Americas are 
a clear indication of this. Our primary and 
long-standing relationship is with the 
English-speaking Caribbean and we are 
continuing to foster that through our 
membership of Caricom. Our relationships 
with Mexico have always been excellent 
and we will certainly try to do everything 
we can to maintain that. As for our links 
with Central America, these have im-
proved considerably over the last year, 
now that the Central Americans have 
accepted the idea of Belize's indepen-
dence. As you rightly say, they have not 
supported Guatemala in any suggestion of 
excluding Belize from the Central Amer-
ican arena. In fact, our inclusion has been 
consolidated day by day, with no objec-
tions from Guatemala. 
As for Europe, as you know, we 
have some difficulties, particularly with 
regard to the banana regime. Europe itself 
is divided on this issue. Our relationship 
with the EU is, by and large, one with the 
United Kingdom. As regards the other EU 
countries, there are some with whom we 
have hardly any relations — not in a 
negative sense — but just as a matter of 
fact. There are others with whom we have 
some exchanges — a little bit of trading 
and perhaps technical assistance, and we 
hope to keep building these links. 
■ Belize appears largely to have achieved 
a sense of unity but there seems to be some 
problem with the Garifuna people. Is this 
significant ? 
— I don't believe so. Any mi-
nority group will always feel that more 
should be done, and perhaps justly so. But 
you will also get elements within any 
group that will attribute failings or prob-
lems to the fact of their ethnicity rather 
than to other factors. I think the Garifuna 
people have, in fact, come an extremely 
long way in terms of their image and 
acceptance among the rest of the com-
munity. The Garifuna people are to be seen 
in all walks of life whether in the private 
sector or the government. Anybody who 
sees the difficulties as something which 
stem from attachment to a particular 
ethnic grouping is, I think, probably not 
looking at the whole picture. 
■ What about the specific issue of the 
monument to the Garifuna people and the 
surrounding land? With only 200 000 
people in Belize there is a lot of empty land 
that could be used. 
— Well there are several factors 
here. That land was acquired by displacing 
Garifuna people. It was taken away from 
people who traditionally farmed in that 
area and we feel that that was an injustice. 
But there are, within the Garifuna com-
munity, just as many people who are 
convinced that if it is a competition 
between people's access to land and 
homes, and a monument, they would 
rather choose the former. As for the point 
that there is a lot of land available 
elsewhere, that fails to recognise the fact 
that one has to have access to utilities such 
as water and electricity. It is not logical just 
to say that there is plenty of land available. 
That is not a sufficient base on which to 
build a community. 
'We need to be prepared 
for the era of trade 
liberalisation' 
■ Finally, can you recapitulate your key 
objectives for Belize ? 
— As I said, we need first to 
straighten out the government's financial 
position. Government must extract itself 
from the private economy. We must get 
out of the way of the private sector by 
eliminating our domestic debt. In addition, 
we obviously need to be prepared for the 
era of trade liberalisation. This has the 
potential for great benefits but also for a 
great deal of damage to our economy. We 
are, therefore, seeking alliances — with 
our traditional partners such as Caricom 
and with non-traditional partners such as 
the Central American countries — to 
better prepare ourselves to deal with the 
challenge. It is particularly important in the 
field of agriculture. A totally free market 
could easily disrupt our domestic agricul-
tural activity, perhaps beyond repair. So 
we aim to ensure that we develop the 
markets that must be developed in the 
region, to give our farmers more export 
outlets. Once foreign agricultural products 
are freely able to invade the domestic 
market, the only solution is for us to 
penetrate external ones. We have very 
little time, but through these alliances I 
mentioned, we have a lot of skill available 
to us in the region to help us accomplish 
this objective. 
The overall message must be that 
the government has a very serious situ-
ation to correct. To do that, it has to take 
measures which will be painful. But the 
bottom line isthat if you take the measures 
and suffer the pain now, you can solve the 
problem. If you carry on as if there is no 
problem, then you finally end up in a much 
worse situation. Fundamental common 
sense dictates that we must act im-
mediately, even if there is a cost attached, 
so that we can move forward in the 
shortest possible time. M Interview by H.G. 
-ι 
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(Architect of Belize's independence 
5/nce Belize's first election under 
universal suffrage in 1954, George 
Price, the current leader of the 
opposition, has spent more years 
than anyone else at the helm of his 
country. He was also one of the key 
players, and some would say the 
main architect, of its independence. 
A founding member of the PUP, he 
rose quickly to assume the leader-
ship. In 1958, he was prosecuted by 
the British authorities for sedition 
—and his popularity with the voterssoared. 
He went on to win five successive elections 
and to leave his imprint firmly on the nation. 
When he opted for a new seat of govern-
ment in the interior, the pretext was a 
cyclone which had threatened the coastal 
capital. The real reason was George Price's 
desire to bring government closer to the 
people, removing it from the closed world of 
Belize City. It was also Price who led the first 
post-independence government. He went 
out on a limb in 1983 when he refused to 
sanction the invasion of Grenada by Amer-
ican forcesand, despite US pressure, he kept 
a number of ministers in his government 
who were regarded by Washington as 
'socialists'. Having lost to the UDP in the 
1984 election, the PUP regained power in 
1989 and George Price again became Prime 
Minister. 
The regular swing of the pen-
dulum between two political parties with 
few ideological differences, and the fact that 
George Price himself has long experience of 
office, have moulded him into a moderate 
but by no means complacent opposition 
leader. He has recently stepped up his 
criticisms of the rigorous policies of the 
current government — policies which 
appear to have hit the UDP's popular 
standing. But having held the reins of power 
for so long himself, he cannot dissociate 
himself entirely from the problems which 
Belize now faces, particularly when govern-
ment ministers seldom miss an opportunity 
to attribute most of the blame to him. 
■ Mr Price, you have recently increased 
your attacks on the policies of the govern-
ment. What are your main criticisms of the 
current administration ? 
— Our criticism is that the 
economy of Belize is in trouble and, for the 
most part, the trouble has been caused by 
the government. When they came to 
power in July 1993 they did certain things 
that adversely affected the economy. In 
particular, they cancelled or suspended 
contracts that were ongoing. This led to a 
loss of confidence among the business and 
financial community. If the government 
can go back on contracts, what else might 
it do in the future. It also created un-
employment and the result was less tax 
revenue going into the state coffers. They 
incurred additional expenditure by em-
ploying their political officers and discharg-
ing a number top civil servants. That 
represents a double expenditure. Money 
has to be found to pay the salaries of the 
new people and to compensate those 
whose service has been ended. They have 
spent a lot of money on new vehicles and 
also on travelling. In a poor country like 
Belize, official travel should be controlled 
and, where it is necessary to attend 
conferences, we should try to keep the size 
of delegations to the minimum. Perhaps 
just two or three people, or sometimes 
even just one, instead of six. We see 
ministers taking unnecessary trips too 
many places. As a result of all this, the 
economy is in trouble. 
The first thing they did when 
they gained power was to present a deficit 
budget. It was the first time in our political 
history that this had happened. In 1993, 
the deficit was something like $20 million 
and in the following year, they presented 
another budget containing a deficit of $40 
million. So they have had to find ways of 
collecting more money. They have done 
this by imposing a tax known as the 'gross 
proceeds tax'. When the importer brings in 
goods and sells them to the wholesaler, the 
wholesaler has to pay 1 % tax. And when 
the wholesaler sells the goods to the 
retailer, the retailer in turn has to pay 1 %. 
When the product finally reaches the 
consumer, he has to pay anywhere from 
3% to 5% of the value of the goods. The 
effect of all this is to increase the cost of 
living. And one of the results is that there 
are fewer jobs available and more un-
employment. In addition, there are virtu-
ally no significant projects in the pipeline. 
The only projects that are ongoing are 
those that our government set up. For 
example, there was the Rehabilitation 
Programme of Belize which was designed 
to improve the canals, and roads like the 
Southern Highway. 
■ Members of the present government 
would argue that if there are problems 
now, it is because your administration 
spent too much and took on to many 
expensive commitments. 
— Let me address that point. We 
did not leave the state bankrupt. At the 
time there was the change of government, 
the central bank had $89 million in foreign 
reserves. There was another $40 million 
deposited in the commercial banks. So 
there was money there. We also left a mid-
year budget which would have been 
balanced had they chosen to work with it. 
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The income that was projected from 
customs duties was all collected. There has 
been a lot of talk about the five buildings 
that were constructed by an Italian com-
pany when we were in power. It has been 
suggested that the government could 
have built them for less but I think this is 
misleading. When the Ministry of Works 
puts up a building, they don't include a 
number of charges in the calculation : for 
example, the architectural plans or the cost 
of supervision, because these are done by 
the Ministry of Works and absorbed in 
their budget. And the new buildings are 
serving a very useful purpose. There is the 
market itself, of course. The police needed 
more room and now there is a new police 
station. We had to have a customs building 
for the new seaport and now we have got 
it. There is also a fire station, which was 
clearly needed, and a library for the 
students. They may have appeared to cost 
more than the usual buildings but they 
clearly have a value. 
■ Can I ask you about the milk project 
that your government started. The Prime 
Minister says that it would have cost the 
government money and that was why 
they had to cancel some of their commit-
ments. 
— Yes. There was a plan in place 
when we left office whereby an investor 
would build a factory to process milk. And 
that would have saved the foreign ex-
change that pays for the import of milk. 
We thought the project was feasible but, 
for some reason, the government cancel-
led it. 
■ You say, regarding investment in the 
country, that the government lacks cred-
ibility. Isn 't it the case that a lot of countries 
are finding it difficult to attract foreign 
investors. Wouldn't you face the same 
problem if you were in power? 
— I should say that the problem 
is self-induced. The government brought 
about the loss of credibility through the 
actions they undertook when they gained 
power. They have caused it and they now 
have to solve the problem. Meanwhile, the 
people suffer. The cost of living has gone 
up. 
■ Looking beyond the economic issues, 
what are your other major concerns ? 
— We are worried about an 
imbalance of power within the govern-
ment. There was a recent change in cabinet 
portfolios and we now have one that 
encompasses the security forces, the police, 
the attorney-general and the courts. We 
think there is too much concentration of 
power within a single ministry and that 
that imbalance could lead to trouble in the 
future. 
■ What kind of trouble. 
— The same kind of thing that 
happened in Haiti. You shouldn't allow 
one person to control the army and the 
forces of law and order. The power has to 
be distributed. Before, the police came 
under one ministry, while defence was the 
responsibility of another. 
■ Why do you think Mr Barrow has 
received all these different responsibilities. 
— I am not entirely sure. There is 
an impression that the Prime Minister is not 
strong enough in Cabinet to do what he 
thinks should be done. 
■ What about the disagreement be-
tween the two Ministers — Hubert Elrin-
gton and Dean Barrow. The Prime Minister 
argues that this is evidence of freedom 
inside the government and of a healthy 
democracy. 
— He may think that but I think it 
reveals the weakness of the Cabinet. A 
Cabinet should be strong and united 
behind a government's policy. Democracy 
has certain rules. When a minister doesn't 
agree with a policy, that minister should 
resign. 
■ Belize appears to enjoy a reasonable 
sense of national unity but a problem 
seems to have arisen involving the Gar-
ifuna community and the fate of the 
Garifuna monument. Do you see this as a 
significant problem. 
— That could be a problem. They 
were going to build a park and a monu-
ment and the government changed that 
by taking a part away for housing. I think 
they made a mistake. They should have 
allowed it to go ahead. A lot of money was 
invested in the monument and the park. It 
is really a case of undoing what we set out 
to achieve in preparing for independence. 
Our party, the PUP, had to bring the six 
districts of the country together. At one 
time we were separated. Everything was in 
Belize City and the outer districts were 
isolated. We got them united under a 
name — Belize — the old name of the 
settlement in the Bay of Honduras which is 
derived from the Maya expression for 
'road to the sea'. We also gave the country 
a flag and an anthem. That brought the 
people together as a nation : a small one 
admittedly but, nevertheless there is a 
feeling of nationhood. And we have been 
very careful to maintain this sense of unity. 
Now there is a danger that the cancellation 
of the monument could introduce divi-
sions. We are a country of various races and 
our challenge is to keep everybody to-
gether — different origins but one natio-
nality. I think that is one of the big 
attractions that we have for tourists. 
Admittedly, we have seen an increase in 
crime, and a drug problem which is hard to 
avoid, but in relative terms, the country 
enjoys good security, certainly in com-
parison to other countries. And as a tourist 
base we can offer big attractions : the 
barrier reef, the extensive ruins of the 
Maya civilisations, beautiful scenery and 
very diverse wildlife. 
■ Finally, can you sum up the difference 
between your party and the UDP. 
— Belize is a democracy and we 
see it as our duty to do everything possible 
to develop the whole country. We don't 
think the government should be used as an 
instrument of a single political party, 
discriminating against people or practising 
victimisation. And that is what is happen-
ing at the moment. We feel that members 
of our party are being penalised. I think 
that is a big difference. We would be a 
compassionate government — one that 
feels responsible for the whole country. 
Another big difference, I think, is that we 
are better administrators, as was shown in 
the last government. We do not promise 
more than we can fulfil. You need to show 
responsibility in working out a programme 
of government. We are also more con-
cerned about the 'little' man. We are there 
to improve his life condition. The weaker 
you are the more you should benefit from 
the protection of the government. wm 
Interview by H.G. 
"f 
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The Queen's representative in 
Belize is Sir Colville Young, a poet, 
musician and intellectual who po-
litely greets the visitor with a 
permanent and completely natural 
smile. He is the Governor-General, 
representing the Crown in Belize. 
He is so affable that you continually 
have to remind yourself of the 
position this man holds. He, in the 
meantime, does his utmost to 
make you forget it. 
His humility matches 
Belmopan, the modest capital, 
and his language harmonises with 
these calm surroundings. Sir Colville ap-
pears to be at ease in his comfortable, but 
not excessively luxurious, official residence, 
although he would appear just as com-
fortable, one imagines, in an even more 
modest setting. 
A half-hour session is frustrating 
when you do not want to conduct an 
interview but rather to allow your inter-
locutor free rein. It is all the more 
frustrating when you rapidly discover that 
what he has to say is really worth listening 
to. And all the while, he makes it clear that 
he is quite prepared to listen to you. 
Given his reputation as a con-
noisseur of his country's culture, the 
simplest thing was to ask him what 
constituted culture in Belize — a nation of 
200 000 inhabitants divided into innumer-
able groups originating from all quarters. 
His calm replies are punctuated with the 
modest 'I believe ...', an expression charac-
teristic of those who, in fact, know. 
Each group still speaks its own 
language; the Chinese speak Chinese, the 
Mayas speak Mayan, the Garifuna speak 
Garifuna and so on. The lingua franca, 
however, is Creole, the tongue which 
emerged from the interbreeding of Euro-
peans and Africans. It has become the 
common language of communication — 
an example of something originating in 
one group which has been accepted by 
everyone. There is also a degree of 
commonality in eating habits : the typically 
Creole dish, 'rice and beans' is eaten 
everywhere. So too is goat meat, which 
was originally 'Spanish' (brought by the 
mestizos). The empanada, a maize flour 
patty, is also widely consumed. As Colville 
Young puts it, 'there is thus an intermixing 
of our cultures'. 
Unfortunately, this intermixing 
does not extend to matters of religion. 
There are a number of indigenous rituals, 
for example, when the Garifuna celebrate 
their settling in Belize, but generally there 
is little 'native' input, and European 
religions predominate. 'I think that is a 
great pity' says the Governor General. He 
continues, 'although the Bible's message 
has remained the same, the way in which 
from Mexico and other neighbouring 
countries and who all helped to forge the 
nation. The newcomers often came to 
escape political systems against which they 
had revolted or revolutions which had got 
out of hand. And as Mr Young observed, 
'despite the fact that we were living under 
a colonial system, which was intrinsically 
bad, they appreciated the stability and 
peace of this small country.' 
Immigrants do not pose prob-
lems of integration for the simple reason 
that they resemble and speak like a 
sizeable part of the population which is of 
the same stock. The people living in the 
North and West of the country were also 
originally from Mexico and Central 
America. In addition, those who arrive 
want to become Belizean. 'I am pleased 
about that,' says the Governor-General. 
the message is passed on, and the medium, 
could have been adapted throughout the 
world. For example, here, there could have 
been a Belizean approach, after the 
fashion of certain countries where music 
and local rhythm also play a part.' 
The predominant religion is Cath-
olicism, which may seem surprising for a 
former British colony. When the English 
first arrived, the religion was obviously 
Anglican, with a little Methodism thrown 
in. The trend towards Catholicism was 
natural, however, given the large numbers 
of immigrants who arrived subsequently 
Sir Colville Young, Governor and poet 
A humility that matches the modest 
capital and a language which 
harmonises with the calm surroundings 
'They are loyal to Belize'. Immigrants tend 
to have little schooling and they accept 
very low wages. With unemployment rife, 
this causes friction, but there is not the 
same type of tension as in France, for 
example, between the local population 
and Algerians or other foreigners. But, as 
our interviewee wryly observed, 'when our 
people go to the United States, they face 
problems of prejudice, and this opens their 
eyes'. 
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Admittedly, Belize is not very 
well known abroad. The Governor-General 
agrees that it does little to advertise itself, 
but then, the country does not have 
sufficient infrastructure to receive large 
numbers of tourists. He thinks it could be a 
mistake for Belize to sell itself too well — 
people would want to come and there 
would be nowhere to accommodate them. 
Also, too many tourists might destroy the 
simple way of life while, in environmental 
terms, species such as alligators and some 
birds might not be able to withstand too 
great an intrusion onto their territory. 
By contrast, bringing tourists into 
closer contact with the people and through 
them, with the country, in a regulated 
way, could perhaps be promoted. This 
would provide some income for individual 
citizens instead of all the profits going to 
big companies. 
All the contributions made by 
different groups have been melded to-
gether to forge a culture. It may appear to 
be threatened by Américanisation through 
the medium of television, amongst other 
things, but Colville Young 'believes that' 
the local culture is strong enough to resist, 
although he admits he does not know for 
how long or at what level. American 
culture, he observes, has made inroads 
everywhere, even in Russia where hambur-
gers are now commonplace. One of the 
reasons why American culture is infiltrating 
more and more into Belize, apart from the 
fact that approximately 60 TV channels are 
received there, is that tens of thousands of 
Belizeans live in the United States, where 
they have gone in search of better oppor-
tunities. When they return to Belize, these 
people import a lifestyle which seduces 
those who remained : these expatriates 
have an air of success about them and the 
USA thus acquires the image of being a 
paradise. 
However, in country areas, tales 
and myths are still very much alive and 
these have not been diluted by American 
influences. 'We have to make a major 
effort to keep our myths, proverbs, tradi-
tional healing methods, dances, arts and 
artisans alive and well', says Colville Young. 
But who is to do this? Sometimes, people 
think that it should be the government, 
but is it a good idea for it to interfere too 
much in cultural matters? On the other 
hand, if everyone wants someone else to 
deal with the problem, nothing will ever 
be done. 
Approximately ten years ago, 
Colville Young wrote a stage play based on 
a Belizean story. In a sense, it was more like 
a short opera, including music that he 
composed himself. He sees this as his own 
modest contribution to this work of 
regrouping local culture which has to 
consist of using the country's legends in all 
Children playing at the lagoon in Belize 
City 
There is an intermixing of our cultures' 
areas of life. Even television could be used 
to this end. 
The Queen's man in Belize has 
not only made this contribution to the 
defence of national culture : he has also 
written, published and recorded stories, a 
collection of proverbs, songs, traditional 
music and books of poems. The most 
recent was published in 1993 and was 
entitled 'From one Caribbean Corner'. It 
begins with a delightful composition in 
memory of Bob Marley in which he 
addresses the dead star thus : 
'(...Beat for I) 
Mixing ingredients of your protest 
Like pepper-hot bitterly bubbling : 
Apocalyptic visions 
Of an evil Babylon burning 
And haunted haunting melodies 
Where shanty-town black children 
Bite in emptiness 
Of bloated bellies that wondering 
If throat cut above 
And, under it all, 
The driving pulse 
(O, Beat man, reggae-man, beat for I)' 
In a spontaneous gesture. Sir 
Colville Young gave us his book of poems, 
dedicating it with the simple words 'From 
Colville'. 
He is certainly a man of rhythm and 
style. ™ H.G. 
"I 
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There was no way, with an ordi-
nary vehicle, that we were going to 
be able to drive back up that four-
kilometre long slope. Persistent 
rain had turned it into a quagmire 
of fine, slippery mud. Yet our 
young driver only finally lost heart 
when the clutch gave out. For two 
hours, we had been moving for-
ward in fits and starts in the vain 
¡ hope that all our pushing, aided by 
I the use of scores of branches under 
I the wheels, would provide suf-
| ficient grip. The possibility of being 
I towed out by a Canadian globe-
I trotter, complete with a four-
wheel-drive, also came to naught. 
He had proudly announced to us that he had 
just crossed North America and was prepar-
ing to drive down to the south of the 
continent. But our hopes soon evaporated 
as he too found himself bogged down in the 
mud. In fact, he did manage to extricate 
himself an hour or so later having returned 
to the bottom of the hill. There he managed 
to get up enough speed to tackle the slope. 
Unfortunately, our putative rescuer turned 
out to be a 'hit and run' driver. In his attempt 
to beat the mud, he drove straight into our 
door and, perhaps fearing the consequences 
of the accident, had kept on going, disap-
pearing into the darkness. In fact, the 
prospect of spending the night in the forest, 
and of having to walk several kilometres the 
next day to seek help, made the collision 
seem a trivial matter. We pretended to sleep 
in the muggy heat of our vehicle which had 
become an oven, the windows wound up to 
protect us from mosquitoes, cunning snakes 
and, who knows, a crafty jaguar or two. 
Then there was a miracle. On their routine 
round, with a fully-equipped vehicle, the 
owners of the inn just inside the protected 
zone caught sight of the dim light from our 
headlamps. Covered in mud, we were taken 
back to civilisation and then, after hot tea 
beside the big open fire in the Hidden Valley 
Inn and a three-hour taxi ride, we were back 
in our hotel in Belize City. 
This was our only (slightly) ad-
venturous episode — and an involuntary 
one at that — in a country which attracts 
true adventurers. These are the people one 
encounters at Eva's Restaurant in San 
Ignacio, a small town full of character at 
the foot of the great Mayas mountains. In 
Belize, they can throw themselves whole-
heartedly into the pursuit of their passions, 
whether it be climbing, caving, rafting or 
walking. There are also those who spe-
cialise in diving into the 'Blue Holes'. One 
such is to be found off Belize City, on the 
coral reef. There, it is possible to dive down 
into the deep blue of a 1000-foot-dia-
meter, 480-foot-deep shaft. Alternatively, 
one can stop on the Hummingbird High-
way, not far from Belmopan, in Blue Hole 
Park and take a phenomenal leap from the 
rocky promontory or the surrounding trees 
into a sapphire-blue shaft of sparkling, icy 
water about ten metres deep, set in the 
thousand-foot-drop to the invisible 
bottom of the funnel-shaped mountain 
range, was an unforgettable experience. 
Down in the valley, we were flanked by 
the mountains, standing as if ready for 
some bizarre formation dance. The lights 
of our vehicle, diffuse in the yellowish, 
drizzly dusk, barely illuminated the scene. 
We could sense the site more than we 
could see it but, in our admiration, we 
became part of it. 
The flight of the jabiru 
With his dented straw hat, khaki 
T-shirt and fatigues, John Masson looked 
like a guerilla fighter, an experienced 
guide, an archaeologist in search of hidden 
treasure and a holiday-camp group leader 
all rolled into one. John, who is the Site 
Manager for Programme for Belize is, in 
middle of a pool. You have to aim carefully 
though because it is very narrow. The 
abundant foliage which shades the pool 
and the shadow of the half-open grotto 
create a kind of religious serenity which 
envelops the visitor. 
While descending the last slope 
leading to the waterfall (which few 
Belizeans have visited), we knew that 
what we were doing was unwise. There 
was a steady drizzle and the car was 
already sliding about. Yet even at the most 
awkward moment, we had no real regrets. 
Perhaps we should have insisted on taking 
the 4x4 we had used before. Perhaps we 
should have asked for the cellphone 
(wrongly seen as a new toy, purely for 
show). But the site of the Hidden Valley 
Falls, and the drive in silence down a one-
Programme for Belize : protecting 
100 000 hectares of tropical forest, rare 
animals and important Maya sites 
fact, a bit of each of the last three. Above 
all he is a professional — a manager who 
knows the scientific subtleties or perhaps a 
researcher with management skills. No 
matter. To discover the Rio Bravo Conser-
vation and Management area with him is a 
privilege. He tells you about the creation of 
the Programme for Belize, a private but 
non-profit-making company which has 
bought 230 000 acres (about 100 000 
hectares) of tropical forest. He speaks 
knowledgably about research into bio-
diversity, the natural habitat and horticul-
ture. And he waxes eloquent about the 60 
or so Maya sites located on the land he is 
responsible for. One of these is La Milpa, 
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one of the three most important sites in 
Belize, which has recently come to be 
regarded as the birthplace of the classical 
Maya period. The work of the archaeol-
ogists, he says, is geared to finding the 
answer to one single question : why did 
this civilisation collapse
 
1. You may find it 
difficult to remember all the details from 
this flow of erudite information, as you try 
to keep up with the names of the flowers 
and the birds (the yellow tones of the 
Ludwigia on the Chichibe hedges, the 
purple bells of the Morning Glory). Yet you 
cannot escape the feeling that here is 
someone who wants to share his en-
cyclopedic knowledge. The facts may get 
jumbled but the essential remains : the 
sugary aroma of the coffee bush which 
grows in the shade of ancient trees ; the 
mixture of smells of flowers and damp 
earth ; the rare sight of the jabiru taking 
1 This will be featured in more 
forthcoming issue of The Courier. 
detail in a 
Unusual sight 
The beach cemetery at Caulker Keys 
The charms of antiquity 
Belize City 
flight on its six-foot wings; giant ma-
hogany trees and Maya structures standing 
side by side ; roots embedded in the stone ; 
sensations of freshness ; the harsh contact 
of leaves and branches ; the soft moisture 
of droplets of dew on your neck ; and your 
own frisson of alarm on learning from your 
guide that the musky smell is that of a 
jaguar who wants to remain hidden. Then 
there are the sounds — the cries of animals 
— and the silences. Seeing a jabiru is a 
good omen. 
The route to the park from Belize 
City is circuitous — up towards the border 
with Mexico, then west and back down in 
a south-westerly direction until you are 
almost level with your starting point. The 
sight, however, is well worth the detour. 
'Made in nostalgia' 
It is also worth staying in Belize 
City. This town's languid air and the 
affability of its people make one forget the 
advice to be cautious and the fears about 
lack of security. Criminality, although it 
probably exists, must lie below the surface. 
Belize City invites you to relax, with its 
colonial houses, tree-lined avenues, 
flowery squares, meanderings and, above 
all, the sound of water from the lagoons, 
Haulover Creek river which dawdles its 
way through the town, and the many 
canals. You are reminded of the charm of 
Venice as you watch the swing bridge in 
operation, or the balletic dance of the 
fishing boats with their sails, leaving at 
dawn and coming back at dusk, always 
surrounded by an unreal light. Friday is 
market day, but street vendors can be seen 
every day: players on a daily stage of 
colour and fantasy. You see a little girl in a 
colourful satin dress with lace and flounces. 
The label could be 'made in nostalgia'. She 
is probably a Mennonite, descended from 
19th century European immigrants, who 
has come this very morning from the 
western mountains, accompanying her 
parents who sell wooden artifacts and 
thereby keep the old crafts alive. It is this 
feeling that time has stopped which is the 
magic of Belize City. It is a magic that has 
been spotted in Hollywood. Films crews are 
not uncommon and one might easily 
encounter stars like Harrison Ford in the 
foyer of the Fort Georges Radisson Hotel. It 
is a pity, though, that the films made here 
(Mosquito Coast, Dogs of War or Heart of 
Darkness) should have titles which give no 
hint of the town's true seductive nature. 
Flying over the coral reef in a light 
aircraft at low altitude offers a different 
kind of thrill, but one which depends on 
the vagaries of the weather. Normally, the 
islands guarantee sun and relaxation but 
when we went to San Pedro, it had been 
raining. The potholed streets, which are 
covered in sand for the comfort of ba-
refoot walkers, had become waterlogged. 
We found warmth again in the atmos-
phere of a family 'pension' called the 
'Seychelles'. Its owner, Sandra Cooper, 
combines the friendliness and reserve 
characteristic of many Belizeans. She lived 
in the USA for some years, but decided a 
short time ago to settle in this small corner 
of her country, offering visitors something 
other than the artificial gaiety of the 
hotels; something of the real Belize. It is 
rare to find extensive beaches on the 
islands - you have to go to Placencia on the 
coast for these, but the striking views of 
the sea and the rocks will soon take your 
mind off them. There is always a quiet 
corner to be found, wherever you are in 
Belize. This is particularly the case at 
Caulker Keys, the wildest and least tourist-
oriented of the islands which tends to be 
visited mostly by locals. If you want peace 
and quiet, though, perhaps you should 
avoid the cemetery on the beach. This 
unusual juxtaposition, not surprisingly, is a 
draw for visitors ! ■■ H.G. 
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An end to isolation 
by Jose Morgado* 
Situated at the meeting point of 
the Caribbean and Central America, 
Belize is geographically part of the 
latter, but its culture and language 
place it in the former. Although it 
has been a member of the Carib-
bean Community (CARICOM) since 
1974 and of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) since 1991, 
Belize has always been somewhat 
isolated from both regions and up 
to now, it has not fully benefited from the 
many economic and cultural advantages 
which such partnerships can bring. 
Its small size (22 965 km
2) and 
sparse population (9 inhabitants per km
2) 
mean that its internal market is very small, 
and its per capita socio-economic infra-
structural costs very high. This makes it 
vulnerable to outside forces and de-
pendent on aid from the international 
community to enable it to cope with the 
rigours of development and economic 
growth. 
Despite these constraints, it has 
managed to record some remarkable 
economic results. During the 1980s, Belize 
achieved a real GDP growth rate of 10% 
and kept inflation down to less than 2% on 
average. Between 1992 and 1994, a period 
of international economic crisis, a real 
growth rate of 4% in GDP was maintained 
with inflation at an average rate of less 
than 1.8%. This sustained economic 
growth was achieved thanks to a very tight 
macro-economic policy, favourable export 
prices for agricultural products and access 
to the preferential markets of the Euro-
pean Union and the USA. Privatisation of 
the banana and sugar industries and of the 
telecommunications company also con-
tributed to these good economic results. 
Resident EC Adviser — Belize. 
Keepers of the Maya 
mystery 
As investigations into the causes 
of the disappearance of the Maya civilis-
ation continue, Belize is coming to be seen 
as one of the most important centres of 
this highly developed and dynamic culture 
and is therefore arousing the interest of 
archaeologists and tourists alike. Belize 
also enjoys the benefits of a magnificent 
coral reef (the second largest in the world) 
along its coast, numerous keys (heavenly 
islands of sand and palm trees surrounded 
by the enchanting sea) and its tropical rain 
forest, 80% of which has been preserved 
and which offers flora and fauna the like of 
which are not seen anywhere else in the 
world. All these assets make Belize a 
tropical paradise, whose tourism potential 
has yet to be promoted and developed. 
Like many of the EU's other ACP 
partners, Belize has to cope with the usual 
constraints faced by small developing 
countries. The small size of the internal 
market very much limits the possibilities for 
industry to stimulate production. Other 
problems include the aforementioned high 
infrastructure cost per inhabitant, depen-
dence on the outside world, limited 
resources, a fragile environment, and 
vulnerability to natural disasters (especially 
tropical storms). Action taken to aid 
development of the most important sec-
tors, such as agriculture, tourism and the 
private sector more generally, entails, 
amongst other things, developing the 
infrastructure to increase competitiveness. 
European assistance is geared towards 
achieving this aim. 
The main projects implemented 
under Lomé I (1975-1980) involved the 
construction of three secondary schools 
and a veterinary laboratory equipped with 
modern equipment, and the expansion of 
the international airport. ECU 2 million was 
also provided towards the construction of 
the new Belize City Hospital. 
The Lomé II national indicative 
programme (1981 to 1985) continued to 
provide assistance for the social infrastruc-
ture, and in particular the Belize City 
Hospital. The existing wood and concrete 
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Belize City Hospital 
The old and the new country report — Belize 
Total assistance to Belize, 1975 to 1994 (in ECU million) 
1975-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 
Lomé I Lomé II Lomé III Lomé IV Total 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
European Investment Bank 
STABEX 
Assistance for refugees 
Joint NGO financing 
Other non-scheduled assistance 
Regional cooperation 
TOTAL 
5,6 
— 
0,3 
— 
— 
— 
2,0 
7,9 
5,5 
2,6 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0,3 
8,4 
8,0 
4,0 
— 
1,5 
1,3 
0,3 
— 
15,1 
9,0 
3,5 
— 
0,5 
0,1 
2,0 
2,1 
17,2 
28,1 
10,1 
0,3 
2,0 
1,4 
2,3 
4,4 
48,6 
building, which was 100 years old, was the 
only large hospital in the country and it did 
not provide adequate levels of medical 
care. 
Under Lomé III (1986 to 1990) 
and the first financial protocol of Lomé IV 
(1991 to 1995), about 90% of NIP resources 
were devoted to social and economic 
infrastructure. The two main projects here 
are the upgrading of the Hummingbird 
Highway, the sole road link with the south 
of the country, which is crucial for the 
transport of produce such as bananas, 
citrus and rice, and the continuing work on 
the hospital. The latter does not just 
include design and construction, but also 
covers training of hospital staff, and 
technical assistance for the Health Ministry 
to advise on its preparations for the 
transfer to the new building and for the 
day-to-day management of the hospital. 
By the end of 1994,99% of total scheduled 
assistance (ECU 29 million) had been 
allocated, and 95% actually spent, the 
project being 98% complete. 
Through the European Invest-
ment Bank, Belize has benefited from 
additional EU assistance in sectors which as 
a rule do not satisfy the assistance criteria 
of the European Development Fund. 
Under the four Lomé Conventions, the EIB 
has financed five loans to the Development 
Finance Cooperation for the promotion of 
small and medium-sized enterprises and a 
pilot gold mine project, and two loans to 
Belize's electricity company. Total EIB 
assistance amounted to ECU 10.1 million in 
the period between 1983 and 1994. 
Regional cooperation to 
improve integration 
The various Lomé Caribbean re-
gional programmes offer considerable 
scope for development but this is one area 
where Belize has perhaps not been able to 
maximise the potential of EU assistance. 
Notwithstanding this, under Lomé I and II, 
the country did benefit from three finan-
cing operations amounting to ECU 2.1 mil-
lion in total which focused on agricultural 
research projects. 
The Belize Government is 
cooperating with the EU to implement a 
project intended to preserve and promote 
the most important Maya monuments in 
the country (Caracol, Xunantunich, Altun 
Ha, Nim Li Punit etc.). This project also 
includes the construction or improvement 
of access routes, and of small museums on 
Refugees from Guatemala. 
The EU has provided funds to help 
immigrants integrate into Belize society 
archaeological sites, and the opening of 
centres offering tourist information ser-
vices, accommodation and catering under 
one roof. 
Out of the total of ECU 90 million 
allocated under Lomé IV to the Caribbean 
Regional Integration Programme (via Cari-
forum), ECU 2.1 million has been provided 
for research and technical assistance pro-
jects in the fishing sector, management of 
which is carried out by Belize in its capacity 
as the regional authorising office. 
The political stability of Belize in 
the violent central American region has 
attracted some 35 000 refugees and dis-
placed persons from neighbouring coun-
tries. These people have been settled 
throughout Belize for a number of years 
now. Under Lomé III and IV, the EU 
financed four projects, at a cost of 
ECU 2.5 million, to help improve the living 
conditions of refugees and to assist them 
to integrate. There is also a project, costing 
ECU 0.5 million, which aims to explore 
ways of preserving the barrier reef and 
managing the coastline. This was approved 
in 1992. In December 1994, the EU ap-
proved a sum of ECU 1.5 million for a 
research programme into the conservation 
of the tropical rainforest. Finally, between 
1990 and 1994, the EU financed projects 
managed by non-governmental organis-
ations to the tune of ECU 1.3 million. 
Future work will not just be 
limited to maintaining the current macro-
economic policy of the government, and 
establishing a coherent and well-main-
tained infrastructure. There will also be 
intensification and diversification of the 
agricultural sector (in response to food 
shortages), the promotion of tourism as an 
important source of income and the 
development of various aspects of the 
fishing sector covering such areas as 
research, training, production and pro-
motion. Finally, there will be support for 
the private sector, with a particular focus 
on small and medium-sized enterprises, 
reflecting the fact that this is a key area for 
future economic development and 
growth. ™ j.M. MALAWI 
A much happier country 
As international attention was focused on South Africa in May last year for the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as State President, a 
drama of similar historic proportion was unfolding without fanfare in Malawi. Thirty years after imposing one of the most brutal 
autocratic rules Africa has seen this century, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda was heavily defeated in a presidential election. The fear that 
gripped this nation for three decades, which had begun to lift a year earlier following the approval of multiparty democracy in a 
referendum, suddenly disappeared. Only then did the full extent of Dr Banda's legacy become apparent : 19 presidential palaces, an 
economy in shambles and a population living largely in appalling ignorance and poverty (income per capita is less than $200, one of 
the lowest in the world). 
A year on, The Courier, which for 
more than fifteen years was effectively 
unable to cover Malawi, visited the 
country to see how the government of 
President Baklili Muluzi is dealing with the 
legacy. It found a much happier country 
and a functioning democracy making 
considerable efforts to overcome both the 
psychological effects and the economic 
consequences of Banda's misrule. 
Although the political atmos-
phere has relaxed considerably and the 
media are becoming more and more 
vigorous in their pursuit of transparency 
and accountability, a residual fear among 
the population is discernible. The fall of Dr 
Banda and the full meaning of democracy 
have yet to sink in : people generally are 
still cautious about voicing criticism. Civil 
servants remain largely afraid of taking 
decisions, even at very low levels, for fear 
of retribution with the result that adminis-
trative processes are inordinately slow and 
considerable delays are caused to vital 
projects. Such is the seriousness of the 
situation that the donor community led by 
World Bank is supporting a programme 
designed to remove some of the bot-
tlenecks. The government, meanwhile, 
plans a more profound reform of the 
service, and has in this regard set up a 
cabinet committee, chaired by Vice-Pre-
sident Justin Malewezi, who happened to 
have headed it for a period under Banda. 
The committee was due to produce a 
paper in June. 
Mr Malewezi told The Courier 
that reforms would not be easy because 
they include changing the whole concept 
of the civil service in Malawi to make it 
neutral and capable of serving any govern-
ment in power. To start with, there has to 
be a census to establish its exact size and 
then to institute new gradings and salary 
structures. There is an urgent need to 
improve the efficiency of the middle ranks 
which are, at the moment, very weak. 
People at different levels should be com-
fortable enough and courageous enough 
to take certain decisions which are ap-
Schoolchildren in Malawi 
Despite limited resources, the new 
government is giving high priority to 
education and school enrolment has 
increased dramatically 
propriate at their level, said the Vice-
President. 
With hindsight, the now wide-
spread belief in Malawi that Dr Banda had 
a policy deliberately designed to keep his 
people ignorant, impoverished and sub-
jugated can hardly be disputed (see the 
article Banda — the making of a despot). 
Yet it cannot be denied that he began in 
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1963, when he came into office as Prime 
Minister, on a very good note, keeping his 
pre-independence promises of more 
schools, roads, clinics and clean drinking-
water to rural communities. He appeared 
then to be genuinely popular but as he set 
about consolidating his one-man rule, a 
couple of years later and began to see 
plotters in every corner, he hit upon an 
ingenious system of private enterprise 
which transformed Malawi literally into his 
private domain, a system in which he 
distributed patronage to a select few. 
Battle against ignorance 
Under that system, primary edu-
cation became extremely expensive and a 
luxury, especially for the 90% of the 
population who lived in the rural areas and 
at subsistence levels. For over 25 years, a 
large number of children were denied any 
education. Of the approximately 70 000 
children who left primary school every year 
only a fraction found places in the 118 
secondary schools in the country. The sole 
university — the University of Malawi — 
admitted no more than 800 students 
annually. The Kamuzu Academy, which 
Banda set up ostensibly to educate bright 
but disadvantaged children and claimed to 
finance himself, turned out to be of very 
limited use for the country. Specialising in 
the classics with exclusively expatriate 
tutors recruited from the UK, the Academy 
took children (most of them foreigners), 
from rich family backgrounds or with 
connections to the ruling Malawi Congress 
Party. 
Suspicion of subversive activities 
in the academic community meant that 
students, lecturers and professors of the 
University of Malawi were constantly 
intimidated, harassed and often thrown 
into jail. Standards inevitably fell. The 
statistics speak for themselves : there are 
fewer than 200 doctors (the majority 
expatriates) and fewer than 100 lawyers in 
the whole country! The illiteracy rate is 
61 %, second in Africa only to Mozambique 
which, as is well known, was beset by civil 
war for over fifteen years. 
The impact of this neglect of and 
indeed vandalism to the economy and 
society, as will be seen elsewhere in this 
report, has been devastating. This is 
generally recognised and there is a cross-
party consensus in Parliament to make 
education the top priority. Indeed it is the 
only sector that has been spared in the 
overall financial squeeze the country has 
been enduring since the beginning of the 
year. It received the highest allocation 
under the last budget (23% of the total). 
In March last year the Govern-
ment introduced free primary education, 
abolished compulsory school uniforms and 
undertook to provide textbooks and 
exercise books free of charge. The response 
was overwhelming. Over 3.2 million child-
ren enrolled. 'It was totally unexpected but 
we are delighted', says the Minister of 
Education, Sam Mpasu. 'We suspected all 
along that costs were deterring many 
parents from sending their children to 
school. We knew that costs involving 
textbooks, exercise books and uniforms 
were very significant to a person who is on 
a subsistence level. We did not have to 
wait for researches and studies to establish 
that', he explained. 
The Minister revealed that with 
that number of children, an additional 
38 000 classrooms are needed. 'As I am 
speaking they are studying under trees, in 
mosques and churches and so on, and the 
pupil-teacher ratio is 60:1 ; not an ideal 
situation but acceptable under the circum-
stances.' Some 22 900 teachers have been 
recruited, 90% of whom are school leavers 
who require training. Mr Mpasu said that 
the annual requirement for exercise books 
is 18 million (6 million per term). 
The World Bank is again inter-
vening here, leading a group of donors 
willing to help out with the construction of 
classrooms and the training of teachers. 
USAID is putting up $25 million for a 
programme with a bias towards the 
education of girls — who were particularly 
disadvantaged under Banda's regime. 
Aware of the bottlenecks the 
current situation could produce in the 
coming years, when these children will be 
seeking places in the secondary schools, Mr 
Mpasu says that plans have already been 
laid for the establishment of 250 day-
secondary schools (about 10 additional 
secondary schools for each of the 25 
districts, to ensure that one at least is 
within the walking distance for any 
student. 'We are moving away from our 
emphasis on boarding schools which are 
very expensive to run.' 
As to tertiary education, Malawi 
has stopped sending students abroad 
because of the shortage of foreign ex-
change. 'We are trying to establish another 
university, but in the meantime we are 
expanding the existing one to meet the 
demand which will increase shortly.' 
Those who have missed out on 
secondary and tertiary education are not 
being forgotten either. A lot more effort 
will be put into vocational training and 
'distance learning', the latter calling for 
better use of the 40 000 distance learning 
centres which already exist throughout the 
country. The Ministry of Education is 
working closely with the newly created 
Ministry of Women's and Children's affairs 
to upgrade and expand basic adult literacy 
programmes, especially in the rural areas. 
Poverty alleviation 
These educational measures, as 
well as reforms in agriculture, on which 
90% of Malawians depend, are part and 
parcel of the government's policy of 
poverty-alleviation. Inflation, meanwhile, 
which has shot up to 45% in recent months, 
is placing severe strains on living standards. 
The Government was obliged, despite 
financial difficulties, to increase civil service 
salaries by 25% across the board last April. 
But what is really contributing to the 
country's survival at the moment are the 
better than expected maize harvests this 
year. This is a direct result of the last year's 
timely intervention by international 
donors (including the European Union) to 
finance an input programme which en-
abled the Government to provide free 
fertilisers and seeds to over one million 
smallholders. 
The task of improving the living 
standards of Malawians is a daunting one. 
However, there are three things going for 
country. The first is the people's under-
standing of the seriousness of the econ-
omic situation and their willingness to 
make sacrifices, the second is the country's 
significant untapped resources, and the 
third is the enormous amount of goodwill 
towards Malawi in the donor community 
which is reflected in its readiness to support 
the government's efforts. ^Augustin oyowe 
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strengths and weaknesses 
The sight, in May, of a Member of 
Parliament on the government 
benches waving a fly-whisk at the 
opposition, in an obvious mockery 
of Dr Kamuzu Banda, and the 
general humour in which the whole 
episode was received, were poig-
nant evidence to this observer of 
how firmly democracy was taking 
root in Malawi. It even lent cre-
dence to assertions that nowhere 
else in Africa is it functioning better 
than here. Two or three years ago, 
such an episode would have been un-
thinkable. The MP would have been ar-
rested, tortured and probably killed. The 
current President, Bakili Muluzi, is const-
antly under attack for one reason or another 
and the press has never had it so good, 
enthusiastic in the pursuit of good govern-
ance, sometimes to the point of absurdity. 
The Speaker of Parliament, R 
Munyenembe told The Courier that 
Malawi is passing through an interesting 
period after being subjected to one-party 
rule for 30 years. 'If the press can be left 
free,' he said, 'I'm sure the future for 
democracy in this country is bright, but if it 
is muzzled, we will go back to the one-
party system, and to one-sided stories. But 
as things stand, we are hearing balanced 
views on what is happening in this count-
ry.' 
For a nation that has never had 
experience of real democracy, and has 
enjoyed freedom for just one year, this 
comes as a surprise. Even more surprising is 
the attitude of the political class, whether 
in government or opposition, to the 
experiences of the past three decades. 
Many of them spent years in prison, either 
for minor political offences or on trumped-
up charges. Yet there is a total absence of 
bitterness, making the task of national 
reconciliation much easier, at least on the 
surface. Parliament has set up a National 
Compensation Tribunal to probe the 
injustices of the Banda regime and to 
compensate innocent victims. Indeed, a 
few have already been compensated. A 
new Constitution, in which human rights 
and press freedoms are enshrined, was 
passed by Parliament in May. 
Increase in insecurity 
Democratic freedom has brought 
with it a rise in crime and insecurity, and 
the reaction of some Malawians, in the 
absence of a trustworthy police force and 
an efficient judiciary, has been to take the 
law into their own hands. There have been 
lynchings, sometimes using the notorious 
'necklacing' method first employed in 
South Africa. This type of mob justice is a 
source of serious concern for Minister of 
the Interior, Peter Fachi. Although the 
suggestion has been discounted by many, 
there are fears that remnants of the 
Malawi Young Pioneers, who sought 
refuge in Mozambique, may be linked to 
the crime wave and that, in the long run, 
they may constitute an even greater threat 
to democracy. 
The police force is also considered 
a threat to democracy although it must be 
stressed that this view is held by only some 
ministers. Their suspicious handling of 
some recent murders, supposedly criminal 
but in reality political, have raised doubts 
as to their loyalty. The loyalty of certain 
elements in the Malawi Congress Party, 
who'it is believed, may not have fully come 
Speaker Munyenembe 
'If the press can be left free, I am sure 
the future for democracy in this 
country is bright 
to terms with their loss of power, is also 
questioned. 
On the side of democracy, how-
ever, is a well-disciplined army which 
steered clear of politics over the years, and 
to whom the nation should be grateful for 
bringing the MYP reign of terror to an end, 
thus facilitating Malawi's transition to 
democracy. Following the murder in April 
of the army commander. General Mamkin 
Chigawa, ostensibly by armed robbers near 
the border with Mozambique, a new 
commander has been appointed by Pre-
sident Muluzi. In recent months, the army 
has been conducting operations through-
out the country to recover illegally held 
arms. 
A view of the new Malawi Parliament 
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Reform of the judiciary 
Reforms to the judiciary, de-
signed to guarantee its independence and 
ensure equal and easy access of all to 
justice, have been greeted with con-
siderable relief by the people of Malawi. 
The traditional courts have been stripped 
of most of their powers, being restricted to 
cases involving customary law, and they 
have also been brought under the jurisdic-
tion of the High Court. 
During the Banda regime, high 
court judges were chosen from the admin-
istration and were civil servants. Although 
the new government has made it possible 
for people from the private sector to enter 
the judiciary no one has taken up the 
offer : there is a paucity of qualified people 
in the Malawi legal profession and the low 
level of remuneration does not make the 
job particularly attractive. Vice- President 
Justin Malewezi says that there are pro-
posals to separate the judiciary from the 
Civil Service and for judges to have a 
different scale of remuneration. 'When 
these reforms are in place,' he asserted, 'it 
will be easier for lawyers in the private 
sector to accept appointments to the 
bench.' 
The Vice-President indicated that 
reforms will also be necessary in the police. 
Observers point out that the force be-
haved, under the previous regime, as if it 
were an arm of the ruling party. Like some 
MCP politicians, there are police officers 
who have difficulty coming to terms with 
the new political order. The prison service is 
also earmarked for transformation with 
the aim of making it less punitive and more 
focused on rehabilitation. This is seen by 
Mr Malewezi as a challenging but crucial 
aspect of the government's overall human 
rights approach. A whole programme of 
retraining and training will be necessary for 
both the police force and the prison 
services. 
The Court system, meanwhile, 
faces a huge backlog of cases, some of 
which are murders dating as far back as 
1990. This is causing considerable unease in 
the country, because, as Mr Malewezi 
observes, 'justice delayed is justice denied.' 
The problem is compounded by the fact 
that some districts have no magistrates' 
courts. In the opinion of High Court Judge, 
Anastasia Msosa, who is also Chairman of 
the Electoral Commission, an interim 
measure would be 'for us judges to tour 
the country on circuits to hear these cases 
and dispose of them.' But as some of them 
involve murder it will not be easy. Murder 
cases require to be heard by a jury and 
Malawi has almost lost the habit of jury 
trials. Judge Msosa, however, told The 
Courier that she had been one of a group 
of judges who had recently toured the 
United Kingdom to 'familiarise ourselves' 
with jury trials. 'In the UK,' she said, 'we 
saw how the system operates. There isn't 
much difference with what we were used 
to, but there was no harm in re-acquaint-
ing ourselves with the procedures to see 
where we can make changes.' 
Transparency and 
accountability 
Of great concern to the donor 
community in Malawi's young democracy 
are the issues of transparency and account-
ability. The experience of the previous 
regime, with its abuses of power and 
nepotism are still fresh in the memory. So 
too is their expropriation of public funds. 
The resources available to Malawi, which 
are needed for development, are meagre 
and the country cannot afford to have 
them salted away. Today, corruption in 
Malawi is thought to be on a relatively 
small scale, certainly in comparison to other 
African states, but there is a view that it 
needs to be 'nipped it in the bud' before it 
becomes more widespread. The focus, of 
course, is on the ministries, in particular the 
Ministry of Works where awards of con-
tracts have always provided opportunities 
for bribery. The Government says it is 
dedicated to ensuring transparency and 
accountability. Indeed in his interview with 
The Courier, President Muluzi indicated 
that an Anti-Corruption Bureau was being 
set up to investigate all cases of corruption. 
Finance Minister, AlekeBanda, meanwhile, 
gave an assurance that anyone found to be 
defrauding the Government would im-
mediately be prosecuted, as a deterrent to 
others. The Auditor-General's Office, he 
revealed, is being beefed up and hence-
forth its reports will be closely examined 
and acted upon, unlike previously when 
they were simply consigned to the arch-
ives. Any discrepancy or whiff of corrup-
tion will result in the Ministry concerned 
being scrutinised by a team consisting of 
representatives of the Ministries of Justice 
and Finance, and of the Police. 
But these are currently just words 
and promises. They underline the need for 
a strong and independent press in a 
country where the Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation still sees itself as the Govern-
ment's mouthpiece. Independent news-
papers, which have found their way on to 
the streets since the advent of multiparty 
democracy, have been engaged in recent 
months in a campaign against corruption 
on a scale never before seen in Malawi. 
Unfortunately, despite this vibrancy, there 
is a great danger that a good number of 
them will disappear in the not-too-distant 
future for the simple reason that advertis-
ing revenue, on which they depend, is not 
sufficient. Currently they depend on the 
few advertisements placed by parastatals 
which are still controlled by political 
appointees of the previous regime. Lately 
there have been signs of discrimination in 
the distribution of advertising. With poli-
ticians who own newspapers increasingly 
using them as political tools, and few 
prospects of an appreciable expansion in 
the private sector in the coming years, 
democracy continues to be under threat. 
That, at least, is the opinion of E. Chitsulo, 
editor of the Michiru Sun and President of 
the Malawi Journalists' Association. 
Although licences for private 
radio broadcasting are being issued, no 
Malawian group has yet met the con-
ditions. So far, only a foreign evangelical 
organisation has secured one and has gone 
on to set up a radio service. At the 
moment, Malawi has no television station 
but it is understood that Malayasias 'TV 
Three' is planning to set one up in the near 
future. Hi A.o 
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divisions 
In addition to the Malawi Congress 
Party (MCP), two major political 
formations emerged during the 
transitional period. These were the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) led 
by Bakili Muluzi and the Alliance for 
Democracy (AFORD) led by Chak-
ufwa Chihana
1. Although not 
really tribal in outlook as in most 
African countries, the support of all 
three parties is regionally based ; 
the MCP in the centre, AFORD in 
the north and the UDF in the south. 
Since the May 1994 elections, there 
has been considerable manoeuvr-
ing for position in the new democratic 
Malawi. 
Both AFORD and the UDF, it 
should be recalled, suffered considerable 
harassment immediately after the unban-
ning of political parties and before the 
referendum on multiparty democracy in 
June 1993. They had little access to the 
media, and their rallies were tightly 
controlled. UDF leader, Bakili Muluzi was 
even arrested shortly before the re-
ferendum and charged with misuse of 
public and party funds when he was MCP 
secretary-general 12 years earlier. Yet the 
opposition successfully campaigned for a 
'yes' vote. But the months leading up to 
the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions saw divisions within the opposition. 
Whereas the smaller parties — the UFDM 
and the Congress for the Second Republic 
— rallied around the UDF to ensure the 
defeat of the Malawi Congress Party, 
AFORD remained independent, accusing 
the UDF of being made up of former 
members of the MCP and torturers. 
In the May elections, Bakili 
Muluzi of the UDF came first in the 
presidential race, ahead of Dr Banda, with 
Chakufwa Chihana of AFORD coming 
third. In the parliamentary poll, the UDF 
won 85 seats, the MCP 56 and AFORD 36. 
The UDF formed a minority government. 
Surprisingly, AFORD initially went into an 
They accepted reluctantly, however, the 
proposal for a Senate — to be im-
plemented in 1999. 
Advocates of a second Chamber 
argued that it would provide women, who 
' 1. A fourth party, the United Front for 
Multiparty Democracy (UFMD), set up in Lusaka by 
three exiled political groups — The Socialist League 
of Malawi, the Malawi Freedom Party and the 
Malawi Democratic Union — was overshadowed, 
mainly by AFORD. The arrest and imprisonment of 
AFORD's leader on his arrival in Malawi from exile 
helped provide it with considerable publicity. The 
UFMD joined the UDF along with a fifth party, the 
Congress for the Second Republic. 
opposition alliance with the MCP, al-
though several of its members had de-
fected to the UDF. The explanation ? There 
was a need to preserve the country from 
tribal divisions. By September, Mr Chihana 
had accepted President Muluzi's proposal 
to become second vice-president, a post 
not foreseen in the Constitution and which 
Parliament had to create. He was also 
made Minister of Water and Irrigation and 
his party, AFORD, was allocated three 
other ministerial posts. Together AFORD 
and the UDF have 121 seats in the 177 seat-
parliament. The President's explanation? 
There was a need to preserve the country 
from tribal division.Yet AFORD claims it 
retains the status of an opposition party. 
Among the recommendations 
made by the Constitutional Conference set 
up by Parliament were the abolition of the 
post of second vice-president, a limitation 
of 24 on the number of ministers and the 
creation of a second chamber — the 
Senate. Parliament, which retained the 
right of veto, rejected the first and second 
proposals, stating that the President must 
be free to determine the size of his cabinet. 
The Parliament in Zomba — currently 
unicameral but there is a proposal for a 
second chamber 
constitute 52% of the population but 
currently have only 6% of the seats in 
Parliament, with the opportunity of 
greater representation. But the debate in 
Parliament, which focused on the need for 
affirmative action for women who had 
suffered discrimination and oppression for 
years under Dr Banda, revealed con-
siderable unease. It was argued the main 
beneficiaries would be a few educated 
urban women who have nothing in 
common with women in the rural areas. In 
any case, observers note, it is unlikely that 
the proposal will see the light of day. By 
1999, a new unicameral Parliament will 
have been elected, and it is doubtful 
whether the mechanisms for the election 
of a second chamber will be in place. ■§ 
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'For the first time in 30 years, people 
can live as human beings' 
In May 1994, Bakili Muluzi was 
elected President of Malawi. He 
defeated Dr Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda who had ruled the country 
with an iron rod for 30 years. A 
Moslem from the South, in a pre-
dominantly Christian country, he 
served for a while as Secretary-
General of the Malawi Congress 
Party (MCP) before falling out of 
favour with Dr Banda. He left politics and 
went into business. With the lifting of the 
ban on other parties in 1993, following a 
referendum, he founded the United De-
mocratic Front (UDF) which went on to win 
the largest number of seats in the Par-
liamentary election. In this interview with 
President Mulizi, The Courier reviews the 
current political situation in the country. 
■ Mr President, it is now a year since 
multi-party democracy was ushered into 
Malawi and you came to office. How do 
you characterise your first year? What 
have been the main achievements ? 
— It has been a very difficult 
year, particularly on the economic side 
although politically we have done very 
well. I think our achievement has been the 
fact that in Malawi, for the first time in 30 
years, people can live as human beings. We 
have a democracy where people are now 
free to express themselves. This has been 
the main concern of all of us. What is left 
now is for us to consolidate these achie-
vements. 
■ Remaining with the issue of democracy, 
you have had to create the post of second 
Vice-President and provide ministerial 
positions for AFORD. These moves have 
been approved by Parliament, and you 
have explained that they were aimed at 
promoting national unity. But the first 
generation of African politicians began this 
way—getting all the political parties into 
one fold — and within a short time, they 
established de facto or de jure one party 
states. What do you say to that ? 
— Let me tell you that I am one 
of those who advocated and fought for a 
multi-party system of government. I don't 
believe in a one-party state. I want to see a 
strong opposition in this country, because 
it keeps the Government on its toes. 
Although AFORD is with us, it is just to 
make the government work. I certainly 
would not advocate that we go back to a 
one-party state : it is a bad system. AFORD 
has come in as our partner in government 
but they are not members of the UDF. They 
remain on their own as a political party, 
with their own views. They have their own 
policies just as the MCP has. We will make 
sure that the démocratisation process 
continues and that Members of Parliament 
can express their views freely in the 
chamber. 
■ Parliament has just approved a new 
Constitution, having rejected some of the 
recommendations made by the Consti-
tutional Conference. Given the country's 
experience ever the last 30 years, would it 
not have been more appropriate for the 
Constitution to be the subject of a more 
extensive national debate and, possibly a 
referendum ? 
— I should say that they were a 
great many consultations on the Consti-
tution. When we started at the Conference 
Centre almost 18 months ago, people 
discussed the issues exhaustively and 
indicated what they wanted. Consul-
tations also took place all over the country. 
Groups from the Parliamentary Committee 
on the Constitution went to all districts, to 
listen to the people's views on all the 
issues. There was a week-long conference 
in Lilongwe. You may say a week is not 
enough, but the views of the Chiefs, 
Newly democratic Malawi lies at the 
heart of the Southern Africa region 
'We must work together for regional 
integration' says President Mulizi 
religious leaders and political leaders were 
all well canvassed and it was a good 
conference. The Constitution contains all 
that it should contain. No Constitution is 
ever perfect. There always will be amend-
ments needed here and there, but in the 
process, we certainly tried as much as 
possible to have widespread consultation. 
■ Women, who represent 52% of the 
population, suffered considerable injustice 
under the Banda regime. In view of this, 
would a policy of 'affirmative action' in 
their favour not be appropriate ? 
— I think what we need to do is 
address the question of education for 
women. That's the most important thing. 
Girls in this country have been denied 
education at higher levels. Early marriages, 
and the system that we had under the one-
party state, meant that parents could not 
afford to educate girls, or to let them 
continue with their education. I have, as a 
matter of policy, introduced free primary 
education. With the help of an American 
donor fund, this specifically encourages the 
promotion of girls' education. Once we 
have succeeded in improving their edu-
cation, we think they will be able to 
participate very intelligently in national 
t 
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debate. It is important that women 
participate in our parliamentary life. They 
should be able to take part. That is why 
education, for the moment, is the most 
important thing. 
Meanwhile, my government is 
trying everything possible to put women 
into responsible positions. I have ap-
pointed three as ambassadors. In the last 
30 years, we have never had a female 
ambassador. I have appointed women to 
the chairs and boards of parastatals. So we 
have made a start and I am sure we will 
make progress. We think that in the next 
five to ten years, we can bring women up 
to participate fully in national political and 
economic life, reflecting their importance 
in the population. 
■ Why did you order the closure of two 
prisons ? 
— For obvious reasons. They 
evoked bitter memories of years of torture 
by the previous government. They were a 
legacy of the past that had to be closed. 
■ What instruments have you put in 
place to ensure that human rights are 
respected ? 
— One is the Constitution itself. 
We have ensured that fundamental 
human rights are within the Constitution, 
enshrined in a bill of rights. All the specific 
human rights aspects have been very well 
addressed within the Constitution. I think 
that is very important. It means, for 
example, that nobody, not even myself as 
President, can order the police to arrest 
anybody without cause. I have no powers 
to do that. The second important factor is 
that within the government, you have 
people like myself, who fought for human 
rights and democracy. We said we had had 
enough and rejected what had gone 
before. So the will is there to guarantee 
human rights for all. 
■ Were the UN Declaration and African 
Charter on Human Rights incorporated 
into the new Constitution. 
— Yes. In fact they have always 
been there, clearly stated even in the old 
Constitution. But the previously govern-
ment simply ignored them. 
■ Donors are taking a keen interest in 
what is happening in Malawi at the 
moment. How committed are you to the 
principles of transparency and account-
ability in government, and also to the fight 
against corruption ? 
— Very, very committed. I must 
tell you that I was one of the first to speak 
out against corruption and I am very much 
against it. We are now trying to establish 
an anti-corruption bureau which will be 
completely independent. When the bill to 
set this up was being drafted, there was a 
question as to whether it should be made 
responsible to me as the Head of State. I 
objected to this idea. I said I wanted the 
Bureau to be free to check even me. That 
shows my commitment. 
I am determined to ensure that 
we have transparency, and that ministers, 
civil servants, customs officers, the police 
and so on, are properly accountable to the 
people of Malawi. Having said this, those 
who allege corruption need to come up 
with evidence that it exists. That is very 
important. It happened in Zambia where 
everybody was talking about corruption in 
government and President Chiluba ended 
up dismissing almost everybody. I am 
saying that if anyone can come forward 
and say to me 'your Minister A did this or 
that in a corrupt manner', and there is 
evidence to prove it, I can assure you that 
that minister will be dismissed im-
mediately. 
■ You have spoken about the Bureau 
that is being set up. Will it investigate the 
past as well ? 
— I don't know exactly how 
wide its terms of reference will be, but 
broadly speaking, we are talking about 
anything that is viewed as unacceptable 
conduct in government. If it happened a 
month ago or last year — in other words, 
within my mandate — we will definitely 
investigate it. We would also like to know 
what happened during the previous 
government if possible. We want to know 
about it if there is any evidence of 
corruption, particularly in connection with 
embezzlement of the people's money. The 
people have a right to be protected. 
■ The Opposition tells me you now have 
in your hands, the results of an enquiry into 
a corruption allegation. When will that 
report be made public ? 
— Well a report was made and 
there was no evidence of corruption. What 
I saw in that report was that Malawi was 
being cheated by some unscrupulous 
business people who overcharged us for 
exercise books which are vitally needed in 
our schools. The Minister of Education 
went ahead and bought these without 
even checking the price. The matter has 
been investigated and we have found that 
there was no money involved in terms of 
somebody being bribed. There is no 
evidence of that nature in the report. 
What there is, is an indication that we 
were overcharged. I have said that we will 
not pay unless the company that supplied 
us can prove to us that it was a good price 
that they were offering. Two officials are 
currently in London now to negotiate with 
them and if they don't come up with a 
better, fairer price, we are not going to 
pay. They can take us to court if they want. 
■ For the sake of transparency would it 
not still have been better to ha ve made the 
report public ? 
— It will be made public. What 
we are waiting for, is the group that has 
gone to the United Kingdom to put the 
finishing touches to the investigation. 
Once that has happened, we will make it 
public. 
■ Are ministers required now to declare 
their assets ? 
— Under the constitution, yes. I 
have done so and so have all but two of our 
ministers. 
■ There has been rising crime recently. 
What measures are you taking to tackle 
the problem ? 
— The problem is not only in 
Malawi. I think the whole region is facing 
very serious difficulties in this regard. With 
all the wars on the continent — in 
Mozambique, Angola and the Horn of 
Africa — there are a lot of people moving 
here who have weapons. That has made it 
very difficult for us to cope with the 
situation, given our limited resources of 
manpower. The issue of security here, as in 
any country, is important because without 
it, many investors will be put off, and 
people become firghtened of moving 
around. So we are doing everything 
possible to address the security question. 
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We are going around all locations to 
identify those who have got weapons. If 
we find them, we confiscate them, unless 
the owner can prove that he has a licence. 
We have found quite a few this way — 
often coming from Mozambique. 
■ That leads me to my next question. 
How much of a threat to democracy are 
the remnants of the Young Pioneers who, I 
am told, are taking refuge in the neigh-
bouring country ?. 
— Well, I wouldn't like to use the 
word 'threat' although I suppose anybody 
who has got a weapon is a threat in some 
sense. It is true that some of the former 
Young Pioneers have run away, fearing 
perhaps that the new government would 
arrest them. But we are saying to them 
that we will not do that: 'You are 
Malawians, come back because this is your 
country'. On the other hand, there are 
some who have bad intentions. They want 
to subvert the stability of the country. We 
hear that some of them may have fled to 
Mozambique but we have no proof of 
that. We are investigating the claims. But I 
don't think we are talking about a large 
number — just a handful of people. 
■ Dr Banda's tentacles reach very deep 
into the Malawian economy. How do you 
propose to deal with it ? 
— You are talking about the 
Press Corporation ? 
■ Yes 
— What you say is true. We have 
an economy where a great deal is in the 
hands of just one person and that is very 
dangerous. Naturally my government will 
not allow that. We believe in a free market 
economy — not concentration. We do not 
feel it is proper that Banda should have 
personal control of almost 30% of GDP. We 
are vigorously examining the issue and 
discussing it with them. We are civilised 
people and we want to involve them in the 
discussions. So we are looking into that. 
■ Including the issue of ownership ? 
— Yes, that is a key aspect. 
■ The European Union has been involved 
in development in Malawi for a number of 
years and has played a significant part 
during the transition period. How do you 
see this relationship developing in future ? 
— Let me start by expressing my 
deepest thanks to the European Union. 
They have been our partners for a long 
time. They have contributed greatly to 
recent developments in this country, for 
which we are most grateful. We want this 
partnership to continue. I have always said 
that poverty is a danger to democracy and 
if we don't get assistance, then our 
democracy is endangered. The expec-
tations of the people are very high, and the 
poverty is very deep. So I hope to see 
continuing close cooperation between us 
and the EU. 
■ What kind of emphasis do you place on 
regional cooperation ? 
— We think we have an import-
ant role to play in the region. I happen to 
be the current chairman of the COMESA — 
the Common Market for Southern Africa. I 
believe that in the region now, in order for 
economies to be improved, regional integ-
ration will be very important. We already 
belong to SADC and COMESA and we must 
work together for regional integration of 
both resources and development. The 
region has got all the resources necessary 
but they need to be tapped and to do that, 
you have to attract investors : businesspeo-
ple who will come in with their money. The 
market within the COMESA region is about 
300 million people. The SADC countries 
have about 130 million. So we need to 
develop these wider markets. And in order 
to do that, there must be the full particip-
ation of all the member states in our 
regional bodies. 
■ In conclusion, is there any key area that 
you would like to highlight ? 
— The most important point at 
the moment is that Malawi is trying to 
tighten its belt. Fiscal discipline is the only 
effective medicine for restoring the 
economy. It is an area where we in 
government are doing everything possible. 
Because of the very difficult economic 
situation we inherited from the previous 
regime, I am still asking the donor com-
munity to be sympathetic to Malawi's 
situation. It is not a normal one. We have 
had 30 years during which the economy 
has been progressively ruined. We are 
trying to build up a new system and that is 
bound to take time. In the meantime, we 
need a sympathetic ear and a helping hand 
from our partners. As for the Malawian 
people, we believe that they understand 
the challenges that we face and will give 
this government time to implement its 
programmes. ■! Interview by A.O. 
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An interview with Gwandaguluwe Chakuamba-Phiri, 
Vice-President of the Malawi Congress Party 
Gwanda Chakuamba was senten-
ced to 22 years in jail in 1980 for 
sedition. He had been a member of 
the ruling Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP) and, for a period in the 
1970s, he was Minister for the 
Southern Region. He was released 
in July 1993 after serving 13 years of his 
sentence, following a vigorous campaign on 
his behalf by the opposition movement A 
few months later, he was appointed Sec-
retary-General of the MCP, a post that had 
been vacant for nearly ten years. More 
recently, he has become the party's Vice-
President, deputising for the ailing Kamuzu 
Banda. The Courier spoke to him during its 
recent visit to Malawi. 
■ The Malawi Congress Party of which 
you are Vice-President, was in office for 
decades as the sole political party in the 
country. Its record on human rights and 
economic management have been de-
scribed as appalling. Does the MCP ac-
knowledge these accusations ? 
— It is true that the MCP was in 
power for more than three decades and 
during that period there were certain 
things that it did well and certain areas 
where it didn't perform well. Instead of 
emphasising those things that the MCP did 
not do well, however, I would rather talk 
about the future management of the 
country. But if our record of human rights 
did not meet international expectations, I 
think that should be accepted. I too 
suffered under MCP rule. I was sentenced 
to 23 years in prison of which I served more 
than 13 years. But that situation has been 
corrected by the recent elections. The MCP 
is a new party now. It is no longer being run 
by one person. It is recruiting new mem-
bers and developing new policies in line 
with the new political environment. 
M Ina multi-party setting, don 'tyou think 
it would be wise of the MCP at least to 
apologise openly to the Malawian people 
for what happened in the past ? 
— When you say MCP I am not 
sure exactly what you mean. On the day 
that the Mwanza Report, published by the 
Commission of Inquiry, was presented to 
the President, I made a statement that it 
was not the MCP as such — as a party — 
that was guilty of sanctioning improper 
behaviour. It was individuals acting outside 
the framework of the party. The country 
should look at it from that point of view. 
■ As you said, you yourself were a victim 
of MCP rule. Why did you choose to rejoin 
the party that treated you in the way it 
did? 
— Many people ask me that 
question and I answer it in a very simple 
way. Before I went to prison, I was not a 
Christian. When in prison, I decided to look 
at various religions of the world. I read the 
Koran and the Holy Bible from beginning 
to end — many many times — and I came 
to the conclusion that I should become a 
Christian. I asked God to forgive me for all 
my sins. And the Bible says that you cannot 
ask for forgiveness if you do not forgive 
others. So, if I am to follow the Bible, the 
only thing that I can do is forgive and 
forget. Forgiving means coming together 
and working together. 
■ Dr Banda is still the Life President of the 
MCP. He is old, frail and sick. Given his kind 
of leadership, which involves taking all 
decisions personally without delegating 
authority to others, how is the party now 
being led ? Who is actually in charge ? 
— Under our new constitution, 
we have a national executive committee of 
36 members. Dr Banda is number one, I am 
number two. I chair all the meetings and 
we make decisions collectively. It is not a 
single individual who takes the decisions. 
■ With your party's past record, how can 
you be an effective opposition in Parlia-
ment? 
— We are trying to be an 
effective opposition but, you know, even 
the ruling party is having to learn the 
process of democracy. So are we of course. 
We are not used to arguing for or against. 
Under a one-party system this didn't 
happen. So it is something that concerns 
both sides; government and opposition. 
■ The one-party system meant that it 
was difficult to distinguish between party 
property and state property. It all seemed 
to be interlinked. Now that you are in a 
multi-party democracy, how do you pro-
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pose to separate the activities of the MCP 
as a political entity from those of the 
businesses with which it had links ? 
— Ever since it was established, 
the MCP has been an independent entity. 
The Life President of the MCP also es-
tablished businesses in his own right. 
People have tended to associate the two, 
seeing his business interests and, to be 
specific, the Press Corporation, as part of 
the MCP : alternatively, believing that the 
MCP is looked after financially by the Press 
Corporation. This has not been the case. Of 
course we get funding but it is not from 
business, it is from the Life President of the 
party. So there is a distinction between the 
two. 
■ So at the moment, the MCP is financed 
by Dr Banda 
— Yes. 
■ What about the members of the party 
who are involved in the Press Trust ? 
— That is Dr Banda's business. He 
owns, I think, 96.5% of the shares. As the 
owner of the company, he can choose 
anyone he likes to be a member of the 
board. But that has nothing to do with the 
MCP. For instance, in my case, I have just 
been recently appointed a board member 
of the Press Trust. But that is not the same 
as the Press Corporation and I have nothing 
to do with it. 
The burnt-out building of the Malawi 
Congress Party in Blantyre put to torch 
by an angry mob protesting against 
the party 
MCP members 'must adapt to a 
democratic society and accommodate 
other people's criticisms' 
■ In the ideological sense, what does the 
MCP stand for? 
— After a long period of one 
party rule, the MCP is now coming up with 
a progra mme to accom modate itself to the 
present economic and political set up. We 
want our members to understand what 
democracy is and that is our major hurdle. 
So our first step is a programme to make 
our own members understand that times 
have changed. They must adapt to a 
democratic society and they must accom-
modate other people's criticisms, viewing 
them not as enemies but as people 
contributing to the welfare of the country. 
■ There are rumours that the MCP still 
has contacts with a group of the Malawi 
Youth Pioneers operating in Mozambique. 
Is this true ? 
— That is absolutely not true. 
Before I went to prison, I was actually the 
commander of the MYP and I know most 
of the people involved. After my release, I 
got involved in the disbandment of the 
military wing of the MYP. I obtained all the 
records — how many people were in the 
armed wing, what sort of firearms they 
had and so on — and I personally handed 
these over to the army and the police for 
their study. But they did not believe the 
figures. So we are not in contact with these 
people. Personally, I don't believe there are 
many of them in Mozambique. 
■ How do you see the future of Malawi, 
both politically and economically ? 
— The future of Malawi depends 
upon us, government and opposition alike. 
We on the opposition side have a duty to 
make sure that things don't get out of 
hand. Things now are getting out of hand 
economically. The situation of the country 
is not as we would like to see it and we are 
pointing this out to the government. The 
government's response is that we are in a 
different society now, but we are saying 
that much more must be done for the 
people to be assured of a good future. You 
read in the paper about corruption, sugar 
being smuggled, and high-ranking figures 
being involved. They are allegations for 
which we do not have proof but they are 
frightening nonetheless. So the govern-
ment must be made more democratic and 
transparent than it is today. The personal 
business that they are doing, should be left 
for other people to do and they should 
concentrate on the management of the 
country. 
■ You mention corruption which is very 
interesting. Would you be in favour of an 
inquiry being set up to investigate corrup-
tion in the past and for action to be taken 
in future against anyone found guilty of 
corruption ? 
— Yes. You know there has been 
a rumour, which was published in the 
paper, about a Minister receiving 6 million 
kwacha. At the last budget meeting in 
Parliament, we proposed the setting up of 
a parliamentary committee to inquire into 
these and other allegations. But I was told 
that the British High Commissioner had 
already instituted a committee of inquiry 
(the newspaper that published the report 
was stopped from appearing). So I am in 
favour of that, and I also support legis-
lation against corruption. We must take a 
dealings with it because it is very serious 
and that is what we will tell the govern-
ment. Whoever goes down that road 
should be held accountable and the 
President should take appropriate 
action. ■■ Interview by A.O. 
Τ 
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of a despot 
History will not judge Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda kindly but it certainly cannot 
accuse him of having been a hypocrite. Throughout his 30 years in office, his totally 
uninhibited utterances, as recorded, for example, m John Lwandas book 'Kamuzu 
Banda of Malawi — a study of promise, power and paralysis', revealed him as a 
manic dictator probably worse in callousness than Amin, Bokassa or Ngwuema. He 
made his intentions quite clear f rom the beginning. European-style democracy was 
not for Africa. He would brook no opposition and anyone who dared challenge his 
authority would be ruthlessly dealt with — thrown to the crocodiles or into jail to 
'rot'. Kamuzu, he boasted, was law in Malawi. And he lived up to these threats. 
That the West turned a 
blind eye to his regime during the 
Cold War was not only due to his 
profound dislike of communism 
and his close links with apartheid 
South Africa, despite condemnation from 
the rest of black Africa. He also espoused a 
brand of private enterprise which was 
sweet music to the West — and whose 
true nature did not become clear until 
recently. He ran Malawi as his own private 
domain and controlled businesses that 
account for nearly 35% of the country's 
GDP (see interview with President Muluzi). 
Those who knew Dr Banda, first as a 
medical student in Edinburgh (he used to 
describe himself as the 'black Scot' and was 
a prominent member of Church of Scot-
land) and then in the early 1950s, when he 
practised medicine in London, have spoken 
of their dismay and difficulty in reconciling 
his humanity then with his subsequent 
career as a brutal despot. 
The early years 
Although he lived almost 40 
years abroad, Dr Banda kept in touch with 
developments back home. He first ap-
peared on the political scene in the then 
Nyasaland in 1958 when he was invited to 
assume the leadership of the Nyasaland 
African Congress (NAC). This was campaig-
ning for independence and against the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
which the British had created in 1953. The 
NAC needed someone of Banda's political 
stature, popularity and oratory. The choice 
was an effective one. Within a year of his 
return, the political temperature in the 
colony had risen so high that civil disorder 
broke out. A state of emergency was 
declared. Dr Banda was imprisoned and 
the NAC was banned. However, a new 
party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 
was formed a couple of months later with 
the jailed Banda as leader. 
Britain, having accepted the in-
evitability of decolonisation in Africa, 
despite the opposition of white settlers, 
released Banda in 1960 to lead a deleg-
ation to London for a constitutional 
conference. The resulting elections in 1961 
were won overwhelmingly by the MCP 
which had built up huge support in the 
rural areas. In 1963, the Federation was 
dissolved and Nyasaland achieved self-
government with Dr Banda as Prime 
Minister. Independence (as Malawi) came 
in 1964 and two years later, the country 
became a republic and one-party state 
with Banda as President. 
Even before independence, 
major policy differences, in particular over 
the pace and manner in which the 
economy should be Africanised, had emer-
ged between Banda and the young educ-
ated radicals who had been instrumental in 
his return home. These included Henry 
Chipembre, Kayama Chiume and Orton 
Chirwa. The dispute came to a head in 
1965 when several ministers, led by Chip-
embre, revolted. Dr Banda's willingness to 
maintain the status quo ensured he had 
the support of expatriates. On the advice 
of the Governor-General, he sought and 
won a confidence vote in Parliament. This 
sealed the fate of the rebel's : they were 
either arrested or forced into hiding or 
exile. An attempted 'invasion' by some of 
them in 1967 failed, resulting in the death 
of the former Home Affairs Minister, 
Yatuta Chisiza. 
Dr Banda's grip on power tight-
ened in 1971 when he was voted Pre-
sident-for-Life. From then on, no oppo-
sition was tolerated, as he installed a 
system of intimidation and of political and 
economic subjugation through an emascu-
lated MCP. A wing of the party, the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (a paramilitary 
organisation) was set up and within it, the 
Youth League (political intimidators and 
extortionists) literally went on the ram-
page. They forced Malawians to buy party 
membership cards, without which they 
had no access to such things as land, bank 
loans, government jobs and even public 
transport. There was also the Women's 
League, whose only purpose was to 
entertain Dr Banda wherever he went — a 
humiliation of which the women con-
cerned were quite unaware until after the 
dictator's fall. Most had considered this 
thankless duty as an honour. They had to 
wear uniforms bearing the ¡mage of Dr 
Banda and their husbands often ran up big 
debts to purchase them from firms linked 
to the President. 
With a loyal police force and a 
network of informers throughout the 
country, no one dared openly to express 
dissent. The nation lived in fear. Dr Banda 
took on the title of Ngwazi (conqueror) 
and insisted on being addressed by his full 
list of titles: His Excellency the Ngwazi, 
Life-President, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda. 
Malawians had other reasons to live in 
fear. The judiciary was reorganised to 
strengthen Dr Banda's authority following 
a few early court cases whose results 
displeased him. He was reported to have 
said at the time that his word was law in 
Malawi and no judge could acquit or show 
leniency to any of his political enemies. In 
1964, for example, when Machipisa Mun-
thali, the chairman of the Electoral Com-
mission and the state marketing organis-
ation ARDMAC, was sentenced to five 
years in jail for subversion, the government 
appealed and secured a term of 11 years. 
Munthali was not in fact released until 27 
years later. Under Dr Banda, the jurisdic-
tion of the traditional courts was extended 
to cover a wide range of issues, including 
criminal cases. Presided over by Chiefs who 
were loyal to the President, these courts 
were reserved for Malawians, while the 
High Courts and magistrate courts dealt 
with Asians and Europeans. 
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An archive shot of Hastings Banda at a 
rally, flanked by members of the 
Women's League 
The President brooked no opposition 
and turned Malawi into a personal 
■fíefdom 
Initial economic success 
Although the Cold War partially 
explained why, unlike Amin and Bokassa, 
Banda attracted little attention from the 
West on human rights issues, his initial 
success in improving Malawi's economy 
silenced most critics. He pursued the policy 
begun by the NAC of improving the lives of 
peasants, albeit with donor support -
providing rural areas with improved water 
supplies and sanitation, schools, health 
facilities and roads. He also ensured that 
farmers had access to subsidised inputs. His 
encouragement of private enterprise, with 
a range of inducements such as low-cost 
factory space, generous tax allowances, 
tariff protection and free repatriation of 
profits, together with his friendship with 
apartheid South Africa, produced the 
necessary foreign investments (particularly 
South African). Boosted further by in-
creased flows of official assistance, the 
economy grew rapidly, averaging 8% per 
annum during the 1970s. Food production 
rose steadily to match the rate of popu-
lation growth (a feat few African countries 
have achieved) and the commercial sector 
expanded as the production and export of 
the main cash crops — tobacco, tea and 
sugar — doubled. Manufacturing grew on 
average by 11%. 
In the early 1980s Asians were banned 
from trading in the rural areas. Dr Banda 
believed this was a sector that should be 
reserved for Malawians. But observers also 
noted a political motive : the need to keep 
the rural areas, where he drew his main 
support, from being influenced by a group 
of people who were becoming wealthier 
and as a result were likely to become 
influential. 
Between 1978 and 1981, the 
economy declined as rapidly as it had 
grown in the early 1970s. Growth dropped 
to 1.7%per annum (below the population 
growth rate), mainly as a result of severe 
drought and the growing conflict in 
Mozambique. Indeed these were to be the 
two major factors behind Malawi's econ-
omic misfortunes during the 1980s, when 
GDP growth seldom exceeded 2.5% per 
annum. Another significant element was 
the global recession, which was particularly 
strongly felt in South Africa. Although real 
growth improved to reach 3.6% in 1988 
and 4% by 1991, as a result of IMF-
supported structural adjustment measures, 
the economy as a whole was characterised 
by reduced ODA, falls in investment, lower 
export receipts, depressed wages and 
widespread poverty. In 1989, the World 
Bank reported that Malawi's annual 
income per capita was only $160 and it was 
classified among the six poorest nations on 
earth. Whether Dr Banda was living in 
'cloud-cuckoo-land' or deliberately chose 
to ignore the report is difficult to ascertain. 
To him, Malawi was making great econ-
omic strides and he, Kamuzu, had banished 
poverty. 
After the initial spate of invest-
ment in education and health (mostly 
through donor assistance), these areas 
suffered neglect for over two decades with 
the result that Malawi not only has the 
highest illiteracy rate in Africa (Mozam-
bique excepted) but also lacks skilled 
manpower. Low wages and a distorted 
system of private enterprise translated into 
a lack of savings and a failure to develop an 
indigenous entrepreneurial class. When 
Asians were banned from commercial 
activities in the rural areas, a vacuum was 
created which Malawians were not equip-
ped to fill. 'They did not have the finance, 
did not know where to start and did not 
get government support', P. Kalilombe, 
Chairman of the Malawi Chamber of 
Commerce, told The Courier. The lack of 
job opportunities in the urban areas 
explains why Malawi is one of the least 
urbanised countries in Africa. 
Personal control 
In maintaining the dual agricul-
tural system inherited from the colonial 
era, in the name of private enterprise, Dr 
Banda ensured personal control and ex-
ploitation of the country's agricultural 
output. The estates which produced the 
main export crops of tobacco and tea 
occupied the most fertile lands. With the 
blessing of the 'Life President', members of 
the MCP had easy access to choice land 
which was often not put to good use. 
Peasant smallholders, by contrast, oc-
cupied marginal areas. Their main product 
was the staple food, maize, grown largely 
for subsistence, and there was also some 
tobacco growing under a quota system. 
The Agricultural Development and Mar-
keting Corporation (ADMARC) bought 
their produce at fixed prices. 
Although parastatals were and 
still are involved in agriculture, manu-
facturing and mining, foreign investors 
usually went into joint-ventures with 
either the Malawi Development Corpor-
ation or the Press Corporation, 96% of 
which is owned by Dr Banda. The latter 
company dominates the modern sector 
with large tobacco, tea and sugar estates. 
It also has numerous other interests in 
transport, cattle ranching, property de-
velopment, retail and wholesale activities 
(some of which were taken from Asians) 
and even civil engineering. There is a 'Press 
Trust', to which profits from the Corpor-
ation are paid, purportedly for the benefit 
of the Malawian people. Through the Press 
Corporation Dr Banda indirectly controlled 
the economy. In addition, he did as he 
pleased with the nation's finances. 
With such huge resources at his 
disposal, a firm grip on the internal political 
situation and control of the security forces, 
Banda was able to reach his political 
opponents wherever they were. In 1979, 
Aitati Mpakati, leader of the Socialist 
League of Malawi (SOLEMA), was injured 
in a letter bomb attack in Zambia. In 1983, 
he was murdered while on a visit to 
Zimbabwe. In the same year, the leader of 
the Malawi Freedom Movement (MAF-
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REMO), Orton Chirwa, and his wife Vera, 
were abducted in Zambia and brought 
back to Malawi. Tried for plotting against 
the government they were sentenced to 
death but this was commuted to life 
imprisonment following appeals from 
several Heads of State. Like thousands of 
Malawians imprisoned for political reasons, 
the Chirwas were tortured. Orton died in 
prison in 1992 and his wife, who was not 
allowed to attend his funeral, was released 
in 1994. A journalist who was an opponent 
of the regime was killed along with his 
entire family in Zambia. 
Perhaps Dr Banda thought he 
was immortal. No one was allowed to 
emerge as an obvious successor. Anyone 
who showed any sign of popularity was 
eliminated. In 1983, the Secretary-General 
of the MCP and minister without portfolio, 
Dick Matenje, was reputedly involved in a 
controversy over an eventual successor. He 
and three other prominent politicians were 
murdered, with their deaths attributed to 
a road accident. The post of MCP Sec-
retary-General was left vacant for 10 years 
until 1993, when Gwanda Chakuamba was 
appointed. 
In the late 1980s, the ageing Dr 
Banda began to show signs of senility and 
power began, for the first time, to slip from 
his hands. It was effectively exercised by his 
trusted lieutenant, John Tembo and his 
official companion of over 30 years, 
'Mama' Cecilia Kadzamira
 
1. The end of the 
Cold War, which saw the winds of de-
mocratic change blowing across Africa, the 
weakening of apartheid in South Africa 
and further economic difficulties at home, 
signalled the beginning of the end for the 
regime. Dr Banda initially resisted pressure 
for change, hoping he could weather the 
storm, but the die was cast. In 1989, when 
10 people, including a senior M AFREMO 
official, were killed in a bomb attack in 
Zambia, a spate of reports on human rights 
violations in Malawi appeared. 
Amnesty International issued a 
damning report on detention and torture 
of political dissidents. In 1990 another 
' At the time of writing, John Tembo and 
'Mama' Cicelia Kadzimira were in detention on trial 
for the murder of Dick Matenje and three other 
prominent politicians in 1983. This followed the 
report of an enquiry ordered by the new Govern-
ment which revealed their involvement. Dr Banda 
has also been accused and is under house arrest. He 
has resisted appearing in court on the grounds that 
he is suffering from high blood pressure. 
human rights organisation accused the 
Malawian security forces of having shot 
dead 20 anti-government protestors and, 
from then on, international donors began 
to demand democratic reforms. When two 
groups of human rights lawyers from 
Britain and America visited the country in 
1993 and issued separate reports giving 
graphic details of murder, torture and the 
inhuman conditions in Malawian prisons, 
the regime finally realised it had an 
unwinnable battle on its hands. 
Emboldened by developments, 
exiles in Tanzania met in 1991 and formed 
a new opposition movement, the Malawi 
Socialist Labour Party. Later that year other 
exiled groups — MAFREMO, SOLEMA and 
the Congress for the Second Republic 
formed the United Front for Multiparty 
Democracy (UFMD). 
The latter was supposed to have 
been replaced by the Interim Committee 
for a Democratic Alliance, with Chakufwa 
Chihana as chairman, when all the exiled 
opponents met in Lusaka the following 
year. But Chihana's immediate return to 
Malawi changed that. He was arrested on 
arrival at the airport and while in prison, 
the internally constituted Alliance for 
Democracy came into being with him as 
leader. 
In March 1992, Roman Catholic 
bishops made their unprecedented inter-
vention with a pastoral letter criticising the 
lack of freedom and human rights abuses in 
the country. With pressure mounting. 
President Banda carried out his own 
'democratic reforms', holding elections in 
June 1992 for an enlarged legislature with, 
some 675 MCP candidates taking part. 
The electoral supervisor reported 
an 80% turnout and claimed that this was 
further proof 'that democratic elections as 
conducted in Malawi produce democratic 
results.' Donors, who had suspended 
development aid awaiting the implemen-
tation of reforms, were unconvinced. 
The months that followed saw 
the failure of attempts by John Tembo to 
hijack the process of change (see the 
article : Malawi's transition to democracy). 
In 1992 he sought unsuccessfully to win 
over the army commander, Lt-Gen Melvin 
Khanga, in his struggle to succeed Banda. 
When the commander refused, 
he was forcibly retired and replaced with 
General Isaac Yohane who would not 
budge either. The army (mainly the lower 
ranks) took on the Young Pioneers the 
following year, shortly after Dr Banda's 
return from a brain operation in South 
Africa. The MYP was disbanded at the 
insistence of the army which was bitter at 
having lost out to them in terms of both 
conditions of service and equipment over 
the years. The of the MYP was a devastat-
ing blow to John Tembo and the MCP, but 
the best thing that could have happened 
to Malawians in their fight for democracy. 
Overnight the instrument of intimidation 
had gone. 
During Banda's absence in South 
Africa, a three-man presidential council 
had been set up, in accordance with the 
Constitution. It was headed by Tembo who 
seized the opportunity to make several 
appointments to strengthen his position. 
After the referendum of June 1993, which 
approved a return to multiparty de-
mocracy he, in anticipation of elections, 
made a number of cabinet changes, clearly 
designed to bolster the MCP in the North 
and South where he knew it had little 
support. 
Gwanda Chakuamba, released 
from prison in 1994 after serving 13 years 
of a 22-year sentence for sedition, had 
joined the United Democratic Front which 
had fought for his release, but he was 
persuaded to rejoin the MCP as Secretary-
General. He was expected to deliver the 
votes of the Southern Region. But in the 
May 1994 presidential poll, the Malawians, 
seizing the opportunity to break from the 
longest and the most brutal dictatorship 
Africa has seen this century, gave victory to 
the UDF, consigning Banda's regime in the 
process to the dustbin of history. rM A.O 
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democracy 
by Peter Beck Christiansen" 
Between 1992 and 1994, Malawian 
society underwent a complete 'and 
peaceful' change with the holding 
of multi-party elections. This took 
place against a backdrop of often 
violent transition in neighbouring 
Mozambique and South Africa. 
The effects of more than 
30 years of one-party, one-man, 
autocratic rule have been de-
scribed elsewhere in this report. 
All services were geared towards 
the glorification of one person and the 
development of a whole class of sycoph-
ants perpetuated this. The consequences 
included nepotism and a divided society — 
a very rich and small upper class alongside a 
very big and poor underclass, with hardly 
any middle class or skilled labourers. There 
was also the siphoning of the economic 
surplus from the rural areas, both through 
the pricing systems and party taxes of 
various kinds. This went to the dominant 
conglomerates such as ADMARC, Press 
Trust and its offshoots, and into private 
property. The practical results were un-
paralleled poverty and a desperate health 
situation, even without the scourge of 
Aids. All this in a country which, unlike 
many others, had not suffered the miseries 
of armed conflict. 
There was, furthermore, a com-
plete disrespect of established inter-
national human rights and other general 
legal principles. The government/ruling 
party exercised absolute control over the 
population and their property. There was 
no separation of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers, despite provision for this in 
the Constitution. Human rights violations 
were recorded throughout the 1970s and 
1980s but they had little impact on the 
outside world. However, the crumbling of 
the Berlin Wall and of communist regimes 
throughout eastern Europe finally led to a 
* Head of the European Commission Delegation 
in Malawi. 
change in the attitudes of donor countries. 
In the meantime, an opposition 
had emerged both within and outside 
Malawi. Those involved placed themselves 
at considerable personal risk, as witnessed 
by the bombing and arson murders of 
members of the opposition in Lusaka and 
Harare. Perhaps the most important factor, 
however, was that the people of Malawi 
had become tired of their continued 
subjugation and the lack of hope for a 
better future. The one party monolith, 
despite its all-pervasive surveillance net-
work, completely underestimated this fact. 
Pastoral letter 
The decisive move which was to 
spark the changes was the publication, in 
March 1992, of a pastoral letter by the 
eight Catholic bishops in Malawi. This was 
read out in all the Catholic churches in the 
country. How the printing and distribution 
was able to take place without being 
discovered remains a mystery. Read today, 
the letter appears rather innocuous. It only 
lightly condemned the one-party govern-
ment and its human rights violations. 
However, it represented the first open 
challenge to the government. Although 
the authorities did not openly respond, it 
emerged that the murder of all eight 
bishops was contemplated. A tape of the 
relevant discussions was leaked, and sub-
sequently broadcast on South African 
radio. 
In April 1992, trade union leader, 
Chakufwa Chihana returned from a visit to 
Zambia and was promptly arrested. During 
the 12 months which followed, his High 
Court trial attracted extensive local and 
international interest. 
In May, the international donor 
community informed Malawi at a meeting 
in Paris that new commitments had been 
frozen pending required changes in the 
treatment of human rights in the country. 
Despite this, on his return from Paris, the 
Minister of Finance told the press that the 
meeting had been excellent for Malawi ! 
In the same month, strikes broke 
out in Blantyre and more than 30 people 
were killed by government forces. At the 
same time, the authorities undertook an 
intensive search for people with access to 
photocopiers and fax machines. The aim 
was to put a stop to the growing distri-
bution of 'seditious literature'. Many 
hundreds were imprisoned and tortured. 
In the second half of 1992, an 
umbrella organisation called the Public 
Affairs Committee (PAC) was formed. This 
brought together such bodies as the Law 
Society, the Chamber of Commerce and all 
the religious organisations, and its purpose 
was to act as a conduit for discussions with 
the government. The President responded 
by naming a Presidential Committee on 
Dialogue (PCD) for this purpose. He also 
announced a referendum to be held by the 
end of the year, under UN auspices. The 
UN's Electoral Assistance Office demurred, 
stating that it not would be technically 
possible in the time available. In addition to 
the need for proper voter registration, 
there would have to be civic education for 
the population, many of whom believed 
that 'Multipati' was an alternative party to 
the ruling Malawi Congress party (MCP). 
The government finally backed 
down but then went on to provoke new 
controversy over the issue of voting 
procedures. They insisted that there should 
be separate ballot boxes for the 'yes' and 
'no' votes in the referendum. The PAC, the 
donors and public opinion generally wan-
ted a single ballot box so as to avoid any 
possibility of fraud. After another pro-
longed tug-of-war, with intervention by 
the International Commission of Jurists, 
the government again had to give way. In 
the meantime, the PAC had started a civic 
education campaign which was financed 
mainly by the EU budget line for de-
mocracy and human rights, while the UN 
had assembled a team of experts to advise 
on such matters as voter registration, 
campaigning and voting procedures. 
In the run-up to the referendum 
on 14 June 1993, the government con-
sistently misused its dominance of the 
media and most notably of the single radio 
channel. This gave extensive coverage to 
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President Banda's campaign but studiously 
avoided mentioning the opposition except 
when quoting the President. The in­
dependent press, which had only emerged 
in 1992 in the face of opposition from the 
authorities (initial issues were banned), 
succeeded in getting a number of copies of 
its publications on to the streets. These sold 
like hot cakes and rapidly became col­
lectors' items. 
A vote for change 
At the end of the day, the 
referendum was a well-organised affair. Of 
the 4.7 million registered voters, 3.2 million 
cast a ballot. In fact, the turnout was 
probably close to 90%, the discrepancy 
being caused by widespread double regist­
ration. It must be doubted whether 
everyone voting fully understood the issue 
at stake, but the outcome was neverthe­
less clear. 66% voted in favour of a multi­
party system. In the Northern and 
Southern Regions, the figures were 88% 
and 85% respectively while in the govern­
ment stronghold of the Central Region, the 
result was 47% in favour and 53% against. 
When the result was announced, crowds 
took to the streets in the major cities to 
celebrate and demand further changes. 
The following day. President Banda broad­
cast a remarkable speech in which he 
conceded defeat and called for a general 
election to take place within a year. 
The new opposition wanted a 
government of national unity to oversee 
the country in the period leading up to the 
election. Following prolonged discussions, 
however, a transition mechanism was put 
in place instead. Seven parties had been 
registered, and in September 1993, the 
National Consultative Council (NCC) was 
established containing six representatives 
of each party. In the period up to the 
General Election on 17 May 1994, this non-
elected grouping discussed all aspects of 
the transition including the setting up of an 
electoral commission and defining the rules 
for campaigning in the media. It also 
oversaw the drafting of the new Consti­
tution. This was voted into being on the 
day before the election by the outgoing 
one-party Parliament — which abolished 
itself in the process. The importance of the 
NCC cannot be overemphasised. It served 
as a forum for compromise but more 
importantly as the venue for the creation 
of democracy. 
One major event of this period 
was the disarming of the Malawi Young 
Pioneers (MYP), a process which began on 
3 December 1993. The NCC had discussed 
the need to undertake this task for several 
months but the MCP prevaricated with all 
the means at its disposal. The catalyst was 
the killing of two Malawi Army soldiers by 
MYP members in a bar brawl in the 
northern city of Mzuzu. The army, which 
had always regarded itself as being politi­
cally neutral, had seen resources, including 
weapons, increasingly being diverted to 
the MYP in recent years. A group of 
younger officers at the Lilongwe barracks 
led the seizure of the MYP headquarters. 
The building was sacked, along with 
several shops belonging to the Press 
Corporation, and in three days of violence, 
a total of 28 people were killed. During this 
period, the Government was not in evi­
dence. Indeed, on 4 December, the radio 
broadcast a football match live from 
Blantyre pretending that there was peace 
in Malawi. In the following weeks, the 
army searched and destroyed all the MYP's 
military bases and confiscated its heavy 
weapons. The possibility of an army 
takeover could not be ruled out but, in the 
event, they withdrew to their barracks 
following the obligatory sacking of the 
three top generals. 
During this period, following 
concerted pressure by the International 
Red Cross Federation and other donors, all 
political prisoners were freed. Several of 
those released from prison now serve in 
the government. One result of this gesture 
was the general resumption of develop­
ment aid. 
Funds go astray 
With the one-party govern­
ment's power thus reduced, it was possible 
for the election campaign to commence. 
This began with voter registration under 
the auspices of the international com­
munity. The government still held the 
financial levers, however, and during this 
period, a deficit of more than 500 million 
Kwacha (approximately ECU 80m at the 
time) was run up. No satisfactory expla­
nation has yet been given as to what 
happened to these funds. 
The campaign was more balan­
ced than in the earlier referendum in both 
the written press and on the radio, but 
there were still accusations of electoral 
malpractice and intimidation levelled by 
international NGOs. It is doubtful if the 
elections could have been deemed free and 
fair if the outcome had not been a change 
of government. 
In the event, the Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections followed the pat­
tern established in the referendum. The 
UDF emerged as the biggest party with 
45% of the votes (78% in the South). The 
former ruling party, the MCP, took 37% of 
the vote with its support heavily concen­
trated in the Central Region (65%). AFORD 
won an overwhelming victory in the North 
(85% of the poll) but only scored 17% of 
the national total. Bakili Muluzi of the UDF 
assumed the Presidency while his party 
formed a minority government. 
The ageing President Banda 
again took to the airwaves to concede 
defeat, sounding a great deal more frail 
than a year earlier. His apparent invinc­
ibility had already been undermined the 
previous year when he had been flown to 
South Africa to undergo minor brain 
surgery — although strenuous efforts 
were made to keep this trip secret. His 
military arm, the MYP, had been shattered 
and his financial muscle proved inadequate 
to maintain him in power. 
The change of government and 
political system took place without in­
cident. After thirty years, the task of 
sorting out the economic mess, and tack­
ling the all-pervasive poverty in the 
country, had begun. The move to a free, 
democratic system, with full respect for 
human rights, was necessary for this to 
happen but Malawians are well aware that 
this is just the first step. There is still a long 
way to go before the effects of 30 years of 
economic and psychological malpractice 
can be overcome. The people of the 
country can, however, be justifiably proud 
of having made the transition without any 
major bloodletting — and largely outside 
the international limelight, ϋβ P.B.C. 
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has to get worse to get 
better' 
'Cash budgeting.' These two words 
summed up Malawi's dire financial 
circumstances when The Courier 
visited the country in May. It is a 
system of allocating resources in 
accordance with available revenue. 
In practice this has meant priority 
ministries like Health and Edu-
cation, which saw their share of the 
budget increase substantially in 
March, receiving 50% of their 
requirements and others getting 
only 30%. 
Set against the background of 
the often inadequate and, in some inst-
ances, rapidly deteriorating social infra-
structure, in health and education for 
example, these measures appear incredibly 
harsh. Education admittedly is getting a 
fair share, with donors showing con-
siderable interest in providing assistance. 
But the health services are in a deplorable 
state. This at a time when Malawi is facing 
a serious Aids epidemic. A visit to the 
Zomba Hospital is a heart rending ex-
perience. The hospital lacks almost every-
thing — personnel, equipment, mainten-
ance and drugs — and patients, including 
children, sleep on the floor and outside 
under trees, in Southern Africa's wintry 
conditions. They wait for hours for treat-
ment, and a lot of them are dying. 
Yet the tough, no nonsense fiscal 
discipline, imposed by Finance Minister 
Aleke Banda, is sweet music to the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
donor community. It is designed to pull 
Malawi as quickly as possible out of the 
economic mess into which the Kamuzu 
Banda regime plunged ¡t. A few indicators 
reveal the extent of the crisis : a budget 
deficit of nearly $57 million, an inflation 
rate of 34.7% and a declining per capita 
income. 
Persistent droughts since the 
beginning of the 1980s and the world 
recession have both played a significant 
part in the reversal of the country's 
economic fortunes after the good growth 
of the 1960s and 1970s and the improved 
performance following the implemen-
tation of structural adjustment program-
mes. But the last months of the previous 
regime also saw reckless spending on an 
unprecedented scale. According to Finance 
Minister Banda, government borrowing 
rose from K637.8 million in 1993 to 
K1133.3 million in 1994. With the floating 
of the kwacha in early 1994, at a time of 
serious foreign exchange shortages (fol-
lowing the suspension of international 
assistance pending implementation of 
political reforms), the currency depreciated 
sharply. This fuelled inflation and GDP fell 
by almost 9%. 
It was clear that drastic measures 
would have to be taken to avoid economic 
collapse. There could be no growth, no 
attraction of foreign investments and no 
chance of the government achieving its 
main objective of poverty-alleviation until 
the economic distortions were tackled. 
'We have made it very clear from the 
beginning,' said Mr Banda, 'that as a 
Government, we are in a very difficult 
situation ; that this country is poor, that 
things will get worse before they get 
better., and that we have to make 
sacrifices.' 
Transfer of departmental 
accounts 
Cash limitations apart, there is a 
learning process involved in the whole 
exercise, for ministers and civil servants 
alike. They have to learn the simple truth 
that Governments do run out of money, 
according to Reserve Bank Governor, 
Professor M. Chikaonda. Under the pre-
vious regime, extra-budgeting was an 
accepted practice and it worked perfectly 
for spending units which had their ac-
counts at the Reserve Bank. According to 
Mr Chikaonda, ministries presented 
cheques at the commercial banks who had 
no way of checking the balances. In this 
manner they obtained overdrafts, created 
excess liquidity and increased government 
debt vis-a-vis the banks. Since April, all 
Government accounts have been moved 
from the Reserve Bank to the commercial 
sector to make it impossible for any 
department to obtain credit surrepti-
tiously. With 'cash budgeting', each has to 
make savings in whatever area it deems 
necessary. Departments, of course, are not 
barred from borrowing. But those who 
wish to can only do so through the non-
bank sectors and that 'is less serious in 
terms of the inflationary impact,' says the 
Reserve Bank Governor. 
The impact of the austerity meas-
ures on the population has been less 
traumatic than expected. This is due to the 
fact the majority live on subsistence 
farming in the rural areas and are less 
dependent on consumer goods, but there 
is undeniable hardship, especially among 
wage-earners, who have seen inflation put 
a number of basic commodities out of their 
reach. The Government was forced to 
increase civil service salaries by 25% across 
the board in April. 
Relief on the way 
But there is relief on the way. 
According to Aleke Banda, these shortages 
of funds are unlikely to last for the whole 
year, because of the various tax measures 
he announced in the March budget. These, 
he hopes, will start yielding revenue by 
June. Indeed the Government is pinning its 
hopes for financial salvation, at least in the 
short to medium term, on improved 
efficiency in revenue collection. Studies 
have revealed that there are considerable 
slippages, particularly in the customs 
department, and if plugged, the result 
could be a substantial increase in income. 
For example, large amounts of goods are 
often declared to be in transit to neigh-
bouring countries when, in reality, they are 
being dumped in Malawi because there are 
is no-one to supervise their onward move-
ment. As well as ensuring that this is 
stopped, the Minister of Finance indicated 
that pre-shipment inspections are being 
reinforced and that measures are being 
taken 'to investigate people who want to 
defraud the Government.' 
Doing these things, of course, 
requires building up more capacity by 
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recruiting and training more police and 
customs officers and this entails more 
expenditure. The IMF and the British 
Government are understood to be provid-
ing assistance in this field. Mr Banda 
admits, however, that, 'no matter how 
much we raise from our own resources, we 
are still dependent on balance of payments 
support from our donors.' In May, Ma-
lawi's foreign reserves were down to only 
0.7 months of import cover (1.9 months if 
all the foreign currency denominated 
accounts of the banking sector were 
included). The adjustment programme, 
which the Government has agreed with 
the IMF, requires the Central Bank to 
increase the figure to 1.9 months by the 
end of the year and Mr Chikaonda appears 
confident that this target will be met. The 
aim is also for the interest rate to be 
reduced from its current 34.7 % to 20%. The 
Governor's optimism is partly based on the 
fact that the foreign exchange market has 
been liberalised and a programme of 
foreign exchange auctions has just been 
introduced which is designed specifically to 
build up reserves. 
The liberalisation of currency 
exchanges, coupled with the govern-
ment's directive to exporters to release 
60% of their foreign exchange earnings 
into the market, as well as the law which 
prohibits banks from having no more than 
20% of their capital base in foreign 
currency, have resulted in an abundance of 
foreign exchange. The impact, according 
to Mr Chikaonda, was seen recently both in 
the stabilisation of the kwacha's value and 
in the specific case of the Petroleum 
Control Commission which was able to 
raise $60m from the market in just one 
week, having previously had difficulty 
paying its foreign creditors. 
Foreign assistance 
With donors satisfied with the 
Government's fiscal measures, there is an 
enormous amount of goodwill towards 
Malawi. Indeed there are no shortages of 
offers for assistance, and these in almost 
every sector of the economy. Last year, the 
IMF provided a $22 million eight-month 
standby credit for the structural adjust-
ment programme while the World Bank 
began a $40m programme designed both 
to assist the Government in its reforms of 
the various economic sectors and to import 
maize to overcome shortages. An input 
programme, financed by a group of donors 
led by the Bank, in which free fertilisers and 
seeds were distributed to the poor before 
this year's planting season, enabled the 
country to have better maize yields this 
year, despite erratic rainfall. 
The reforms being carried out in 
agriculture should ensure better standards 
of living for peasants. Although Dr Banda's 
regime claimed to espouse the free 
market, agriculture, like very other sector 
of the economy, was, in reality controlled 
by the government, particularly in terms of 
pricing. The result was not only a sub-
sistence existence for the vast majority of 
the people, but also a contraction of the 
economic base. 'The price regime was so 
static that it provided the smallholder with 
no opportunities to take advantage of 
emerging domestic as well as international 
markets', explained Agriculture Minister, 
Dr Mapopa Chipeta. So agriculture is being 
liberalised both at the production and 
marketing levels. Restrictions on the 
export of a number of commodities, 
except maize, have been removed so as to 
encourage farmers to diversify and expand 
the agricultural base. Farmers are being 
encouraged to move into other food crops 
such as sorghum, cassava and sweet 
potatoes as well as into industrial products 
such as cotton, oilseed, soyabeans and 
sunflowers. But the emphasis goes even 
further, with encouragement for agro-
forestry and livestock development. In 
addition, Malawi still has available the fish 
resources of Lake Malawi not to mention 
the country's considerable tourist poten-
tial. 
The Minister admits that the 
tobacco industry, which most farmers find 
more lucrative, is not yet fully liberalised. It 
is still governed to some extent by a quota 
system. Most of the country's tobacco crop 
is cultivated by estate farmers but smallhol-
ders grow it in small quantities and in 
accordance with quota allocations. The 
explanation for this policy is that 'Malawi 
has to respond to certain market allo-
cations at the international level.' The 
plan, however, is progressively to de-
regulate the sector allowing farmers them-
selves to organise production and market-
ing, in collaboration with the Tobacco 
Control Commission. 
Aside from the policy aspects, agriculture 
in Malawi faces a number of practical 
constraints including a shortage of arable 
land, lack of access to inputs and credits, 
environmental degradation and the in-
creasing frequency of drought. Smallhold-
ing is declining in Malawi because of the 
rapid increase in the population. The 
average farm size has fallen from 1.6 
hectares per family in 1969 to 1.1 ha in 
1989 and this is projected to fall further, to 
0.3ha by the year 2000. The result has been 
increased poverty. Yet there are the 
estates, employing a small number of 
people, that occupy the best arable land in 
the country and produce only a narrow 
range of export crops (tobacco, tea and 
sugar). One might have expected the 
government to have land reform at the 
top of its priority list. But as on all issues 
concerning private property and enter-
prise, it appears to be treading warily. Dr 
Chipeta spoke, instead, of the need for 
more efficient use of land to make it more 
productive. 'It is true,' he said, 'that a large 
number of our farmers are on marginal 
lands and are not able to produce food for 
themselves, let alone participate in domes-
tic and international markets for industrial 
crops. But we feel that market forces must 
determine how best land should be util-
ised.' 
The Minister also looks to the 
market as far as inputs are concerned. To 
him the government's role should be that 
of a facilitator, creating the environment 
for 'private entrepreneurs to participate in 
the provision of inputs to the agricultural 
sector.' At the same time, however, the 
government is taking an active interest in 
ensuring that smallholders have access to 
Processing the tobacco crop 
No yet fully liberalised, but the plan is 
to deregulate the sector progressively 
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community and the World Bank in par-
ticular, it has set up the Malawi Rural 
Finance Company to address smallholders' 
needs. This follows the failure of the 
extension unit in the Ministry of Agricul-
ture to provide an effective service in this 
area. 
Dr Chipeta said that over the 
next few years, the government would be 
adopting an environmental protection and 
management strategy for soil and water 
conservation. Malawi faces an immense 
problem of erosion and drought but it also 
has tremendous potential for irrigation. 
There are an estimated 400 000 hectares of 
land that could be irrigated and the future 
of agriculture will depend on progress in 
this area. The government will not be 
aiming for big projects, which require 
sizeable investments. Instead it intends to 
emphasise small and medum-scale irrig-
ation. 'Our proposal is for farming com-
munities to establish and manage these 
schemes themselves, with the Government 
providing extension services,' the Minister 
said. A number of pilot projects, supported 
by donors, are already up and running. 
Dr Chipeta regretted the lack of 
encouragement to farmers to organise 
themselves in the past, as well as the 
inability to relate research to their needs. 
The government, he said, was taking 
measures to rectify these failings. Farmers' 
organisations are now being encouraged 
so that ideas on new techniques and 
technologies can be transmitted to them 
through these organisations. 
Harvesting sugar on one of the 
plantations 
One might have expected the 
government to have land reform at the 
top of its priority list 
Manufacturing and job 
creation 
A successful broadening of the 
agricultural base should result in significant 
improvements to the living standards of 
Malawians. It should also encourage the 
growth of the manufacturing sector and 
the creation of jobs, although it has to be 
recognised that an inadequate raw ma-
terial base is just one of several factors that 
has hamstrung industrial production over 
the years. Others include the smallness of 
the domestic market, the high cost of 
transport, a lack of investment capital and 
an insufficiently educated workforce lead-
ing to a lack of skilled manpower. 
Overcoming these disadvantages 
will be a long and hard task. Indeed they 
already impinge negatively on the govern-
ment's privatisation programme which is 
part and parcel of its poverty alleviation 
policy. The fact that Malawi had a political 
system for 30 years which did not promote 
the emergence of a middle class, and that 
widespread poverty translated into a lack 
of savings and capital formation, puts the 
authorities in a somewhat awkward situ-
ation today. Very few Malawians can 
afford to buy shares let alone enter joint 
ventures with foreign investors. But ways 
have to be found, according to Vice-
President Justin Malewezi, who is in charge 
of the programme. He suggests, among 
other things, that Malawi may have to do 
what was done in Eastern Europe 'where 
they allocated shares to the masses.' 
Another big challenge facing the 
government in this area is what to do with 
the Press Corporation, the conglomerate 
which is owned by former President 
Hastings Banda, and which dominates the 
private sector. There is also the question of 
the Press Trust. 'This is an intricate area,' 
Mr Malewezi admits. 'It is not just Dr 
Banda's concern, but also that of the 
Malawi Congress Party, because all the 
trustees are members of the MCP. We 
would like to see the depoliticisation of the 
conglomerate.' What is remarkable here is 
the concern in government circles for 
legality. Whereas, in most countries, the 
Press Corporation would be considered to 
be public property, that could be legally 
declared as such, ministers again approach 
the issue with caution. 'We have not 
abandoned the legal option as a last 
resort', the Vice-President told The 
Courier. 'But we feel an attempt should be 
made at negotiation. If that fails, we will 
then go through the legal procedure. 
Parliament can introduce an Act and take it 
over, but we fear that the message we will 
be sending to prospective investors and 
others who do business here may not be 
the right one.' 
Whatever the difficulties Malawi 
faces at the moment, observers are united 
in predicting a better economic perform-
ance in the future, thanks to the liberating 
effects of the current political situation. As 
P. Kalilombe, who is Chairman of the 
Malawi Chamber of Commerce, told The 
Courier, 'the changes now taking place are 
more dramatic than people imagine. It is 
not just the movement from one party to 
multiparty democracy ; it is a movement of 
attitudes as well. People are beginning to 
feel that the individual matters and that as 
an individual, one can contribute to the 
development of the country. Previously 
the attitude was that 'Kamuzu will do 
something for us'. We used merely to be 
passive but that has now changed.' At long 
last, Malawi is not only politically free, but 
economically free as well. In short, the 
process of development is only just starting 
after 30 years of independence. MB A.O 
-I 
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Banda's 30 years rule were a collection of 19 
palaces which have become more of a 
burden than an asset for Malawi in terms of 
maintenance. Five have understandably 
been sold, but the one which presents the 
Government with its biggest dilemma is the 
palace in Lilongwe. 
By far the largest, the most 
expensive and almost certainly the most 
luxurious presidential palace in Africa, it 
took 15 years to construct. The story 
reveals a striking parallel with that of 
Nicolae Ceausescu's palace in Bucharest. Dr 
Banda was said to have ordered the 
reconstruction of the staircase several 
times, and the final result was a series of 
ornate and individually-carved balustrades 
alternating from top to bottom. 'Mama' 
(as Banda's companion and official hostess 
was called) was also closely involved in the 
design, choice of decoration and furnish-
ings — and what tastes she had ! The cost, 
calculated from vouchers found in the 
Ministry of Works, totalled $250 million, 
but it was almost certainly more than that. 
Sitting on about 550 hectares of 
land, of which 200 are well-manicured 
gardens, it has the obligatory mini-
stadium. This was reserved for Banda's 
famous Women's League who were de-
dicated to his entertainment in dance, 
songs and praise. The palace has five 
presidential suites complete with offices, 
appartments for first ladies with ac-
companying offices, innumerable rooms 
for entourages, banqueting halls, toilets 
and kitchens. Dr Banda's appartment and 
Mama's were decorated with incredible 
luxury and taste, each fitted at strategic 
points with communication panels to 
enable the President or his companion to 
summon anyone within the palace at the 
press of a button. There is an in-built 
theatre for live orchestral music. The 
Courier was given a one-hour guided tour 
of the building but nobody there could 
confirm with certainty how many rooms 
the palace actually has! 
300 gardeners 
Beyond the garden area, appart-
ments were built for staff who would have 
numbered up to 1000. Even today, the 
Government employs some 300 gardeners 
just to maintain the grounds and overall, 
the cost of the palace's maintenance is put 
at one million kwachas a month. 
Banda's folly? 
Nobody at the palace in Lilongwe could 
confirm with certainty how many 
rooms the palace actually has ! 
The dictator was only days away 
from moving in when he was defeated in 
the presidential election. His successor. 
President Bakili Muluzi has shunned the 
site preferring Sanjika in Blantyre instead. 
Except perhaps for the palace in Zomba 
which he appears willing to retain, all the 
others are up for sale — 11 in all. Any 
offers ? 
The Lilongwe palace, which has 
been used a couple of times by the new 
government to host conferences, is being 
treated differently. Despite the huge cost 
of maintenance, the current plan is to keep 
it, both as a monument to Banda's folly 
and as a national asset, nonetheless. It 
would not be right to sell it, officials told 
The Courier, given the money that was 
spent on construction and the amount of 
land that it occupies. The Government is 
currently examining various ways of 
making use of it to derive an income, if only 
to reduce the cost of maintenance. ■■ 
A.O. 
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refugees in Malawi 
Although the European Union's presence in Malawi is felt in almost every sector of 
the economy, one aspect of its activity that is not particularly well known is its 
crucial role in the settlement and repatriation of Mozambican refugees. The Courier 
visited the now empty Luwani refugee camp in Lisungwe (Mwanza district) and 
saw what must be a classic example of how relief can be linked successfully to 
development. 
The story began in 1988, 
at the height of refugee influx, 
when all the camps in Southern 
Malawi were full to their ma-
ximum capacity and the UNHCR 
made an urgent appeal to the EU 
for assistance. A senior UNHCR 
programme officer told 77je 
Courier that the European Com-
mission's prompt response to the request 
was both timely and exemplary. It enabled 
the UNHCR to start work immediately on 
the site which it had secured from the 
Malawian government in a forest reserve 
area. It had prepared plans for permanent 
structures — a school, a clinic, waterpoints 
and feeder roads. Most importantly, it 
included an environmental project involv-
ing tree planting by the refugees to 
counter the anticipated deforestation 
which they themselves were expected to 
cause. 
The camp was built to accom-
modate between 80 000 and 100 000 
people. In order to relieve pressure on the 
border areas, refugees from Nsanje and 
Mulanje were transported to the new site 
and by 1992, it had reached its maximum 
capacity. An open camp, refugees here 
constructed their own huts, came and 
went as they pleased, and lived in families 
as normally as possible. The camp's facilities 
also catered for the needs of the local 
people, particularly in the field of health 
services. 
After the signing of the peace 
accord in Mozambique, there was a 
spontaneous departure of refugees who 
wanted to return home as well as an 
organised repatriation. By the end of last 
year, the camp that had once been a hive 
of activity, was empty and eerily quiet. To 
avoid an outbreak of disease in the area, 
the UNHCR again appealed to the EU to 
finance a clean-up campaign involving, in 
particular, the destruction of huts, the 
closing of latrines, and refuse clearance. 
Again, the Commission responded prom-
ptly. 
In April this year, the UNHCR, 
which has all but wound up its activities in 
the country, handed over property and 
equipment worth some $36 million to the 
Malawi government. The inventory in-
cluded vehicles, education and health 
facilities, waterpoints, warehouses, roads 
and rehabilitated forests in locations 
throughout Malawi. Included, of course, 
were the facilities of the Luwani camp — 
vehicles, a clinic, a school, 500 boreholes 
and more than 375 hectares of afforested 
land planted with local tree species. 
The Courier visited the Luwani 
facilities to see what plans are being made 
to ensure that they are utilised effectively 
A view of the clinic at the Luwani 
camp 
Today, local people benefit from the 
facilities set up to help Mozambican 
refugees 
by the local population. Although the 
people living in the immediate vicinity 
number only 2300, the clinic, which is still 
functioning, now serves a population 
within a radius of 40 sq km — about 
184 000 people. Even former refugees still 
come across the border to seek medical 
attention there. The clinic has a doctor, 
two nurses and a medical assistant. At the 
time of The Courier visit, a two-way radio 
communication system was being installed 
to link the hospital with other medical 
centres. It still needs equipment for a 
planned operating theatre. The aim is to 
avoid having to send patients to distant 
hospitals, as currently happens, for minor 
operations that could easily be dealt with 
locally. Luwani also needs one or two 
ambulances and a supply of essential drugs 
to make it properly operational. 
As for the school buildings which 
are modern and furnished, the Govern-
ment has yet to decide what level of 
education to provide there, given the 
country's pressing needs in both primary 
and secondary education. 
The Union's assistance for re-
fugees was not restricted to the Mwanza 
district. The Commission also funded the 
extension of the Ntcheu district hospital in 
Boma, providing a maternity wing, a 
paediatric ward, a store room and an 
extension to the mortuary. In Biriwiri, it 
built a health centre to meet the needs of 
the huge number of refugees in that area 
while in Dedza, it funded the construction 
of the Mulangeni maternity wing. All of 
these facilities, which are of a higher 
standard than those in many urban areas 
(such as Zomba) are now being used by 
Malawians as well as Mozambicans who 
travel over the border (as in the case of the 
Luwani camp). Ironically, the refugee crisis 
has resulted in an improvement in the 
quality of life of the local people. But this is 
no less than the Malawians deserve, for 
they were generous to those who came 
seeking shelter. The UNHCR and the 
European Commission also deserve praise 
for their foresight in ensuring that per-
manent rather than makeshift structures 
were built and that environmental de-
struction and degradation were lim-
ited, nm A.0 EU-Malawi cooperation 
Linked to changing needs 
by Jürgen Lovasz* 
Malawi has been associated with 
the European Community since the 
entry into force of the first Lomé 
Convention in 1976. Until the be-
ginning of the 1990s, the cooper-
ation was of a financial and tech-
nical nature. Since then, the poli-
tical dimension has become an 
important part of the relationship. 
Community development assist-
ance to Malawi under Lomé l-IV is princip-
ally given in the form of financial support 
and technical expertise funded from the 
EDF. Besides receiving grants under the 
four National Indicative Programmes 
(NIPs), Malawi is benefiting from support 
under the Structural Adjustment Facility, 
regional cooperation, emergency aid in-
struments and Stabex, together with risk 
capital and interest subsidies managed by 
the European Investment Bank. Activities 
financed in Malawi under the Community 
budget (i.e. outwith the Lomé Conven-
tion) are, in particular, for cofinanced 
projects together with NGOs, food aid and, 
more recently, for the ongoing démocratis-
ation process. 
The overall total assistance allo-
cated to Malawi by the European Com-
munity amounted to about ECU 529 
million (excluding regional and EC bud-
getary support) up to the end of 1994. In 
addition, 440 000 tonnes of food aid was 
provided to Malawians and refugees from 
Mozambique. 
The provision of Community as-
sistance to Malawi under the Lomé Con-
ventions has always been linked to the 
development needs of the country. These 
needs have changed over the last 20 years 
* Economic adviser at the EC Delegation in 
Malawi. 
and the programming has had to adapt 
accordingly. 
Lomé I 
From the time of independence 
until the end of the 1970s, Malawi ex-
perienced strong economic growth. GDP 
grew in real terms by an average of more 
than 6% and in per capita terms by 3% 
annually. This impressive performance was 
due to substantial increases in agricultural 
output thanks to the timely availability of 
inputs and credit, the expanded provision 
of extension services and increased re-
search activity. The increased output not 
only provided an export base but also 
fuelled the expansion of secondary sectors 
such as manufacturing. Total productive 
activity also benefited from the balanced 
development of basic infrastructures, not-
ably roads, railways and public utilities. 
Community assistance under 
Lomé I (1975-80) supported this develop-
ment with an emphasis on increasing 
agricultural production and the incomes of 
smallholders in the fields of tobacco and 
coffee. In the fisheries sector, development 
activities concentrated on boosting fish 
supplies to improve the nutritional status 
of the population, in particular in the 
Lakeshore are. From a total NIP of ECU 
67.9m, 32% was devoted to agriculture 
and fisheries. A further 25% was allocated 
to the energy/industrial sector while 19% 
went for the development of road trans-
port. Water/sanitation and education/ 
training received some 18%. The overall EC 
allocation of funds to Malawi under Lomé I 
amounted to ECU 74.3m (excluding re-
gional and EC budgetary support). 
Lomé II 
The content of the Lomé li NIP 
(1980-85) was influenced by the de-
teriorating economic situation in the 
country after 1979. On the domestic front, 
Malawi suffered two years of drought in 
1980 and 1981 while externally, there was 
a worsening in the terms of trade due to 
steep rises in imported fuel prices, capital 
imports and intermediate goods. There 
was also a decline in the export prices of 
tobacco, tea and sugar. The debt servicing 
problems of the country grew sharply as a 
result of increasing interest rates on the 
international money markets and higher 
transport costs for exports following the 
disruption of Malawi's traditional routesto 
the seaports. In the light of these con-
straints, the Community concentrated its 
development assistance on supporting 
food security and on expanding the 
national and regional road network. Thus, 
out of an NIP of ECU 80m, 39% was 
allocated to road transport and 32% to 
agriculture and fisheries. A further 11% 
was spent on social infrastructures and 
training programmes while 7% went to 
trade promotion and micro-projects. 6% 
was allocated to small enterprise develop-
ment. The total Lomé II allocation to 
Malawi amounted to ECU 101.5m. 
Lomé III 
During the second half of the 
1980s, Malawi experienced further ex-
ternal and internal shocks. The terms of 
trade continued to weaken, the rail lines to 
the ports of Mozambique were cut off 
completely and capital inflows fell leading 
to an accelerated loss of foreign reserves. 
The country also suffered two further 
droughts in 1986 and 1987. As a result, real 
GDP stagnated and inflationary pressures 
intensified. Having implemented a number 
of measures at the beginning of the 1980s, 
with the financial support of the IMF and 
the World Bank, aimed at restoring ex-
ternal and internal equilibrium, the 
country now issued a 'Statement of 
Development Policies 1987-1996' and for-
mulated a comprehensive structural ad-
justment programme. 
The Lomé III NIP took account of 
the balance of payments constraints and 
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allocated ECU 12.5m to the Industrial and 
Trade Policy Adjustment Credit (ITPAC) 
developed with the help of the World 
Bank. It was becoming increasingly ap-
parent that the food security of the 
majority of Malawians would depend on 
domestic agricultural development for the 
foreseeable future. Consequently, out of a 
total of ECU 114.5m in the NIP, 67% was 
allocated to agri-rural development. This 
involved an integrated socio-economic 
approach to the development of the rural 
areas of Malawi where 85% of the popu-
lation lives. 
This development programme 
also incorporated, for the first time, a 
'child-spacing' programme. It was only in 
the second half of the 1990s that most ACP 
governments, including Malawi, accepted 
the need for measures to address the 
increasing socio-economic pressure caused 
by high population growth rates. Between 
1964 and 1987, Malawi's population doub-
led. As a small country (94 200 km
2) with 
one of the highest population densities in 
Africa (110 people per km
2), Malawi was 
facing increasing pressure on its arable 
land. The average farm size of smallholders 
fell from 1.6 hectares in 1969 to 1.1 ha 20 
years later. During this period the Com-
munity also continued to assist the de-
velopment of the road infrastructure. 
From 1986 onwards, the increas-
ing conflict in Mozambique saw Malawi 
being confronted with a growing influx of 
refugees. In response, the EC provided ECU 
16.8m for refugee relief programmes 
undertaken in the country by the UNHCR 
and various NGOs. The total support to 
Malawi under Lomé II amounted to ECU 
167.7m. 
Lomé IV 
As of 1988, Malawi's economy 
began to show signs of recovery. This was 
mainly due to the changed policy environ-
ment. Real GDP growth reached 7.8% in 
1991 and the annual rate of inf lation fell to 
11.9%. The fiscal deficit (including grants) 
was also reduced to 1.8% of GDP by fiscal 
year 1991/1992 while the current account 
deficit amounted to 8.9% of GDP. How-
ever, the basic development constraints 
remained. Accordingly, Malawi's NIP under 
the first financial protocol of Lomé IV 
continued with the approach of concen-
trating on agri-rural development and 
road infrastructure. Of the ECU 121m 
available under the NIP, 65% and 25% were 
allocated to these sectors respectively. The 
remaining funds were earmarked for, 
among other things, balance of payments 
support. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
Malawi has experienced fundamental poli-
tical changes and yet more internal and 
external shocks. With changes in the world 
Commission Delegate Peter Christiansen 
meets with Malawi's new President, 
Bakili Muluzi, the winner of the first 
multiparty elections in 1994 
political situation, western industrialised 
countries began to make more political 
demands on governments and put 
pressure on those that violated funda-
mental human rights. Since the 1960s, 
Malawi had been governed by an author-
itarian and highly centralised political 
system. The government exercised very 
tight political, economic and social controls 
on both organisations and individuals, 
intimidating the entire population in the 
process. This approach also often had the 
effect of paralysing decision-making within 
government. In May 1992, the inter-
national donor community, including the 
EC, decided to freeze non-humanitarian 
aid to Malawi until such time as the 
government introduced and practised 
basic human rights in accordance with 
recognised international standards. This 
policy, combined with internal pressures, 
induced Dr Banda, the former President, to 
hold a referendum which took place in 
June 1993. In the poll, the majority of 
Malawians opted to abandon the one-
party state in favour of a multiparty 
democracy. The first multiparty elections 
were held in May 1994 and the opposition 
■— which had previously been proscribed 
— assumed power. 
Because of these developments, 
the EC made no decision on a new 
development programme until after the 
referendum when the international donor 
community decided to end the aid freeze. 
In the interim, donor countries neverthe-
less supported various activities linked with 
the démocratisation process. Thus, the EC 
provided ECU 1.2m towards aspects of the 
organisation of the referendum. In addi-
tion, Malawi received massive assistance 
during this period to help counter the 
effects of the 1991-92 drought, which was 
particularly severe. The EC was one of the 
main donors in this effort contributing, up 
to the end of 1994, some ECU 15m under 
Lomé IV for the relief activities of the 
UNHCR and NGOs. 
The effects of the drought and 
the economic insecurity resulting from the 
political changes contributed to a serious 
worsening in the balance of payments 
situation after 1991. The absence of 
market-determined exchange rates and 
the prospect of devaluation also led to 
increased currency speculation. In February 
1994, the government and the Reserve 
Bank finally decided to liberalise the 
exchange rate system. After the aid freeze 
was lifted, and in view of the severe 
balance of payments situation, the EC 
decided to provide balance of payments 
support to the tune of ECU 30.6m. It also 
continued with its work on a comprehens-
ive support programme for the agriculture 
sector. Work on a road project in the south 
of the country, which had been frozen, 
was accelerated during 1994. The appraisal 
of a rural health and population pro-
gramme is currently under way while the 
Community (now the European Union) is 
"ï 
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also providing support to a number of 
programmes designed to enhance the 
démocratisation process in the country. 
Two further developments have 
also had an impact on recent EU support. 
Since the middle of the 1980s, the AIDS 
problem has grown rapidly. In Malawi, the 
present HIV infection rate is estimated at 
about 30% of the urban population and 
12% of those who live in rural areas. In 
response to this crisis, the EU has been 
implementing an information, education 
and communication project since the 
beginning of 1990. This is aimed at target 
groups such as bar girls and lorry drivers as 
well as at the general public. 
The second development has 
been the environmental degradation of 
the country. This has resulted both from 
the increased population density and the 
additional strain caused by the large-scale 
influx of refugees. Within its agricultural 
and afforestation programmes, the EU 
aims to address the issues of sustainable 
food security and the need for tree 
planting. 
A final comment relates to the 
EU's regional activities from which Malawi 
has benefited. Several road projects have 
been supported from regional funds be-
cause they have improved the regional 
network. This have been of particular 
importance for Malawi's access to the 
outside world. In the context of EU/SADC 
Part of the Malawi countryside 
reforested with the assistance of the 
European Union 
regional cooperation, Malawi is respon-
sible for fisheries, forestry and wildlife and 
assistance is provided to the Tsetse and 
Trypanosomiasis Control Programme and 
the College of Wildlife. Studies on regional 
wildlife and the Southern African Centre 
for Ivory Marketing have also been under-
taken. 
Finally, Malawi also plays an 
active role in the framework of the more 
recent Cross Border Initiative (CBI) which 
aims to facilitate intra-regional trade and 
investment. In December 1994, the 
government sent a letter to the Commis-
sion setting out CBI policy and specifying 
comprehensive reforms for implementing 
the objectives of the initiative. In response 
to this, the EU is providing additional 
balance of payments support to the tune 
of ECU 12m. 
Outlook 
To summarise, EC-Malawi 
cooperation under the Lomé Conventions 
has been determined by the evolving 
requirements of the country. The EU is 
playing a leading role in the policy dialogue 
with the government and it provides a 
substantial proportion of total develop-
ment assistance to the country (85% of 
whose development budget is currently 
financed by the donor community). But in 
spite of major international assistance for 
the development of Malawi, critical anal-
ysis reveals that the standard of living of 
the majority of the population has not 
improved over the last 30 years, and the 
social indicators are still among the worst in 
the world. As indicated above, both 
external and domestic constraints have 
hampered a more rapid development. 
Without donor support, how-
ever, it can be assumed that the majority of 
the population would have been even 
worse off. Thus, there is no alternative to 
development aid, although the man-made 
constraints need to be addressed better. In 
other words, better coordination of de-
velopment efforts is needed involving the 
I social partners within Malawi and the 
I international donor community. 
Under the 'Poverty Alleviation 
Programme', the achievement of 
household and national food security is the 
main theme. This implies the development 
of natural resources, particularly in the 
agricultural sector, as well as consideration 
for the environmental impact of such 
efforts. Improving the health of the 
population, controlling population growth 
and providing better education and vo-
cational training are further important 
components in the drive to achieve food 
security. Under the second phase of Lomé 
IV, the EU will certainly be willing to 
consider supporting Malawi in addressing 
these and other development-related 
issues. 
The new government must, 
however, also display a full commitment to 
these concerns and demonstrate that it is 
in a position to manage scarce financial 
resources in such a way as to achieve 
determined development objectives. In 
this context, the structural reforms that are 
needed in the public sector must be 
implemented in order to overcome the 
current severe fiscal deficit. Finally, it is 
hoped that the government will take the 
lead in prioritising development objectives, 
strategies and activities. Where required, 
external expertise may be provided, but 
the 'ownership' of the development pro-
cess must rest with the people of Malawi 
and their representatives. ■■ J.L. 
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European Union 
Initial thoughts of the Commission in 
the run-up to the 1996 Inter-
Governmental Conference 
When Commission President Jacques Santer and his colleague Manuel Oreja 
addressed a packed press conference in Brussels on 10 May, it is likely that some of 
the journalists present had mixed emotions. Following a relative lull in the 'great 
debate' over where the EU is heading, thoughts are now turning to 1996 and the 
next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The subject should provide rich pickings 
for the media as the various interested parties set up their stalls and strive to 'sell' 
their vision of the EU. Heated arguments are the bread and butter of journalism and there 
will be no shortage of these in the coming two years. At the same time, memories of 
Maastricht are still fresh. Seemingly interminable debates, which saw significant additions 
to the lexicon of EU jargon, presented the news gatherers with a formidable challenge — 
which they didn't always succeed in overcoming. The people of Europe could hardly be 
unaware that big issues affecting their future were being decided in the Dutch city. They 
were bombarded with reports about it for many months, three countries had full-scale 
referendum campaigns and others had lengthy Parliamentary debates which were 
exhaustively reported. But too often it seemed like the Tower of Babel. Politicians and 
pressure groups, 'sceptics' and 'federalists', constitutional experts and monetary specialists 
appeared in procession on the television screens to offer varying, and often contradictory 
interpretations of such things as 'subsidiarity' and 'federalism'. They spoke of the two new 
'pillars', EMU, convergence targets, co-decision and qualified majorities. And many 
Europeans 'switched off', either literally or metaphorically. Those who persevered and 
sought elucidation in the text of the Maastricht Treaty itself (helpfully supplied by the 
Commission) found no succour there. Without a copy of the pre-existing treaties for cross-
reference, the text was almost impossible to understand. 
It was this unhappy situation 
which saw the Maastricht Treaty teeter on 
the precipice before finally being pulled 
back on to firm ground. The Danes voted 
'No' but accomodatingly decided to have a 
rerun of the poll. The French almost voted 
'No' but as it turned out, a miss was as 
good as a mile. The British Parliament came 
close to halting the whole process just as 
the finishing line seemed to be in sight. 
For Jacques Santer, one of the 
key imperatives will be to avoid a similar 
situation developing in 1995-96. That was 
why he warned of the risk of alienating 
Europe's citizens when he spoke to rep-
orters on 10 May. There was a need, he 
said, to involve them in the debate and to 
take measures to make the whole system 
more democratic and transparent. In fact, 
Mr Santer and Mr Oreja were ostensibly 
presenting a report on the functioning of 
the Maastricht Treaty. But while emphasis-
ing that the Commission had no proposals 
on the table at the moment, Mr Oreja 
acknowledged that, in highlighting the 
successes and shortcomings of the Treaty, 
they were clearly identifying areas that 
required action. 
So what will the 1996 IGC be 
about? According to the Commission 
President, it will not be about extending 
the substantive competences of the EU 
(whose components parts are the Euro-
pean Community and the two pillars of 
intergovernmental cooperating covering 
foreign and security policy, and justice and 
home affairs). In other words, it is not 
about what the Union does but about how 
it does it. 
There seems to be a general 
consensus that the EU's decision-making 
procedures have become too complex and 
unwieldy. The power of any country to 
block proposals in the Council of Ministers 
has already been reduced but the national 
veto remains in a number of areas and 
many see this as a threat to further 
progress in an enlarged Union of 15 
members. With several Mediterranean and 
Eastern European countries knocking at 
the door, the EU is expected to grow 
further. Enlargement is one of the few 
ideas which seems to unite all the member 
states, but there are fears that unless the 
veto is curtailed, the result will be paralysis. 
The Commission did, however, stress that 
it did not envisage removal of the veto 
altogether— it should still be retained for 
'constitutional' issues. 
A further question relates to the 
system's democratic legitimacy. Those who 
argue that democracy has lost out in the 
EU's structure may have a point. Laws are 
proposed by an unelected Commission 
while national ministers, who are the 
'legislators', do deals behind closed doors 
— although it should be recognised that 
the latter have a 'democratic' mandate 
(more or less) from their country's elec-
torates. In fact, the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament have increased signific-
antly with successive treaty changes but it 
is still far from being the sovereign body in 
the system. Complexity is another problem 
that has resulted from the piecemeal 
granting of new powers to the Parliament. 
"t 
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Danish referendum campaign. 
A second plebiscite was needed to get 
the Maastricht Treaty back on the rails 
As the Commission observes in the 
preamble to its report (reprinted below), 
the result is that there are now about 20 
different procedures being used. The 
Commission would like to see this reduced 
to just three. In addition, the report talks of 
bringing national parliaments more fully 
into the process. 
The Commission is also concerned 
about the way in which the two 'inter-
governmental' pillars of the Union are 
operating — or, in many cases, failing to 
operate. Those who favoured closer integ-
ration at Maastricht were keen to see 
foreign policy/defence and justice/home 
affairs brought in to the system. Those 
who opposed moves towards a more 
'federal' Europe were determined that this 
should not result in a loss of sovereignty. 
The result was a classic compromise. The 
Union would have responsibility for coordi-
nating action in these areas but the 
'supranational' Community would not — 
hence the two new pillars. The result, of 
course, is even more administrative compli-
cation and, as events have subsequently 
shown, the Union does not always act 
decisively or indeed speak with one voice. 
Against an à la carte 
Europe 
Finally, given the increasingly 
heterogeneous nature of the Union, the 
issue arises of how far one or a group of 
member states can choose to opt out of 
particular policy areas. For Jacques Santer, 
the idea of 'Union solidarity' is paramount 
and he therefore expressed opposition to 
permanent opt-outs. Recognising the poli-
tical realities, however, he acknowledged 
that the system should be flexible enough 
to allow countries to move towards the 
Union's common goals at different speeds. 
Denmark and the UK already have opt-
outs under the Maastricht Treaty but there 
is an understandable concern that too 
much fragmentation could put the whole 
edifice in danger. 
In the coming months, the Com-
mission's initial thoughts will be crystallised 
into more formal position papers and 
ultimately into a set of proposals which will 
be presented to the national governments. 
Although Jacques Santer, with his stress on 
'no new competences', was keen to 
downplay the possibility of conflict be-
tween the key actors at the IGC, it is 
difficult to see how this can be avoided. 
europe 
Measures to curtail national vetos, improve 
the democratic credentials of the Union 
(which must surely favour the Parliament) 
and strengthen the 'intergovernmental 
pillars', can hardly fail to alter the current 
institutional balance which heavily favours 
the Council of Ministers. For the Commis-
sion and, it would appear, the majority of 
member states, construction work on the 
EU should continue, even if the dreaded 'F' 
word (federal) is eschewed for diplomatic 
reasons. In some member states, the 
approach appears to be very different — 
the talk is of 'drawing a line in the sand' or 
perhaps even reverting to more inter-
govemmentalism with the 'repatriation' of 
certain common policies. Few of the 
leading actors are prepared to voice the 
opinion that these visions are directly in 
conflict with each other. At the moment, it 
is difficult to see how the conflict can be 
resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. 
But then, the EU seems to have a knack of 
reconciling the irreconcilable. ™ 
Simon Horner 
Preparing Europe for the 
21st Century 
We reprint here, the preamble of the Commission's report on the functioning of the 
Treaty on European Union which was published on May 10. 
This report by the Commission is 
its response to the mandate of the Corfu 
European Council that the Community 
institutions review the operation of the 
Treaty on European Union. It is the first 
stage in a long and delicate process. It takes 
stock of the operation of an instrument 
that has been in force for only eighteen 
months. The fact that, in the run-up to the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the 
institutions are each reviewing their col-
lective modus operandi is a welcome step. 
Practical proposals on amendments to the 
Union Treaty will follow in due course. 
The 1996 deadline was set in 
1991. At that time the Union Treaty was a 
bold response to a novel situation. Object-
ive analysis shows that it is better than its 
reputation would suggest. It has the merit 
of setting out a comprehensive approach 
to European integration, rather than a 
purely economic one. It has enhanced the 
European Parliament's powers, consoli-
dated the Commission's legitimacy, laun-
ched Economic and Monetary Union, and 
generally reinforced the Union's capacities. 
It has mapped out the path to a stronger 
Union presence on the world political 
scene. 
Acknowledging the Treaty's 
strengths, however, also allows us to 
identify its weak points and the shortcom-
ings in its implementation. Through its 
critical analysis, the Commission will out-
line the path which it believes should be 
followed during the Intergovernmental 
Conference in terms of both form and 
content. Institutional questions are ob-
viously very important in a Community 
governed by the rule of law, but they 
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should not blind us to the fundamental 
issues. 
Two major challenges for 
Europe 
The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference will be a key encounter for 
Europe and its future. The outcome will 
determine the shape of things European as 
the 21st century dawns.Two factors are 
especially decisive. 
First, the Union's internal context 
has changed. The Maastricht Treaty ratifi­
cation debate revealed that there was still 
a degree of scepticism about European 
integration. Europe is not easy for people 
to understand ; many do not see what it is 
about. The same problem can also arise 
within an individual country, where the 
citizen may not always realise what policies 
are being followed in his or her name, or 
why. The distance between the citizen and 
the place where decisions are made, means 
that the problem is more acute in the 
Union, however. 
So the first challenge is im­
mediately obvious — to make Europe the 
business of every citizen. The emergence of 
open debate, covering all points of view on 
Europe, is in fact a happy opportunity: 
Europe is no longer deciding on its future 
behind closed doors. 
The Commission does not regard 
the Union Treaty's objective of a Com­
munity closer to the citizen as merely an 
empty formula, but as a categorical 
imperative which guides its actions. The 
Commission will be listening to the views 
of ordinary men and women, and looking 
for common European ways of combatting 
unemployment, safeguarding the environ­
ment and promoting solidarity. Here, as 
elsewhere, the Commission will try to 
speak for the general interest. 
The Commission is convinced that 
the solution to today's problems needs 
firm action at European level. None of our 
Member States can truly tackle the prob­
lems of unemployment and pollution on its 
own. Organised crime cannot be resisted 
by forces which are dispersed. Above all, 
there can be no effective foreign policy 
without the existence of joint action at the 
Union level. This does not mean that 
everything should be centralised. Sub­
sidiarity means working out the right level 
for most effective action on whatever 
question is conceived. That level may be 
local, regional, national, European or, in 
some cases, even world-wide. 
The context has altered not only 
within the Union. The international con­
text has changed even more radically. The 
historic shock waves that began in 1989 — 
on the Union's very doorstep — have not 
come to a halt. The changes following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall have borne fruit. The 
new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe have made tremendous efforts, 
and they have confirmed their attachment 
to the values that are at the very basis of 
the Union. The Union, for its part, has 
committed itself to the integration of 
these countries. 
Herein lies the second challenge. 
How are these countries to be welcomed 
into the Union without striking at the 
foundations of all that has been achieved 
in forty years of European integration? 
How, in other words, can we ensure that 
enlargement will not multiply our weak­
nesses but unite our forces? How can we 
enhance our capacity to take decisions and 
act when our diversity becomes more 
pronounced ? Enlargement must represent 
a new arrangement worked out with our 
eyes open. We have to be aware of its 
implications for the institutions and policies 
of the Union. The Commission is convinced 
that there is an answer to these questions. 
There is no compelling reason why an 
endeavour based on a spirit of openness 
and solidarity should mean weakness and 
dilution : enlargement and deepening are 
perfectly compatible. 
If these two challenges — 
making Europe the business of the citizen 
and making a success of future enlarge­
ment — are to be taken up, we must begin 
by reminding ourselves of the values and 
successes of European integration in the 
past. 
The achievements of 
four decades of 
European integration 
In the 1950s, as the principles 
which were to lead eventually to the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome were 
starting to take shape, the war was still in 
everyone's mind. The deep psychological 
scars which it left behind helped to create a 
consensus as to the basic objectives of 
European integration : the future would 
have to be different from the past. And the 
future has indeed turned out to be very 
different from the past. Europe has been at 
peace. Despite the tragedy of unemploy­
ment, and the social exclusion which is 
tearing at the fabric of our societies today, 
we must not forget that since the 1950s, 
Europe has been through a wholly un­
precedented period of development. 
In setting up a Community de­
signed to last indefinitely, equipped with 
its own institutions, enjoying legal perso­
nality and internationally represented in its 
own name, the Member States have given 
their allegiance to an 'organisation of 
states' which is governed by legal provi­
sions particular to the treaties under which 
it was set up, a fact which makes it 
fundamentally different from the organis­
ations established by traditional inter­
national treaties. They have pooled their 
sovereign rights and created a new legal 
order, involving not just the Member 
States but also their citizens, in the specific 
fields concerned. 
Thus there has sprung up a 
Community based on law. The states of 
which it is composed, whether big or small, 
enjoy equal rights and dignity. The Union 
which brings them together respects their 
different identities and cultures ; but those 
differences do not stand in the way of their 
ability to take decisions and act. This is the 
fruit of an institutional system with many 
strengths. Thanks to the principle of 
subsidiarity, it strikes the proper balance 
between the Union, the Member States 
and the regions, it adds a new source of 
legitimacy common to the peoples of 
Europe and it guarantees the effective 
application of Community law under the 
review of the Court of Justice. Within this 
system the Commission plays an indis­
pensable role, acting as the driving force 
through its right of initiative and its 
position as guardian of the Treaty. This 
right of initiative must be preserved intact, 
if the inevitable confusion and lack of 
overall direction which would result if 
there were multiple competing sources of 
initiative, is to be avoided. 
-ι 
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This Community is also a Com-
munity based on solidarity : solidarity 
between Member States, solidarity be-
tween regions, solidarity between dif-
ferent parts of society, and solidarity with 
future generations. The European model 
forges a fundamental link between the 
social dimension, human rights and civic 
rights. 
This process of integration and 
the particular approach which it has 
followed have been keenly watched all 
over the world. Often, they have served as 
models for the regional groupings now 
coming into being in every corner of the 
globe. It can be said that Europe, the stage 
for the two greatest conflicts of the 
century, has — in creating the Community 
— invented a new form of government in 
the service of peace. 
That is the Community's real 
achievement. Safeguarding it is vital for 
the states which form the European Union 
today and those which aspire to join it. But 
the progress we have seen since the 1950s 
has been made only by dint of constant 
effort; and the lesson of history is that it 
takes less effort to demolish than to 
construct and that no achievement is ever 
final. Merely pointing to past achie-
vements, then, is not enough. 
As always in the successive stages 
of building Europe, what will be needed is 
determination from the Member States 
and — more and more — determination 
on the part of Europe's citizens. They must 
make their voices heard in the ongoing 
task of European integration which con-
cerns them so directly. 
A twofold objective : 
democracy and 
effectiveness 
As we look at the analysis in the 
Commission's report, two main elements 
emerge which will have to serve as guiding 
lines for the work of the forthcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference: 
— the Union must act democratically, 
transparently and in a way people can 
understand ; 
— the Union must act effectively, con-
sistently and in solidarity. This is obvious 
when we are talking about its internal 
workings, but it must also be true in its 
external dealings, where it will have to 
bring a genuine, European identity to bear. 
These, of course, were the ob-
jectives before the original drafters of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, but a look at the way 
the Treaty works in practice will show that 
a great deal remains to be done. The 
prospect of a Union expanded to include 
20 Member States further underlines that 
necessity. 
Democracy forms part of the very 
essence of the Union, while effectiveness is 
the precondition for its future. That is why 
those are the two criteria for assessing how 
the Treaty is working at the moment : and 
that assessment, in its turn, will produce 
the major guidelines the Commission will 
follow at the coming Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
One of the Treaty's basic innov-
ations in terms of democracy is the concept 
of European citizenship. The object of this 
is not to replace national citizenship, but to 
give Europe's citizens an added benefit and 
strengthen their sense of belonging to the 
Union. The Treaty makes citizenship an 
evolving concept, and the Commission 
recommends developing it to the full. 
Moreover, although the task of building 
Europe is centred on democracy and 
human rights, citizens of the Union have at 
this stage no fundamental text which they 
can invoke as a summary of their rights and 
duties. The Commission thinks this gap 
should be filled, more especially since such 
an instrument would constitute a powerful 
means of promoting equal opportunities 
and combating racism and xenophobia. 
The Commission is delighted that 
the Union's democratic legitimacy has 
been strengthened. Making the Com-
mission's appointment subject to Par-
liament's approval has been an important 
step in the right direction. The increase in 
Parliament's legislative powers is another 
welcome development. 
But as decision-making has 
become more democratic, it has also 
become complex to an almost unac-
ceptable degree. The 20 orso procedures in 
use at present should be reduced to three 
— the assent procedure, a simplified 
codecision procedure, and consultation. 
We must put an end to the inconsistencies 
and ambiguities which have so often 
sparked conflicts over procedural matters. 
In addition to democratic control 
at the level of the Union, we need to find a 
way to involve national parliaments more 
directly and visibly in controlling and 
guiding the national choices that apply to 
the Union. 
More generally, we need to 
dispel the obscurity which has descended 
on the Treaties as a result of successive 
additions being superimposed one on 
another. The time has come to simplify 
matters, drafting the whole text anew to 
make it more comprehensible. This need 
for transparency is both a practical and a 
political necessity. 
In the same spirit of openness, 
the principle of subsidiarity, which took 
pride of place in the Union Treaty, has 
begun to change the attitudes of the 
institutions. Debate on the distribution of 
powers and the grounds for introducing 
each new proposal is becoming more 
The European Parliament in session. 
The increase in Parliament's legislative 
powers is a welcome development europe 
regular. But we must go even further. All 
too often the concept of subsidiarity is put 
forward for specific or short-term ends as a 
way of diluting the Union. Yet subsidiarity 
can also be applied positively, to justify 
measures which are better taken collect-
ively than in isolation. The full political 
significance of subsidiarity, as a commit-
ment by the Member States and the 
institutions to find the best way of serving 
the citizens of the Union, needs to be 
underlined. The legitimacy of the insti-
tutions also needs to be strengthened. In 
this context, the Commission believes that 
Parliament should have the right to give its 
assent to any amendment to the Treaties. 
Lastly, a particular effort should 
be focused on making our institutional 
machinery more effective. In the Com-
mission's view, this means paying special 
attention to the common foreign and 
security policy and to justice and home 
affairs. Security at home and abroad are 
indeed legitimate priorities for every 
citizen. 
The very fact that two different 
working methods — the Community 
approach and the intergovernmental ap-
proach — coexist in the same Treaty is a 
source of incoherence. Experience has 
confirmed the fears previously expressed 
on this subject. The single institutional 
framework which was supposed to ensure 
harmony between the various 'pillars' of 
the Treaty has not functioned satisfac-
torily. The proper lessons have to be 
drawn. 
The experience of the common 
foreign and security policy has been 
disappointing so far, although we should 
be wary of making final judgments after 
only 18 months of its existence. However, 
the fact is that the possibilities have not 
been used to best effect, owing to the 
weaknesses of the Treaty as well as over-
restrictive interpretation of its provisions. 
The Treaty sought to establish greater 
consistency between political and econ-
omic objectives of the Union, but this has 
not been fully achieved. Adjustments will 
have to be made so that overlap between 
different instruments does not lead to 
paralysis. The Union must develop a 
genuine common foreign policy com-
mensurate with its economic influence and 
equipped with effective decision-making 
machinery; this cannot be achieved 
through systematic recourse to unanimity. 
The Treaty laid the foundation for such a 
policy, and the forthcoming conference 
should be used to erect an adequate 
framework for a genuine common security 
and defence policy, by building up the 
capabilities of the Western European 
Union and linking it to the existing 
common institutions. 
Cooperation in justice and home 
affairs has been ineffectual, and not only 
because of the lack of coherence in the 
institutional framework. The instruments 
available are inappropriate, and the prob-
lem is compounded by the cumbersome 
decision-making process and a complete 
lack of openness. The Intergovernmental 
Conference will offer an opportunity to 
undertake a radical overhaul of these 
arrangements. 
Conclusions 
The reflections set out above 
show that the main issue during the 
conference will not be an increase in the 
Union's powers. The Treaty of Maastricht 
added a number of powers which make 
the Union a much more ambitious under-
taking than it was in the past. One 
example is economic and monetary union. 
Here the path has been mapped out and 
there should be no renewed discussion on 
the provisions agreed. The recent turbu-
lence on the currency markets merely 
serves to underline how vital this is. 
The main focus will have to be on 
ways of improving decision-making mech-
anisms. The increase in the number of 
states and practical considerations ought 
naturally to lead to wider use of the 
majority rule. This will be even more 
necessary for future enlargements. How-
ever, it is absolutely vital that we preserve 
the nature of the Union as a true com-
munity of states and peoples where there 
is no inbuilt majority or minority. 
Further enlargement will not 
only require the Union to strengthen its 
decision-making capacity, but will also 
force us to look more closely at the 
possibility of different speeds of integ-
ration. This concept already exists both in 
the context of economic and monetary 
union and in the system set up under the 
Schengen Agreement — although the 
latter regrettably still remains outside the 
Community framework. There is nothing 
unusual in allowing some Member States a 
longer period to adjust to certain policies. 
But it must, in the Commission's view, be 
done within a single institutional frame-
work and must centre on a common 
objective. Those states must play their part 
by not blocking any of their partners who 
wish to move ahead more quickly. 
Permanent exemptions such as 
that now applying to social policy, which in 
the last analysis have had the regrettable 
effect of excluding the Social Charter from 
the Treaty, create a problem, as they raise 
the prospect of an à la carte Europe, to 
which the Commission is utterly opposed. 
Allowing each country the freedom to pick 
and choose the policies it takes part in 
would inevitably lead to a negation of 
Europe. 
These, then, are the Com-
mission's first thoughts on the forthcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference. The Com-
mission is proposing a Europe in which the 
different tiers of authority cooperate 
democratically and effectively to help solve 
the problems affecting ordinary Euro-
peans. We want to see a strong and 
independent Europe, taking up its rightful 
place in the world. Strength requires 
internal cohesion. Europe must be much 
more than the sum of its parts. In the new 
international situation, Europe's role as a 
pole of stability is more important than 
ever. That is what is expected of us, but for 
the moment — as war continues to claim 
more victims on our continent — we are 
unable to provide it. Europe must speak 
with one voice, if major challenges are to 
be tackled effectively. We want to see a 
Europe whose people recognise themsel-
ves and each other, precisely because of 
their conviction that an active community 
with shared values is the key to a peaceful 
and prosperous future, and to a juster 
society for all. The Commission will make 
every effort to fulfil this ambition. It has set 
itself the task of demonstrating the 
importance and the potential of this goal 
for ordinary Europeans and ensuring that 
the Member States and the institutions are 
guided by a common interest. In doing so, 
it will be fulfilling its duty as 'guardian of 
the Treaty'. ■■ 
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pet products 
by Frederick 0. Marsh* 
The idea that 'trade is better than 
aid' in achieving long-term and 
sustainable development is widely 
accepted. One of the big disap-
pointments of the past three de-
cades has been the declining share 
of world trade accounted for by 
developing countries outside Asia. 
Today, with liberal economics in 
the ascendant and trade barriers 
coming down, the issue is even more 
pressing. Many studies have been under-
taken as to why so many developing 
countries have become marginalised in the 
global system of commerce, and what might 
be done to reverse this trend. Problems 
include identifying market opportunities 
(and the related issue of acquiring the 
necessary information), obtaining finance, 
acquiring entrepreneurial skills, having 
access to a skilled labour force and ensuring 
product quality. This article deals with the 
first of these — spotting export opportu-
nities and finding out more about them. The 
focus is on the European market for pet 
accessories — just one example of a huge 
number of 'niche'markets in the developed 
world which developing country entrep-
reneurs might find worthy of Investigation. 
And for those who think that the term 'niche 
market' equals 'too small to be of Interest', 
the author, who is a consultant in the field of 
pet products, provides some striking statis-
tics. Pet products are surprisingly 'big' 
business' and the sector offers a range of 
business opportunities covering raw ma-
terials, semi-processed materials and fini-
shed products. 
Not many people realise that 
49% of the 132 million households in the 
EU (the figure prior to the latest enlarge-
ment) keep at least one pet. The pet 
population, excluding fish, totals 136m and 
* This is an abridged version of an article 
submitted by the author who is an international 
consultant. (Marsh Business Services, 17 Albany 
Court, Palmer Street, Westminster, London SW1H 
OAB.). 
includes 35m dogs, 35m cats and 45m cage 
birds. There are around 20m 'other small 
animals', a term which encompasses every-
thing from guinea pigs and hamsters to 
spiders and exotic snakes. Lastly, there are 
ornamental fish which are kept in aquaria, 
bowls and garden ponds. These are to be 
found in at least 9.5 million European 
households and although it is difficult to 
arrive at an accurate estimate of the total 
number of fish kept as pets, the figure is 
thought to be around 141m. 
The amount of money spent by 
European owners on their pets is well in 
excess of ECU 9 billion a year. Most of this 
goes towards food or health care products 
but 18% of the total (ECU 1.6bn) is spent 
on pet accessories. In real terms, this 
market is forecast to grow by more than 
3% per year. This article will focus only on 
accessories for pets, since many of these 
can be and are sourced in developing 
countries. 
One should be aware that the EU 
represents around one third of the total 
world market for pet products. The North 
American market is roughly the same size 
while the remaining third is accounted for 
by countries in the rest of the world, 
notably Australia, Japan, South America, 
South Africa, the Middle East and, increas-
ingly, Russia and Eastern Europe. 
The range of products defined as 
pet accessories is very wide — in excess of 
5000 individual articles. Pet accessory 
manufacturers are, therefore, operating in 
a highly fragmented market and it is not 
surprising to find that there are many 
thousands of enterprises involved. The 
majority of these are quite small — often 
'cottage industries'. 
Dogs and cats 
Collars available in a large range 
of materials, and in many colour combi-
nations, fall under this heading. For dogs, 
there are also leads made of leather, chain, 
rope, nylon or a combination of these 
materials. Other canine products include 
car harnesses, muzzles, training equip-
ment, 'chews' (made of knotted rope or 
buffalo hide) and scoops (for clearing up 
Wicker basket for transporting small 
animals 
In real terms, the pet accessory market 
is forecast to grow by more than 3% 
per year 
-I-Ä.U I **w 
•"11X^-^^^ 
■Mili .·! Ji;
liii¿i-U-¿
i-
feí-*·""^ 
the Courier π° 152 · july-august 199S  fl-europe 
dog mess!), kennels and wicker baskets. 
There is even a 'fashion' market for dog 
coats. Many of these articles could be 
produced in ACP countries. 
For cats, the largest single item is 
cat litter, around 1 million tonnes of which 
is sold in Europe every year. The raw 
materials are either minerals such as 
attapulgite, sepiolite, gypsum and ben-
tonite or vegetable-based materials such as 
maize by-products or wood shavings. 
Other cat accessories include cat beds, litter 
trays and cat scratchers or scratching poles. 
There are also more than one 
hundred different articles marketed under 
the heading of grooming accessories — 
brushes, combs, clippers, grooming tables 
etc. Again, many of these could offer 
A dog kennel is one of the traditional 
pet accessories but there is a 'market 
for everything in this trade' 
production opportunities for ACP coun-
tries. 
Birds and ornamental 
poultry 
In addition to bird cages and 
aviaries, made from a variety of materials, 
and available in many different shapes and 
sizes, there are also fittings such as perches, 
swings and ladders, usually made of wood. 
Other accessories include toys, mirrors and 
feeding and drinking bowls. Further 
market opportunities exist in the field of 
accessories for racing doves and pigeons of 
which there are several million. Pigeon 
fanciers, who keep the birds for racing, 
view their activity as a sport and accord-
ingly, these are not usually included under 
the heading of pets. 
In environmentally-conscious 
Europe, there is considerable interest in 
wild birds and many people buy nesting 
boxes and feeding tables for their gardens. 
Most are made of wood but other ma-
terials, including coconut by-products are 
also used. Another popular accessory in this 
category is bird baths. 
Other small animals and 
fish 
Accessories for the former in-
clude cages and 'homes', exercise and play 
wheels, tunnels, drinking bottles for rod-
ents and bedding material or litter. In the 
more specialised market for reptile ac-
cessories, terrariums and vivariums will 
usually contain sand and ground bark from 
particular trees as well as a range of other 
natural products used in crafted woods-
capes and florascapes. 
For fish, the market, other than 
tanks and bowls, ranges from very 'high-
tech' electrical equipment to basic ma-
terials such as gravel, sand, rock and tree 
roots. The latter are natural products 
which only require collecting, washing, 
sorting or grading. Aquarium gravel, for 
example, is available in many different 
colours, sizes and grades and the size of the 
European market for this product is 
somewhere in the region of 35 000 tonnes 
a year. Annual sales of marine salt for 
aquariums exceeds 1500t. A number of 
firms specialise in the production of crafted 
replicas of natural fossil. Aquarium plants 
are another specialised accessory. These 
are grown on farms in many countries. 
Singapore exports plants to the value of 
ECU 8.5 million each year. There is a related 
niche market for artificial aquarium plants 
while ornaments, including statuary for 
ponds (whether or not they contain fish), 
should not be overlooked. 
Finally there are a number of 
accessories that are adaptable for different 
pets — toys, beds, feeding and drinking 
bowls and carriers made out of wicker, 
wood, metal and plastic. 
Diverse product range 
Manufacturers in ACP countries 
should be aware that the pet accessories 
market covers a diverse range of articles 
from simple raw materials such as rough 
rock for aquariums, through semi-pro-
cessed articles to the finished product such 
as collars and leads. In short, there is a 
market for everything in this trade with 
market niches available in the low, medium 
and high price ranges. 
In Europe, the distribution chain 
for pet accessories includes a specialist 
retail sector (pet shops, garden centres, 
seed merchants etc) as well as the general 
grocery sector whose outlets in some 
countries have a significant share of the 
accessory market. Specialist mail order 
businesses provide yet another distribution 
channel. One German firm, for example, 
publishes a 200 page mail order catalogue 
containing articles only for dogs. Almost 
every country has a pet trade press which 
published monthly magazines read by 
people working in the trade. In most 
countries, there is a national pet trade 
association which brings together manu-
facturers, distributors and retailers. Some 
of these also organise trade fairs. Trade 
fairs and exhibitions specialising in pet 
products including accessories are held in 
most European countries. The largest and 
most important of these is 'Interzoo' which 
is held biannually in Germany. Almost 600 
firms from all over the world exhibit at this 
event, which attracts more than 18 000 
trade visitors. 
Currently, most of the pet ac-
cessories from developing countries mar-
keted in Europe come from Asia. This raises 
several questions. Why only from this 
region? Is it because their producers and 
exporters are more innovative? After all, 
many of the raw materials are available in 
ACP countries. There are clearly manu-
facturing opportunities here for the ACPs 
— as long as exporters provide the right 
product in the right place, at the right time 
and at the right price. Could it be that 
nobody, as yet, has recognised the poten-
tial of the sector. Many ACPs have the 
requisite raw materials and labour force. If 
the necessary finance, management initia-
tive and market information could be 
added to this, there is no reason why 
entrepreneurial firms in ACP countries 
should not succeed in carving out pro-
fitable niches in this growing market, ne 
^ 
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In Western countries, non-
governmental organisations, or NGOs, to 
use a more familiar term, have enjoyed 
considerable success over the last three 
decades, and it is now universally accepted 
that they have an effective role to play in 
the field of development cooperation. 
These omnipresent 'representatives of civil 
society' are engaged in a variety of 
activities to combat poverty including 
emergency aid, financing of development 
programmes, sending volunteers into the 
field, development education and lobby-
ing. Given the breadth of their operations, 
NGOs have given a lot of thought as to 
what their role ought to be. It is a question 
that is also now being posed by their 
Southern counterparts who are becoming 
increasingly recognised. 
By definition, NGOs cannot be 
discussed without referring to the other 
side of the coin, namely the state author-
ities. The distinction between the two 
seems to be becoming more and more 
blurred in certain areas. Could it be that 
the efficiency of many NGOs in responding 
to the genuine needs of people is proving 
to be a double-edged sword ? This is what 
a number of NGOs, fearful of losing their 
autonomy, seem to be telling themselves. 
The accusation is that governments and 
multilateral institutions are trespassing on 
NGO territory, seeing them as little more 
than inexpensive subcontractors — whose 
policies should be 'politically correct' in 
their terms. The 20-year long collaboration 
which has evolved between the European 
Union and NGOs, notably through the 
dialogue set up via the Liaison Committee, 
certainly cannot be described in this way. It 
is much more than a simple marriage of 
convenience. A further point is that 
Northern NGOs are no longer the sole 
beneficiaries of European financing in this 
area. The Union, nowadays, accords in-
creasing importance to supporting NGOs in 
the South. 
Financial resources are essential 
for the NGOs. They obviously need sub-
stantial funds if they are to do their work 
properly, and the public purse represents a 
major source of income — all the more so 
in the current economic climate, where 
raising private funds is becoming increas-
ingly difficult. Seduced by funding imperat-
ives, some NGOs, have tended to favour 
marketing needs over ethics, a trend which 
is dangerous for the whole development 
cooperation sector, and also, unfortu-
nately, for the efficiency of development 
actions. Some see this as a major fault of 
emergency aid. One cannot ignore the 
'popularity' of emergency aid over de-
velopment assistance, or the criticisms that 
have been levelled at the former. Do such 
criticisms stem from envy (because emer-
gency programmes attract more attention 
and money) or is there a genuine incom-
patibility between the two ? A case can be 
made for the opposite argument, namely 
that emergency and development work 
are actually complementary, and that 
there is no need forfriction between them. 
These are some of the many 
questions facing the NGO community 
today which are discussed in this 
dossier. I  Thibault Grégoire 
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Community work with 
NGOs? 
by Bernard Ryelandt* 
The answer to this question can be 
given in just a few words : because 
development should not be solely 
the work of governments, in the 
North or the South. Governments 
need views and methods of de-
velopment and cooperation which 
are different from their own. This 
need is felt all the more as evaluations of 
governments' own programmes have re-
vealed a need for new and diversified 
approaches to be adopted. It has become 
increasingly clear that a technical approach 
to development, without sufficient particip-
ation by and mobilisation of the people 
concerned, frequently leads to limited and 
tenuous results and NGOs are both useful 
and effective in this respect. 
We have witnessed, moreover, 
both within our own countries and in the 
developing states, a spontaneous mobilis-
ation of the energies of individuals, groups 
and networks in favour of development. A 
Community with a human face which 
claims to be close to the initiatives of its 
citizens cannot disregard this, all the more 
so as the resources available to citizens are 
frequently limited in relation to the fields 
within which such initiatives operate. 
As far as the European Com-
munity is concerned, cooperation with 
NGOs is not solely the task of the Commis-
sion officials whose job it is to administer 
cooperation policies and tools. The Council 
has also indicated an interest in them, most 
recently in its resolutions of 1991 and 1992. 
The European Parliament has shown a 
particular interest, voting in favour of a 
number of funding initiatives in this area. 
By its very nature, this institution is open 
and sensitive to trends in public opinion 
and it has supported NGOs from the early 
days. It is thanks to the combined efforts of 
the Parliament and the Commission that 
the first funds for the co-financing of NGOs 
were obtained and utilised in 1976. Let us 
consider this in greater detail. 
All grassroots associations in the 
developing countries, and the NGOs which 
support them, are of fundamental import-
ance. It is essentially their task to create 
genuinely participative development 
which is close to the people, close to what 
they perceive as their fundamental needs 
and in line with their ideas and methods. In 
the absence of this, the finest-sounding 
official programmes will not have the 
'ballast' to remain afloat. 
structures. Much is being said about 
democracy at present, but we sometimes 
tend to forget that real and durable 
democracy within a political system is not 
possible without basic democratic struc-
tures and without recognition of the part 
which everyone has to play in socio-
economic development. Grassroots associ-
ations have a key task in this respect, and it 
is for NGOs to support them and for us, the 
public authorities, to support the NGOs to 
the extent they require. 
The main thrust of action on the 
part of Northern NGOs and hence of 
official support for the latter must, there-
fore, aim, either directly or via develop-
ment programmes, to provide institutional 
support to enable our Southern partners to 
act autonomously. 
The official cooperation of the 
European Community needs to make room 
for European NGOs as they frequently 
have a better knowledge than public 
authorities of the situation in the field and 
of partners at grass-roots level. They also 
have original approaches to development. 
Admittedly, Northern NGOs often started 
ihm-. \*Æ 
Another important advantage of 
grassroots associations and NGOs of both 
South and North is that they strive, in 
particular, to help those who are poor, 
marginalised and neglected — people who 
are often beyond the reach of national 
development policies and of international 
cooperation. This is not easy even for 
NGOs, but it can be said in their favour that 
many of them at least have tried. 
The aim is not to set up a tension 
between NGOs and states, still less to deny 
that the latter play a key role, but rather to 
diversify efforts and approaches to de-
velopment, in order to enable everyone to 
perform their role in societies with diverse 
We have witnessed a spontaneous 
mobilisation of the energies of 
individuals, groups and networks in 
favour of development 
out by doing the work themselves in the 
South. They still do this in many instances 
and often for good reason (for example 
where they are responding to a disaster, or 
where there is an absence of available local 
partners). Increasingly, however, their 
principal reason for being involved is to 
provide support for programmes and to 
supply institutional backing for their par-
tners. A new type of partnership is 
evolving here — one in which it is no 
longer acceptable to be a 'silent partner'. 
"t 
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Adherence to such principles is 
now essential in most developing coun-
tries. Action by grassroots associations has 
increased greatly in these countries, even 
in Africa where the trend is much more 
recent. 
Finally, those responsible for 
cooperation policies also need NGOs be-
cause of the part they play in the North. 
The mobilisation of people to promote 
development has already been mentioned, 
but there is more. A true cooperation 
policy helps to counter simplistic ideas, 
prejudices and political and economic 
interests. After all, the Southern bene-
ficiaries of cooperation policies do not get 
to vote at the next election for the 
Northern politicians who would be willing 
to assist them. Such politicians therefore 
need a development lobby to counterbal-
ance the lobbies defending other powerful 
interests. 
The NGOs must also exert const-
ant pressure on public opinion and govern-
ments for new, more balanced approaches 
to international relations to be adopted, 
with recognition of the basic interdepen-
dence of North and South. Finally they are 
called upon to express the views of the 
people and NGOs of the South in our 
societies. 
A central area of cooperation 
between the Community and NGOs has, 
since 1976, been the co-financing of 
structural development activities, in other 
words, development projects in develop-
ing countries, and awareness-raising 
within Europe. 
I would like to draw attention to 
one original feature of this area of cooper-
ation. Although it is obviously intended to 
achieve the broad general objectives of 
European cooperation policy, which are 
also those of the NGOs, the latter are never 
treated simply as executive agencies, there 
to achieve the specific objectives of the 
public authorities. Funding is given to 
support initiatives taken by NGOs themsel-
ves, as the representatives of civil society. 
The focus is on identifying more specific 
objectives, through consultation between 
the NGOs and the Commission or the 
Parliament, leading to concerted action. 
But the role of the NGOs has, at 
the instigation of both the public author-
ities and the NGOs themselves, extended 
to encompass all the cooperation policies 
of the Community. A well-known example 
is provided by emergency aid, an area 
where NGOs play an important part. There 
are many other examples: food aid, 
specific action in particular sectors or 
countries and action taken within official 
programmes. 
A large number of administrative 
bodies are obviously involved and these 
sometimes lack awareness of the specific 
nature of NGOs and the need for them to 
maintain their autonomy. These bodies, 
including the Community institutions, 
naturally want to see NGOs provide 
assistance in the pursuit of specific object-
ives. And overall, there is a problem in 
obtaining a minimum degree of coherence 
between the actions of the various author-
ities involved in development. In the light 
of these factors, it is inevitable that 
problems and misunderstandings will arise 
— all the more so as a number of 
organisations which claim to be NGOs 
behave more like consultancy offices con-
ducting research into the availability of 
contracts. 
The role of NGOs has extended to 
cover a great many areas, including 
that of Aids prevention 
If we do not wish to kill the goose 
which lays the golden eggs and hope to 
retain the original approach of NGOs which 
is essentially the reason for the importance 
we attach to them, problems must be 
faced openly. We must learn to combine 
the objectives and methods of the NGOs 
and the public authorities, while respecting 
the part played by each and, as part of this, 
the autonomy of NGOs. This cannot be 
achieved without genuine consultation 
between the parties about both general 
policies and specific programmes. 
This will undoubtedly be difficult, 
but it is by no means impossible, if the two 
sides adhere to an appropriate code of 
conduct. One important element is the rule 
that, except in areas or cases where a 
contrary course of action can be justified, 
the public funding should take the form of 
co-financing, with the NGOs' own contri-
bution constituting evidence of the mobili-
sation of the particular group which it 
represents. MM B.R. 
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We come across them during fund-
raising campaigns. We sometimes 
follow their activities on TV. Per-
haps we read their literature. But 
what do we really know about 
'non-governmental organisations' -
a term which encompasses a great 
variety of groups and structures. 
Other than a few NGOs, whose 
work is so well known that it needs 
no further promotion, the answer 
to this question is probably 'very 
little'. Many of them like to cultivate an air 
of mystery. But their role is not something 
that is cast in tablets of stone. Indeed, today, 
many are in the process of redefining their 
own identity. 
Defining the expression 'non-
governmental organisation' is a risky 
exercise. It may include voluntary organis-
ations, 'solidarity' agencies, international 
NGOs, so-called 'quasi-NGOs' and a variety 
of other arrangements. There is, in fact, no 
overall consensus as to what an NGO is. 
They are set up under national legislation 
and the legal conditions and procedures 
therefore vary from country to country. It 
is interesting to note, in this context, that 
the name NGO has recently been ab-
andoned in France in favour of ASI (Inter-
national Solidarity Association). 
One can, of course, try to pin-
point certain common basic criteria. There 
is the idea that an NGO should be a private, 
non-profit-making body. One might men-
tion the 'linking' of North and South as an 
essential feature, while recognising that 
NGOs are also interested in tackling 
poverty in their own countries. A key 
element may be the motivation of those 
involved — a desire to act as part of a 
society but without state control. This last 
'criterion' conveniently ignores the fact 
that many NGO projects are direct off-
shoots of action taken by governments. 
It is an interesting phenomenon 
that the general public has faith in NGOs 
and supports them, even if their compas-
sion in the face of world poverty is only 
rarely aroused. By contrast, the attitude to 
governments is less indulgent — indeed, 
there is often harsh criticism of the actions 
of state institutions. This is the non-
governmental/governmental dichotomy 
which is expressed in people's minds as a 
preference for efficiency over bureaucracy, 
It 
altruism over self-interest, and concern for 
human welfare over entrenched political 
and economic interests. The media const-
antly reinforce the dichotomy. But in 
practice, NGOs cannot be neatly catego-
rised like this. The one thing they are not, is 
a homogeneous whole. The key point 
about NGOs is their diversity, and it is from 
this diversity that they draw their strength. 
All shades 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, 
we have witnessed a veritable explosion of 
NGOs. According to the OECD, there were 
approximately 1600 in western countries in 
1980,2500 in 1990 and, today, we are well 
past the figure of 3000. There are naturally 
differences from country to country, par-
ticularly in terms of size. Oxfam UK, for 
example, which is a massive NGO, does not 
have an equivalent in any other European 
country. There are also big differences in 
numbers. France and Germany have a 
great many NGOs while other countries 
have fewer. In some countries, they have a 
long tradition of working in the field while 
in others, the sector has only emerged 
recently. The UK has some organisations 
that date back to the last century and most 
of the big ones came into being before the 
Second World War. In Spain, on the other 
hand, the first NGO was established only in 
1942, with the real growth taking place 
during the 1980s. National traditions also 
reveal themselves if one looks at the origins 
of NGOs. In Catholic countries, 'cooper-
ation' activity developed almost exclus-
ively along religious lines. Elsewhere, the 
phenomenon was linked more to anti-
establishment traditions. In Scandinavian 
countries, a further element was the 
voluntary spirit and a desire to build society 
based on consensus with the State. This 
corporatist approach is also found, to some 
extent, in the Netherlands. 
Another distinction may be made 
between so-called denominational NGOs 
and so-called secular ones. The former, to 
varying degrees, are run along religious 
lines, either deriving directly from one of 
the churches or having been closely linked 
to a religious denomination in the past. 
The relationship does not necessarily 
influence the NGO's actions although some 
make the delivery of a Christian missionary 
message part of their work. The phrase 
evangelical NGO is therefore in common 
use. Others, go even further, seeing the 
'message' as the central purpose. This 
might be said of NGOs who work closely 
with organisations such as Opus Dei or 
some of those that heve been established 
by smaller sects. As regards 'secular' NGOs, 
a key distinction is whether or not they 
belong to a wider structure or not. Many 
emanate from structures such as trades 
unions, political parties, international or-
ganisations or other social organisations. 
Here too, the link may be more or less 
intimate and may be reflected in their 
actions. Many make no effort to conceal 
their origins (though some do, particularly 
if they were set up by organisations like the 
CIA!). Again, this relationship is often 
linked to national traditions; hence, for 
example, all German political parties have 
their accredited NGO. 
Belonging to a structure may 
represent a source of additional finance for 
the NGO. This is the case particularly with 
many denominational NGOs, often work-
ing in networks, which benefit from a 
portion of the tax received by the Church 
to which they are affiliated. On the other 
hand, 'political' NGOs are sometimes 
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forbidden to raise their own funds and 
depend totally on the government (as in 
Germany). This distribution of own re-
sources/public funds varies widely ac-
cording to the NGO's reputation and also 
varies from country to country. Depen-
dence on public funds runs at somewhere 
between 15% and 20% in France and 
Germany. In the United Kingdom it is 40%. 
In the case of Italy, Sweden and Norway, it 
may be as high as 80%. It should be noted 
that Sweden and Norway do not offer tax 
allowances for private donations, which 
partly explains their low level. 
By virtue of this financing, some 
NGOs (often those with very strong 
foundations) focus their efforts on a great 
variety of subjects, whilst others favour 
more specific actions. 'Specialised NGOs' 
are becoming increasingly numerous and, 
over the years, new areas of activity have 
supplemented traditional ones such as 
education, hunger and health. There is the 
environment, obviously, but also human 
rights, debt reduction or disarmament. 
Over the last 10 years or so, two major 
subjects have cropped up, namely youth 
and women. In these areas, NGOs have 
clearly played an important role in in-
fluencing official policy. Often, moreover, 
NGOs are quick to defend causes, taking up 
a clear and sometimes radical political 
position. Unfortunately, this is usually a 
reaction to official policies rather than a 
preventive measure. Their role is no longer 
restricted to setting up micro-projects as 
they did 30 years ago or to providing 
humanitarian aid as portrayed by the 
media, always eager to highlight cata-
strophes. Today, NGOs are increasingly 
seeking to influence international political 
and economic relationships. 
From early missionaries 
to advocates of the Third 
World 
Often, when NGOs are differen-
tiated in terms of their role or their mission 
within the development sector, three 
distinct categories can be identified : 
— emergency or humanitarian-aid NGOs ; 
— development NGOs, subdivided into 
financing NGOs (offering technical support 
or funds) and operational NGOs (working 
with local groups or sending out their own 
staff) ; 
— development education NGOs (raising 
awareness in schools, running information 
and mobilisation campaigns, lobbying, 
etc.). 
The distinction is not a clear-cut 
one, however. Although some NGOs are 
involved solely in one specific type of 
action, more and more of them are mixing 
their activities nowadays, above all, in 
respect of development and development 
education. In addition, the adoption of 
political stances is not something that has 
occurred overnight. There has been a great 
deal of serious debate about the work of 
NGOs. David Korten, who has studied the 
subject, has identified three 'generations' 
of approach to development in the work of 
NGOs. 
The first contemporary NGOs 
came into being just after the First World 
War, often as direct offshoots of the 
Church. Initially, they concentrated their 
activities on responding to the needs of the 
victims of a war-torn Europe and only 
gradually did they turn their attention 
towards countries in the South. This 
humanitarian assistance did not remain the 
sole prerogative of missionaries and the 
churches for long, as groups of volunteers 
set up organisations in a non-denomi-
national setting. The approach of the first 
'generation' was simplistic. The basic 
message was ; 'If these people are hungry, 
it is because they have no food. We will 
therefore give them food'. NGOs were 
thus responding to immediate and con-
crete need. 
The second approach, which 
coincided with the wave of independence 
at the end of the 1950s and the beginning 
of the 1960s, was born of debate about the 
model which had hitherto predominated. 
The number of NGOs was increasing and 
their activities were diversifying. Hence-
forth, it was no longer simply a question of 
providing assistance in the face of the 
symptoms of poverty. The new objective 
was to enable the people affected to take 
on responsibility for themselves. NGOs 
focused their energies on developing the 
victims'ability to meet their needs through 
local actions. Schumacher's phrase, 'small is 
beautiful', gave rise to the development of 
health committees to implement prevent-
ive measures or introduce agricultural 
practices. Although, at the beginning of 
this second period, many NGOs were 
attempting to reproduce the western 
model, the desire to maintain the econ-
omic and political independence of local 
populations was rapidly to become more 
important, a desire for independence 
upheld by new emergent political concepts 
on the part of intellectuals in the South, 
such as liberation theologists. 
Although the main models off-
ered to the Third World spoke only in 
terms of delayed development and of 
macro-economic growth whose positive 
effects would influence the poor, a new 
ideological debate was taking place within 
the NGO community. The thesis was that 
poverty is a result of the unfair distribution 
of wealth and resources, and of an unequal 
balance of power, both in national and 
international terms. This debate undoub-
tedly contributed to a growing recognition 
of the fundamental role of NGOs in the 
overall development process. In fact, NGOs 
whose main focus was support for local 
projects were soon to become aware of 
the limits of such an approach ; limits based 
on political and economic interests. Since 
the beginning of the 1970s, and in the 
wake of leftist trends and the advent of 
the New World Economic Order, a third 
generation has appeared — that of 
sustainable development. The nature of 
poverty has become political. It is recog-
nised that micro-projects seldom produce 
results except on a small scale, and 
corruption, embezzlement, exploitation 
Working with children in Africa 
Some NGOs focus their efforts on a 
great variety of subjects, whilst others 
favour more specific actions and international relations founded solely 
on self-interest have the effect of sustain-
ing local inertia. To reverse the trend, 
development programmes and projects 
must be accompanied by lobbying and 
development education. In parallel with 
this new role as Third World advocate, 
Northern NGOs have increasingly offered 
support to NGOs from the South, the latter 
being increasingly recognised as necessary 
partners in combating the causes of 
poverty. 
A new debate 
This evolution and the successes 
arising from it inevitably pose new challen-
ges for NGOs nowadays. Hit by recession, 
and occasionally involved in ferocious 
financial competition, NGOs have had 
difficulty in refusing the public money 
sometimes offered them. This develop-
ment serves to emphasise their ever closer 
Save the Children, one of the first 
secular NGOs, was founded in 1919 to 
meet the needs of the victims in 
Central Europe. Since then it has 
expanded its activities into many 
countries. This is a Save the Children 
project in Honduras 
relationship with state organisations. Al-
though the attention of the state may 
seem beneficial, NGOs should not lose sight 
of their non-governmental identity, their 
independence and their specific character. 
Nor should they shirk their responsibility to 
their 'base' or to the people in the South 
whom they support. Many NGOs feel 
threatened by sponsors and governments 
who want to use them for their own ends 
and who therefore oblige them to comply 
with their standards and priorities. In this 
context, some authors speak of increased 
homogenisation of NGOs. Emergency aid, 
although a specific case, with its un-
precedented involvement in conflicts, 
merely serves to confirm the trend. 
Many governments have also 
begun to 'hunt' actively in areas that 
Northern NGOs regard as their own 
territory, seeking ways of dealing directly 
with Southern NGOs. Increased recog-
nition of the latter poses a serious chal-
lenge to Northern NGOs, although few 
would dare to admit it. The famous North-
South NGO 'partnership' remains, in many 
cases, a dominator/dominated relation-
ship, the former obviously being the one 
who has the money while the latter is the 
'beneficiary', placed under supervision. To 
put an end to this paternalistic attitude. 
Northern NGOs need more than fine 
words. They have to work to establish a 
new and real partnership (this was one of 
the major topics of the conference which 
followed the NGO General Assembly in 
April). One requirement in this regard is 
clearly to support Southern colleagues — 
who seek money rather than 'meddling' in 
consolidating their capabilities. 
Another serious aspect which 
NGOs need to reflect on and confront is the 
difficulties they have in working seriously 
together in the development sector. As 
Korten remarks, it appears easier, despite 
the frictions in the relationship, to col-
laborate with governments. The few 
identified instances of genuinely coordi-
nated activity usually only involve NGOs 
with similar leanings. Yet common formu-
lation of strategies in the medium and long 
term is crucial for better development. 
There are other elements to be 
considered in the debate about NGOs. 
There is, for example, the move towards 
more professionalism which is clearly 
underway. Private fund-raising is also a 
subject which has engendered criticism. 
Although we cannot yet speak of a 
genuine identity crisis, the NGOs are 
unquestionably at a turning point in their 
history. They must negotiate in the name 
of the civil society they claim to represent, 
if they are to maintain the reputation they 
have deservedly gained for themselves 
through past actions—as tried and tested, 
competent and efficient structures for 
combating poverty. ■■ T.G. 
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limitations of NGOs in 
m West Africa 
by Moussa Ba" 
At a time when a number of African states seem close to collapse, the need to 
strengthen NGOs takes on an even greater significance. But NGOs face numerous 
difficulties, in particular their dependence on external resources, limited skills and 
problems of adaptation. 
To speak of NGOs neces-
sarily involves discussing the 
'phenomenon of association'. 
Many analysts, particularly in the 
West, see this as a contemporary 
state of affairs but those who 
know black Africa well, are aware that 
'association' has always been an important 
element. In fact, the associative structure, 
which may be summed up as one where 
there is a solidarity, mutual cooperation 
and respect for hierarchies, has, in some 
rural areas, long been the basis of all social 
and economic relationships. There is no 
need here to look any further into this 
model, which is inherent to the African 
tradition. Nowadays, a consensus appears 
to have emerged when speaking about 
'association' based on non-state structures, 
as devised by the West to facilitate North/ 
South contacts. The shaping of African 
associations in the form of NGOs has 
followed on from this. However, if one 
analyses the way African NGOs have come 
into existence, two distinct approaches can 
be identified. There are those that were 
established by Northern NGOs, which saw 
them as intermediaries, and those that 
were set up voluntarily, on local initiative, 
for a variety of reasons. 
Most intermediary NGOs came 
into being between 1970 and 1985. In the 
wake of repeated droughts, problems had 
become so acute in Africa that the majority 
of western NGOs, principally suppliers of 
food, were obliged to take on the role, in 
the field, of food producers. They were 
involved on such a scale that many took on 
environmental restructuring work, either 
in association with recipient communities 
(village groups), or by requesting assist-
ance from those with local influence in the 
form of technical support. In this latter 
case, restructuring sometimes led to the 
creation of an African branch of the NGO. 
This movement to support the 
creation of local structures also coincided 
with the advent of participatory develop-
ment projects which required the initiative 
to come from grass roots groups with a 
certain degree of organisational indepen-
dence. Accordingly, for practical reasons 
relating to the volume of work, and 
financial ones (donor support was needed 
and they were attaching increasing im-
portance to where the demand originated, 
in their financing decisions) NGOs from the 
North devised new approaches. Some set 
up brand new NGOs in the South, others 
distanced themselves from action in the 
field by encouraging local people to take 
over, creating autonomous structures, 
while others still monitored the evolution 
of 'new-born' recipient organisations. 
In the second case, NGOs made 
up of African volunteers generally include 
Africans in positions of authority who are 
either independent (because they do not 
belong to the political class) or 'from the 
Left' (because of their opposition to the 
policies and practices of those running the 
country). A number of the leading particip-
ants in local NGOs are otherwise un-
employed. The people involved have 
various motives. It may be a sense of 
solidarity towards a rural world which is 
becoming increasingly poverty-stricken in 
the wake of repeated catastrophes such as 
droughts or locust plagues. It may be a 
reaction to the limitations of Western 
NGOs, the more 'voluntary' of which are 
sometimes viewed as little more than 
'enthusiasts' or perhaps even 'tourists'. 
Finally, the motive may be one of necessity. 
NGOs having become a source of genuine 
job-creation. 
Owing to the legal void regard-
ing NGOs in Africa, a group of friends 
(generally intellectuals living in the towns) 
are able to set themselves up as an NGO on 
the sole basis that they want to form one. 
Hence the proliferation of such bodies in 
Africa over the last 10 years. They include 
groups which profess to support develop-
ment and service-type NGOs. The former 
are often unions or federations of grass-
roots bodies which are thus confused with 
their social base. The latter, on the other 
hand, specialising in training techniques, 
furnishing loans, literacy programmes, and 
so on, are more reminiscent of their 
Northern counterparts. 
Scarcity of resources 
African NGOs are sometimes 
guilty of amateurism. They often rely 
heavily on the voluntary spirit, using 
people with no professional qualifications, 
and it is rare forthose in charge to have any 
technical training. When it was simply a 
case of carrying out charitable acts there 
were no particular problems with this. 
Goodwill coupled with a certain amount of 
organisational sense was sufficient. How-
ever, when one is talking about support in 
spheres such as agriculture, business or 
hydraulics, problems of efficiency do arise, 
problems which are made worse by an 
obstinate desire to work in isolation and 
without recourse to technical subcontract-
ing (which, it must be admitted, requires 
financial resources that the NGOs do not 
have). 
The old proverb 'Practice makes 
perfect' is a widely held belief in many 
NGOs, so it is not surprising that some 
observers describe the work they do as 
amateurish. Nevertheless, we can see a 
gradual change taking place. A number of 
African NGOs are seeking to improve their 
performance levels, either by recruiting 
qualified personnel, or by training their 
people in technical subjects. Unfortunately, 
there is a feeling that some Northern 
partners are not particularly enthusiastic 
about these new demands. The tendency is 
for these partners to give preference to 
management and monitoring tasks, to the 
detriment of efforts aimed at encouraging 
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human resource development within Af-
rican NGOs. Nowadays, while support for 
organisational and institutional aspects is 
generally acknowledged, the practice sug-
gests that it is rarely an unbridled success. 
The priority is still to obtain a return from 
activities. 
Financial resources are also 
scarce. African NGOs do not, unlike their 
Western counterparts, have members and 
sympathisers making regular contributions 
to the financing of their activities. 
Moreover, few of them develop an initia-
tive to raise funds internally and it is 
unlikely that they would receive finance 
from their own government (even the 
limited encouragement granted in the 
past, such as exemption from taxes and 
import duties on equipment, is being called 
into question). The NGOs are therefore 
totally dependent on the finance they 
receive from their public or private part-
ners in the West. This restricts both their 
development and the efficiency of the 
support they can give. On the planning 
side, they have no margin for manœuvre, 
since funds are received on the basis of 
projects. The NGOs, therefore, have to get 
by on what they are offered. In blunt 
terms, there is no 'life' beyond the confines 
of the project. The projects generally relate 
to highly specific activities which have been 
evolved for target populations and the 
NGO will be reimbursed by the sponsor 
only for work carried out within the 
context of these activities. As for the other 
possible activities, the organisation has to 
come to terms with the fact that it has 
insufficient resources — a situation which 
encourages dishonest behaviour such as 
embezzlement, inaccurate activity reports 
and so on. Finally, their lack of resources 
leads to increased competition between 
NGOs, which does not facilitate exchanges 
of experience, means and tools, although 
such exchanges are indispensable. In this 
context, the few rare exchanges which do 
take place between NGOs are based on 
need and generally developed on the basis 
of a psychological affinity. 
This dual poverty accentuates, 
furthermore, the two imperatives of a 
population's needs and a donor's priorities. 
In fact, both are changing : NGO work has 
progressed from emergency actions to 
development actions, implemented 
through micro-projects. These days, they 
include economic activities and there is a 
growing tendency to take account of the 
need for political affirmation and particip-
ation. African NGOs have great difficulty in 
keeping up with this evolution and many 
of them are out of step with the real needs 
of the populations they are supporting. 
Moreover, donor priorities are also chang-
ing. The humanitarian and geopolitical 
considerations which used to form the 
principal motivation are no longer the 
main priority. The emphasis is now on 
respect for human rights, the establish-
ment of democracy or economic freedom. 
These new priorities have the appearance 
of requirements and, even when shared, 
create genuine problems for African NGOs 
who then appear to be 'left behind' in 
terms of donors' expectations. 
NGOs and civic society 
Nowadays, the proliferation of 
African NGOs offers both promise in terms 
of civil society but also cause for concern. 
Hope is drawn from the fact that the very 
existence of NGOs is evidence of a type of 
popular civil society. Indeed, it would 
appear that the many people's associ-
ations, their federations and the bodies 
which support them, aim to give some say 
to all the 'little people' who have hitherto 
been oppressed and manipulated by those 
in power. It also appears that these 
organisations, which are flourishing 
throughout Africa, are in the process of 
progressively assuming a negotiating role, 
becoming aware of their responsibilities 
and offering a certain resistance to power. 
In this context, African NGOs are, cons-
ciously or unconsciously, on the way to 
setting up an 'intermediate authority' -
something which has long been lacking 
between African states and their popu-
lations. 
Yet there is also concern. The 
development of some NGOs without 
significant links with or contributions from 
the grass-roots, and whose main motiv-
ation is the satisfaction of their own 
material requirements, makes some ob-
servers fear the emergence of a parallel 
administration within the NGOs. It is also a 
recognised fact that NGOs are being set up 
without those in charge having the least 
idea of how such an organisation should 
operate and these are intervening sporadi-
cally, according to the financial opportu-
nities offered to them. Given this prolifer-
ation of intermediate structures, which are 
accused of lining their own pockets, some 
NGOs (which generally identify with their 
social base) are calling for clarification. 
It has also been noted that there 
are some NGOs which rely on 'ready-made' 
ideas, generally reflecting their sponsors' 
expectations. They offer little encourage-
ment for the necessary maturing of the 
concepts that should underpin the work 
they do with the population at large. 
Moreover, most are barely competent to 
monitor properly the communities they 
support. Their results are often disparate 
and short-term, and it is rare for such NGOs 
to offer an 'after-aid' service. 
Most African NGOs, often preoc-
cupied with their portfolio of activities, are 
incapable of measuring or assessing the 
impact of their actions in order to capitalise 
on and develop changes which would 
facilitate genuine participation on the part 
of the people they support. In this context, 
they often demonstrate a fear of political 
action. In fact, rather than acting as the 
provider of emergency aid in crises pro-
voked by state mismanagement, the NGOs 
would do better to devote themselves to 
actions with a more political bias. They 
must become less 'neutral' in their work. In 
particular, African NGOs should be aware 
of their role as a balancing power and of 
the political character of the support they 
offer. They must define appropriate stra-
tegies to favour the full participation of the 
people in their own development. How-
ever, in this respect, despite a wealth of 
experience acquired over the years, most 
African NGOs still lack a 'critical mass of 
analysts' to assist them in defining relevant 
methods and strategies in order better to 
perform their tasks of monitoring the grass 
roots populations they claim to represent. 
Despite all the problems they 
encounter, African NGOs are today ac-
knowledged as essential players in the 
socio-economic and political reconstruction 
currently going on in the continent. As 
they develop, the concerns set out above 
will doubtless diminish. The hopes that are 
attached to them will not prove to be 
misplaced. ■■ M.B. 
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NGOs in the South 
by Geneviève de Crombrugghe* 
For several years, NGOs in the 
South have been able to benefit 
from wider support than the tradi-
tional formula of financing projects 
on an individual basis. Although 
this financing of institutional sup-
port offers a way to improve the 
collaborative relationship between 
the various parties involved, it is 
nevertheless still underutilised. 
Northern NGOs involved 
in development in the South can 
be split into two major categories. 
Firstly there are the operational ones who, 
themselves, manage their actions in the 
field by engaging expatriate and local 
staff, often in collaboration with local 
private or public bodies. Secondly there are 
the financing NGOs who pay for the 
activities of local partner organisations. 
The role of these financing NGOs is to offer 
support to their partners in the South in a 
variety of fields, generally defined by 
mutual agreement between the two. A 
further role is to ensure regular monitoring 
— of the partner's operation, its methods 
of involvement and the results it achieves. 
Although financing NGOs were quite rare 
20 years ago, there has been a considerable 
increase in their number in the intervening 
period. 
'Classical' systems 
The public co-financing systems 
of NGOs in the North were set up at a time 
when most NGOs took the form of 
organisations which were operational in 
the field. This situation has largely de-
termined the context in which the co-
financing rules have been established. The 
most widespread system is financing on 
the basis of individual projects. Here, the 
Northern NGO submits to its co-financer, 
one or more activities which will be 
conducted in the field. The projects must 
be described with precision and include a 
detailed budget. They are examined in 
depth by the co-financing authority and, if 
the assessment is positive, the financing 
undertaking generally covers a period of 
three to five years. Various external 
opinions are generally sought at this 
preliminary phase, which enhances the 
reliability of the opinion but gives rise, on 
occasion, to very long delays in decision-
making. Since priority is given to these 
preliminary examinations, there often 
remains little time for the co-financing 
authority to monitor the projects through-
out their implementation. 
Although this system is relatively 
well adapted to the projects of operational 
NGOs who work in the field, it is less well-
suited to the working requirements of the 
financing NGOs which support the ac-
tivities of their partners in the South. 
In the South, the term NGO is 
used for many different types of organis-
ation. They may be small grassroots groups 
(of villagers, women, etc.) or federations of 
grassroots groups (local, regional or even 
national) which offer services to their 
members. Alternatively, they may be 
support organisations which offer tech-
nical and/or financial back-up for local 
initiatives. Some of these NGOs are inex-
perienced 'novices' while others have 
acquired know-how and obtained results 
in the field which are recognised locally and 
in NGO circles in the North. 
Most Southern NGOs seek finan-
cing from more than one NGO in the 
North, firstly to augment their capacity for 
involvement and secondly in an attempt to 
guarantee a regular income by distributing 
the risks of delay, suspension or cancel-
lation on the part of the Northern partner. 
It is obvious that the formula for financing 
on the basis of individual projects is ill-
suited to Southern NGOs but, in fact, it 
gives rise to inconvenience for both parties. 
The Southern NGO has to divide 
its general programme into a number of 
parts which are then submitted individu-
ally in the form of independent projects to 
different partners in the North. It must also 
prepare separate accounts for each of its 
Northern partners, to justify the amounts 
received. Put briefly, this does not stimu-
late healthy management or consistent 
and transparent accounting on the part of 
the organisation. 
The Northern NGO is generally 
aware of the problems that financing on 
the basis of individual projects poses for its 
partner in the South, but it has to make 
such financing a condition for obtaining 
funds. There is then a tendency for its 
monitoring to be centred solely on the 
specific actions it finances rather than the 
overall operation of its partner. 
The co-financing agency will 
rarely possess the information necessary to 
assess the quality of the working methods 
and field results of the Southern NGO and 
will have to take a decision based on very 
little data. 
The most recent version of the 
General Co-financing Conditions for Euro-
pean NGOs, published by the EC Commis-
sion in 1988, included a new article which 
responds better to the requirements of the 
The term 'Southern NGO' may denote 
organisations of very different types. 
Here, we see a women's solidarity 
association in Honduras dossier 
financing NGOs and their partners in the 
South. It refers to institutional support for 
organisations in the South and makes it 
possible to finance part of the general 
activity of Southern NGOs and to cover 
part of their operating expenses. The 
reports and accounts which must be 
submitted under the rules are documents 
covering the full range of the NGO's 
activities, something which it should, in 
any case, have prepared for its own 
management purposes. 
The aim of the new article was to 
encourage European NGOs to support the 
development of organisations in the South 
by improving their ability to render services 
based on local development initiatives and 
by encouraging their efforts to achieve 
greater operational independence. To 
enable these aims to be achieved, the 
financing rules of the new system leave the 
organisation in the South a wide degree of 
initiative in its choice of actions and 
encourage it to manage its activities and 
finances properly by concentrating on 
overall management. 
The motive behind the new 
article is a worthy one opening the door to 
an improvement in collaborative relation-
ships between all those involved; the 
Southern NGO, the Northern one and the 
co-financing agency. A study on the way in 
which this new opportunity has been put 
to use was carried out in 1992-93
 
1. This 
reveals that some Southern NGOs have 
benefited considerably from the new 
financing system introduced to them by 
their Northern partners. 
The study shows, however, that 
the facility is under-utilised by Northern 
NGOs. A number of reasons have been put 
forward: for example, the article was 
presented as experimental in nature and 
limited to a period of two years, with 
evaluations of contributions in kind, ac-
cepted for projects, not being admitted. A 
survey of some 20 European NGOs, con-
ducted in the context of the study, 
indicated that some Northern NGOs were 
not aware of the new opportunity and 
1 Evaluation of EC/NGO co-financing in the field 
of institutional support to grassroots organisations 
In developing countries, March 1993, COTA, 
Brussels 
had, therefore, been unable to inform 
their partners in the South about it. 
The study also included a survey 
of NGOs in the South, some of whom had 
benefited from financing under the terms 
of the new article and others who had not. 
Overall, Southern NGOs that had obtained 
financing under the arrangement were 
extremely satisfied. The following are a 
few advantages of this financing system 
cited by them : it enables NGOs in the 
South to develop an integrated and non-
sectoral approach to their actions; it 
enables financers to support this global 
approach ; it enables the NGO to adapt to 
the requirements of the field within which 
it operates without being tied to a number 
of achievements it has to accomplish 
within the context of an allocated subsidy ; 
and it helps to enable the NGO to 
consolidate its internal functioning. 
Virtually all the Southern NGOs 
interviewed for the study who had not 
received this new type of financing were 
unaware that the opportunity existed. 
Such organisations were extremely inter-
ested in this innovation. 
The role of financing 
NGOs from the North 
Some Southern NGOs which are 
managed properly and are well developed, 
want to obtain direct access to public 
financing or co-financing authorities (with-
out going through an NGO from the 
North). This direct access is currently 
possible in a limited number of cases, both 
within the EC Commission (for example 
within certain Asia/Latin America — 
budget lines) and within the Ministries of 
Cooperation in certain European countries 
(for example Switzerland). In reality, in 
order to bypass the NGO from the North in 
a financing relationship with a Southern 
NGO, the financing agency has to take on 
all the functions of the Northern NGO. This 
is possible when the agency deals with a 
very limited number of Southern NGOs, 
but it becomes more difficult to achieve 
when the number of partners is large. 
It would be useful, here, to refer 
to the different roles of the financing NGO 
from the North : 
— an identification role : the Northern 
NGO must know its Southern counterpart 
well, and vice versa, before entering into a 
partnership. It must assess the working 
methods, the system of management and 
the field results of the Southern NGO to 
gain a good understanding of what type of 
support will be useful. It must explain its 
own working methods, the types of 
technical and management support it is 
able to offer, its financial resources and its 
access to public funds. 
— a support role : the Northern NGO must 
assess the development objectives of its 
partner in the South, determine — to-
gether with the latter—the areas where it 
needs reinforcing, and seek the most 
effective and least expensive ways of 
achieving this. 
— a monitoring role : the Northern NGO is 
responsible for the proper use of the public 
and private funds allocated to its partner 
and, to do this, it has to organise a 
monitoring system that enables it to 
guarantee that the funds granted are used 
sensibly. In essence, this monitoring must 
cover the internal dynamics of the 
Southern NGO, its development strategies 
and the methods used for implementing 
them, and the quality and transparency of 
its management. This type of monitoring 
involves regular visits by agents from the 
Northern NGO to its Southern partner, 
regular exchanges of correspondence and 
a number of visits by the latter to the 
headquarters of the former. 
— an information role : the Northern NGO 
has to utilise its direct access to actual 
conditions in the South in order to inform 
the public in countries in the North about 
the day-to-day living conditions of people 
in the South. This information must enable 
the Northern public to understand the 
relationship which exists between de-
velopment in both North and South, and 
the importance of solidarity between 
them. 
A number of Southern NGOs are 
highly appreciative of the services offered 
by NGOs from the North and are eager to 
maintain the link with this intermediary 
which knows them well, supports them 
and monitors them. Obviously, not all 
financing NGOs from the North offer the 
same quality of service. Southern NGOs 
seeking direct access to public financing 
agencies are perhaps those who are most 
dissatisfied with their partnership with 
NGOs from the North. ■■ G.d.c. 
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President of the NGDO-EU Liaison Committee 
'The NGOs refuse to be mere onlookers' 
The NGDO-EU Liaison Committee is 
the preferred means of communi-
cation between the NGOs and the 
European Union. We interviewed 
its recently elected President, Agos-
tinho Jardim Gonçalves. A chaplain 
and Portuguese journalist, Mr Gon-
çalves has had long experience of 
the development cooperation 
sector. Having, in the past, been a 
representative of CCHD, chairman 
of the 'Latin American' group of the CISDE 
and also a National Director of the inter-
national press agency 'Inter-Press service' In 
Portugal, he is now the founder and Director 
of OIKOS in his country. We asked him first 
about how he saw his new role as President 
of the Liaison Committee. 
— I think that the role of Pre-
sident is essentially to give coherence to 
the various organisations making up the 
Committee while at the same time provid-
ing the Committee with the verve, impetus 
and dynamism which it needs, given that it 
is made up of people with very different 
experiences. Preference should not be 
given to any one type of experience. They 
must all be employed to engender the 
dynamism which is the Committee's aim. In 
the past, the Presidency has been held by 
people from the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Ireland and France. Now it has passed, for 
the first time, to someone from a southern 
European country, and to one of the more 
recent members of the EU. I am very much 
aware of my responsibility to conserve, 
coordinate and implement, but also of the 
fact that the culture to which I belong is a 
southern European one. I think that this 
meeting of different cultures and consul-
tation between them should further enrich 
the work of European NGOs. 
■ The great strength of NGOs clearly lies 
in their richness of experience and diver-
sity. Is it possible to maintain this diversity 
in a Liaison Committee that brings to-
gether more than 700 organisations ? 
— The NGOs reflect a European 
reality. We are working for the European 
Union, but are concerned to ensure that 
we do not lose the richness which results 
from our diversity. This applies both to the 
construction of Europe and to the civil 
societies in which the NGOs are rooted, 
which give them their significance. The 
Liaison Committee does not intend to 
standardise the work of the NGOs. We 
offer a forum in which the various NGOs 
are able to share their history, experience 
and opinions. We work together, helping 
in the construction of Europe in the specific 
context of solidarity with developing 
countries through cooperation. The way of 
achieving this differs from one country to 
another and from one NGO to another. 
We have no desire to lose the richness that 
arises from the spontaneity of NGO work, 
nor do we want to create something which 
is too standardised and which will, there-
fore, impoverish their work. 
■ Is this diversity something that is 
reflected in the links which the Committee 
has with the European Union ? 
— The Committee is a privileged 
partner in dialogue with the European 
institutions — and is accepted as such — as 
regards development cooperation policies. 
It signals the fact that the societies of the 
15 EU countries still possess vitality. The 
NGOs of the North and South alike have 
full freedom to submit projects or pro-
grammes, or to determine acceptance or 
rejection criteria with the Commission, and 
the Liaison Committee is there to pass on 
their wishes and demands. The Committee 
is therefore the arena for debate over the 
scale of the contribution to be made by 
NGOs to the construction of a Europe 
which shows solidarity. All this is part of a 
continuous dialogue. 
However, there is another prob-
lem at the level of the Liaison Committee 
which is knowing just what is represented 
by it. Does it simply represent the big 
NGOs ; those that are sufficiently large to 
be able to tackle certain matters, to 
develop their lobbying activities orto have 
significant projects in developing coun-
tries? Or is it also open to small NGOs and 
associations that want to develop their 
work in the field of solidarity ? For my part, 
I think that there is no clear answer. It is 
something that needs to be handled at an 
individual country level. After all, it is there 
that things are actually happening. I 
wouldn't say that there is a conflict over 
this issue, but there is a certain lack of 
alignment and an obvious difference in the 
power of the large and small NGOs. 
One of the decisions of the last 
General Assembly was to reinforce the 
links between the Liaison Committee and 
national platforms. I think that up to now, 
despite all the efforts that have been 
made, it has not yet proved possible to 
establish a truly fruitful institutional re-
lationship between the Committee and 
the national platforms. This is a claim made 
by the NGOs from various countries and 
also by Member States. The Liaison Com-
mittee has a duty to ensure that the 
activities of national platforms make a 
significant contribution to the dynamism 
of the EU-developing country relationship, 
and to include both large and small NGOs 
in this. 
■ NGOs actually have a duty to coordi-
nate their activities. But doesn't the search 
for funds, and the resulting competition 
mean that this is little more than fine 
words ? 
— Competition is more talked 
about than actually encountered. It is true 
that NGOs are trying to obtain con-
siderable financial resources. This is espe-
cially the case for those working in the field 
who need capital to support their projects. 
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It is also true that in certain countries, they 
are working in the same locations and the 
same fields, dealing with the same social 
groups. But when one talks about coordi-
nation among NGOs, one is mainly think-
ing about the complementarity which we 
need to have to make their activities even 
more effective. Let me explain what I 
mean. Some NGOs are expert in humani-
tarian assistance. Others have devoted 
themselves to development of the Third 
World using technology transfers, support 
for human resources and so on. There are 
still others which have substantial ex-
perience in the field of political lobbying. 
The fact that NGOs specialise does not 
mean that they should be compartmenta-
lised — isolated one from another. Real life 
isn't like that. A country which has suffered 
the effects of a war needs emergency 
assistance and the NGOs which want to 
bring about development should not 
forget that. By the same token, those 
providing emergency assistance should not 
forget that this is essentially transitory and 
there has to be a follow up. So NGOs 
should not work in ignorance of what 
others are doing. They should seek, rather, 
to share their appeals, challenges, ex-
periences and even their funds and re-
sources. What is currently happening in 
Rwanda and Angola, for example, is very 
unfortunate. It is inconceivable that NGOs 
will be able to continue working in their 
own individual spheres without reaching 
some sort of agreement on coordination, 
so as to make their work more effective. 
■ Looking at the NGO world more 
generally, a characteristic feature of the 
past few years has been the advent of and 
recognition given to Southern NGOs. This 
has inevitably led to a repositioning on the 
part of some Northern ones. 
— I think that there is still a need 
to reflect on and deepen the existing links 
between the societies of North and South 
and between their respective NGOs. The 
fact that it has proved possible to deepen 
this link between peoples, states and 
intergovernmental organisations, within a 
framework of consultation and collabor-
ation, is extremely promising. It means that 
nations are brought closer together. It is 
dynamic movements such as these which 
will bring people together in a spirit of 
solidarity to construct an international 
system which is just, and to achieve world 
peace. 
Having said this, we cannot turn 
back the clock on certain things that have 
happened. The fact that a number of 
European bodies decided to begin forging 
direct links or direct cooperation with 
Southern NGOs in a rather overhasty 
manner will not prevent the Northern 
NGOs from continuing to strive to deepen 
cooperation between NGOs. It will, of 
course, be very difficult if there is no proper 
preparation or commitment to permanent 
evaluation. The overall aim is to continue 
consultation and I can say with regard to 
decentralised cooperation, for example — 
an area in where Southern NGOs are 
increasingly involved that everything is 
conducted in a very good spirit of cooper-
ation between the Liaison Committee and 
the EC. Here we are kept up to date with 
what is going on. We are involved in 
discussions and we participate. I may add 
that we are moving forward together with 
the Commission in the field of research and 
the new relationships developing in this 
area. However, we do think that such 
cooperation must be undertaken with a 
certain degree of caution if it is to be truly 
effective. 
■ You say you wish to continue to work 
in partnership with Southern NGOs, but 
when your predecessor, Guido Dumon, 
was appointed by the General Assembly, 
he expressed the opinion that this partner-
ship had failed. 
— I think we must accept that 
the partnership failed in the sense that the 
our concept of it was a failure. It was not 
implemented in the way that was in-
tended. There were obstructions placed on 
the path that we tried to follow which 
prevented the establishment of the kind of 
partnership which is described in manuals 
and in the speeches of leaders and those in 
authority. You have to be realistic and 
acknowledge that while partnership is a 
goal and an ideal, different countries have 
different economic situations. Everyone 
knows that some countries have more 
resources than others and that means that 
from the outset, we have a situation which 
is not really conducive to partnership. 
There are donors and recipients and the 
latter do not have as much power as the 
former, even if they both started out with 
the best of intentions. On the other hand, 
we are all aware of the history of develop-
ment cooperation. Partnership cannot be 
divorced from reality, from what is actually 
happening in the. world and from the 
realpolitik of North-South relations. The 
situation in the real world can also affect 
relations between Northern and Southern 
NGOs. In areas like international trade or 
technology transfers, we have undoub-
tedly seen forms of interference which 
have prevented the establishment of the 
desired partnership. 
Today, however, it looks as if 
there are more promising signs. It is not just 
that there is still a will within the NGOs for 
the partnership to retain its vitality. There 
is also the fact that we learn by experience 
what direction to take to advance in 
future, and what traps to avoid. 
■ What impact do you think the Liaison 
Committee has had ? 
— The establishment of the 
Committee was an important act. It 
involved the creation of an organisation 
which respects the autonomy of society 
and holds out the possibility of a fruitful 
and permanent dialogue with it, in the 
context of a European system which was 
set up with clear economic aims and 
political intentions. In evaluating the 
Committee's impact, I personally think 
that, although we have already achieved a 
lot and have developed a certain way of 
involving ourselves in the process of 
cooperation between Europe and the 
South, we could have progressed even 
more quickly. I think that we must now, as 
quickly as possible, give some thought to 
the fundamental nature of what we are 
doing — something which probably would 
not have been possible in the past. We 
need to bring about an increase in interac-
tion between the Liaison Committee and 
the various structures of the EU — whether 
it be the Parliament, the Council, COREPER 
or the Commission. As regards the Com-
mission, I am not just talking about the 
NGO unit but about the institution as a 
whole. I would like us to move forward 
more quickly. 
^ 
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Identity 
The NGDO-EU Liaison Committee 
is the representative structure of 
European external cooperation/ 
international solidarity NGOs 
with respect to the European 
Union. It is a democratic and pluralist 
association of individual member NGOs 
grouped in National Platforms In each 
Member State of the European Union. 
Vision 
The Liaison Committee strives for a world 
based on just relationships between all 
peoples in which the European Union 
plays a full role in sharing the earth's 
resources equitably amongst the people 
of the world and makes available 
generously its wealth and expertise to 
those seeking to promote their own full 
development. 
Role 
By providing a channel for the views of 
civil society in the South to be heard in 
■ What, therefore, are the current 
priorities ? 
— Priority must be given today 
to the EU's cooperation policy. It is not 
possible to work outside it, swimming 
against the stream. The EU could have a 
very good policy of cooperating with 
NGOs, but if this is not coherent, the NGOs 
will find it difficult to make their action 
effective. The priority is therefore for the 
Liaison Committee to contribute to the 
definition and inauguration of a coherent 
development cooperation policy. This can 
be achieved in different ways. Dialogue is 
important, but most important of all is the 
ability to take time to ask the key 
questions. The most recent General As-
sembly, in fact, set the pace by raising the 
question of revising the Maastricht Treaty. 
By the same token, it is necessary for the 
Liaison Committee to be able to par-
ticipate, in its own way, in next year's 
Intergovernmental Conference. Lomé is 
also of fundamental importance. It is not 
just a question of joint financing of 
projects, financial resources or other tech-
nical factors. There are other aspects that 
are more importance, such as the de-
finition of cooperation strategies. 
■ In this connection, what do you think 
about the future of the Lomé Convention ? 
— I think it is very dangerous to 
set one's sights on something that will 
dilute the formula offered by Lomé. 
Despite all its faults and failings, the 
Convention represented a desire for some-
thing special as regards dialogue, cooper-
ation and partnership. It was a form of 
multilateral cooperation which went 
Europe, by encouraging a positive and 
progressive European approach to 
international affairs and by working to 
improve the quality, scope and impact of 
EU external cooperation and assistance, 
the NGDO-EU Liaison Committee aims to 
contribute effectively to the formulation 
and monitoring of EU development 
cooperation, emergency assistance and 
other policies that have a bearing on the 
Union's relations with the South. 
Work 
1. To encourage cooperation, dialogue, 
mutual support and the exchange of 
ideas and experiences between NGOs, 
through in particular : 
— the formulation of consensus 
positions ; 
— the promotion of cooperative 
ventures, and 
— the promotion of high standards of 
professionalism in NGO wort:. 
2. To help European NGOs raise public 
awareness of EU relations with the South 
beyond fine phrases. And it has led to some 
concrete results and genuine negotiations. 
Certain mechanisms were inaugurated and 
implemented that have had a real impact. I 
think that killing off this aspect would be a 
step backwards in the history of cooper-
ation. 
Secondly, I think that a great deal 
of experience has been accumulated in the 
sphere of cooperation and a large number 
of people have been mobilised to enable 
Europe and the ACP countries to come 
closer together. It would be a pity now to 
say 'Alright then, all this is a waste of time. 
Let's move in another direction'. I for my 
part favour a much more hard-headed 
evaluation; I think that the evaluation 
carried out for the Lomé IV mid-term 
review was very weak. And, more worry-
ingly, the real problems regarding finan-
cing were not touched upon. The Liaison 
Committee, working with other European 
networks, discussed and reflected on the 
issues. We shared our thoughts and 
worked more closely than ever before but 
there was no echo of these deliberations in 
the final texts. It was ail compartmenta-
lised at an official level. Doubtless, this is 
partly due to the fact that international 
structures often do not provide the con-
ditions which are most conducive to 
sustained collaboration. So there should 
have been a better evaluation aimed at 
breaking down the barriers which have 
originated both in Europe and, more 
particularly in the ACP countries, notably 
on questions relating to competences, 
which have impaired Lome's effectiveness. 
If Lomé fails, and is expunged 
altogether, then the only remaining hope 
and encourage a climate of European 
public opinion conducive to promoting its 
goals and visions. 
3. To provide a link and facilitate policy 
dialogue between European civil sodety 
and the EU by representing European 
NGOs to the European institutions in 
particular, the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council of the Union 
and in other appropriate international 
conferences and fora. 
4. To promote the flow of information to 
European NGOs on EU development and 
emergency aid policies, work and 
resources by acting as a centre for 
information, collection and distribution. 
5. To facilitate and improve the access of 
European and Southern NGOs to EU 
resources for development and 
emergency work. 
for the future will be the international 
charity, assistance and emergency aid 
movements. There will be nothing else. 
■ Are you suggesting that the NGOs' 
main role is now a political one ? 
— Development cooperation in-
evitably has a political dimension. Things 
cannot be allowed to continue to depend 
on the goodwill of people acting in a spirit 
of mercy in the face of suffering. This 
presupposes changes in structures which 
involve redefining cooperation policies, 
and the NGOs have a part to play in this 
respect. 
Today's NGOs refuse to be mere 
witnesses. We will not refrain from inter-
vening until such time as the level of 
suffering absolutely demands it. There is a 
lot of talk about democracy, but the way in 
which it is conceived sometimes means 
there are areas where states reject the 
involvement of civil society. This is the case 
for foreign relations and defence. These 
are areas which are almost state mono-
polies. But the gradual intensification of 
democratic awareness implies that there 
will also be intervention in relations 
between nations as we, the people, 
express our political opinions. That is what 
we already do in the case of social and 
economic problems, which are seen as 
areas of legitimate democratic concern. 
But democracy also entails the capacity and 
right to intervene in foreign policy. The aim 
is not just to ensure that there is peace 
between nations, but also to establish 
international justice, and the NGOs are of 
fundamental importance in this re-
spect. ■■ Interview by T.G. 
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identity: the financing 
dilemma of NGOs 
by J. Bossuyt and P. Develtere* 
Northern development NGOs are 
increasingly dependent on official 
funds to realise their civic agenda. 
This partly reflects their popularity 
as alternative channels of aid de-
livery, partly the stagnation of 
private gifts accruing to them. Only 
a few NGOs reject public funding 
on principle. The changing nature 
of government support com-
pounds the problem. Throughout the OECD, 
donor agencies are earmarking funds to 
special programmes (e.g. on démocratis-
ation, women, the environment). Northern 
NGOs can apply for these funds, but there 
are generally conditions attached to them. 
This also means that there is less money 
available for NGOs to finance their own 
initiatives. 
This dependency presents a 
rather paradoxical situation for civil society 
organisations that are fiercely attached to 
their own values and autonomy of action. 
It causes tensions between NGOs and 
governments, reflected in vivid debates on 
autonomy, subcontracting and complem-
entarity. At best, NGOs fear a loss of 
freedom and flexibility. At worst, they see 
themselves being co-opted by govern-
ments as cheap executing agencies. 
In this article, we look at some of 
these trends and related tensions. We 
distinguish different systems of govern-
ment sponsorship and related NGO stra-
tegic responses. We argue that both NGOs 
and governments have a stake in finding a 
new modus vivendi. Positive trade-offs can 
be realised for NGOs that seek and accept 
official sponsorship. To achieve this, NGOs 
* Jean Bossuyt Is Program Coordinator at the 
European Centre of Development Policy Manage-
ment (ECDPM), Maastricht. Patrick Develtere is 
Head of the Project Division of Solidarité Mondiale, 
Brussels. 
should replace their dogmatic attachment 
to the principle of autonomy with a strong 
stand on identity. 
NGO-f inancing : a menu 
of options 
Governments in different 
Northern countries have developed various 
ways to support NGOs. At the lowest level, 
they provide indirect support by allowing 
tax deductions for private donations. Most 
countries, however, have developed co-
financing schemes to match funds raised by 
NGOs themselves. Sometimes, funds are 
earmarked for specific components of NGO 
work such as transport, personnel, or even 
for the Government/NGO-dialogue. 
Four distinct approaches to 
government sponsorship for NGO-acti-
vities can be identified : the programme 
approach, the project approach, the 'win-
dow' approach, and the 'quango' ap-
proach (each of which is analysed below). 
In most countries, they are taken care of by 
a single ministry for Development Cooper-
ation. NGOs often use the four approaches 
in a mix to finance their varied operations. 
This might be a surprise since each of these 
approaches to NGO sponsorship differs in 
its origins, underlying philosophy and 
consequences for the autonomy, working 
methods and even the development ac-
tions of an NGO. 
The four approaches can be 
placed on a continuum. At the liberal end, 
there is the programme approach. At the 
other and most restrictive end, is the so-
called 'quango' approach (i.e. quasi-auto-
nomous NGO approach). 
As the table shows, the roles of 
government and NGOs in initiating action, 
in executing projects and in financing varies 
between the different approaches. 
Programme approach 
A government relying on a pro-
gramme approach accepts the existence 
and free development of a civil movement 
which is concerned about North-South 
problems. Because government positively 
appreciates the value, representativeness 
and effectiveness of NGOs, it provides 
them with funds — on a contractual basis 
— to execute their activities. NGO efforts 
are seen as a complementary contribution 
to the government's own policies and 
Four approaches to NGO-financing 
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Approach 
Programme 
Approach 
Project 
Approach 
Window 
Approach 
Quango 
Approach 
Who takes the initia-
tive ? 
the NGO 
the NGO 
the NGO or the 
Government 
the Government 
What is the task of the 
NGO? 
to execute its own pro-
gramme 
to execute its 
own projects after approval 
to execute its 
projects within 
a governmental 
framework 
to execute 
projects 
identified by 
government (and 
to act as 
subcontractor) 
Who pays ? 
co-financing 
(NGO and 
government 
cofinancing 
(NGO and 
government) 
cofinancing 
of 100% 
government 
financing 
100% 
government 
financing 
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programmes (e.g. in development edu-
cation). A strong NGO sector, in turn, is 
perceived as broadening political support 
for development cooperation. This ap-
proach is very much inspired by the public 
sponsoring systems for traditional civic 
movements (involved in labour, youth and 
adult education, health care, etc). 
Project approach 
Few governments have deve-
loped a programme approach which is 
based on mutual trust. Most have in-
stitutionalised their scepticism and dis-
comfort with NGOs by adopting project 
approaches. Proposals are scrutinised on a 
case-by-case basis by public servants who 
check if the proposed activity falls within 
governmental priorities and if it is 'politi-
cally acceptable'. The negative side-effects 
of this approach have become apparent. 
NGOs and their partners in Africa, Asia or 
Latin America have to rely on ever more 
creative packaging to suit the system. The 
NGO's own identity and social project may 
find itself diluted in favour of a hotchpotch 
of isolated activities that donors are willing 
to fund. It may also lead to a growing 
bureaucratisation of the NGO sector. 
Window approach 
A window approach is less ap-
preciative of the specificity of the NGOs 
than the programme and project ap-
proaches. Here, governments elaborate 
their own diversified strategies for tackling 
development problems and invite outside 
actors, including NGOs, to present concrete 
project proposals for financing. Well-
known examples are the specific budget-
lines for gender projects, human rights, 
démocratisation and the environment. In 
this system, NGOs compete with private 
consultants, research institutes and 
national organisations all trying to get the 
same scarce resources. 
Quango approach 
All previous approaches leave the 
initiative to the NGOs. It is their choice if 
they want to ask for government money 
and if they want to accept the strings 
attached. Under the quango approach, 
governments consciously utilise NGOs to 
execute projects aimed at achieving 
government objectives. These quasi-auto-
nomous NGOs thus become mere execut-
ing agencies. They are called upon for their 
flexibility, their better contacts with cer-
tain target groups, their cheap delivery of 
services or their experience and pro-
fessionalism. The objectives and the stra-
tegies of the development actions im-
plemented by the subcontracting quangos 
are determined by the governmental 
funding agency. 
Different NGO responses 
As mentioned before, NGO 
financing patterns are changing in most 
OECD countries. Some governments are 
both flexible and prepared to provide 
multi-year programme financing. Others 
adopt a more conditional and restrictive 
approach and prefer window and quango 
types of support. Northern NGOs are 
responding in different ways to these 
challenges to their autonomy and funding 
base: 
'Close your eyes' 
This seems to be the implicit 
strategy pursued by several Northern 
NGOs. These are usually dogmatically 
attached to their autonomy and reluctant 
to accept change. They blame the govern-
ment for being intrusive while refusing to 
co-operate with other NGOs (seen as 
competitors), or with official aid agencies 
(seen as the enemy). This strategy offers 
few perspectives for efficient action in the 
field and institutional survival at home. It 
leads to a proliferation of small, generalist 
NGO's, scrambling for projects and gifts. 
'Follow the market' 
A second category of NGOs links 
its survival and growth to the market. The 
priorities of these NGOs are increasingly 
determined by prevailing market opportu-
nities and special funds rather than by 
constituencies. In some cases, this has led 
NGOs to become private firms, tendering 
for government contracts. Other NGOs see 
the market as a means to earn untied 
money (e.g. by setting up trading associ-
ations like Oxfam). In principle, there is 
nothing wrong with a more market-
oriented approach. It may lead to quick 
and cost-effective responses to genuine 
needs (e.g. emergency aid). But this 
approach may also induce NGOs to become 
too 'greedy' and obsessed with financial 
growth rather than with development 
impact, innovation and political work. It 
may increase (unfair) competition among 
NGOs. Governments prefer to do business 
with NGOs acting as subcontracting agen-
cies than with those displaying a political 
agenda and critical watchdog attitudes. 
'Specialise' 
Some Northern NGOs believe 
that specialisation is the best guarantee to 
ensure both greater development impact 
and institutional survival. In an increasingly 
complex world, knowledge and expertise 
are highly valued. The development 
agenda has expanded dramatically, thus 
creating new opportunities for NGOs that 
have specialised skills to offer in certain 
niches. The rapid growth of NGOs in the 
South also compels Northern NGOs to 
show that they have real added-value to 
offer (beyond the provision of funds). 
Experience so far suggests that specialist 
NGOs will have little problem in securing 
their funding needs on a relatively auto-
nomous basis. 
'Move towards internationalisation' 
Internationalisation is high on 
the agenda of several Northern NGOs. This 
strategy is a two-edged sword. It has great 
potential if it is done to overcome chronic 
problems of scale, duplication and compe-
tition for dwindling funds. Through larger 
entities, Northern NGOs may develop the 
critical mass of funds and skills required to 
influence policy. But internationalisation 
can also be used by Northern NGOs to 
ensure their own (financial) survival. The 
risk of reduced funding at home is circum-
vented by diversifying funding sources 
from abroad. According to Ian Smillie, this 
may lead to a situation in which inter-
national NGOs 'do to older and smaller 
NGOs what McDonald's does to establi-
shed restaurants when it moves into a 
neighbourhood: they put them out of 
business'. 
'Put identity before autonomy' 
A large group of NGOs reject 
both a sterile attachment to the principle 
of autonomy and a too market-oriented 
approach. In their view, NGOs are more 
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than cheap delivery systems. They see 
themselves as independent actors, with a 
specific role to play in international cooper-
ation and in their own societies. 
To achieve their objectives, how-
ever, they will have to make some hard 
choices. The first is to remain unambigu-
ously in the civic realm. Funding that 
reshapes NGOs into parastatals or private 
firms should be avoided. The second is to 
put identity before autonomy. This means 
investing heavily in refining their own 
mandate, role, funding strategies, in-
house skills and expertise. Thirdly, having 
clarified their identity, they need to build 
strategic alliances with a wide variety of 
other actors (such as governments, trade 
unions, social movements, private sector 
associations and local authorities). For too 
long, development NGOs have worked in 
'splendid isolation' in both the North and 
the South. This is a luxury that can no 
longer be afforded. According to Thomas 
Dichter: 'All the necessary ingredients for 
an effective aggregation of the players in 
development are present, perhaps for the 
first time... Perhaps what is needed now is 
a balancing, an articulation of the parts'. 
Northern NGOs with a clear identity may 
have the best chances of find their niche 
within this new configuration. 
Future challenges 
It is rather hazardous to spec-
ulate about the future of the Northern 
NGO sector. Most of the premises underly-
ing their activities are in a process of rapid 
change. Development problems are be-
coming increasingly complex. Roles and 
responsibilities of Northern NGOs are being 
questioned by their Southern partners. 
There are doubts about impact and sus-
tainability. Sources of secure finance are 
under pressure. And unconditional support 
from public opinion is no longer guaran-
teed. 
Against this background, the 
most promising strategy for NGOs seems 
to rest on developing a strong identity. 
Northern NGOs that are firmly rooted in 
their own societies (e.g. in social move-
ments) and that provide clear added value, 
will probably have less to fear from 
government co-option, market regulation 
or direct funding. 
For this scenario to prevail, some 
other thorny issues will have to be re-
solved. First, how to reduce the unhealthy 
competition among Northern NGOs for 
public opinion support? This leads to a 
proliferation of fund-raising appeals, often 
based on miserable images of Third World 
countries. Here also, developmental NGOs 
with a sound message are in no position to 
compete with those promoting relief or 
child sponsoring. Second, how to provide 
incentives for NGOs to abandon their 
almost exclusive focus on local NGOs and to 
work together with a wide variety of 
development actors? This holds major 
promise for greater development impact 
and sustainability. Third, how to build new 
partnerships between Northern NGOs and 
their governments, based on mutual re-
spect for each partner's identity and role ? 
In each of the three cases, the 
way in which government funds are used is 
a most critical factor. If carefully managed, 
they can provide powerful incentives for 
increased co-operation among NGOs, div-
ersification of partnerships in the field and 
a new relationship with governments, H 
J.B. & P.D. 
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Changing perspectives 
in the Philippines 
by Dr Joel Rocamora* 
NGOs in the Philippines have 
among the most extensive and complex 
advocacy experience among NGOs in the 
developing world. International conferences 
dealing with NGO concerns, whether it is 
development, ecology, human rights, 
gender or some other issue, will, more likely 
than not, have Filipino NGO representatives 
present, actively participating and often 
leading discussions. 
The ubiquitousness of Filipino 
NGO representatives in national and inter-
national fora does not necessarily mean 
that they have a coherent theoretical and 
political framework tying together the 
various advocacy positions. The Philippine 
NGO community's record of success in 
advocacy is at best patchy. But it is a wide-
ranging, sophisticated and rapidly chang-
ing advocacy, nonetheless. In recent years, 
Filipino expert on NGOs. 
NGOs in the Philippines have been in the 
throes of what some have called a 'para-
digm crisis'. 
Grappling with reality 
The 'Europe-Philippines in the 
1990s' Project (EP-90s), a joint programme 
of research and advocacy undertaken by 
the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam 
and five major NGO and PO ('people's 
organisation) coalitions in the Philippines, 
provides a good example of new trends in 
Philippine NGO advocacy work. After over 
a year of research and consultations on 
various aspects of Europe-Philippines re-
lations, the five coalitions produced a 
policy paper which was submitted to a 
conference in Amsterdam in March 1995. 
The conference included representatives of 
the European Commission, EU member 
country development ministries, European  -f 
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NGOs, Filipino migrant worker organis-
ations and Philippine solidarity groups. 
In contrast to similar documents 
in the past, which tended to be premised 
on unmitigated opposition to the Philip-
pine government, and its foreign ODA 
donors, the EP-90s policy paper posed a 
framework of development which challen-
ged both the EU and Philippine govern-
ment frameworks. Instead of dismissing 
these competing frameworks on ideo-
logical grounds, the policy paper engaged 
them on the basis of an analysis of the 
current Philippine political and economic 
situation and on mutually acceptable goals 
such as poverty alleviation. 
The document is also one of the 
first NGO coalition statements to grapple 
with politically controversial economic 
issues such as the Philippine government's 
structural reform programme, in particular 
its stabilisation and liberalisation policies. 
While the carefully worded and nuanced 
position on this and similar economic policy 
issues cannot be easily summarised, it 
would not be inaccurate to characterise its 
stance as a call to work for 'pro-people' 
goals, with an eye to the opportunities and 
the limits imposed by national realities. 
One aspect of the EP-90s con-
ference which drew the attention of 
European government officials was the 
presence of Department of Agrarian 
Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao. At the 
conference and in subsequent meetings, 
Garilao appealed for European support for 
NGOs and POs as necessary partners of 
government in the implementation of 
agrarian reform. While critical of the 
present agrarian reform law, NGO and PO 
representatives are willing to work with 
sympathetic and reform-oriented govern-
ment officials such as Garilao to secure 
limited gains for their constituencies. 
The changes in perspective re-
flected in the EP-90S policy paper can also 
be seen in Philippine NGO participation in 
the various UN summits and other inter-
national fora, and most importantly in the 
documents, campaigns and multifaceted 
political activism of NGOs and POs in the 
Philippines. This sea-change in perspective 
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can only be understood, however, by 
placing it in historical context. 
From dictatorship to 
'elite' democracy 
If we exclude church and other 
civic organisations which focus on various 
permutations of alms giving, NGOs in the 
Philippines can be said to have developed 
mainly during the period of the Marcos 
dictatorship (1972-1986). Their political, 
goal — providing services to peopl's 
organisations fighting the dictatorship 
were dearcut and explicit. Their initial 
activities ; awareness-raising, ('conscienti-
sation'), training and organising, research 
and publications, and health and human 
rights work, can be understood within this 
context. 
The political context determined 
the issues taken up by NGOs and their 
overall framework of political and econ-
omic analysis — in other words, their 
overall political stance. At this time, all 
progressive NGOs supported radical, struc-
tural change in Philippine society. Develop-
ment work was seen as inextricably linked 
to political work. More often than not, 
Poster demanding freedom 
for political prisoners 
During the Marcos era, the political 
context determined the issues taken up 
by NGOs 
NGOs were either organised by, or linked 
to, political groups. They were oriented 
mainly towards changes in the national 
government; towards variations of the 
'seizure of state power' paradigm. Work-
ing for change within government was not 
seen as important, except in purely util-
itarian and tactical terms. 
Efforts at organisation were fo-
cused on the disadvantaged classes; the 
urban poor, unionised workers, the 
peasantry and indigenous communities. 
Urban middle class groups were only 
targeted as sources of activists, not as a 
sector to be organised in its own right. 
Mobilisation and mass protest were the 
preferred instruments. NGOs became in-
volved in electoral politics, albeit with very 
few skills and resources. Awareness-rais-
ing, organising and human rights work 
came first and socio-economic activity 
would only develop later. 
In many ways, the early years of 
the presidency of Corazón Aquino (1986-
1992) represented the high water mark of 
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NGO influence. During the first few years 
of the Aquino period, NGOs and POs 
exercised considerable influence in the 
shaping of national political discourse. 
President Aquino at first tried to coopt 
some of theNGO-PO issues — land reform, 
human rights and women's rights, among 
others. Even after she abandoned these 
issues to all intents and purposes, NGOs 
and POs continued to have influence in the 
media, the universities and the churches. 
They had become the shapers of ideo-
logical consensus in the society. 
The NGOs' and POs' choice of 
political terrain was determined partly by 
available resources — in other words, by 
their strengths. They had considerable 
mobilisational capability and the insti-
tutional infrastructure for shaping political 
issues. During the first few years of the 
Aquino period, these resources made for 
significant influence. As the regime 
became consolidated, however, partly 
through concessions by the President to 
major power centres and partly through 
the institutionalisation of an 'elite' de-
mocracy, NGO-PO coalitions found them-
selves increasingly marginalised. 
Towards the end of the Aquino 
period, NGOs began to adjust to changing 
conditions, but it has been a very slow 
process. Work on ecological and women's 
issues has expanded rapidly. More recently, 
several NGOs have been trying to raise 
their capability to intervene in the area of 
credit provision using a range of techniques 
from small savings programmes to the 
building of rural banks. There is an 
increasing tendency to work with govern-
ment units, to access their resources and 
even work with them in joint projects. 
There was a lot of excitement about the 
implementation of the Local Government 
Code passed in the last year of the Aquino 
period. 
Pushing for change 
A number of factors have pushed 
development NGOs and the progressive 
movement as a whole into a renewed 
process of strategic reorientation. One is 
the crisis in the national democratic (ND) 
movement, the largest and best-organised 
segment of the Left in the Philippines. 
Another factor is the worldwide crisis of 
socialism. The messy collapse of the whole 
socialist bloc and the 'market socialism' 
being espoused by China and Vietnam 
have thrown up a lot of questions about 
anti-or non-capitalist alternatives whether 
they be Stalinist or 'democratic socialist.' 
Another factor pushing strategic 
reorientation is perceived change in the 
political economy of Philippine society. 
Many people in government and business 
circles believe that the decade-long econ-
omic crisis is over, and that the economy is 
entering a period of steady, if modest 
growth. The inflow of foreign investment 
and the return of capital, combined with 
large migrant worker remittances, has led 
to the perception that the 'boom and bust' 
cycles are now over. People in NGO circles 
remain sceptical, but economic develop-
ments have led them to re-examine their 
assumptions about the economy. 
Another, more widespread per-
ception is that the locus of economic and 
political change is shifting away from 
Manila to local areas. Despite the economic 
stagnation of the past decade, local 
industry and commerce have grown 
around key centres such as Cebu and 
Davao. Combined with the limited re-
sources of the central government, and the 
simple fact that Manila cannot physically 
absorb more industry, it is generally 
accepted that the logic of development is, 
of necessity, going to follow political 
decentralisation. 
Challenges to NGOs 
The widespread perception of 
the increasing importance of local areas has 
also found its way into the NGO-PO 
community. While progressive groups 
continue to cling to their national agendas, 
more and more of them believe that 
structural change at the national level must 
be based on accumulation of power at the 
local level. To compete effectively with 
local centres of power, NGOs are scaling up 
the size and impact of their projects. This 
has led to movement away from small, 
village-based livelihood projects towards 
integrated area development. 
These trends have fed into chan-
ging relations between NGOs and political 
groups. As the capability of NGOs de-
veloped, especially in socio-economic 
work, there was a stronger tendency to 
resist the 'guidance' of political groups. 
The formation of NGO coalitions added to 
this tendency as the coalitions became the 
locus of political discussion and advocacy 
across political blocs. One key outcome was 
a change in perspective on the relationship 
between development work and national 
political struggle. As one NGO study put it : 
'NGOs of all stripes have begun to in-
tegrate political visions with development 
requirements in a manner which, perhaps 
for the first time, sacrifices neither'. 
The biggest challenge comes 
from Philippines 2000, the Ramos regime's 
political project — its comprehensive 
economic and political strategy. Many 
progressives continue to be sceptical about 
Philippines 2000. Others oppose it out-
right. But the programme, especially its 
anti-monopoly thrust, has provoked many 
policy struggles among competing upper 
class factions and this has opened up new 
possibilities for multi-class fraction alli-
ances. These developments have forced 
progressives to question their economic 
assumptions and at a minimum, to increase 
their capacity to handle macro-economic 
policy issues. 
Elite political projects create 
problems for progressive groups. If Pre-
sident Ramos succeeds in projecting a 
reform agenda, he can mobilise and 
energise large segments of the upper 
classes. He can drain middle class support 
away from NGOs. More directly, Philip-
pines 2000 challenges NGOs not only to 
criticise, but to devise an alternative 
project. To do this, NGOs have to move 
beyond finding fault with specific govern-
ment programmes and projects, to ap-
preciate issues from the vantage point of 
governance, and to learn to see the 
national interest 'forest' — not just the 
'trees' that are the specific demands of 
NGO constituencies. ■■ JR. 
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bothered bureaucrats of Brussels 
by Brita Schioldann Nielsen" 
Development cooperation is seen as having important political implications and lobbying is, therefore, undoubtedly one of the 
NGOs'major roles. Although, for the majority, it is secondary to their main task of carrying out development actions, there are some 
that focus almost exclusively on lobbying. NGO networks have also been established for this specific purpose. Eurostep, which 
coordinates the lobbying work of a number of European NGOs, is an example of one of these. It pursues two main objectives: to 
influence the policies of multilateral institutions while promoting alternative models based on the specific NGO perspective, and to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of the aid provided by these organisations. We approached Eurostep for their views on the 
lobbying process, the motivations which lie behind it and the outcomes, if any. We asked them to focus on lobbying of EU bodies. 
Here is their frank and sometimes pointed contribution. 
On a grey December 
morning in 1992, a group of 
people are protesting outside the 
Council of Ministers' building in 
Brussels. This is an almost daily 
occurrence, but what makes this event 
unique is the three dromedaries and 
turbaned Tuaregs who are among the 
protesters. This colourful protest against 
European beef dumping in the Sahel was 
organised by Eurostep, a relatively new 
face in the growing crowd of lobbying 
organisations in Brussels. The initiative to 
create a European network, with the 
overall aim of influencing EU development 
policies, was taken by experienced leaders 
of some of Europe's major NGOs. The 
founders from six EU countries had, 
through their work with the Commission, 
realised that it was no longer sufficient to 
have a relationship only with their national 
government. The EU was here to stay and 
decisions on development policies would 
increasingly be taken in Brussels. Another 
realisation was that, to be effective, the 
network should have members in all EU 
countries, and preferably also in European 
countries outside the Union. Members 
should be actively involved in the South 
and membership would be limited to two 
organisations per country. 
When the Eurostep secretariat 
wasset up in Brussels in 1991, ithad 21 like-
minded, non-denominational organis-
ations as members. They come from 13 
European countries and work in more than 
90 developing nations in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. Their combined annual 
contribution to development actions 
* Member of the EUROSTEP Secretariat. 
amounts to more than ECU 400 million. To 
have members actively involved in the 
South was seen as fundamental for the 
advocacy work of Eurostep. Policies have 
to be founded on the experience of the 
members together with their Southern 
partners. Another important feature is the 
economic independence of the network. 
Eurostep is funded through annual fees 
levied on its members and is not reliant on 
the EC or any other institution. Hence, it is 
free to pursue objectives which might not 
always be in line with official policy. Each 
year the General Assembly reviews Euro-
step's programme and sets priorities for 
the following year. These are influenced 
largely by the official agenda for develop-
ment cooperation at the European level, 
by the members' own concerns and by 
what is happening in the UN. 
Eurostep concentrates on a lim-
ited number of issues. It operates a 'lead 
agency' principle whereby member or-
ganisations take a leading role in the 
development and implementation of pro-
gramme activities. This ensures both that 
members are actively involved in the work 
of the network and that the activities 
reflect the concerns of the member or-
ganisations and their partners in develop-
ing countries. For each issue in the pro-
gramme there is a working group. One 
example is the Gender Working Group, 
currently focusing its energy on issuing 
position papers in the run up to the Beijing 
conference. This meets once a year but it 
has a Task Force which convenes ap-
proximately every two months to take the 
work forward and monitor EU and inter-
national conferences. The Gender Group 
has two lead agencies : Oxfam UK for the 
advocacy, and NCOS, Belgium to engender 
activity among the member agencies. 
Three people are employed in 
the Brussels office. The members' in-
sistence on having a small secretariat has 
several advantages, apart from the ob-
vious financial one. For example, it means 
the members feel obliged to undertake 
work themselves. Also, the staff know 
each other well and are able to create an 
atmosphere characterised by good inter-
relationships and appreciation of the work 
of each member of the team. The latter is 
essential if success is to be achieved while 
working under constant pressure. 
Measuring the concrete results of 
lobbying is always a tricky matter. The 
effects may depend on changes in men-
tality in how development should be seen 
and pursued — which may take years. We 
do believe, however, that some concrete 
results have been achieved due to our 
efforts, in cooperation with other net-
works and NGDOs. For example, an EU 
decision to launch a special initiative for 
recovery programmes, backed by more 
than ECU 100 million, came after NGDO 
lobbying during the Danish Presidency. A 
permanent budget line for rehabilitation 
— another NGDO objective — has also 
been created with the help of the Euro-
pean Parliament. During the same Pre-
sidency, Eurostep pushed for extra person-
nel for the 'women in development' desks 
in the external relations and development 
departments of the Commission. Two 
extra people were employed. With the 
approach of the Lomé IV mid-term review 
in 1994, which saw proposals that could 
radically alter the nature of the agree-
ment, Eurostep helped set up a joint 
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programme in collaboration with the three 
other major Brussels-based NGDO net-
works, (APRODEV, CIDSE and the NGO-EU 
Liaison Committee). The purpose was to 
monitor the review and contribute to the 
debate with comments and proposals. 
Two main reports and six smaller consecut-
ive reports were produced. 
The World Social Summit was 
also closely monitored by Eurostep. Po-
sition papers were drafted before each 
preparatory committee and reports on the 
progress of the official and NGO meetings 
were written after each session. These 
inputs were greatly appreciated by NGOs 
and official delegates. If one compares the 
NGOs' 'Quality Benchmark' paper for the 
Summit with the final official paper, it is 
clear that NGOs had a major impact on the 
outcome. A careful assessment has to 
made in each case however, in order to 
evaluate the time and money put into this 
kind of event in relation to the output. 
The major 'success' to date has 
clearly been the beef dumping case. The 
impact of EU agricultural subsidies on 
developing countries is a serious cause for 
concern, and with this in mind, Eurostep 
produced a report in 1992 calling for 
further reforms of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. This was followed in 1993 by a 
campaign focusing on EU subsidies for beef 
to West Africa. Research undertaken by 
Novib, Eurostep's lead agency on trade, 
showed how frozen European beef, sold 
on Sahel markets at subsidised prices, 
prevented local farmers from selling their 
fresh meat. It also revealed a lack of 
coherence between agricultural and de-
velopment policies. Development aid was 
being given to the farmers but, at the same 
time, they were being driven out of 
business by the dumping of European 
surpluses. During the research, suspected 
fraud involving EU subsidies was also 
discovered by chance. It appeared that 
some EU exporters were being funded to 
sell capas (a meat product) whose fat 
content was much too high to be eligible 
for export refunds. The dossier was passed 
to the fraud administration of the Commis-
sion. When the campaign began on that 
December morning in 1992, with Sahelian 
farmers handing over the report to the 
Council President, it attracted support 
from 250 organisations in Europe and West 
Africa. TV reporters and journalists from 
several EU countries covered the event. 
The European Parliament also became 
actively involved, supporting demands for 
abolition of subsidies and policy coherence. 
At the same time Eurostep members sent 
the report to their ministries of agriculture 
and development, and sought talks with 
the responsible ministers. Although all 
accusations were denied from the outset, 
EU export restitutions on capas destined 
for West Africa are now 28% lower than 
when we started the campaign. EU exports 
to the region have decreased and Sahelian 
farmers are regaining their market share. 
In combination, the reduction in export 
subsidies and the devaluation of the CFA 
franc are largely responsible for this 
encouraging result. Other positive news is 
that the Commission has accepted an 
internal guideline which is intended to 
bring about a coherent EU policy towards 
the livestock sector of West Africa. Though 
this is a 'success story', seen from the point 
of view of a lobbying network, the main 
question still remains : how to make the EU 
coherent in all its policies. 
Having a small office, as under-
lined above, has positive aspects but it also 
has its negative side. There is a lack of time 
to pursue all the things that need to be 
done. An advocacy office needs to have a 
clear overview of who is who in the 
European institutions. Time is needed to 
develop connections. But elections mean 
that there are changes in the Parliament, 
Commissioners also change or move to 
new portfolios, and within the adminis-
tration, new geopolitical visions mean 
changes to the structure and composition 
of the directorates-general just as one is 
beginning to understand the old set-up. 
For a Brussels-based NGO, the 
European Parliament is without doubt its 
best ally. It is an open institution and most 
MEPs take the view that, as the only 
democratically elected EU body, they 
should listen to the 'people' and put 
forward their concerns if they find them 
reasonable. 
The Council is more distant but 
this is not a particular problem for the 
Eurostep secretariat as Council lobbying is 
undertaken by the network's members at 
national level. The Council press-depart-
ment is easily accessible and its personnel 
are very helpful in finding and forwarding 
press releases and reports of Council 
meetings. A problem which crops up now 
and then is it can take several weeks to get 
Council reports in English, which is Euro-
step's working language. Another dif-
ficulty is access to the agendas of meetings. 
This is probably not the Council's fault but 
rather that of the rotating Presidencies. 
One somewhat surprising experience 
during the recent Danish Presidency was 
the discovery that openness (one of 
Denmark's main themes), certainly had its 
limits. In spite of some good results and the 
very positive working relations with the 
Danish Development Minister, it was very 
difficult for the Working Group on the 
Presidency to get information in either 
Brussels or Copenhagen. 
The same difficulty of access is 
often experienced with the Commission. It 
is possible to develop relationships with 
single individuals but generally. Commis-
sion papers are heavily guarded until they 
become public. We experienced this prob-
lem when seeking information about the 
Commission's work on the Cairo Summit. 
The views of an American stagiaire at 
Eurostep, writing subsequently in an 
internal report are instructive. She had 
thought the US Congress was difficult, but 
went on to say had never experienced 
'bureaucracy like this before'. As a result, 
and in order to understand better the 
Commission's working methods, Eurostep, 
together with WIDE (Women in Develop-
ment in Europe), carried out research and 
published a report entitled 'Gender map-
ping of the European Union'. Our vision of 
a good relationship with the Commission, 
is where the official drafting a policy paper 
finds it natural to contact a relevant NGO 
to hear its views on the subject. We should 
also like to see NGO networks like Euro-
step, which produce newsletters on EU 
development policies that are sent all over 
the world, allowed to attend relevant 
press conferences and receive press inform-
ation from the Commission. The Commis-
sion President has spoken of the need for 
more openness and for the EU to get closer 
to its citizens. We have another and very 
simple proposal. Let us work together ! mm 
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money 
Over the last 10 years or so, the 
public's generosity towards the 
world's most deprived peoples has 
been regularly tapped. The collec-
tion of money has yielded to the 
laws of communications and mar-
keting and it is nowadays a source 
of competition. Although the 
majority of NGOs act according to a 
professional code of ethics, some, 
by going over the top, seem ready 
to 'sell their souls'. This is a negat-
ive aspect which impinges on all 
who work in the field not to 
mention those in the South. 
Few, today, could say that they 
have never been approached by an NGO ? 
It may be in the form of a personalised 
leaflet through the post, or a smiling boy 
scout on a street corner clutching some 
symbolic object which he hopes you will 
buy. It may not be a direct approach — 
perhaps a wall poster advertising an 
organisation, or some publicity on TV. 
Collecting money is fundamental for any 
NGO concerned about its independence, 
but the era of attracting funds in the 
traditional manner is long past. It is really 
only in the United Kingdom that charities 
still hold out collecting tins to generous 
souls, although even there the exercise has 
'gone professional'. The very use of the 
phrase 'collecting money' appears obsolete 
in an age where we speak of fund-raising. 
'Marketing' donations 
Although the success of collect-
ing money depends largely on how well 
known the organisation is (fame does not 
always go hand in hand with efficiency), 
good mobilising capabilities have also 
become decisive. While some NGOs have 
chosen to delegate this task to specialised 
marketing agencies, many others have had 
to reorganise their staff with a view to 
professional fund-raising. The amateur 
approach is no longer acceptable. It may be 
a sign of the times, or an imperative of 
competition, but NGOs have adopted 
management and operating methods 
which make them look more like busi-
nesses, although they stop short of becom-
ing fully commercial companies. Fund-
raising has thus yielded to the laws of 
communications and marketing. 'Value 
marketing' today has its own manuals, 
seminars, specialists and techniques. There 
are TV slots and sometimes highly im-
aginative poster campaigns, not to men-
tion all the objects such as pens and T-shirts 
bearing the organisation's logo. And, of 
course, there is direct mailing, which has 
proved to be the best way of recruiting 
potential donors and of retaining those 
who already contribute. 
For many, the donation has thus 
become a 'product' to be defended in the 
same way as any other commercial pro-
duct. As such, it has become a source of 
competition. Such competition is not, in 
itself, negative, since it is the very essence 
of fund-raising. However, it cannot be said 
that the playing field is level. Most 
donations are commandeered by the few 
'big' NGOs. It is a question of having a high 
profile, certainly, but also one of financial 
resources. In order to make use of direct 
mailing, which is very expensive, an NGO 
has to use up a proportion of its resources. 
According to Karel Claes, who is the 
director of the Direct Social Communi-
cations agency ; 'a direct-mailing campaign 
to recruit new donors means that, on 
average, no more than 50% of the money 
raised goes to actual NGO projects. The 
rest is needed to cover costs.' He points out 
on the other hand that 'when the cam-
paign is aimed at retaining current con-
tributors, direct-mailing costs are of the 
order of 10-20%'. 
Not every association can afford 
such an investment, particularly since there 
is a finite number of potential donors. All 
those in the profession concur that the 
pool is limited. The association's files may, 
therefore, actually constitute its 'good-
will'. The best files, says Mr Claes, 'are 
those containing the profile of the ideal 
donor. In Belgium, for example, this would 
be an elderly female who is probably 
Catholic'. 
Public profile, financial resources, 
and current trends, are all involved. Some 
associations are linked more with the 
Poster for CNCD, a network 
of Belgian NGOs 
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public's immediate concerns at a certain 
time (with the aid of the media). This is the 
case of NGOs which aim to protect the 
environment. In terms of raising funds 
from private sources, such organisations 
have experienced an upsurge, but this 
already appears to be on the wane. Just 
like any other commercial product, do-
nations have their own life cycle. Some 
claim that the next 'victims' of the chang-
ing markets will be the emergency organis-
ations. It is certainly true that they have 
succeeded in penetrating the donations 
'market' in recent years but the old adage 
is well-known — all fashions go out of 
fashion. 
The market share lost by an NGO 
(to continue using the commercial jargon) 
is not necessarily picked up by others. 
Thanks to the new approach in collecting 
funds, private donations have increased 
spectacularly over the last decade, both in 
terms of numbers of contributors and 
amounts given. Over the last two or three 
years, however, a downward trend seems 
to have set in, at least as regards the 
number of people dipping into their 
pockets. (The overall amount has remained 
stable because of larger donations). The 
reason for this is two-fold. There is, of 
course, the current economic climate, with 
the general public less likely to contribute 
during a recession. But there is also a sense 
of weariness when confronted with a 
proliferation of requests. This proliferation 
has come about because certain NGOs 
have an annoying tendency of issuing an 
appeal every time there is an emergency 
and also because of the increase in the 
numbers of NGOs, the result is what the 
English-speaking media calls 'aid fatigue'. 
In order to stand out in the public 
eye amongst the flood of requests, some 
NGOs have made great efforts to be 
creative. But, beware ! If there is, indeed, a 
donations market, it must continue to be 
based on genuine ethics. The end does not 
always justify the means and this gene-
rosity race has more than once got out of 
hand. 
Although certain moral stan-
dards linked to fund-raising might be 
dubious, such as, for example, the sale of 
objects totally lacking in symbolism, others, 
on the other hand, are a source of genuine 
concern. The aim is transparent — to make 
a profit. 
The end does not always 
justify the means 
An NGO which raises funds from 
private sources must be honest in its 
dealings with the public, but at the same 
time it will be aware that it has to present 
its actions in the most profitable way 
possible in financial terms. Unfortunately, 
honesty does not always go hand in hand 
with profitability. Other factors may inter-
vene. There is, of course, action for its own 
sake, but not all action brings a return. As 
John Clark, has stated 'although everyone 
agrees with the old adage that it is better 
to teach people to fish than to give them 
fish, when it is a matter of donating 
money, the private donor prefers to carry 
on paying for the fish'. Although the 
majority of NGOs are firm in advocating 
integrity, others (relatively few, it must be 
admitted) have chosen to operate in 
murkier waters. These are the ones whose 
real actions are somewhat different from 
those they choose to portray to the public. 
There are many more NGOs, 
however, that conceal from their donors 
the cost of their fund-raising campaigns. In 
France, the amounts set aside for this 
purpose represent 18% of total costs. The 
figure for Belgium is only slightly lower 
while in the Netherlands they can be as 
much as 37%. In fact, if one examines the 
accounts of NGOs (those that are actually 
published), one comes across figures which, 
at the very least, appear to require further 
explanation. What is one to make of the 
25% of expenditure to be found in some 
cases under the heading 'sundry expenses' 
or other 'administrative costs'? Why do 
some NGOs put fund-raising and inform-
ation under the same heading? Naturally, 
the auditor's initials appear, carefully 
written, in the margin of the accounts, but 
in most cases this official is passing judg-
ment only on fund management and not 
on the qualitative use of monies. This 
attitude, whereby NGOs lack the courage 
to inform the public that its activities incur 
costs as well as generating income, is an 
obvious shortcoming. 
Such an absence of controls da-
mages the 'brand image' of the voluntary 
development movement as a whole and of 
fund-raising in particular. Supplemented 
by media criticism (some NGOs have been 
revealed to be completely fraudulent). 
including some TV programmes whose 
compilers have chosen to make no allow-
ances, public mistrust of NGOs is on the 
increase. Indeed, as part of the current 
debate concerning NGO autonomy, 
above-board fund-raising is now more 
necessary than ever. 
Of course, NGOs are by no means 
alone in suffering from the activities of a 
dishonest minority. For the latter, the 
people of the South represent little more 
than an easy 'profit opportunity'. 
'Charity show' 
Let us go back ten years. In terms 
of development and the Third World, the 
1980s were, for many members of the 
public, symbolised by the terrible famine in 
the Sahel with pictures of starving children, 
their eyes full of flies, being watched 
helplessly by their mothers. These ¡mages, 
dubbed by some NGO activists as 'pornog-
raphic' were presented on TV every 
evening. Images of similar 'bad taste' 
arrived through the letter box in the 
morning from certain NGOs, tempted by 
gain. Ethical principles and codes of con-
duct, if such had ever existed, were 
discarded. It was the birth of what many 
have described as the 'charity show'. 
The use of these wretched, ne-
gative images, whose sole aim is to shock 
sympathetic people, to generate compas-
sion on the part of the public and to trigger 
the donation reflex has not, it would 
appear, been checked by media weariness 
of the famine in the Sahel. For these 
unscrupulous NGOs, any tragic situation is 
fair game. Proof of this can be seen in the 
example of an NGO (whose high profile 
needs no boosting) which sent out by 
direct mail, the picture of a little Colombian 
girl, buried alive in the rubble of Armerò. 
There are other examples although many 
NGOs have recognised their mistakes and 
nowadays, the trend does appear to be on 
the decline. However, we should not be 
surprised, in the current climate, to see a 
swing back towards 'compassion' fund-
raising. 
Of course, some NGOs will 
defend their cause by citing disasters 
where immediate emergency aid is re-
quired and there is a desperate need for 
funds. A shock image is therefore seen to 
be excusable. Is it not the case that such 
images portray the truth ? Of course it is. 
The pictures have not been 'cobbled up' in 
"t 
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shown regularly on our screens. But, 
according to the NGO Liaison Committee, 
it is a question of human dignity. And how 
many NGOs are engaged in this emergency 
work ? Few indeed, it would seem, if the 
piles of wretched images sent out are to be 
treated as the 'norm'. 
Such an approach harms develop-
ment. The use of such images reinforces 
the notion of an assisted and passive 
population. They are usually accompanied 
by texts which also aim to 'accost' the 
reader ('if you do not donate £20 im-
mediately, this child will starve to death'.) 
And they do nothing to help the people of 
the South who are trying to project a 
different picture — one in which the 
people themselves take responsibility for 
their own development. European public 
opinion polls confirm this sorry state of 
affairs. All the NGOs' efforts to increase 
awareness and knowledge of develop-
ment are thwarted by such imagery. (This 
includes the efforts of some who themsel-
ves resort to such images for fund-raising 
— which not surprisingly can generate 
internal tensions.) 
Ethics as the sole aim 
Various codes of conduct in fund-
raising have been set up to restore a 
professional approach in the world of 
voluntary development cooperation. 
These are aimed at inducing 'troublemak-
ers' to return to the straight and narrow. 
Some regulate the use of files and publi-
cation of accounts and others deal with 
images and messages. Still others systemat-
ise all these various topics. In this way, 
signatory organisations undertake both to 
guarantee the dignity of the recipients and 
to safeguard the private life of the donors. 
They also undertake to ensure that their 
activities are serious. In some countries, 
such as France, the Netherlands or Ger-
many, this code of conduct has arisen from 
a mutual desire on the part of the NGOs. In 
Belgium, on the other hand, there is no 
such code as yet. Many agree that an 
initiative is necessary, but it has become 
bogged down in argument. 
The reason for this is that not all 
NGOs have the same intentions. For 
example, some (often those most con-
cerned by these codes) have been criticised 
as being concerned solely with their own 
interests — awarding themselves with 
some kind of quality label while still failing 
to practise what they preach. In fact, the 
codes being proposed could be criticised 
for 'aiming too low'. Certain elements are 
left vague, leading to differing interpre-
tations, and others are simply omitted 
altogether. Those, more numerous, NGOs 
which demand tougher rules and therefore 
refuse to sign the watered-down version, 
run the risk of being denied the 'quality 
label' ! Adherence to a code of ethics 
should certainly not be viewed as a 
promotional tool. 
Another area of disagreement is 
whether or not there is a need for a 
monitoring body. A code of conduct which 
does not penalise is largely ineffective. But 
who is there to carry out the task of 
monitoring? In some places, this problem 
has actually been solved. Government 
departments are responsible for this in 
France and the United Kingdom (the 
famous Charity Commission) while in 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Germany, independent foundations or 
institutes have assumed the task. 
Reinforcing the notion of an assisted 
and passive population? 
The use of sudi images harms 
development 
Not all countries, however, have 
statutory requirements dealing with the 
ethics of fund-raising. This shortcoming is 
partly offset by larger-scale initiatives. This 
is the case, in particular, of the code of 
conduct relating to ¡mages and messages 
drafted by the EC-NGO Liaison Committee. 
In the final analysis, other than 
formal regulation, the most effective 
constraint is, undeniably, an examination 
of one's own conscience. Fund-raising is an 
independent tool in the service of the 
recipients, but ethical considerations 
should always prevail over the require-
ments of marketing. ■■ T.G. 
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NGOs torn between subordination and 
independence 
by Michel Falisse* 
Courier dossiers are intended to 
provide an in-depth analysis of 
particular subjects or sectors by 
approaching them from different 
viewpoints. The author of this 
article, who is the Secretary Gen-
eral of SOS Faim (a Belgian NGO), 
offers his own forceful, and un-
deniably controversial opinions, 
about the relationship between 
NGOs and governments in an era of 
'cofinancing'. 
Historically speaking, 
NGOs appeared on the scene at 
the start of the 1960s. This was at a time 
when the colonial powers were no longer 
finding it easy impose their views on their 
former dependent territories. The mis-
sionaries who had catered to the health 
and education of the 'natives' during the 
colonial period were suddenly dependent 
on the sovereign authorities of the newly 
independent states. Voluntary Service 
Overseas was one of the responses to this 
and was intended to provide a legal and 
financial basis enabling missionaries to 
continue their work. 
Much of the North's population 
had been made aware of Third World 
poverty and they tried to help as best they 
could, usually by collecting money to 
finance small projects. These had the 
advantage of being in direct contact with 
realities at local level. This approach, and 
the positive results achieved by it, were in 
notable contrast to the billions spent in 
'official cooperation' - expenditure which 
often brought only very limited benefits to 
local people. Furthermore, 'official de-
velopment cooperation' was frequently 
only one element in the policies towards 
the Third World adopted by former 
colonial powers; policies hereafter refer-
red to as neocolonial. 
In most European countries, joint 
NGO and government financing is doubt-
less linked to these two facts. On the one 
hand, it provided a response to criticism 
that the former colonial states were failing 
to confront the problem by making it 
* Secrétaire général de SOS FAIM. 
possible to reach local people through 
NGOs. On the other hand, it also provided 
financing for organisations closely con-
nected to Churches and political parties 
allowing them to continue their neocol-
onial work. Co-financing was also the 
logical consequence of a genuine commit-
ment on the part of the people of the 
North, who had been shaken by the 
contrast between their standard of living 
during the 'swinging sixties' and the 
poverty of the South. The dynamism of this 
commitment owed more to Christian 
charity than to the traditions of proletarian 
internationalism. Admittedly, churches 
were no longer financed as in colonial 
times; projects involving churches were 
now co-financed and the 'multi-purpose 
room' played a vital part. On Monday, it 
might be used as a clothes-making work-
shop, on Tuesday for the catechism, on 
Wednesday as a meeting place for young 
people and on Sunday for Mass ! By the 
same token, the NGOs that were structur-
ally linked to political parties benefited 
from the generosity of their cooperation 
ministers who met their colleagues from 
their sister parties of the South at con-
ferences to take stock of the situation. Co-
financed projects resulted from this. In one 
place, it might involve working for de-
mocratic consolidation (for this, read 
support for party structures). Elsewhere it 
might involve setting up a health centre 
(for this, read, softening up the voters in 
favour of a future party candidate stand-
ing for election). 
The political upheavals of the 
1970s in the South also helped to bring 
about changes within NGOs, not just by 
causing them to abandon the charitable 
approach but also by giving them a much 
more political profile on all questions 
associated with development. NGOs 
became genuine advocates of the peoples 
of the South and, increasingly, began to 
upset those who, up to that point, had 
financed them. NGOs were involved in all 
manner of struggles. They denounced 
neocolonial domination, the power of 
multinationals ('states within states') and 
infringements of human and national 
rights. No subject was taboo for them ! 
Global economic crisis and the 
increasing monopolisation of the planet's 
wealth by a diminishing group of priv-
ileged people, together with the political 
upheavals following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, plunged most African countries and a 
number of others — which had not yet 
managed to take off economically — into 
severe crisis. In response, Western countries 
again imposed their solutions in the form 
of structural adjustment, multi-party sys-
tems and military and humanitarian inter-
vention. In this situation, NGOs were called 
upon increasingly to act as subcontractors, 
implementing policies defined by govern-
ments. This is particularly true of emer-
gency aid policies. French and Belgian 
doctors have, today more than ever, 
become simple tools of state policy. 
States and multilateral organis-
ations have considerably refined their 
subcontracting policies, getting others to 
do what they want done, at less expense. 
Why not, therefore, entrust the implemen-
tation of policies to those cheap research 
units called NGOs? A few scandals com-
bined with the actions of political lobbyists 
will soon lead the authorities to draw up 
new regulations. The final outcome will be 
that only a few chosen NGOs — those that 
satisfy the new and more draconian 
demands of their co-financers — will be 
preserved. Today's discredited policies will 
give way to others formulated by those 
who hold the levers of power. 
This development is particularly 
dangerous since it will end up by con-
siderably limiting the number of NGOs. 
Only those which have proved their 
professionalism will be preserved. There is 
a real risk that there will no longer be any 
real NGOs to represent the concerns of the 
public. The first to lose if this happens, will 
undoubtedly be the public authorities 
themselves. Deprived of opponents and 
dynamic criticism, governments will find 
themselves staring into a void, their own 
policies having no more validity than those 
of totalitarian regimes, m M.F. 
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or innovators in unstable 
situations 
by Nicholas Stockton* 
This short paper sets out to de-
monstrate how the emergence of a 
media-dependent, international 
rescue and crisis management 
industry is degrading the quality of 
Í
humanitarian space. This trans-
formation has been heralded by 
the deregulation of the humani-
tarian theatre and the creation of a 
market in which a proliferation of 
diverse agencies compete for contracts. In 
this new market, the humanitarian man-
dates of intergovernmental bodies are 
muddled with a myriad of contracted goods 
and services. Humanitarian action is, there-
fore, expressed in a Gordian knot of financial 
contracts, well beyond the reach of inter-
national humanitarian law and account-
ability. The commercial necessity to portray 
contractual achievement, harnessed by the 
Northern political demand for triumphant 
televisual humanitarian interventions, helps 
to fashion a contract culture where 'success' 
is imperative. Thus, even while the collective 
impact of the new humanitarian industry 
falls below established international mi-
nimum standards, accountability for this, by 
apparent mutual agreement, goes unremar-
ked and disregarded. 
Conventional 
humanitarianism 
Humanitarianism is probably best 
understood by reference to the body of 
international law that defines human 
rights in the specific context of conflict. This 
mainly consists of the Geneva Convention 
and later Protocols, the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and, in 
Africa, the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. 
Together, these place obligations for the 
protection of civil populations upon 
governments, and upon two specialised 
* Oxfam UK and Ireland Relief Coordinator. This 
is an abridged version of a paper prepared by the 
author for the Wilton Park Seminar 'Aid under Fire'. 
The views expressed here are entirely personal. 
inter-governmental institutions : the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) — which is not, as some believe, an 
NGO — and the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Huma-
nitarian law mandates these organisations 
to monitor the performance of signatory 
states, and the associated statutory instru-
ments provide some technical standards 
against which to judge humanitarian 
performance. 
These legal instruments range 
from qualitative rights, such as protection 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, to quantified standards on food, 
water, health and shelter. In the post-
Second World War period, when most of 
these standards were negotiated, con-
temporary opinion held that proper stan-
dards of accountability and control could 
only be met by government agencies. 
Therefore, humanitarian action became 
the near-exclusive domain of governments 
and intergovernmental authorities. In 
principle, accountability for meeting mi-
nimum standards was, at that time, a 
relatively straightforward matter. First, the 
actors in humanitarian crises were few, and 
'audit trails' were short. Second, these 
agencies operated under, and were ex-
plicitly named in, international treaties. 
The humanitarian market 
The emergence of the new hu-
manitarian industry is a direct result of the 
ideological hegemony of the new right in 
the post cold war era. On the demand side, 
Bernard Kouchner's formulation of the 
'right of interference' and the popularis-
ation of Paolo Freire's 'theory of con-
scientisation', were symbolic of the grow-
ing assertiveness of the private relief and 
development sectors. On the supply side, 
the introduction of commercial competi-
tive tendering in most official aid program-
mes financed the massive growth in the 
NGO sector, particularly in the social service 
and welfare field. 
This growth was encouraged by 
many Northern donors to help fill the 
vacuum created by cuts in social welfare 
services resulting from economic adjust-
ment policies. The retreat of the state from 
guaranteeing national health, education 
and welfare norms (including emergency 
relief), has created numerous opportu-
nities for the private sector, especially at 
the community level. 
It is at this local level where NGOs 
claim comparative advantage over govern-
ments, that life chances are increasingly 
determined, and where civil loyalties 
therefore gravitate. NGO credibility in 
'community-based' service provision is 
frequently earned at the expense of 
central government's perceived legi-
timacy. It is ironic that the proliferation of 
ethnically-defined livelihood conflicts 
probably derives, in part at least, from the 
political success of NGOs in strengthening 
'civil society' at the communal level, 
compounded by their failure to meet rising 
aspirations in the economic sphere. 
As nation states have divested 
themselves of their operational welfare 
role, many have emphasised their residual 
security functions, and have resorted to 
terror and violence to stay in power. Under 
these circumstances, armed insurgency 
may be seen as the only available means of 
political expression and economic advance-
ment. Subsistence resource wars, often 
identified with ethnic loyalties, have 
created an explosion in political violence 
and human suffering. From ten wars in 
1959, there are now over 50 being waged. 
From less than 10 million refugees in 1980, 
the world now has more than 23 million. In 
response to this, a significant shift from 
development to emergency aid has occur-
red. From less than $200 million in 1971, 
emergency aid spending by OECD coun-
tries had expanded to $2.6 billion by 1992. 
The UN consolidated appeal for Rwanda in 
1994 alone raised over $1 billion. 
This is big business and the 
competition between the humanitarian 
NGOs and between human rights organis-
ations is intense. The designer flags, tee-
shirts, watches, flak jackets and other 
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branded apparel of the new humanitarian 
workers jostling for television profile, 
testify to this. 
Markets versus 
mandates 
Markets are, in theory, regulated 
by consumer choice. In humanitarian 
emergencies, the 'consumers' are often 
destitute, and excluded from planning and 
coordination meetings. 'Choice', from the 
perspective of the intended beneficiary, is 
academic. If refugees and other disaster 
victims are unable to exercise consumer 
sovereignty, market-driven humanitarian-
ism is certainly responsive to meeting the 
needs of other categories of 'consumer', 
such as major donors and army com-
manders. This can be illustrated by con-
trasting the operational approaches of 
mandate and market-driven humanitarian 
organisations. 
The French word, 'unicité', is the 
concept used by the ICRC in circumscribing 
their operational jurisdiction. It is used to 
define territory in which the ICRC is 
'uniquely' able to operate. Thus, where 
international NGOs gain entry to conflict 
zones under the recent phenomenon of 
integrated UN/NGO negotiated access 
programmes (such as Operation Lifeline in 
Sudan, and Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia), the ICRC's principle of 'unicité' 
would indicate their own withdrawal. In 
the absence of the ICRC, it is more likely 
that breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
can be perpetrated with impunity, since 
NGOs have no legal status in international 
humanitarian law, no mandate, no le-
verage and no experience in the matter of 
protecting prisoners of war, visiting mi-
litary detainees and so on. 
The very process of negotiating 
UN/NGO access to conflict zones also 
confers legitimacy upon warring parties 
and coincidentally facilitates the incorpor-
ation of relief aid into military strategies. 
Given the media profile that NGOs seek, it 
is obvious why aspiring insurgents prefer 
the international NGOs to the publicity-
wary ICRC. Furthermore, in pursuit of 
televised humanitarian success. Northern 
politicians are much less likely to finance 
the traditionally tight-lipped ICRC than the 
publicity-hungry new humanitarian con-
tractors. 
The market-led introduction of 
NGOs into the space formerly occupied 
solely by the ICRC undermines the chances 
of holding Geneva Convention signatories 
to account. In addition, 'negotiated access' 
replaces the formula of relief determined 
by need, with a political negotiation 
between two warring parties '. Such 
interventions may well reinforce the ca-
pacity of parties to wage war and may also 
offer an incentive to starve captive civilian 
populations to bolster a negotiating po-
sition. 
It also appears that the power of 
the NGO lobby is now so great that it is 
further eroding the quality of humani-
tarian space through its well-developed 
lobbying ability. In this regard, ad hoc UN 
resolutions often demand far less than the 
victims of war and persecution are actually 
entitled to under the Geneva and Refugee 
Conventions. Instead, the protection of 
humanitarian agencies is the justification 
for military intervention, and this some-
times becomes the major expense in 
humanitarian operations. 
Erosion of accountability, 
and the 'culture of 
success' 
One peculiar dimension of the 
humanitarian industry is the interdepen-
dence of the contracting parties, and the 
ever-present risk of market exclusion. For 
example, the official aid establishment 
projected public outrage at any suggestion 
that refugee mortality rates in Goma 
during July 1994 (at that point running at 
ten times the level designated by the 
World Health Organisation as 'catastro-
phic'), were an indictment of the inter-
national community. Thus, whilst organis-
ational mandates may reflect higher pur-
poses and outward goals, the greater need 
to project images of success can subvert the 
quality of public debate about humani-
tarian action, even in the midst of the most 
appalling human tragedy witnessed for 
many years. 
Another dimension of the new 
humanitarian imperative to dress up failure 
as success is reflected in the recent trend to 
introduce developmentalist concepts into 
the emergency relief domain. Humani-
tarian projects are defined, measured and 
judged by achievable goals such as clinics 
built, human rights monitors deployed, 
doctors deployed, mine awareness kits 
distributed, gender awareness workshops 
run, litres of water distributed, and so on. 
By concentrating upon the fulfilment of 
contracted inputs and outputs rather than 
upon actual humanitarian outcomes, the 
industry is able to demonstrate contractual 
success even within spectacularly un-
fulfilled mandates. This approach coincid-
entally offers a way of accommodating 
and legitimating a long-term role for NGOs 
in the conflict zone. 
NGOs — humanitarian 
cure or curse? 
Nobody who witnessed the 
cholera camps in Goma could reasonably 
doubt that the humanitarian NGOs rep-
resent a profound expression of human 
compassion. Nevertheless, there is surely a 
deep paradox in the rapid expansion of the 
humanitarian industry and the simul-
taneous decline in refugee welfare and 
protection standards. 
Certainly the absence of an in-
dependent inspectorate of humanitarian 
intervention does allow maverick organis-
ations to exploit the new market more 
easily, and this diminishes all agencies. In 
this respect, the recently published NGO 
Code of Conduct is a worthy initiative of 
self-regulation. However, in view of the 
widespread erosion of existing minimum 
standards, and commonplace defiance of 
international humanitarian law, there can 
be very little hope that the Code of 
Conduct will significantly alter matters on 
its own. Ironically, the concept of a 'culture 
of impunity' that is used to describe the 
political and moral economy of the Rwan-
dese refugee camps, could equally be 
employed to describe the modern humani-
tarian aid industry; donors, NGOs and 
all. Ml N.S. 
1 M. Duffield, Complex Political Emergencies: 
Evolution and Crisis in Relief Policy, 1994. 
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development 
by Pierre Laurent* 
Among the litanies that regularly 
exercise the limited world of Third 
World assistance, one particular 
complaint crops up continuously, 
namely the impossibility of inter-
change between emergency and 
development aid. There have been 
many variations on this theme. A 
few brave thinkers have propounded views 
which are less linear, talking about the 
transition from development to emergency 
aid. Others have been more bold, daring to 
introduce a transitional concept and an 
arena in which the two aims can be 
balanced, which they term rehabilitation. 
These are the three key terms which can be 
combined in a variety of permutations. 
Those on the grandest scale have even been 
applied in practice. And Boutros Boutros 
Ghali has recently tried to make the ap-
proaches more coherent by advancing the 
concept of a continuum. 
There is some evidence of a 
reconciliation between the different ap-
proaches. Supporters of emergency assist-
ance are now integrating long-term aims 
into their emergency action and are 
entering into local partnerships, while 
'developers' are agreeing to work with or 
withdraw in favour of local agents. There 
are numerous examples of collaboration. 
The tools used to effect such a reconcili-
ation are simple since after all, apart from 
the very different know-how possessed by 
both sides, all that is needed is intelligence, 
understanding and a willingness for dia-
logue. Of course, it is not always easy to 
put the new ideas into practice. There is a 
cultural divide which needs to be bridged 
and ideological preconceptions that need 
to be abandoned. However, the intention 
is there. 
* Médecins du Monde international. 
A brief glossary and 
critique of received ideas 
'Providers of emergency aid leave 
everything as it was before !' 
Responding to this assertion, it 
should be noted that, with only a few rare 
exceptions, no one now believes in the 
provision of emergency aid on its own. 
Most humanitarian organisations are en-
gaged in consistent rehabilitation and 
development operations. 
It also appears to be the case that 
NGOs, the usual 'providers of emergency 
aid', have now reviewed their approach in 
depth and are trying, as far as possible, to 
incorporate a long-term view right from 
the start of the emergency. Few organis-
ations today withdraw as soon as the 
immediate criris has passed. They have all 
developed strategies, based on the con-
tinuum approach, enabling them to deal 
with rehabilitation and long-term prob-
lems from the viewpoint of both human 
and material resources. This is done either 
in an integrated manner, or by using local 
or international partners. 
'Emergency humanitarian aid is using 
up all resources, both public and 
private' 
Clearly, the fact that emergency 
humanitarian emergency aid is more visible 
influences both ordinary citizens and 
elected representatives in its favour. One 
can hardly criticise the type of public 
awareness which sees acute suffering give 
rise to immediate generosity. As regards 
public funds, it is clear that large amounts 
have been mobilised for humanitarian aid 
and this has certainly had a negative 
impact on development assistance. And 
we should not delude ourselves into 
thinking that the two areas are sufficiently 
connected that an increase in the former 
somehow mitigates a reduction in the 
latter. Emergency aid mobilised by public 
authorities is not for use in development. 
But despite the big increase in emergency 
humanitarian assistance, it is still in-
sufficient. Only rarely, are there enough 
resources to respond properly to a par-
ticular crisis. Another element is the doubt 
that has arisen over the last 20 years about 
the capacity of development aid to prom-
ote actual development. Economic stag-
nation in many developing countries has 
coincided with the abandonment of cer-
tain ideological positions giving rise to 
considerable uncertainty among poli-
ticians. The result is that the latter find it 
easier to justify humanitarian assistance. It 
ought also to be pointed out that the 
greater visibility of humanitarian aid makes 
it easier for elected representatives to 
boost their political profile. 
Nonetheless, supporters of emer-
gency assistance still have long-term finan-
cing difficulties. The issue is not so much 
whether one can restore the lost 'equilib-
rium' between development and humani-
tarian aid — which must be an impossible 
aim — but how to reform the adminis-
trative structures for the management of 
the funds by intergovernmental bodies. 
Administrative structures are never neutral 
and the current division between emer-
gency and development aid does not 
encourage flexibility. 
'Supporters of humanitarian assistance 
handle information in a sensational 
manner instead of using it to educate 
and develop the views of the general 
public' 
Looking at this proposition, we 
should start off by saying that no one can 
control the actions of the media, and that 
this very fact represents progress in our 
democracies. In any case, sensationalism is 
not what the supporters of emergency aid 
set out to achieve, although communi-
cation is incontestably one aspect of their 
action. In fact, many human dramas remain 
outside the limelight, despite the efforts 
and strategies adopted? The long list 
includes Sudan, Angola and Nigeria for 
example. The principle whereby a single 
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train derailment gets publicity but regular 
derailments are uninteresting, unfortu-
nately, continues to apply. 
Achieving an adequate 
response 
None of these comments or 
refutations, however, constitute a re-
sponse to the complaint made at the 
beginning of this article and the main 
problems are not in this area. Let us accept 
that neither emergency assistance, nor 
rehabilitation, nor development, even in 
their most open forms, are able to respond 
to all the suffering and vulnerability that 
exists. Let us also accept that, however 
complex the approach described by these 
three words, they do not constitute a way 
of approaching the real world which 
involves learning from experience and that 
a large number of victims and crises are still 
slipping through the net provided by this 
perspective. Rwanda has without doubt 
been the most striking example of this. 
In other words, it is not a ques-
tion of defining situations in terms of 
'emergency', 'rehabilitation' or 'develop-
ment'. The reality is that there are only 
different forms of vulnerability of peoples 
and individuals, and very different ways of 
responding. They may be immediate 
emergencies, long term crises or both at 
the same time. They may necessitate 
conflict prevention or the rebuilding of a 
legal system. They may entail political, 
diplomatic or humanitarian solutions, used 
exclusively or to complement one another. 
Such an approach entails a reassessment of 
the wide variety of institutions involved 
and the form they take (NGOs and 
international agencies) in a spirit of com-
plementarity. 
Are we to conclude from this that 
NGOs, using the sociological strategy 
adopted by organisations, have hitherto 
been seeking to justify their existence by 
reducing the real world to what they are 
able to perceive? This is certainly the case, 
though it does not explain the situation 
fully. The approach proposed here does 
not simply entail abandoning our existing 
conceptual frameworks, but also attempt-
ing to deal with the real world, which is 
now more fluid than ever, on a national 
and international scale, and to distinguish 
common lines of cleavage and peculiarities. 
It is not so much a question of 
NGOs reviewing their theoretical and 
conceptual framework in a spirit of pure 
abstraction, but rather of changing our 
viewpoint. We must also make it possible 
for all public and private agents to find the 
space in which they can exercise their 
responsibilities, which is one of the features 
of our society. 
Definition of the people most at 
risk — those who have been the worst hit, 
or who seem likely to become victims — 
allows us to cast light on a whole range of 
smaller risks. NGOs are symbolic agents 
and, as such, they must use their power to 
cast light into dark places in a way which 
Irrigation to feed the population 
'There are neither emergencies, nor 
rehabilitation, nor development, there 
are only different forms of 
vulnerability... and very different ways 
of responding to such situations. ' 
will lead to speedy action. Definition of 
other risks will only be useful if we are able 
to respond to them in concrete terms, as 
effectively as possible and in a sustained 
manner. The role of organisations of 
international solidarity is not solely to bear 
witness or to denounce abuses, but rather 
to affirm that they have been assigned an 
area of responsibility by society which will 
never be dealt with by other structures, 
(notably the state). These are 'the margins 
of the margins of the margins'. NGOs live 
where the illusion that the state provides 
ends—where new forms of citizenship are 
being developed at the same time as other 
people at risk are being revealed. The state 
must take care of the remaining area. To 
say that orphans are among the most 
vulnerable groups in Rwanda today, and to 
work in this area creating durable struc-
tures based on solidarity, is to cast light on 
other groups at risk, such as women, 
soldiers and so on and to accept that 
another agency, namely the state, will take 
charge of this. In this process, the areas in 
which the state intervenes, and its legi-
timacy, are redefined. 
We must remember that those of 
us in NGOs of the North and South are not 
a substitute but a structural solution to 
certain types of risk, responding in the 
short, medium and long terms by making 
proposals — but especially by taking 
action. 
But this entails a major change in 
the philosophical approach adopted. There 
must also be an end to the dichotomy 
between the supporters of emergency 
assistance, who can be caricatured as 
people who think that saving an individual 
means saving humanity, and the de-
velopers who think that individual inter-
ests can only be met by adopting a 
collective approach. Accepting the ideo-
logical and conceptual barrenness of this 
distinction will allow us to respond better 
to people who have been psychologically 
hurt and who are physically at risk. 
Whether, in the fina I analysis, the response 
is geared towards one person or many, we 
must be ready to tackle complex situations 
outside a conceptual framework, giving 
ourselves the means to adopt a suitable 
response which does not necessarily fit into 
comfortable pre-existing categories. ■■ 
P.L. 
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survey 
by Myfanwy van de Velde* 
It's not so often that a country sees 
its very distant past as of import­
ance to its future. That is the case, 
though, in Vanuatu, where a small-
scale project — the Vanuatu Cul­
tural and Historic Sites Survey — 
has, over the past five years, made 
a tremendous achievement in rec­
ording the many facets of the 
country's heritage for future gener­
ations. 
The VCHSS (or Rejista 
Blong Olgeta Olfala Pies Blong 
Vanuatu, as it is known in the vernacular) 
sets out to identify, record and map as 
many as possible of the Melanesian count­
ry's archaeological, cultural and historic 
sites. In examining known sites -— and in 
many cases discovering new sites in the 
process — the project is unearthing and 
preserving for posterity a wealth of detail 
about Vanuatu's prehistory as well as 
about its more recent social and economic 
history. 
The manner in which it is done 
demands a wide variety of skills. Vanuatu is 
not, of course, one neat island, every 
* Vanuatu Desk Officer in DG VIII of the European 
Commission. 
corner of which is easily accessible—few, if 
any, of the Pacific island countries are. In 
Vanuatu's case there are dozens of popu­
lated islands, and some 100 indigenous 
languages. (Most of the people of Vanuatu 
— the ni-Vanuatu — speak a newly 
emerged contact language, called Bislama, 
which is now the national language). 
The Survey (which the EU has 
been part-funding since 1990) has em­
ployed the services of some 60 volunteer 
fieldworkers to visit sites and record their 
findings. In general village people and their 
chiefs welcome the volunteers, and de­
monstrate pride in 'their' site and satisfac­
tion that government has sought to 
preserve it. Local knowledge about the 
myths surrounding the site and its original 
and later uses is noted (and often photo­
graphed) and this — together with its 
physical characteristics — is reported back 
to the government-run Cultural Centre in 
the capital, Port Vila. Here the findings are 
recorded not only in written form, but also 
electronically (with software designed 
specifically for the project), with site 
position data recorded on a geographical 
information system, Mapinfo. 
The survey is not limited to 
physical evidence of the past, however: 
the volunteers often set out with cassette 
recorders and cameras to register tradi­
tional stories or songs and dances. 
The work of the dedicated few 
(all ni-Vanautu) working on the VCHSS is 
well advanced, but there is no danger that 
the inventory that has been created will 
itself become history. A prime function of 
the Rejista is that it should serve as a tool in 
the appropriate planning of development 
projects, reducing — indeed preferably 
eliminating — the damage so often done 
to a country's cultural heritage through 
ignorance or disregard of sites of cultural or 
archaeological value. And things are look­
ing good already : though the Survey is 
brand new, it is already a government 
requirement that it should be consulted 
before a development project is planned. 
Prehistory shaping future development : in 
Vanuatu, at least, that is felt to be 
right. ΛΜ M.v.d.v. 
Historical site in Vanuatu. 
Drums erected in the centre of a dance 
floor in northern Malakula Supporting private 
initiative in Latin America 
by Ewout Klungel 
Although The Courier's main focus is on ACP countries, we try from time to time to 
feature events in other parts of the developing world. The author of this article, 
who works for the UNDP's Empretec programme in Uruguay, reports on the initial 
success of an E Usponsored scheme designed to promote the expansion of business 
links in South America. 
After the infamous, 'lost 
decade' of the 1980s, Latin 
America is regaining the confi-
dence of international banks and 
foreign investors. A wave of dé-
mocratisation has swept away the 
military dictatorships, economic 
reforms are starting to bear fruit, 
and ambitious integration programmes 
such as the Mercosur, have moved high on 
to the political agenda. 
To help reinforce economic prog-
ress in the region, the EU recently set up 
the ΑΙ-In vest Programme — an initiative to 
promote entrepreneurial cooperation be-
tween the Union and Latin America. It 
covers such areas as technology transfers, 
the establishment of joint ventures, edu-
cational activities and sub-contracting of 
public works. Initiated with a grant of ECU 
20 million (with a 50% maximum for EU 
participation in projects) the programme 
covers entrepreneurial cooperation be-
tween 33 European and Latin American 
countries. One of its most innovative 
characteristics has been the creation of 
Eurocenters of Entrepreneurial Cooper-
ation. By the end of 1994,12 of these were 
up and running and 8 more were in the 
pipeline. Theirfunction is to bring together 
all local organisations and institutions that 
have the potential to contribute to en-
trepreneurial cooperation and are inter-
ested in participating. This covers such 
bodies as chambers of industry and com-
merce, employers' and professional or-
ganisations, and institutions specialising in 
entrepreneurial or development cooper-
ation. The principal tasks of the Euro-
centers are to : 
— Inform enterprises about the Al-lnvest 
Programme and the opportunities it pro-
vides ; 
— Look for European business partners 
using the close links that have been 
established between the Eurocenters and 
their European counterparts who are 
members of the Coopeco (Economic 
Cooperation) network; 
— Analyse the enterprises' needs and 
improve both their professional ¡mage and 
the image of their industrial cooperation 
and/or investment projects. 
The Eurocenter Uruguay 
A look at the functioning and 
accomplishments of the Eurocenter in 
Uruguay offers a perspective of how the 
Programme operates. The country's Cham-
ber of Industry was selected as the location 
for the Centre which began operating in 
October 1994. It brings together various 
organisations including the sectoral com-
mission of Mercosur, the national SME 
organisation, the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Associacion Empretec (which 
coordinates several UNDP programmes 
and has wide experience in organising 
trade missions and business negotiation 
rounds). All of these bodies are able to 
consult the EU's BC-Net network, a da-
tabase containing company profiles which 
is intended to match the interests of 
European and Uruguayan enterprises. 
Additionally, the Eurocenter 
Uruguay has developed a series of activities 
promoting the Al-lnvest Programme. A 
brochure has been designed, 1500 enter-
prises have been directly informed about 
the programme, articles have been pub-
lished in the country's main newspapers 
and radio interviews have been given. 
Most importantly, all of Uruguay's main 
business associations have been 
thoroughly briefed about Al-lnvest. 
Information on business conven-
tions in the EU is systematically dis-
seminated to Uruguayan companies. Trade 
missions have been organised to fairs in 
Santiago and Cordoba producing promis-
ing results in terms of both export and 
import opportunities. The most recent 
trade mission was to Hannover. Future 
plans include an Italian trade mission to 
Uruguay and an Al-lnvest sponsored 
Uruguayan mission to Asturias. 
One of the biggest and most 
promising activities is planned for October 
1995. This is an EU-sponsored Round Table 
Business Meeting, organised in association 
with Empretec, which is expected to 
attract some 300 participants. It will cover 
five sectors: plastics, textiles, food, elec-
tronics and biotechnology, and is open to 
any interested company. The only require-
ment is the submission of a company 
profile for the Eurocenter to review, so as 
to ensure that the enterprises attending 
have similar interests. The European com-
panies participating will be selected by the 
organisations that are members of the 
Coopeco network. The Eurocenter main-
tains regular contacts with 'Coopecos' in 
the larger EU Member States but Robert 
Villamil, who is the Eurocenter's Director, is 
keen to encourage participation from 
other Member States. 'Events such as these 
are a great opportunity to initiate cooper-
ation with countries that trade with or 
invest little in Uruguay,' he points out. 
There are already many examples 
of successful cooperation under the Al-
lnvest Programme and, with numerous 
business conventions planned for the 
coming year, the momentum is expected 
to be maintained. Of course, business 
cooperation between Europe and Latin 
America is not as developed as it could be. 
Distance, language barriers, and different 
business cultures all have the effect of 
limiting contacts, especially at the level of 
SMEs. But as Mr Villamil emphasises, 'the 
Al-lnvest Programme, through its cooper-
ation networks and the business conven-
tions it facilitates, can act as a stimulus to 
overcome these barriers, bringing Euro-
pean and Latin American enterprises 
together.' wm E.K. 
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¡Aid under fire: what 
¿¡policy?  κ 
The statistics are indeed horrifying 
in this the 50th anniversary of the 
United Nations. From only five 
complex emergencies in 1985 in-
volving some 8 million refugees, 
the international community is 
today dealing with an average of 
28 such emergencies annually in-
volving more than 25 million re-
fugees. Projected to the year 2045 
and taking into consideration the 
rapid growth in the world's popu-
lation, there would be 140 complex 
emergencies annually and more 
than 55m displaced people 
throughout the world. At the 
moment some 70 countries are hosting 
refugees. The cost to the international 
community has been enormous and it is 
escalating: from $5 billion in 1980 to $30bn 
in 1994. By the end of this decade these 
expenses are expected to rise to $40bn 
annually, according to UN sources. The costs 
to development are even more alarming as 
large proportions of development budgets 
continue to be spent on relief and peace-
keeping operations. 
The changing nature of 
conflicts 
Brian Atwood of the United 
States Agency for International Develop-
ment wrote recently that the world spent 
more on peace-keeping operations in 1993 
than it did in the previous 48 years 
combined and that in the same year, 
investment in development declined by 
8%. The share of official development 
assistance (ODA) allocated by OECD coun-
tries to relief rose from less than $500m in 
1980 to $3.5bn in 1993, and this at a time 
when overall ODA is declining. Last year 
over one billion dollars were raised for the 
Rwandan crisis alone, more than the 
amount received in development assist-
ance by the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. 
This situation has led to renewed 
interest in the linkages between relief and 
development and has provoked a debate 
on their validity in conflict-related emer-
gencies. Following natural disasters, relief 
operations are aimed primarily at ensuring 
the survival of the afflicted population and 
restoring their means of livelihood as far as 
is practicable. Experience has shown that 
this process is as lengthy and expensive as 
development itself. However, the concept 
of a 'relief/development continuum' in 
conflict-related emergencies is proble-
matic, given the absence of peace. Hith-
erto, relief and development strategies 
have both tended to rely on the existence 
of state structures. Today, donors are 
increasingly being confronted with a 
credibility problem, whether in their re-
lationship with partners whose legitimacy 
and accountability are questionable, or 
with relief agencies whose conduct in 
complex political and military situations is 
unpredictable. The number of 'failed' 
states, particularly in Africa, is growing. 
Although there has been an 
expansion of 'the democratic zone' re-
cently, the pattern of modern warfare has 
also changed. The inter-state conflicts of 
the past have been superceded by internal 
struggles. Liberation wars have given way 
to power struggles between warlords 
unencumbered by ideological motives. 
Arms are now freely available to criminal 
groups and violence is no longer the 
monopoly of states. Drug trafficking in 
conflict zones is on the increase. Humani-
tarian assistance on the other hand is 
increasingly coming up against issues of 
good governance and human rights. 
With only a few exceptions, 
donor countries have not redefined their 
policies to take account of the current 
situation. On the contrary, they appear to 
be in disarray. Indeed, the impression is of a 
gradual withdrawal with an increasing 
tendency to subcontract humanitarian aid 
to private and voluntary bodies. As a 
result, we have seen a proliferation of relief 
agencies and NGOs working in the field, 
sometimes in an uncoordinated fashion. 
Defining a policy 
Against this background of near 
anarchy and in order to arrive at a greater 
understanding of the issues, a common 
analysis of the problem and a definition of 
policy, a seminar was held at Wilton Park, 
Sussex, in the United Kingdom, from 7-9 
April. The title of the seminar was Aid 
Under Fire : redefining relief and develop-
ment assistance in unstable situations. 
Organised in association with the United 
Nations Department of Humanitarian Af-
fairs, the Overseas Development Institute 
and Actionaid, it was attended by senior 
and middle-ranking officials from multi-
lateral and bilateral aid agencies, NGOs 
and academics from across Europe, North 
America and East Asia, as well as aid 
recipients from the developing world. 
A key question, among the many 
posed by the organisers, was whether 
conflict-related emergencies were still 
primarily a matter for relief agencies given 
their proliferation in recent times and the 
greatly increased costs involved. In other 
words, is the aid system the appropriate 
mechanism to deal with the political and 
military dimensions of conflicts, and is it 
sensible to link relief with development, in 
the light of the fact that the conflicts are 
assuming an increasingly 'permanent' 
character. 
The seminar naturally took stock 
of the politico-economic context in which 
these emergencies are taking place, not-
ably with the ending of the Cold War and 
the breakdown of old alliances. This has 
changed the dynamics of relations be-
tween donors and recipients (the former 
had promoted the economic growth of 
states and provided support to leaders of 
questionable character and legitimacy). It 
has also resulted in greater availability on 
the black market of large quantities of 
arms from the former Communist bloc, an 
increase in arms trafficking to unstable 
regions of the world, enormous strains on 
aid budgets, political and economic press-
ures on governments in donor countries, 
and economic failures leading to a massive 
increase in poverty in some parts of the 
developing world. 
Concern was expressed that the 
international community had not mobi-
lised sufficiently to halt arms trafficking, 
especially when information is available on 
their routes, and that it has not done 
enough to monitor and fight human rights 
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impunity has developed with relief assist-
ance often deliberately disrupted and 
manipulated. Humanitarian assistance, 
some participants warned, risks becoming 
a camouflage for inaction — diverting 
attention from tackling the fundamental 
problems. Compassion, they said, is no 
substitute to taking up the challenge. 
There is a need for the international 
community to reappraise its understanding 
of the nature of conflicts and of peace. 
Poverty, injustice, environmental changes 
and population pressures are not the only 
causes of civil conflicts. Historical animosity 
and memories of such animosity, as Bosnia 
and Rwanda have shown, are also import-
ant factors. 
As preventive measures begin to 
prove effective in dealing with natural 
disasters, some participants pointed out, a 
similar 'insurance policy' against man-
made ones needs to be taken out, espe-
cially when it is possible to forecast where 
and when they will occur. Some practical 
measures can be taken. These include a 
commitment to fight illegal arms traffick-
ing, a ban on the production of mines, 
promotion of good governance, the de-
velopment of a free press and encourage-
ment of press freedom, strengthening of 
indigenous capacity to manage and resolve 
conflicts within society and, where neces-
sary, support to those local, national, 
regional and international organisations 
that are best placed to resolve conflicts 
using a multi-track approach. 
Significantly, there were few 
voices advocating the advancement of 
democracy, even though aid is now often 
linked to it as a matter of policy. De-
mocracy, especially in multi-ethnic 
Humanitarian aid being delivered in 
Sudan 
Increasing costs for relief and dwindling 
funds for development 
societies, is proving a risky undertaking as 
the experience of Rwanda and Burundi 
shows. 
The conference agreed that al-
though information is available, there is 
often a lack of understanding of the root 
causes of conflicts and a lack of under-
standing of the local culture. This high-
lights the need to strengthen national crisis 
management capacity. Indeed many were 
of the opinion that the international 
community should assist more in conflict 
management than in resolution, 'because 
some conflicts are cyclical and unresolvab-
le.' Rwanda and Burundi, they said, have 
enjoyed periods of peace and stability only 
because their leaders were able to manage 
the crisis during those periods. 
The growing shortage of funds 
did not escape the attentions of the 
participants. While there was regret over 
the increasing costs of relief and the 
dwindling funds available for develop-
ment, the conference agreed that there is 
an enormous amount of waste, as was 
clearly illustrated at the height of the 
Rwandan crisis. Although efforts are being 
made at the United Nations to find ways of 
raising funds, the current situation calls for 
a more rational use of resources. A 
suggestion by one speaker which attracted 
widespread support was that a proportion 
of the huge funds normally generated 
internationally during large-scale disasters 
of the type suffered by the Rwandans and 
the Iraqi Kurds, when public sympathy 
translates into substantial donations, 
should be set aside for long term humani-
tarian aid and development. 
Inherent link between 
relief and development 
In discussion groups, opinions 
were divided as to how far relief agencies 
should be involved in conflict manage-
ment. There were those who felt they 
should adhere to the principle of 'non-
intervention', restricting themselves to 
saving lives and creating 'a human space', 
on the basis that they have neither the 
skills nor the capacity to mediate. Others 
believed they should be part and parcel of 
the multi-track approach to conflict resol-
ution. In either situation, there was a 
general recognition of the danger of 
donors indirectly increasing tensions, legiti-
mising otherwise criminal groups, influenc-
ing the dynamics of the conflict and 
compromising their neutrality. The un-
comfortable relations between relief or-
ganisations and military authorities in 
recent conflict situations, with the former 
obliged to negotiate with the latter to 
gain access, as exemplified in Bosnia, Sudan 
and Angola, was emphasised as being a 
negative aspect. The majority of particip-
ants, however, agreed with the idea of 
agencies being involved in prevention and 
for an international body to be responsible 
for gathering and disseminating inform-
ation in an early warning capacity. 
On the fundamental question as 
to whether there is an inherent relation-
ship between relief and development, the 
seminar concluded that there was. It noted 
the failure of policies in this post Cold War 
period where the tendency is to separate 
relief from development. The idea behind 
this is that civil conflicts are temporary 
interruptions to normal development pro-
cesses. But today we are witnessing 
conflicts of very long duration and of great 
intensity and destructivenesss. Those that 
do end leave little or no infrastructure as a 
basis for the resumption of production and 
development. The seminar deplored the 
lack of planning at the relief stage which 
meant that the development aspects are 
ignored. Relief in the current global 
context, must have a clear 'window' on 
development. There must, in short, be an 
interface between the two, and insti-
tutions should devise their relief and 
development policies accordingly. ■■ 
Augustin Oyowe 
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between relief and 
development 
by Debarati Guha Sapir 
Wilton Park conferences' have gained a reputation in the UK as a useful forum for 
high-level participants wishing to engage in a free exchange of views on foreign 
policy issues. The Courier was privileged to attend the recent conference on 'Aid 
under fire' with permission to report in general terms on the key elements of the 
discussion (see previous article). Below, we supplement this with an abridged 
extract of one of the conference presentations kindly supplied to us by Debarati 
Guha Sapir who is a Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). In a 
world where humanitarian crises are now more likely to result from human 
conflicts than natural disasters. Professor Sapir argues that the international 
community needs to rethink its approach and come up with a new global policy in 
the field of relief and development activity. 
The developmental and 
long-term implications of disasters and 
relief have been an international concern 
since the famines of the early 1970s. A 
small but persistent group within inter-
national and national agencies have 
pushed for disaster preparedness and 
prevention. Their activities implicitly in-
cluded development issues. However, their 
focus remained largely on natural disasters, 
with some awareness of the complexity of 
causes in the case of famine. By the 1980s, 
conflicts had taken centre stage in relief 
programmes, and discussion shifted to the 
complexities involved in this area. The 
militarisation of these crises, with the 
emergence of humanitarian interventions 
involving armed forces, has resulted in an 
increase in the number of key players in the 
decision-making structures of national and 
international agencies. Responsibilities 
have become divided between various 
government ministries (defence, develop-
ment, foreign affairs), and international 
agency departments. This is a situation 
which is conducive, overall, to increased 
ideological polarisation between non-
militarists and militarists, and between 
pragmatic developmentalists and action-
oriented relief practitioners. As in most 
cases, all sides have valid arguments. The 
problem now is to find the right mix of 
arguments, and transform these into a 
concrete and applicable policy. 
That relief is increasingly being 
provided at the cost of development is 
undeniable. Arguments include the one 
that humanitarian aid offers a 'way round' 
finding difficult political solutions to thorny 
problems, or that relief is quicker, easier 
and much more visually appealing than 
development programmes. Today, the 
main actors in the international com-
munity concur, to a greater or lesser 
degree, on some of the parameters of the 
current humanitarian situation. Not-
withstanding this, they have had dif-
ficulties in coming up with a response, 
especially in terms of programme planning, 
budget allocations and overall policy. 
Many practical problems confront field 
agencies as a result of ambiguities at the 
donor level and contradictions in this 
context. 
The difficulties in introducing any 
long-term perspectives in relief arise chiefly 
from two factors : 
— the very hard-to-change traditional 
views of relief as defined by the historical 
'fire-brigade' approach, namely a short, 
sharp input to save lives (an approach 
which has long-dominated the relief 
scene), and ; 
— the rigidity of existing administrative 
structures within and among many donor 
institutions. 
Responsibilities are sharply di-
vided between those involved in develop-
ment cooperation, and those operating in 
the field of emergency relief. As a result, all 
activities that ensure the transition be-
tween emergency and development 
action fall between two stools. Field-level 
ambiguities resulting from the current 
situation are readily illustrated in the 
Somali context. Was the reconstruction of 
the Mogadishu sewerage system an emer-
gency action or part of the development 
programme? Dithering over such mun-
dane questions led to a delay in funding 
and resulted in a cholera epidemic. Serious 
consequences, both human and financial 
followed the mistakes made in efforts to 
disarm and demobilise the population. 
Emergency programmes began demobilis-
ation in Somalia without the necessary 
concurrent investment in providing alter-
native means of livelihood or education. 
The result was that a costly effort failed 
lamentably; within days of handing over 
their arms, nearly everybody had suc-
ceeded in regaining them. 
Of the many questions and 
lessons emerging from these examples, I 
would like to point out what is, in my 
opinion, the key underlying issue. Given 
our awareness of the magnitude of current 
crises, and agreement that strategic plan-
ning, (which includes developmental/tech-
nical as well as political aspects) is the key 
to successful international response, do we 
not need to explore where and how we 
should establish structural and institutional 
links between relief and development? 
Should disaster preparedness fall under 
development cooperation or emergency 
assistance? Should the policies be re-
thought in the post Cold-War period 
where the nature of humanitarian crises 
has changed ? 
A global policy, spelling out 
institutional links between development 
programmes and relief operations in the 
light of new realities, needs to be devised. 
Inter-agency (or service) coordination, 
while critical, is rarely useful in the absence 
of policy or long-term strategic plans. More 
often than not, emphasis on coordination 
y 
only becomes an alibi for inaction. Coun-
tries such as Liberia, Angola, Somalia, 
Sudan, Cambodia and Myanmar dem-
onstrate the difficulties facing develop-
ment and relief workers in deciding which 
'hat to wear' when asking for funds. 
In conclusion, international agen-
cies involved in countries with protracted 
emergencies or chronic unstable conditions 
need urgently to review their strategies 
both for relief and development. ■■ D.G.S. 
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by Alain Labrousse* 
land used for subsistence farming, among 
rice below the normal ground level and in 
cassava fields. It is even possible to see 
areas of up to three hectares devoted 
solely to the cultivation of cannabis. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) issued a report in 
which it said : 'The situation regard-
ing the abuse of and traffic in 
narcotics has continued to de-
teriorate in Africa over the past 
few years. If effective action is not 
taken (these phenomena) will be 
added to the poverty, violence, 
corruption and instability of the 
communities concerned.' Several 
years later, this pessimistic forecast 
( has been largely confirmed. 
Cannabis production 
Though cannabis has been 
known in East and Central Africa since the 
14th century, it was not introduced to 
West Africa until after the Second World 
War, by Ghanaian and Nigerian soldiers 
who had fought in Burma with the British. 
At first, the marijuana trade in 
rural areas was relatively limited and 
controlled, but in the last decade, follow-
ing the drop in the prices of raw materials 
such as cotton, ground nuts, coffee and 
cocoa beans, farmers have started to 
cultivate the cannabis plant more extens-
ively. Their activity ranges from just a few 
patches, hidden among subsistence and 
market garden crops, to relatively large 
areas covering several acres and belonging 
to a single owner. There are also indi-
cations that, here and there, experiments 
in the cultivation of poppies and coca trees 
are being carried out. 
It would appear, however, that 
far from being a survival strategy, the 
cultivation of such crops in Ghana and 
Nigeria has been seen from the outset as an 
attractive way of making money. 
Ghanaian and Nigerian traffickers have 
started to 'export' their form of produc-
tion to other regions of West Africa, in 
* Director of the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory 
(GDO), Paris. In 1993, this organisation produced a 
study on the drug situation in West Africa. 
particular Senegal and Southern Gambia. 
The islands of the Saloum Delta and the 
Gambia and Casamance rivers (the main 
areas of production in the region owing to 
a favourable climate and relative isolation) 
are home to peasant farmers with relat-
ively large areas under cultivation. Across 
the region, Nigerian and Ghanaian traffic-
kers offer seeds to farmers, paying them in 
advance for the harvest which they come 
to collect when it has been taken in. The 
system involves paying CFAF 300 000 for 
the cannabis harvested from 10 m
2, which 
must be delivered within three months. 
The farmer who does not meet this 
commitment must then supply double the 
quantity stipulated. 
The Nigerians have also started 
to extend their activities to Benin, where 
cannabis is known locally asgué. It is found 
in each of the six provinces of that country. 
And the Ghanaians are extending their 
activities to Burkina Faso. There are 
significant areas of cultivation in the 
central and western region along the Sissili 
and Nahouris rivers to the north of the 
frontier with Ghana. These are effectively 
under the control of Ghanaians, as the 
same ethnic groups live on both sides of 
the frontier. A significant proportion of the 
crop produced is reputed to be for export. 
In Côte d'Ivoire, cultivation seems 
to have developed hand in hand with 
implementation of the first structural 
adjustment programme between 1984 
and 1988. It developed more rapidly when 
world cocoa (and coffee) prices collapsed in 
1988/89. This period also saw a restructur-
ing of the cocoa marketing and distri-
bution system, and the dissolution of credit 
networks in an area where farmers had 
been forced into producing nothing but 
cocoa. The price paid to the producer for a 
kilo of cocoa beans fell from CFAF 400 to 
CFAF 200. In some cocoa growing regions 
of the south west, 'ganja' has been 
established for a number of years now 
among young cocoa plantations (two or 
three years old). It is also found in plots of 
Sub-Saharan Africa: a 
market crossroads for 
traffickers 
Alongside this development, 
Africa has, since the 1980s, become a 
significant air and sea transit route for 
heroin from Asia, destined for the USA and 
Europe, and for cocaine heading for 
Europe from America. At the start of this 
decade, heroin intended for Europe and 
the USA began passing through Nigeria. 
Initially, it was so-called 'brown sugar' 
(heroin no. 3) imported directly from the 
Indian subcontinent. In South East Asia, 
traffickers also dealt in 'Chinese' heroin 
(heroin no. 4) and the routes were later 
diversified to pass through East and Central 
Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire). The 
African networks, meanwhile, extended to 
cover more countries. By 1994, it was 
estimated that 30% of heroin consumed in 
the USA had been introduced there by 
Nigerian networks. 
The through traffic of cocaine 
from South America also affects most of 
the large countries of West Africa, in 
particular Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. It has 
recently begun to have an impact on South 
Africa as well. As for heroin, large-scale 
trafficking is accompanied by the activities 
of the 'small fry', made up of thousands of 
small-scale couriers of all nationalities who 
take drugs to the various European nations 
with which their countries have historical 
and linguistic links. 
The increase in the number of 
production areas and trafficking networks 
has had an overspill effect on local popu-
lations. But there are other crucial in-
fluences — the economic crisis, the flight 
from the countryside, the effects of 
structural adjustment on unemployment, 
and the destruction of family life as parents 
seek a livelihood leaving the children to 
their own devices. Psychotropic drugs such 
as amphetamines, barbiturates, and tran-
quilisers can be found on sale everywhere 
and are in widespread use, especially 
among the street children of the urban 
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Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), farmers are 
poisoning themselves without realising it 
by using amphetamines provided by ped-
lars, in order to cope with hard manual 
labour during the short rainy season. 
The most worrying factor is the 
advance of cocaine and heroin. These were 
developing world 
Successful drug seizure at Amsterdam 
airport 
15 kilos of pure heroin smuggled by 
small-time dealers from Nigeria and 
Ghana 
the preserve of the privileged classes a few 
years ago but usage is now growing 
among the common people in all the big 
cities. The fact that heroin and cocaine are 
the only two imported products not to 
have increased in price (CFAF 15 000 per 
gram) in the poor areas of Lomé and 
Abidjan, following the devaluation of the 
CFA franc, indicates that traffickers have 
targeted their activities on these local 
markets. ■■ A.L. 
What is the EU doing to fight drugs?  I
It is now a commonplace to say that drug trafficking has 
become a global problem. It is becoming dear, however, 
that the traffic in illicit substances is increasing more 
rapidly in the Third World. This was revealed in the 
answers to a questionnaire, sent in 1993 to all EC 
Commission delegations in the ACP countries, on the situation 
with regard to trafficking and drug abuse in each country. Two 
regional studies prepared at the request of Commission 
departments in 1994, one in West Africa and the other in the 
Caribbean, unfortunately confirm the alarming scale of this 
problem in most ACP regions. 
The harmful effects of drug taking on development are no 
longer disputed. Abuse of various kinds of illegal drugs and 
involvement in drug trafficking are undermining national 
institutions, weakening governments, promoting corruption and 
contributing to political instability. Reinforcement of legal 
structures, and the treatment and reintegration into sodety of 
drug addicts are a heavy additional burden on national legal and 
health budgets. The result is the diversion of already limited 
resources away from productive investment. 
The cultivation of illegal crops is, moreover, distorting national 
economies. The production of such substances displaces 
subsistence farming activity and may transform a region which 
had been self-sufficient into a net importer of food products. In 
addition, the profits reaped from production and, in particular, 
from drug trafficking inevitably lead to an insidious increase in 
crime within the society and institutions in question, owing to 
the existence of systems for laundering the proceeds. 
In view of the deterioration in the situation in a large number 
of ACP countries, and in order to foster their attempts to 
develop, there is an urgent need to make a concerted effort to 
deal with the drug problem. It goes without saying that any EU 
policy to combat drugs must be drawn up against a background 
of existing international policies in this area and must in addition 
comply with the commitments taken on by the Union within 
other international organisations. 
The EU was the first regional economic organisation to ratify 
the 1988 UN Convention against the illegal trafficking of drugs 
and psychotropic substances, and then to sign the overall action 
programme passed in February 1990 by the UN General 
Assembly's special session on drugs. Following an agreement 
concluded at the beginning of 1993, the Union has been working 
closely with the UNDCP {United Nations Drug Control 
Programme). It is also an active member of the Dublin group, 
which acts as an international coordinating body and includes the 
main aid donors involved in combating drugs (the EU and its 
Member States, the USA, Canada, Norway, Australia and Japan). 
The enactment of a directive on money laundering in 1992 
and the Union's partidpation in the FATF (Financial Action Task 
Force) are enabling it, moreover, to cooperate with other 
countries or regions of the world so as to pursue an active policy 
of setting standards in the fight against the conversion of 'dirty' 
money through legal economic channels. 
It is worth noting that the increasing attention given to the 
fight against drugs at a European level is dearly reflected in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which identifies the problem as a priority for 
action. It is included in the three 'pillars' of the Treaty on 
European Union, in the areas of public health, justice and internal 
affairs and foreign policy and common security. The Fourth Lomé 
Convention also makes explicit reference to the fight against 
drugs while the subject is expected to figure in the second 
financial protocol of Lomé IV, which is currently being drawn 
Up. HI Jeanne Remade. 
:, ■·■■-.: 
the Courter n° 152 ■ july-august 1995 r The chicken and the egg... 
What comes first, development or education ? This was a question posed by Unesco in 
the February 1995 issue of its magazine 'Sources'. Their conclusions, which we reprint 
below, make interesting reading. Looking at indicators such as population growth, 
health and per capita income, Unesco revealed that the two elements actually go hand 
Average number of 
children per woman 
Under 5 mortality rates 
(per 1,000 live births) 
•300 
■250 
9 10 
Ι f-o 
90 100 
Female literacy rates 
FEMALE FERTIUTY, MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND UNDER-5 MORTALITY RATES 
(Source : Education for all : Status and Trends, UNESCO, 1994) 
90-
80-
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Mean years of schooling (men and women) 
30-
1 
I 
10 
2 
1 
1 
20 
3 
I 
30 
4 
1 
1 
40 
5 
1 
1 
50 
6 
ι 
60 
7 8 9 
1 1 t 
I 1 1 
70 80 90 
Adult literacy rates 
100 
LITERACY RATES, MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 
(Source: idem). 
"I 
Fewer, healthier children 
Raising the level of female li-
teracy facilitates women's access to in-
formation on contraception and planned 
parenthood. They also become more 
aware of hygiene and nutrition, which 
means their children live longer and are 
generally healthier: evidence indicates 
that each additional year of a mother's 
schooling translates into a 5-10% drop in 
child mortality. 
This changes the way women 
think about child bearing and motherhood 
and, as the graph on the left shows, usually 
leads to a significant drop in fertility. 
The trend is especially apparent 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well 
as in Asia and the Pacific. In Brazil, for 
example, illiterate women have an 
average 6.5 children while those with a 
secondary education have only 2.5 
Longer lives 
Statistics also reveal a direct 
correlation between literacy levels and life 
expectancy : the more literate the popu-
lation and the more years of schooling, the 
longer the life span. 
As mentioned above, people 
who have learned to read and write are 
more attentive to hygiene and health care. 
They tend to be less fatalistic and, in the 
event of illness, are more likely to turn to a 
doctor. Of course, literacy is not the only 
factor that affects life expectancy. Access 
to medical treatment, the family's financial 
circumstances, and the social environment 
are also crucial factors. 
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in hand. In other words, education gets better as countries develop, and development picks up 
speed as the level of education rises. Their conclusion is that for governments everywhere, 
education remains a sound investment. 
Richer populations 
Does an increase in per capita 
income cause the level of education to rise, 
or is it, on the contrary, education that 
enables the economic situation to im-
prove ? No doubt it is a two-way process. 
National income is, of course, 
governed by the rate of production. But it 
is also contingent on factors such as natural 
resources or population growth : the more 
mouths to feed, the more thinly spread the 
benefits of increased production. 
Nonetheless, the statistics show 
that, generally, better educated popu-
lations are also richer ones. 
And yet-
As the last graph shows, there is 
no great difference between the number 
of years spent in school and rates of 
activity. This may reflect on the quality of 
education. The difficulty of finding a paid 
job that matches the aspirations nurtured 
in school and/or university, and the in-
ability to create a paying activity by and for 
oneself, despite all the training one has 
received, could mean that the content and 
standards of education are not relevant 
enough. 
It may also reflect the inroads 
that modern technology continues to 
make into the workplace ; technology that 
certainly allows for growth in production, 
but which replaces rather than creates 
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E9 Enterprising Africa 
by Gilles Roussel 
The author of this article is the 
Secretary-General of 'Africréation' 
(African agency for creative youth, 
77 Rue de Charonne, 75011, Paris). 
He writes here about the vitality of 
cultural entrepreneurs in a number 
of African countries where his 
agency operates, focusing on their 
training needs and their potential 
role in economic development. 
In February 1995, Af-
ricréation initiated its second African 
Cultural Entrepreneurs' Training Prog-
ramme. This project, entirely financed by 
the EDF, is the brainchild of the Benin 
Ministry for Culture and Communication 
and is supported by the Ministries for 
Culture in neighbouring countries. A selec-
tion committee chose 10 future trainees 
from the 170 candidate files submitted. All 
are under 30 and they come from seven 
African countries. Six are women. Their aim 
is to set up projects involving the theatre 
and museums or under the multidisci-
plinary heading of 'Cultural Action'. 
The Racines (Roots) Festival took 
place in December 1994 in Porto-Novo 
(Benin). This was a multi-faceted occasion, 
encompassing music, dance, theatre, lec-
tures/debates and exhibitions, dem-
onstrating the creative wealth and open-
minded spirit of this historic town on the 
Gulf of Guinea. Events were initiated, 
conceived and produced by a team headed 
by 27 year-old Igor Agueh. 
If you travel via Cotonou, the 
economic capital, take the coastal route. 
On the left, an unassuming wooden notice 
announces the 'Médiathèque de Dia-
sporas' (Diasporas Multi-media Centre). 
Where the road ends, there is an African 
house where artists and their works, 
exponents of the plastic arts, dramatists 
and musicians intermingle. It is here that 
highly organised exhibitions (such as the 
first Cotonou Carnival) or improvised 
events and concerts are prepared. The 
results are achieved in a lively and en-
ergetic atmosphere which alternates be-
tween serene and tempestuous. The prin-
cipal organiser at the centre, Camille 
Amouro, is a 32 year-old dramatist. 
Continuing on to Lomé, you will 
find, at the start of a very quiet road, one 
of the first African design enterprises, 
offering decorations, furniture-making 
and fabrics. Kossi Assou, a 35 year-old 
plastic-arts designer, is the man behind 
these prolific and authentic forms which 
are sold throughout Africa and Europe. 
In Burkina Faso, Chadian Koulsy 
Lamko, a dramatist who returned to 
Ouagadougou after two years as writer-in-
residence in Limoges, has opened an 
agency for training Burkinabé artists. 
Meanwhile, Parfait Doudy from Congo is 
collaborating in the development of a 
Burkinabé regional audiovisual production 
unit. He is awaiting an improvement in the 
situation in his own country, which is 
currently not favourable to the setting-up 
of cultural enterprises. He sees his project in 
Burkina as the forerunner for a Bantu 
Communication project he plans to set up 
later in Congo. 
Lastly, there is Maryam Maloum-
bila from Chad. Her native country pre-
sently has more pressing concerns but she 
has, nonetheless, successfully established 
Kadja Kossi, an artistic and socio-cultural 
centre, in N'Djamena. 
Most of the young Africans who 
completed the first training programme 
organised by Africréation in Lomé, which 
ran from February 1992 to March 1993, are 
therefore proven entrepreneurs and inno-
vators. Although, unfortunately, not all 
were successful, 144 candidates got their 
projects through the selection procedure, 
overcoming the difficulties of that troub-
led time in Togo and, above all, the 
problems they encountered on return to 
their countries. It would be useful to give 
an explanation at this point of why this 
'gamble' on people and their spirit of 
enterprise was actually made, the bet 
being placed as much on the diversity of 
content as on the continuity of implemen-
tation. 
Culture in development 
Without wishing to oversimplify 
matters, it ought to be said that, in Africa, 
planned, administrative solutions have too 
often been sought merely to satisfy the 
operators and at the expense of those 
actually involved. This is particularly true in 
the cultural sector where a number of 
para-administrative or pan-African events 
or structures were set up, virtually all of 
which were stifled by bureaucracy and by 
the fact that they lost sight of their initial 
objectives. This must be countered by the 
notion of cultural entrepreneur — first and 
foremost an individual with a specific 
project and an artistic and organisational 
vision. In Africa, where art has a strong 
presence and is integrated into many 
spheres, a cultural entrepreneur is often an 
artist or an economic player. His project is 
always autonomous or as independent as 
possible. To make a virtue of necessity, 
budgets have to be modest and public 
financing realistic (for Africréation, these 
are essential criteria for verifying the 
feasibility and duration of productions). 
It is thus possible to discern a 
particular notion of cultural development 
which concentrates on relevance and the 
entrepreneurial skills of the players. Con-
trary to what is sometimes asserted, many 
young Africans wish to set up cultural 
enterprises and this is undoubtedly just the 
beginning. Here, culture has an essential 
role as an alternative development model, 
geared more to real people, their creativity 
and desires, reconstructing communities 
on a local scale and attempting to set up 
effective cooperative networks between 
players on the African scene. 
An African cultural entrep-
reneur's actions are, of necessity, innovat-
ive owing to numerous constraints which 
can be overcome only by ad-hoc solutions, 
often conflicting with pre-established 
structures. For such projects to function in 
the long term, they must be of modest 
size, and this also applies to the promoter's 
ego, although he must have a great sense 
of commitment. 
During the selection procedure 
for the second Africréation programme, it 
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was certainly demonstrated that reason-
able size and ambition could go together. 
Proposals full of vitality were made for 
theatre projects (21% of the total), live 
shows (17%) and plastic arts (10%). Some 
projects were somewhat ill-defined with 
27% designated under the catch-all term 
'Cultural Action'. This often reflected a lack 
of rigour in the initial approach. It should 
be noted that much progress remains to be 
made in enterprises involved in sectors 
which require technology or networks such 
as audiovisual, publishing and multimedia 
activities. These are currently underdeve-
loped in Africa. Similarly, there is a real gulf 
between French and English-speakers, 
Nigeria, in particular, being looked on as a 
continent apart. If cooperation within 
Africa cannot overcome this obstacle, it 
faces a bleak future. 
Cultural enterprise is obviously of 
limited importance to the African economy 
which is essentially dependent on North/ 
South relations (trade between African 
states represents just 3% of the continent's 
total trade). The African entrepreneur 
must, therefore, develop projects which 
are relevant and, above all, small-scale, 
capable of serving as a basis for local 
development and regional relations. 
The post-colonial and sometimes 
'neo-colonial' situation which prevails 
mean that the work of the cultural 
entrepreneur can be particularly relevant. 
He or she is in a position to be an agent 
both for genuine local economic develop-
ment and for the advancement of local 
democracy. Cultural centres, cinemas 
which have been converted into theatres, 
artistic events and festivals all contribute to 
the emergence of local cultural policies, 
even if it is a very slow process. The 
democratising role is accompanied by 
something more concrete, namely job 
creation, albeit on a modest scale. The 
number of artistic and musical groups 
which survive and evolve under uncertain 
conditions in Zaire, Burundi, Togo, Nigeria 
and Chad is impressive. 
The original nature of the African 
artistic outlook means that the economic 
dimension, although small, plays an in-
novative role in a field where relationships 
between disciplines are very strong. It also 
combines with the liberalising dynamic 
created by all cultural life. It is, however, 
markedly different from the role of culture 
in Eastern Europe, for example, where 
ideological criticism still predominates. 
Training needs 
The cultural entrepreneur is a 
rarity. He or she has to be a manager 
capable of performing amazing feats : for 
instance matching the financial constraints 
to the ambitions and innovative spirit of 
the creator. In Africa, the requirement for 
skills is considerably heightened by the 
weakness, and in some cases, complete 
lack, of cultural administration (this is the 
case, for example in Zaire, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone), as well as by the major 
problems involved in financing. There is a 
particular dependence on financial circuits 
originating in the North. Entrepreneurs 
have to adapt to these, gain an under-
standing of the rules and procedures and 
try to tap into pre-existing networks of 
relationships. 
The training requirements of 
African cultural executives are thus im-
mense, all the more so when set against a 
context in which the universities do not 
have a role. At this point, we ought to pay 
tribute to the CRAC (Regional Cultural 
Action Centre) in Lomé, which is re-
sponsible for training many cultural admin-
istrators. It enjoys a precarious existence, 
but it must be acknowledged that a 
number of projects and policy develop-
ments have been due to its work. 
Training requirements are essen-
tially of two types: methodology and 
access to cultural networks. Methodology, 
broadly speaking, covers administration, 
management, implementation of cultural 
projects and definition of cultural policies 
whether at a local or national level. Access 
to networks is fundamental. It entails a 
knowledge and understanding of both the 
cultural policies and the bodies that exist to 
implement them. There is also the issue of 
implementing a genuine network of 
cooperation and (essentially in our view) 
creating linkages between the 'actors' and 
Africa's cultural institutions. We believe, 
from this standpoint, that the regional 
dimension is crucial. It is by this means that 
Africréation, through its various projects, 
enhances exchanges and collaboration 
throughout the Gulf of Guinea, with a 
particular focus on Benin, Togo, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Burkina Faso. The last-men-
tioned country has made a genuine cul-
tural policy into one of the driving forces 
behind its development. 
The stakes involved in artistic and 
cultural training programmes are thus 
crucial and must include the following 
features : 
— encouragement of creativity, improve-
ment of technique and development of 
the notion of method ; 
— progress in Africa itself, but also favour-
ing comparative work through courses 
staged in both Africa and Europe ; 
— creation of trans-African cooperative 
networks ; 
— a high profile through the achievement 
of professional and entrepreneurial pro-
jects: this forms the very backbone of 
educational and vocational awareness ; 
— improvement of complementarity be-
tween technical, artistic and managerial 
training programmes on the one hand and 
administrative colleges on the other hand. 
CRAC in Lomé could be relaunched in this 
context. 
In historical terms, art in Africa 
has always been a force favouring social 
cohesion and unification, idealising and 
transcending the attributes of power, the 
sacred and the people. It is always fascinat-
ing to observe that the 'transmutative' 
virtues which are applied directly, and 
largely without intermediaries, to the 
entire group, are always active in con-
temporary African art. This expresses a 
directly perceptible reality by using a 
language which is sometimes highly sophis-
ticated. African culture is and always has 
been a crucial element in development 
because the transcendency of forms of 
expression is combined with contingency, 
an immediate and structure-giving 'ap-
plicability'. The role that culture has to play 
in development in Africa also brings hope 
for a northern art which is smothered by 
the microcosm and which has lost its sense 
of reality; which is, when all is said and 
done, less essential, less vital and too 
concerned with appearances. 
Today's emerging African cul-
tural managers, are helping to reveal to 
the world that the 'aesthetic' stakes have a 
direct and significant contribution to make 
to economic, social and political develop-
ment. ■■ G.R. 
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| <■ Livestock policies for the 
Caribbean 
by Don Walmsley 
The member states of Caricom are 
all net importers of livestock pro-
ducts and these account for 40% of 
the total regional food import bill 
amounting to a little more than $1 
billion. The domestic livestock 
industry has traditionally enjoyed 
government protection in the form 
of tariffs, quotas and subsidies. 
With the recent trends towards 
trade liberalisation, and the attend-
ant removal of protective barriers, 
local producers and processors have become 
very concerned about the future of the 
industry, and indeed about whether it has 
one! Caricom countries are GATT signa-
tories and as such are bound by its rules. 
However, up until last year, agricultural 
products were not included in the com-
modities covered by the agreement. This has 
changed with the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round in April 1994. 
The aims of the GATT agreement 
on agriculture are to provide the mecha-
nism to bring about increased access for 
members to each other's markets, and to 
reduce subsidisation of exports and domes-
tic support of agriculture. In addition, the 
agreement covers sanitary and phytosa-
* The author Is indebted for background material 
provided at the seminar by H. Blades, B. Blake, W. 
Dookeran, G. Melville, L. Rankine and R. Singh. 
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nitary controls on trade in agricultural 
products since these have been used as 
non-tariff barriers, sometimes unjus-
tifiably. A set of uniform rules to guide and 
enforce the sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures is to be provided in order to 
minimise their negative effects on trade. 
The changes are scheduled to 
take place gradually extending over the six 
years of the agreement, that is from July 
1995 to June 2001. However, there is 
provision for greater flexibility for develop-
ing countries; the reductions in tariff 
levels, domestic support and export sub-
sidies, which are set at two thirds of the 
general level, may be effected over a ten-
year period and international financial 
institutions may be approached for help in 
making the required adjustments. In addi-
tion, there are special concessions for net 
food-importing countries. 
What are the implications for 
Caribbean livestock farmers? The reduc-
tion in subsidies will force them to become 
more cost effective or go out of business. 
The expected increase in feed costs will 
reduce their competitiveness since the 
industry is heavily dependent on imported 
feeds. On the other hand, the price of 
imported milk and meat products is likely 
to rise as export subsidies are lowered in 
the developed trading countries and this 
could lead to a reduction in the demand for 
them and thus stimulate domestic produc-
tion. Some countries, notably Jamaica and 
Trinidad & Tobago, have begun the 
process of removing trade restrictions 
under structural adjustment programmes. 
The general consensus is that there is 
potential for growth in the Caribbean 
livestock industry, but lack of a definite 
policy presents a difficulty in its realisation. 
Regional seminar 
Therefore, conscious of the need 
for discussion on how the changes in 
international trade would affect the lives-
tock industry in the member states of 
Caricom, in March this year, CTA and the 
Caribbean Agricultural Research and De-
velopment Institute (CARDI) organised a 
regional seminar in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 
with assistance from the local Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
Under the title Livestock Policies 
for the Caribbean, the objectives of the 
seminar were to examine the existing 
livestock subsector, define a regional policy 
and identify priority areas for ¡mplemen-
Prize bull in Jamaica 
Livestock farmers in the Caribbean 
need to become more efficient if they 
are to survive in the increasingly liberal 
global trading environment 
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tation. Participants came from the Caricom 
member countries, Canada, the USA and 
the Netherlands. They included represen-
tatives from the regional government 
ministries, agricultural R. & D. organis-
ations, universities, international insti-
tutions, veterinarians, farmers, livestock 
producers' associations, processors, credit 
agencies, feed manufacturers and other 
input suppliers. 
In preparation for the meeting, 
CTA and CARDI commissioned three back-
ground studies that examined the impli-
cations of trade liberalisation, growing 
trends towards regionalism and structural 
adjustment measures for the Caribbean 
agricultural sector and, more particularly, 
the livestock subsector. As well as the 
consequences of the new GATT, the 
investigations also looked into the possible 
effects of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank (IDB) agricultural 
sector loans programme in the region. The 
results of these studies were presented to 
the meeting for discussion. Papers given by 
staff of the World Bank, FAO and USDA 
also provided information to put the 
regional situation into perspective. 
The livestock industry 
The domestic livestock sector has 
been a major factor in food security efforts. 
The region's annual production of poultry 
meat in recent years has been about 94 000 
tonnes, which makes it the main type of 
meat produced, exceeding by far that of 
beef (22 000t), pork (13 000t) and mutton/ 
goat meat (8500t). Some countries have 
become self-sufficient, or almost so, in 
some meats. This is the case for pork in 
Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, 
beef in Belize and Guyana and broiler meat 
(especially whole chicken) in Barbados, 
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. Neverthe-
less, the successes with pigs and poultry are 
associated with high costs for imported 
feeds and feed ingredients. 
The regional dairy industry pro-
duces about 98 000t per year of whole 
cow's milk, but this satisfies less than half of 
annual consumption. The shortfall is met 
from imported powdered, evaporated and 
condensed milk. Caricom nutrition plans 
have set a target of at least one pint (570 
ml) of milk per day for each child of school 
age and also for pregnant and nursing 
mothers. This means that, at present, the 
region is producing less than a third of its 
minimum requirements. 
Trade protection 
There is a wide variation in trade 
protection measures applied to meat and 
milk in the different countries of Caricom 
although the Common External Tariff 
(CET), as its name implies, was designed to 
provide uniform protection for agricultural 
and industrial production. At present, it is 
set at an overall level of 30% but there are 
lower rates for certain foodstuffs and 
special goods that are critical in low income 
diets. The Caricom heads of government 
have exempted agriculture from the gen-
eral provisions and agreed to maintain a 
rate of 40% pending international de-
velopments that might affect regional 
trade, such as GATT and NAFTA. There 
have been problems in implementing the 
CET because of the conflicting interests of 
tourist-based economies intent on low 
import prices and those countries wanting 
to develop and give protection to their 
agricultural sector. The compromise sol-
ution has been to allow flexibility to 
individual governments in setting the CET 
for agricultural commodities. Also, there 
are still problems of market access within 
the region in the form of non-tariff barriers 
for agricultural products, although for 
other commodities, these have largely 
been removed. 
As can be seen in the following 
situations regarding the major types of 
meat consumed — broilers, beef and 
mutton/goat meat—the trading arrange-
ments are by no means standard. 
With regard to their broiler 
industries, both Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago have implemented 'tarification' 
(i.e. converting non-tariff restrictions such 
as quotas, variable levies and negative lists 
into equivalent ordinary tariffs). In 
Jamaica, whole broilers are subject to no 
other charges than the CET of 40% 
whereas in Trinidad & Tobago, there is also 
an import charge of 20% with a phased 
reduction to zero by 1998. The story is 
different again for chicken parts : imports 
of all parts into Trinidad & Tobago are 
restricted but in Jamaica, backs and necks 
(important for low-cost nutrition) enter 
free of tariffs while other more expensive 
parts such as legs and breasts are subject to 
the same tariff as whole chicken. 
The local production of mutton 
and goat meat has been provided with 
adequate levels of protection by imposing 
tariffs of 30% in Guyana and 35% (declining 
to 15% by 2000) in Trinidad & Tobago. 
Trade distortions associated with quotas 
and licences have been removed. It is 
considered that a tariff of 30% would allow 
for competition and improve productivity 
in all Caricom countries. 
The situation with milk is some-
what more complex because of non-trade 
concerns such as social factors, nutrition, 
food security and rural stability. The 
majority of dairy farmers in the region are 
small and usually part of a mixed farming 
system where the sale of milk provides a 
On the hoof! 
Tariffs protect local production of goat 
meat as well as other livestock 
products... but the rules vary from one 
country to another within the region 
valued cash income. In the past, because of 
nutritional concerns, governments tried to 
design policies that would stimulate milk 
production and, at the same time, make it 
affordable to the poorer sections of the 
population. This has not been successful 
because of conflicting objectives. For 
example, previous policy has been to put 
low tariffs on imported milk powder 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
of the Port of Spain seminar 
— A programme of transition is needed 
to ensure an effective change from the 
present trade regime to the new 
arrangements. 
— The livestock industry will need 
continued government support while 
adjustments are being made. 
— The timetables for the reduction of 
tariffs should follow the GATT guidelines 
and be in harmony with the growth of 
the particular industry in relation to self-
sufficiency (e.g. broilers, mutton and pork) 
or export (beef). The region will be placed 
at a disadvantage if a country pursues 
liberalisation strategies more quickly — 
perhaps because of structural adjustment 
programmes — than its trading partners. 
— Regional trade in animal products will 
be essential for further development of 
the subsector. However, its success will 
require a re-examination, rationalisation 
and harmonisation of existing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers so as to remove the 
present distortions in regional trade. 
Another major limiting factor is lack of 
good marketing intelligence. 
— Regional standards (or protocols) for 
livestock products need to be established 
to meet those of competing imports. This 
would also assist in avoiding 'dumping' 
from extra-regional sources. 
— There is a dearth of quality 
information that would help in all aspects 
of the subsector — production, processing 
and marketing. An appropriate database 
is needed. 
— National and regional institutions 
should be established to strengthen the 
efforts of iivestock producers and 
processors and to address trade 
harmonisation, regulation and monitoring, 
financing and other constraints. 
— There is a need for regional livestock 
associations (e.g. a Caricom poultry 
association) with linkages within the 
producer countries. There is also a need 
for effective dairy boards. 
— Local conflicts that can arise between 
different government departments that 
deal with different aspects of the livestock 
industry (e.g. ministries of agriculture and 
ministries of trade), need to be resolved, 
as do those affecting producers and 
processors. 
— Veterinary services need to be 
improved, especially those dealing with 
beef, mutton and pork. Animal health 
information should be made available at 
the producer/processor level through 
organisations such as the Caribbean 
Animal and Plant Health Information 
Network (CARAPHIN). 
— Programmes for control of praedial 
larceny should be made effective. 
— Improvements in productivity to 
increase competitiveness will require 
training for producers and processors in 
both technology and management. 
Promotion of entrepreneurship should be 
given due attention. 
— Imported feed is a major cost to the 
livestock industry. Policies, therefore, 
should favour the use of local feedstuffs 
and feed ingredients, and fanning systems 
which would involve breeds that would 
be more efficient on local nutrition. Use of 
preferred local breeds should be 
encouraged. 
— CARDI and the Caricom Secretariat 
should take the major initiative in taking 
the recommendations on policy to the 
regional Standing Committee of Ministers 
responsible for Agriculture and to the 
Caricom Heads of Government 
Conference. 
— CARD! should set up a task force to 
monitor and report on progress in the 
implementation of the recommendations. 
intended for processing and consequently, 
insufficient protection was given to the 
domestic dairy farmers. This has even 
threatened the survival of the industry. A 
solution to this problem, put forward at 
the meeting, would be to introduce 
regulations to prevent powdered milk 
being used in the milk processing industry. 
Under this system, milk powder could be 
imported free of duty, providing an 
alternative for those consumers who are 
not able to afford the (anticipated) high 
price of fluid milk. 
Conclusions 
During the course of the meet-
ing, three working groups were formed 
(covering the broiler industry; mutton, 
beef and pork; and dairying). They· were 
given the task of reviewing the papers 
presented, indicating other areas and 
factors affecting policy, making policy 
recommendations, indicating priority areas 
and suggesting a mechanism to get the 
recommendations on to national and 
regional agendas for agriculture, especially 
those aspects affecting livestock develop-
ment. 
The findings of these groups, 
which were presented to the meeting and 
incorporated into the seminar's conclusions 
and recommendations, are set out in the 
box. BB D.W. 
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AT WORK 
EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
Following, where required, favourable 
opinions from the EDF Committee, the Com-
mission has decided to provide grants and 
special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs 
to finance the following operations (grants 
unless otherwise stated). Major projects and 
programmes are highlighted : 
Economic and 
social infrastructure 
Cape Verde : ECU 3.09 million to improve the 
road infrastructure on the islands of Santiago, 
Sao Nicolau and Maio. 
Guyana : ECU 6 million for the water supply 
system in the Pouderoyen region. 
Kiribati : ECU 1.2 million towards the upgrad-
ing of the airports of Bonriki, Kanton and 
Cassidy. 
Trade promotion/structural 
adjustment 
Guinea : ECU 19 million for a general import 
programme in support of structural adjust-
ment. 
Haiti : ECU 23 million for a general import 
programme in support of structural adjust-
ment. 
Caribbean region : ECU 12.8 million for a re-
gional tourism programme designed to im-
prove the sector's performance and income. 
All ACPs and OCTs : ECU 3 million to finance 
a variety of actions promoting trade and 
tourism. 
Agriculture 
Benin : ECU 6.5 million for a rural structural 
programme in Mono department. 
Malawi : ECU 1 million for an agro-forestry 
pilot project designed to ensure locally man-
aged, viable food production at the family/vil-
lage level, within the framework of the fight 
against poverty. 
Mauritania : ECU 3 million for rural develop-
ment in the Lake Aleg region in the centre of 
the country. 
Mauritania : ECU 1 million to support agricul-
tural activity in Gorgol and Trarza. 
Enterprise 
Dominican Republic: ECU 4.2 million to sup-
port the development of the productive and 
trading capacity of local small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
Health 
Togo : ECU 625 000 to support the combined 
'information-education-communication' ap-
proach in respect of HIV/AIDS and sexually 
transmittable diseases. 
Education 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal : ECU 
16 million for a training and information 
programme on the environment. 
Palop countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea 
Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe) : 
ECU 2.5 million to support the setting up of a 
Portuguese-language book fund. 
New Caledonia : ECU 830 000 towards the es-
tablishment of a school of commercial mana-
gement for the training, in particular, of Me-
lanesian officials. 
Institutional support 
Mauritania : ECU 500 000 to support the unit 
attached to the National Authorising Officer 
responsible for coordinating EU-financed pro-
grammes, with a view to improving aid 
absorption. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT 
BANK 
Loans 
Côte d'Ivoire : ECU 30 million for Petrochi (the 
national oil company) to support the first 
phase of exploitation of the 'Lion' and 'Pan-
ther' fields recently discovered 13 km from 
the coast. The new finds should enable the 
country to reduce its imports of oil and gas. 
VISITS 
Ayala Lasso, UN High 
Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
On 23 May, Prof. João de Deus Pinheiro, the 
Commissioner responsible for relations with 
the ACP countries and South Africa played 
host to Ayala Lasso, the UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. Discussions cen-
tred on cooperation between the two insti-
tutions and on the specific situation in three 
African countries : Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. 
On the subject of cooperation, Mr Pinheiro as-
sured the High Commissioner that the EU was 
ready to maintain its efforts in the human 
rights field and that it was awaiting concrete 
proposals. Replying, Mr Lasso indicated that 
there was a need for support in establishing a 
corps of human rights observers so as to give 
the High Commission the capacity to react 
when the need arose. He also emphasised the 
importance of coordinating the actions of the 
UN, the EU and the NGOs, seeing, in this con-
text, a pivotal role for the Union. 
The High Commissioner went on to congra-
tulate the EU on its initiative in sending 
human rights observers and technical person-
nel to Rwanda. 
He took the view that the mere presence of 
the observers exerted pressure on the 'local 
actors' and that it had prevented further ag-
gravation of the situation in recent weeks. 
Prof. Pinheiro spoke of the possible prolong-
ation of this mission which was currently due 
to be concluded at the end of August. 
As regards Burundi, the High Commission is 
looking at the possibility of supporting a si-
milar operation in order to avoid a crisis deve-
loping. Currently, there was a need to look at 
the modalities of any such operation, and to 
establish the position of the Burundi author-
ities. 
Prof. Pinheiro indicated that the Commission 
was studying this question pending an initia-
tive by the UN High Commission and that a 
decision in principal would shortly be taken. 
With the same preventive approach in mind, 
a 'human rights' operation is envisaged for 
Zaire. The UN will shortly be setting up an 
office for this purpose in Kinshasa. Prof Pin-
heiro indicated that the Commission was 
again ready to study any proposals put for-
ward by the United Nations. 
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Commissioner for Refugees 
Africa in general, and Rwanda and Mozam-
bique in particular, were the main themes 
under discussion when Professor Pinheiro rec-
ently met Sadako Ogata, the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees. 
It should be noted that half of the UNHCR's 
resources are currently being devoted to the 
African continent. One problem, which is pro-
ving particularly difficult to resolve, is that of 
the Rwandan refugees. As Mrs Ogata pointed 
out, it is extremely expensive to support two 
million people in refugee camps, but the con-
ditions necessary for their return home have 
not yet been created. 
Prof. Pinheiro indicated that the situation 
would be studied in the light of the report by 
the international commission of inquiry. The 
Commission was looking at the conditions re-
quired for a resumption of aid — something 
which he envisaged taking place before the 
summer. The inquiry report had limited the 
responsibility of the Rwandan government for 
the events that had taken place in the Kibeho 
camp. For her part, Mrs Ogata was seeking 
clarification of the contents of the report. 
Turning to Mozambique, the discussion then 
focused on the programme aimed at tackling 
poverty and reintegrating war victims in the 
country, which had been implemented jointly 
by the UNHCR and the European Commission, 
in close collaboration with the Mozambique 
government. The High Commissioner ex-
pressed the hope that this programme could 
serve as a model for Africa. 
At the end of the meeting, Professor Pinheiro 
said he hoped that a further meeting could 
be arranged with Mrs Ogata once agreement 
had been reached on the 8th European Devel-
opment Fund, for the purpose of discussing 
those aspects of the Fund which would re-
quire coordination between the two insti-
tutions. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Commissioner Pinheiro meets 
ACP ambassadors 
Commissioner Pinheiro paid a visit to ACP 
House in Brussels on 8 June. This, his first offi-
cial meeting with ACP ambassadors, was of 
particular significance given the current po-
sition of the Lomé mid-term review negoti-
ations following the failure to reach agree-
ment within the Council of Ministers in 
Brussels in February. There was considerable 
interest, particularly on the ACP side, in what 
Professor Pinheiro would say about ACP-EU 
cooperation and more specifically, about the 
negotiations and the renewal of the financial 
protocol. 
In his welcoming address, Abdi Hassan Mshan-
gana, the Tanzanian ambassador and Presi-
dent-in-office of the Committee of Am-
bassadors, stressed the significance of the 
Commissioner's visit at a time when cooper-
ation with the ACPs was going through a dif-
ficult phase. He spoke of the marginalisation 
of ACP-EU cooperation, noting that, in spite 
of this apparent trend, Professor Pinheiro had 
been keen to take on responsibility for the 
policy. The ambassador went on to praise the 
personality and commitment of the Com-
missioner who, he said, did not view develop-
ing countries in general and the ACPs in par-
ticular, as a 'world apart'. 
Referring to the problems with the Lomé mid-
term review, Mr Mshangana warmly thanked 
the Commission for its commitment to a just 
and reasonable sum for the 8th European De-
velopment Fund. He said that the figure of 
ECU 15.8 million being sought by the ACPs 
would enable a renewed Convention, based 
on transparency and a spirit of mutual confi-
dence, to be rationalised in an efficient 
manner. At the end of his speech, he urged 
the EU to seize again the opportunity to 
work with the ACP countries in a partnership 
for the future. He also argued for joint reflec-
tion aimed at establishing the basis for effect-
ive cooperation in the next century. 
Commissioner Pinheiro, who was accompanied 
on his visit by Steffen Smidt and Peter Pooley 
(respectively Director-General and Deputy 
Director-General for Development at the 
Commission), began by thanking the Commit-
tee of Ambassadors for its invitation. It gave 
him the opportunity, he said, to share a 
number of thoughts about the future of ACP-
EU cooperation and to tackle the feeling of 
disappointment arising from the blockage in 
the Council of Ministers which had persisted 
for four months. He himself might be justified 
in feeling a particular sense of frustration. On 
assuming responsibility for relations with the 
ACPs, he had not taken long to discover the 
significance of the system that was in place, 
both in symbolic terms and as evidence of the 
vitality of ACP-EU cooperation. But within just 
a few weeks, the Council had found itself 
deadlocked. 
Professor Pinheiro argued that the impasse 
with which they were confronted at least 
tended to show that the mid-term review 
was no mere exercise in style. Despite the 
doubts that people rightly had in the current 
circumstances, he felt it was necessary to 
remain confident. Using a railway analogy, 
the Commissioner compared the current 
hiatus to that of a train stuck between 
stations because the electric current had been 
cut, or because somebody had pulled the 
emergency handle. 
Professor Pinheiro stressed that, since the 
middle of February, the Commission had done 
all it could to support the Council Presidency 
in its efforts to convince the most reluctant 
Member States on the subject of the propo-
sed increase in EDF resources. He declared his 
conviction that it was not simply a debating 
matter involving specific Member States. The 
entire policy of the Union vis-à-vis the coun-
tries of the South was at stake. 
He added that although the resolution of out-
standing issues in the Lomé mid-term review 
was important, the problem should not be al-
lowed to cloud the other objectives and 
priorities that the Commission was intending 
to develop in the coming years. With the 
Lomé Convention at a turning point, the 
question that should be asked, according to 
the Commissioner, was whether it was able to 
respond to the new needs and challenges re-
sulting from recent international upheavals. In 
his view, it was essential to find an answer to 
this question. In a similar vein, he spoke of 
the need to respond to the new geostrategic 
realities. In this context, he said, South Africa 
took on particular importance. He said that it 
was a priority for the Commission not only to 
see the specific nature of the EU/South Africa 
relationship defined, but also to ensure that 
there was a proper articulation of the way in 
which this would mesh with policy under the 
Lomé Convention. 
Concluding, Professor Pinheiro sought to offer 
reassurance to his listeners by explaining the 
basic philosophy which underpinned his ac-
tions. He said that he would devote all his en-
ergies to ensuring that development policy, 
founded on a combination of political com-
mitment, interdependence, generosity and so-
lidarity, regained a significant place in the 
EU's scheme of things. 
During the discussion which followed, the ACP 
ambassadors raised a number of issues with 
the Commissioner including the use of Por-
tuguese within the ACP Group, the Uruguay 
Round and its possible impact on the poorest 
sections of the world population, support for 
private investment, and improvements to the 
current Lomé Convention mechanisms. Other 
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gional economic integration and the specific 
case of South Africa. Commissioner Pinheiro 
replied fully to all these questions and said he 
was willing to consider all ideas and sugges-
tions put forward from the ACP side. 
On his departure from the building, Professor 
Pinheiro signed the 'Golden Book' of ACP 
House. He included an eloquent message — 
'3C (coordination, complementarity and coher-
ence) + E (effectiveness) = F (future)'. 
Massamba Mboup 
EU gives financial assistance 
for Haiti elections 
The Commission has recently agreed a propo-
sal submitted by João de Deus Pinheiro to 
make a contribution of ECU 1 million towards 
the legislative and local elections taking place 
in Haiti in June. The poll is an important one 
covering the election of all the country's dem-
ocratic organs with the exception of the Pre-
sidency. A Presidential election is expected in 
December 1995. 
The aid is a concrete expression of the Com-
mission's commitment to supporting democ-
racy in Haiti. An expert has just been sent to 
the country to identify, in close cooperation 
with the Haitian authorities, the ways in 
which the aid can be applied to help the de-
mocratic process and the judicial reforms 
needed to ensure the proper functioning of 
the state in accordance with the rule of law. 
This assistance is part of a much wider aid 
package, involving the EU and other inter-
national donors, which was put in place fol-
lowing the return of President Aristide in Oc-
tober 1994. It is recognised that Haiti cur-
rently faces a critical situation, the economy 
having gone into steep decline following the 
military coup and the resulting international 
economic sanctions, in 1991. 
The country has urgent needs in all economic 
and social sectors. Recognising this, the Com-
mission was not slow to react once President 
Aristide had been restored to power. In Nov-
ember 1994, it signed a national indicative 
programme with Haiti which is worth ECU 
120 million (ECU 106 million in grants and 
ECU 14 million managed by the EIB). Schemes 
already approved by the Commission include : 
— a rehabilitation programme to the value of 
ECU 25 million for road infrastructure, agricul-
ture, water distribution and education ; 
— a energy sector rehabilitation programme 
to the value of ECU 16 million, to repair a 
power station rendered inoperable by a fire ; 
— a structural adjustment support programme 
to the value of ECU 23 million, the funds from 
which will go into health and education; 
— the unblocking of Stabex funds (used to 
compensate for losses in export earnings resul-
ting from its lower agricultural commodity 
prices — covering, in Haiti's case, cocoa, 
coffee and essential oils). The sum involved 
here is ECU 25 million and the funds will be 
used for the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
and rural facilities. 
Other projects in priority sectors are in the 
process of being identified. 
In addition to emergency aid valued at ECU 
18 million (which was never suspended), the 
EU is also supplying significant amounts of 
food aid in the form of basic food products 
and agricultural inputs. 
If one adds to these totals, the various actions 
undertaken by the EU under other budget 
lines (refugees, decentralised cooperation, 
NGO cofinancing, Aids etc) for which the 
Commission services are ready to examine 
proposals submitted, Haiti is benefiting in the 
short term to the tune of almost ECU 210 
million. 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
COUNCIL 
Development ministers meet 
Meeting in Luxembourg on Thursday 1 June, 
under the chairmanship of Jacques Godfrain, 
French Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs 
with responsibility for cooperation policy, the 
Development Council discussed and approved 
a number of texts on different subjects. 
Three resolutions were adopted : 
1. Complementarity of EU and Member State 
policies 
This text, which is part of the follow-up to 
the document 'Horizon 2000', seeks to in-
crease the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
that have been put in place. Stressing that 
complementarity is important for the ef-
ficiency of both Union and Member State de-
velopment policies, the Ministers recognised 
that this did not pose a threat to the policies 
of the latter. It represented, instead, a means 
of gaining added value from the experience 
of both sides — a synergy which could only 
benefit the recipients of aid in the final 
analysis. 
2. Support for structural adjustment 
This resolution, which fixes orientations for 
the Commission, is aimed at improving the ef-
fectiveness of the structural adjustment facility 
in the light of the mixed experiences of ACP 
and Mediterranean countries in this area. 
3. Support for regional integration 
The text adopted refers to the less-than-decis-
¡ve results of past experience in the field of 
regional integration, sets out the precon-
ditions for success in this area and makes 
recommendations in the fields of trade policy, 
donor coordination and general development 
cooperation policy. 
In addition, the Council adopted a declaration 
on research in the developing countries which 
sets out priorities for the EU and its Member 
States. These include a lasting improvement in 
the food security and health spheres, support 
for better utilisation of university resources 
and assistance for development-related re-
search activities. The declaration referred to 
the need for research results to be used and 
disseminated, and for aid in this area to be 
made more effective, as well as reiterating 
the basic purpose which is to allow develop-
ing countries to achieve sound and sustainable 
development. 
There was a detailed exchange of views on 
the evaluation of EU development program-
mes, leading to the adoption of a document 
which sets out the way in which this should 
take place (terms of reference, field of appli-
cation, methods and implementation rules). 
This follows on from the declaration made by 
the Development Council In November 1994. 
As regards cooperation with South Africa, the 
Council adopted conclusions on a Commission 
proposal for a regulation concerning the legal 
framework for implementing the EPRD (Euro-
pean Programme for the Reconstruction and 
Development of South Africa). This establishes 
the modalities for managing the ECU 15 mil-
lion which have been allocated to this prog-
ramme under the Community's 1995 budget. 
The Ministers welcomed with some en-
thusiasm, the positive outcome of Com-
missioner Pinheiro's trip to South Africa, and 
made an appeal for the General Affairs Coun-
cil to adopt the negotiating mandate pertain-
ing to the Community's long-term relationship 
with this country, at its meeting on 12 June. 
This would allow the Commission to proceed 
rapidly with the negotiations. 
The Council also noted, with interest, a pro-
posal for a regulation on humanitarian aid 
that was presented by Emma Bonino, the 
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tarian Office (ECHO). This foresees the estab-
lishment of a legal base for a number of bud-
getary lines devoted to humanitarian aid, in 
particular as regards ECHO'S own operations. 
The Development Council's decision to engage 
in a political and technical dialogue with 
Rwanda, with a view to the resumption of 
aid, was perhaps the most significant point on 
the agenda at this particular session. Ministers 
discussed the situation in the country in the 
aftermath of the Kibeho massacres. With the 
assistance of Commissioner Pinheiro, it was 
possible to resolve the outstanding differences 
between the different delegations. The Coun-
dl decided to send an emissary from the 
Union, within the following 10 to 15 days, to 
open a dialogue with the Rwandan govern-
ment. 
This decision was taken, bearing in mind the 
need to support the process of normalisation 
and reconciliation in the country, and the po-
sitive reaction of the Rwandan government to 
the conclusions of the International Commis-
sion of Inquiry. On the basis of the report 
from this emissary, it may be possible to 
resume provision of the aid that has been sus-
pended (amounting to between ECU 40m and 
ECU 45m), thus allowing the EU to resume its 
participation in the rehabilitation and rec-
onstruction process in Rwanda. These decisions 
were the subject of a joint declaration by the 
Council and the Commission, the text of 
which is reproduced in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy section of this News 
Round-Up. 
During the press conference which followed, 
Minister Godfrain and Commissioner Pinheiro 
expressed satisfaction with the positive out-
come of the meeting. They were particularly 
encouraged by the decisions taken in respect 
of Rwanda. 
The President in Office of the Development 
Council also expressed pleasure at the prog-
ress made on the subject of coherence in 
Community policies, and on the operational 
coordination taking place in six 'pilot' coun-
tries (Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Et-
hiopia, Mozambique and Peru) in the fields of 
health, the fight against poverty and Aids. 
During lunch, the Ministers discussed, among 
other subjects, the situation in Angola and 
Mozambique, Eritrea, humanitarian flights to 
Somalia, and the Conference on Women sche-
duled for Beijing later this year. 
COMMON FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY 
POLICY 
Statements 
Within the framework of its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union 
has recently issued a number of statements, 
details of which are set out below : 
Rwanda : condemnation of 
events in Kibeho 
Declaration of 25 April 1995 
The European Union utterly condemns the 
violence which led to several thousand civilian 
deaths in the Kibeho camp during Rwandan 
army operations to close down the camp on 
22 April. The Union urges the Rwandan au-
thorities to launch an inquiry without delay in 
order to identify those responsible for the 
massacre and to take all the necessary sanc-
tions speedily. 
Events of this gravity can only make it more 
difficult for refugees and displaced persons to 
return, this being an essential prerequisite for 
national reconciliation and a lasting solution 
to the Rwandan problem. 
The EU would point out that its development 
aid for Rwanda is conditional on respect for 
human rights and progress towards national 
reconciliation. 
It emphasises that international aid to the 
local population must be allowed to proceed 
unhindered. It therefore calls on the Rwandan 
authorities to make it easier for the inter-
national and non-governmental organisations 
to carry out their task of relieving suffering. 
Rwanda: development aid 
suspended 
Joint Council and Commission declaration of 
12 May 1995 
Following the events in Kibeho, implemen-
tation of the aid programmes for the Govern-
ment of Rwanda undertaken by the Com-
munity pursuant to the recommendations of 
the Development Council on 25 November 
1994 in the light of the objectives and 
priorities defined in the common position of 
24 October 1994 has been temporarily sus-
pended. 
Following detailed consultations, it has been 
established that the suspension will affect the 
Community's development aid programmes 
and will not affect humanitarian and emer-
gency aid, aid to the health and education 
sectors or measures in support of human 
rights and the rule of law. 
Subject to action to be taken following the 
conclusions of the Committee of Inquiry, 
which must work in total independence, the 
gradual resumption of assistance will depend 
on the concrete efforts of the Rwandan au-
thorities to achieve the objectives and 
priorities of the common position adopted by 
the Council on 24 October 1994. 
The Commission will provide the Council with 
further information as necessary. 
Rwanda: dialogue on the 
resumption of aid 
Joint Council and Commission declaration of 
2 June 1995 
Taking account of the positive response of the 
Rwandan Government to the conclusions of 
the Commission of Inquiry, and the need to 
provide support towards improving the situ-
ation, the Council of the European Union and 
the European Commission have decided, fully 
respecting the common position of 24 Oc-
tober 1994, to engage in political and tech-
nical dialogue with the Rwandan government 
aimed at the full resumption of EU assistance 
to Rwanda and at the pursuit of efforts desig-
ned to establish ways and means of promot-
ing rehabilitation and reconstruction within 
the country. 
Niger: peace agreement with 
Tuareg rebels 
Declaration of 10 May 1995 
The European Union welcomes the signing of 
the peace agreement between the Govern-
ment of Niger and the Armed Resistance Or-
ganisation (ORA). It is heartened by this decis-
ive step towards national reconciliation, which 
offers hope to the population of Niger and 
the region as a whole, urges the signatories 
to do their utmost to consolidate the peace, 
and will, in future direct its cooperation with 
Niger towards attainment of that objective. 
Angola: Dos Santos and 
Savimbi meet 
Declaration of 10 May 1995 
The European Union welcomes the fact that 
the long-awaited meeting between President 
Dos Santos and Mr Savimbi finally took place 
smoothly in Lusaka on 6 May. It pays tribute 
to all who worked for the holding of that 
meeting. 
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important development making possible the 
swift deployment of UNAVEM III forces and 
contingents. It hopes that the climate prevai-
ling at those talks will impart fresh impetus to 
the application of the peace agreements on 
the ground and will serve to strengthen in 
practice the essential process of national re-
conciliation in Angola. 
Sierra Leone: European 
hostages freed 
Declaration of 18 May 1995 
The European Union welcomes the release of 
the ten European hostages abducted in Sierra 
Leone and pays tribute to all those who 
played a role in securing their release. 
The European Union notes that the continu-
ation of the conflict has led to the death, dis-
placement or disappearance of many innocent 
Sierra Leoneans and calls on all parties to seek 
an end to the hostilities and to work towards 
national reconciliation. It welcomes the state-
ment made by the Sierra Leonean Govern-
ment proposing a cease-fire and unconditional 
peace talks and announcing the lifting of the 
ban on political activity. It counts on all Sierra 
Leoneans to participate wholeheartedly in the 
peace process. 
The European Union strongly supports the ef-
forts made by the United Nations Secretary-
General and his special representative to 
promote peace in Sierra Leone. It also wel-
comes the active commitment of the Com-
monwealth Secretary-General, the Chairman 
of the Economic Community of West African 
States and other States in the region. 
GENERAL 
INFORMATION 
Commissioner Pinheiro visits 
South Africa and Mozambique 
João de Deus Pinheiro, the European Com-
missioner with responsibility for relations with 
the ACP countries and South Africa, made an 
official visit to the latter country, as well as 
Mozambique, between 11 and 18 May. The 
aim of the visit was to define the new frame-
work for relations between the European 
Union and South Africa, and to reaffirm the 
EU's support for the démocratisation process 
taking place in Mozambique. 
On his arrival in South Africa, the Commissio-
ner was received by State President Nelson 
Mandela at his private residence in Houghton, 
in the north of Johannesburg. After the meet-
ing, the two men declared themselves to be 
optimistic and confident about the future of 
relations between South Africa and the Union. 
Professor Pinheiro indicated that, notwithstan-
ding any difficulties encountered in the ne-
gotiations, he was convinced that a mutually 
beneficial solution could be found. 
At the time of the visit to Europe of Thabo 
Mbeki, South Africa's Vice-President, at the 
beginning of the year, a number of misunder-
standings and disagreements over the future 
form of relations between the EU and South 
Africa had emerged. Pretoria was seeking full 
membership of the Lomé Convention while 
Brussels was proposing a more limited link 
with Lomé combined with a trade and 
cooperation agreement which could lead to 
the establishment of a free trade area. The 
European side took the view that, given the 
economic weight of South Africa (its exports 
to the EU are equivalent to 50% of those of 
the 70 ACP countries), full membership of the 
ACP Group could have negative effects on the 
other ACP countries. For its part, the South 
African Government felt that the EU would 
be the main beneficiary of a free trade 
agreement. 
The Commissioner's visit provided an oppor-
tunity to smooth out some of the differences 
between the two sides and to relaunch the 
negotiations on a somewhat different basis. 
Thus, South Africa would be able to adhere 
to the Lomé Convention but it would be ex-
cluded from certain sensitive areas notably in 
the food production sector. As regards the bi-
lateral agreement, the Commission has propo-
sed an 'asymmetric' timetable which would 
allow South Africa to have privileged access to 
the European market, without, in the first in-
stance, having to offer reciprocity for Euro-
pean exports. A definitive decision on the 
proposals to be made by the European side 
Commissioner Pinheiro in 
conversation with President 
Mandela during his recent visit to 
South Africa 
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'~"?¡ak. was expected to be made at the Cannes 
Summit (scheduled for 26 and 27 June). 
Having met with President Mandela, Com-
missioner Pinheiro attended the summit of the 
World Economic Forum which took place in 
Johannesburg on 11 and 12 May. He had a 
meeting there with Trevor Manuel, South Af-
rica's Trade and Industry Minister and Jay 
Naidoo, Minister without portfolio, who is re-
sponsible for the country's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). This gave 
Professor Pinheiro the opportunity to reaffirm 
the EU's support for South Africa's process of 
democratic transition and economic rec-
onstruction. In this context, Mr Naidoo and 
Professor Pinheiro put their signatures to the 
European Programme for Reconstruction and 
Development (EPRD) which allocates the sum 
of ECU 125m to South Africa for 1995. The 
parties have agreed that the funds should be 
used to finance action in the fields of edu-
cation, health, rural development, promotion 
of economic cooperation, trade and invest-
ment, support for small and medium sized 
enterprises and, more generally, in helping 
the democratic process. 
On the following day. Professor Pinheiro trav-
elled to Pretoria where he met with Vice-Pre-
sident Thabo Mbeki. Mr Mbeki expressed sat-
isfaction at the way relations with the EU 
were developing. Given the particular charac-
teristics of his country, he recognised that it 
might be necessary to envisage a route some-
what different from that set out in the Lomé 
Convention during future negotiations bet-
ween the two sides. The two men also reiter-
ated their wish to associate other countries in 
the region with the negotiations and Prof-
essor Pinheiro stressed that nothing would be 
done behind the backs of the ACP states. 
From Pretoria, the Commissioner flew on to 
Cape Town, the legislative capital. He visited 
a number of projects supported by the Euro-
pean Union in the townships of Guguletu and 
Khayelitsha and met with local officials. In the 
afternoon, he had an exchange of views with 
Doctor Ginwala, the Speaker of the South Af-
rican Parliament. The discussions focused on 
the difficulties in bringing Parliament closer to 
the people — whether in the EU or in South 
Africa. 
Despite having a hectic schedule in South 
Africa, Professor Pinheiro also took time to 
visit Mozambique. There he met the President 
of the Republic, Joachim Chissano, Prime Min-
ister Pascoal Mocumbi, Renamo Leader Afonso 
Dhlakama and a number of other ministers 
and business leaders. The visit was taking 
place at a significant time, with Mozambique 
in the throes of a democratic transition and 
facing enormous economic problems. In the 
course of a press conference, Commissioner 
Pinheiro stressed the need for Mozambique to 
respect the commitments it had entered into 
with the IMF and the World Bank. This, he 
said, would release a 'snowball effect' in 
terms of commitments from other donors. He 
also spoke of the need to find a rapid sol-
ution to the problem of reintegrating re-
fugees, displaced people and demobilised sol-
diers, back into society. He declared that he 
was impressed by the willingness of the 
Government to implement political and econ-
omic reforms and stressed that the Commis-
sion would lend full support to the process. 
Among other actions, practical expression of 
this support was to be found in the provision 
of more than ECU 60m in four financial agree-
ments and an additional allocation within the 
framework of the 7th EDF. Finally, the Com-
missioner reiterated the importance to Moz-
ambique of close economic cooperation with 
the other countries in the region and, in par-
ticular, with South Africa. It was essential, he 
declared, for Mozambique not to remain 
isolated. Francis Caas 
Italian humanitarian and 
emergency aid reaches ECU 
50 million in 1994 
The increase in civil strife in countries such as 
the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda 
has prompted a redirection of Italian aid to-
wards humanitarian assistance in recent times. 
According to Under-Secretary of State, E. 
Scammacca del Murgo e dell'Agnone, parti-
cular attention has been given to the integ-
ration and coordination of Italian aid with the 
operations conducted by the United Nations 
and the European Union. In 1994, Italy provi-
ded ECU 50 million for operations in the 
emergency and humanitarian field in 30 coun-
tries. 80% of this was utilised by the Emer-
gency and Development Office of the Italian 
Foreign Ministry with a particular focus on ex-
Yugoslavia (ECU 14m) and Rwanda (ECU 6m). 
The remaining funds were granted to coun-
tries with difficulties of an exceptional nature 
such as Mozambique, the West Bank and 
Gaza territories, Croatia and Albania. 
The 1994 Annual Report of the Emergency 
and Development Office gives the following 
breakdown of emergency aid allocations : 
40.3% to Eastern Europe, 35.5% to Africa, 
5.6% to the Middle East, 2.2% to Asia and 
1.3% to Latin America. 
Most of the aid (40%) was granted to the 
health sector while 18% and 17% respectively 
were committed to food aid and emergency 
assistance for refugees and displaced people. 
The aid can also be broken down as between 
assistance for victims of natural disasters (37%) 
and for victims of war (63%). 
The Italian programme has been directed 
mainly towards the problems of the weakest 
members of society, notably women and 
children. Indeed, the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) received ECU 8.5 million, making it 
the largest single recipient of Italian support 
in this area. In the food aid sector, Italy is fun-
ding numerous agricultural development pro-
jects in Bosnia, Africa, Gaza and Montenegro. 
It is attempting to adopt a longer term ap-
proach, going beyond emergency aid and in-
cluding the supply of seeds and material for 
animal reproduction in its programmes. Fran-
cesco Alois! de Larderei, who is the Director 
General of Italian aid, says that Italy has ad-
opted a more transparent and rapid approach 
with its bilateral aid programme. 
83% of Italian aid is managed by international 
organisations, notably the UN agencies (69%) 
and the European Community Humanitarian 
Office (14%). Around 20 Italian NGOs have 
signed the Framework Partnership Contract 
with ECHO. A move towards a more decen-
tralised approach through the use of NGOs, 
accompanied by greater cooperation with 
international organisations, has increased the 
credibility of Italy's development policy inter-
nationally. At the same time, projects have 
been dictated by the priorities of the inter-
national community rather than by any arbit-
rary criteria. In this way, it is hoped that hu-
manitarian aid can provide a model for more 
efficient development aid, which has suffered 
extensively from budget cuts. 
Mr Scammacca del Murgo e dell'Agnone 
maintains that Italian aid in this area has been 
conceived with a view to connecting humani-
tarian assistance with rehabilitation and devel-
opment aid. The objective of establishing a 
'continuum' between emergency and develop-
ment assistance, he says, is an integral part of 
all Italy's humanitarian initiatives. 
Giovanni Livi 
Sudanese bishop on whistle-
stop European tour 
Monsignor Paride Taban, the Bishop of Torit 
in Southern Sudan, visited Brussels and a 
number of other European cities in early June. 
His main aim was to highlight the continuing 
plight of the people in Southern Sudan and to 
plead for mutual respect and reconciliation as 
a way of restoring peace in the country as a 
whole. The problems of Sudan have largely 
disappeared from the television screens of 
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A young woman recently arrived 
at Kakuma Camp in Northern 
Kenya, after walking for several 
days from her home area in 
Southern Sudan 
Western Europe following the ceasefire broke-
red by former US President, Jimmy Carter. 
Bishop Taban warned that this event did not 
necessarily imply progress towards peace in 
the country. The fighting prior to the 
ceasefire had been particularly fierce and the 
government, he said, was using the lull to re-
group and rearm. He predicted a new out-
break of fighting shortly. Bishop Taban said 
that the people of Southern Sudan were 
crying out for peace. He was critical of fac-
tional rivalries within the rebel SPLA move-
ment which had created a 'multi-headed 
monster', playing into the hands of those 
who would 'divide and rule'. Continuing with 
the analogy, he spoke of how the church mo-
vement had sought with some success to deal 
direct with the 'body' (the ordinary people) 
bringing tribes and local commanders to-
gether. He made a plea, however, for outside 
help to continue work in this area. It was ex-
pensive for the church to carry out its moni-
toring role in the more remote regions and 
assistance was needed both for relief and for 
the training of monitors. He urged, above all, 
the need to develop a culture of peace. s.H. 
'Populations in danger': 
bearing witness through 
images 
Photographs from the celebrated Magnum 
Agency and texts by renowned authors were 
recently made available to Médecins sans 
Frontières to mount an exhibition entitled (in 
French) 'Regards'. Working in tandem, the 
photographers and authors went to areas in 
crisis which the media has recently tended to 
neglect or ignore. 
The thinking behind this initiative on the part 
of the humanitarian agency may be expressed 
in the following way : 'The first humanitarian 
gesture is to recognise the existence of those 
for whom one is working by witnessing what 
is actually happening to them and speaking 
about them.' 
In other words, in order to tell their story you 
need to look and listen, so as to achieve a 
better understanding. This is what was propo-
sed, and what the authors and photographers 
set out to achieve. Thanks to their talents, 
they succeeding in shedding new light, not 
just on the humanitarian work, but on the 
actual people who are threatened, coming to 
their aid by helping them to escape from the 
status of 'anonymous victims'. 
The places and subjects chosen by the dif-
ferent teams of photographers and writers 
were Cambodia (Carl de Keyzer and Tim 
Crabbe), Guatemala (John Vink and Bernard 
Comment), the homeless in Moscow (Do-
novan Wylie and Brigitte Raskin), Rwandan 
refugees in Tanzania (Eli Reed and Manuel 
Vicent), Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire 
(Leonard Freed and Alain Borer), Afghanistan 
(Chris Steel Perkins and Olivier Roliri) and 
Southern Sudan (Sebastião Salgado and Jean 
Lacouture). 
(The Magnum 'Regards' Exhibition runs from 
19 June to 29 September at the 'Espace 
Photo' of Médecines sans Frontières, 94 Rue 
Dupré, Brussels. Tel. 474 74 74, Fax. 474 75 
75) 
SUPPORT FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Commission has recently decided on the 
following financing for projects by organis-
ations working to support victims of human 
rights violations. 
ACP countries 
Sudan : ECU 40 000 for a rehabilitation prog-
ramme for torture victims. 
Non-ACP countries 
Argentina : ECU 100 000 for medical, legal, 
psychopedagogical and social support to adol-
escents in families that suffered repression and 
torture under the former military dictatorship. 
Bosnia : ECU 100 000 for therapeutic and 
psychological help to women and children in 
Tuzla, traumatised by the war. 
Bosnia : ECU 60 000 for psychotherapeutic 
help for refugees with a particular focus on 
victims of torture and racist attacks. 
Bosnia/Croatia : ECU 70 000 to finance intens-
ive training sessions for psychiatrists and psy-
chologists involved in helping people traumat-
ised by the war. 
Estonia : ECU 30 000 for medical, psychological 
and social help for victims who suffered tor-
ture under the former Soviet regime. 
Romania : ECU 40 000 to establish rehabili-
tation services for people in Bucharest and its 
environs who were tortured under the former 
regime. 
Romania : ECU 40 000 for a rehabilitation 
centre covering the lasi area to help people 
who were tortured under the former regime. 
Multi-regional 
ECU 140 000 for a rehabilitation programme 
for torture victims. The programme includes 
research, the establishment of networks, edu-
cation, training and awareness-raising. 
ECU 56 000 for a programme of medical and 
psychiatric care for both female and male vic-
tims of sexual attacks. 
ECU 56 000 for a programme to identify and 
document torture practices and their effects. 
ECU 86 000 for a programme of psychother-
apeutic support to adult torture victims with 
a view to reintegrating them into society. 
ECU 173 000 for a programme to support 
migrants from specific countries who have 
been tortured and/or are suffering from 
trauma. 
ECU 60 000 for a 'mobile ambulance' to pro-
vide psychological support for refugees — 
notably Bosnian women — from the former 
Yugoslavia. 
ECU 27 500 to finance an international semi-
nar entitled 'Reconcile to rebuild ? Impunity, 
Justice or Pardon ?' 
HUMANITARIAN 
AID 
Aid decisions 
The Commission has recently taken the fol-
lowing decisions to provide humanitarian aid 
(including emergency and food aid) : 
ACP countries 
Central and East Africa : ECU 4.62 million for 
the prolongation until November 1995 of the 
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port of people and goods in this region. 
Angola : ECU 7 million to follow up the hu-
manitarian assistance plan, particularly in 
favour of displaced people, with food aid, log-
istical support, shelters, other basic essentials 
and sanitation. 
Côte d'Ivoire : ECU 400 000 for sanitation and 
the rehabilitation of water points for the 
population of Tabou-Grabo, most of whom 
are Liberian refugees. 
Niger : ECU 215 000 for a vaccination cam-
paign against meningitis, with particular em-
phasis on 200 000 children living in the capital 
and the surrounding area who have been 
most exposed to the epidemic. 
Niger : ECU 250 000 to extend the vaccination 
campaign against meningitis to children in the 
Maéradi, Dosso and Tahoua regions. 
Sierra Leone : ECU 550 000 to provide basic 
essentials for displaced people in the 
Moyamba district. 
Somalia : ECU 350 000 for medical aid for the 
people of the Hoddur region and for nutr-
itional support in six other regions. 
Zaire : ECU 250 000 for a sanitary project over 
a three-month period aimed at ending the 
spread of the Ebola virus, for which there is 
no known cure. 
Haiti : ECU 6 million for food, sanitary and 
medical aid covering a period of eight 
months. Priority will be given to primary 
health care, food aid for children and preg-
nant women and the provision of drinking 
water in both urban and rural areas. 
Non-ACP countries 
Bolivia : ECU 1.15 million for a food prog-
ramme and medical assistance for some 7500 
families who are victims of drought and flood-
ing in the departments of Potosí and 
Chuquisaca. 
Colombia : ECU 400 000 for a variety of pro-
jects to reconstruct hospitals and health cen-
tres destroyed by earthquakes. 
Ecuador : ECU 450 000 to help displaced peo-
ple in the wake of the hostilities with Peru. 
Guatemala : ECU 1.1 million for food, medical 
and logistical aid aimed at helping the re-es-
tablishment of Mexican refugees and the 
return of displaced people to their place of 
origin. 
Nicaragua : ECU 3 million to help displaced 
people and demobilised soldiers in the north-
east of the country achieve self-sufficiency. 
Support will be given, in particular, to agricul-
tural production, the re-establishment of live-
stock herds and the rehabilitation of infra-
structures. 
Nicaragua : ECU 450 000 for medical and log-
istic aid in favour of victims of droughts and 
epidemics in the north of the country. 
Peru : ECU 200 000 for a programme designed 
to eliminate cholera in the poorer quarters of 
Lima. 
Peru: ECU 750000 for medical assistance 
aimed at putting an end to two epidemics. 
Former-Yugoslavia : ECU 93.89 million to 
cover the essential needs of the population 
affected by the war. 
Russian Federation/northern Caucasus: ECU 
10 million for the population affected by the 
conflict. ECU 3 million of this is for Chechnya, 
Daghestan and Ingushetia and ECU 7 million is 
for displaced people from Chechnya in neigh-
bouring republics. 
Russian Federation (Sakhalin Island) : ECU 
250 000 to help victims of the recent 
earthquake which has severely damaged the 
oil-producing town of Neftegorsk. 
Afghanistan : ECU 6.635 million for displaced 
people from the Kabul area, Kunduz, Kan-
dahar and Jalalabad. 
Armenia/Azerbaijan : ECU 7.65 million to pro-
vide food aid for displaced people and the 
other most vulnerable sections of the popu-
lation of the two countries, following the col-
lapse of their economies and the serious dec-
line in agricultural production resulting from 
the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. 
Iraq: ECU 1.435 million for refugees and dis-
placed people in the camps around Zaho in 
the north of the country. 
Kirgizistan : ECU 2 million to supply medicines 
and medical materials to certain hospitals 
aimed at supporting the least-favoured sec-
tions of the population. 
Tadjikistan : ECU 1 million to purchase wood 
so as to enable the construction of housing 
for displaced people in the centre of the 
country and in northern Afghanistan. 
Chechnya : ECU 10 million for war victims, in 
the form of food and medical assistance and 
support for re-establishing water supplies. 
Lebanon : ECU 250 000 for an evaluation of 
the medical and sanitary needs of the Pales-
tinian population living in refugee camps. 
Cambodia : ECU 2.34 million for the purchase, 
transport and distribution of rice to people 
who have been repatriated, particularly in the 
north of the country. 
Stop Press 
Lomé IV mid-term 
talks concluded 
The negotiations in the mid-term review of 
the fourth Lomé Convention finally ended 
with agreement in Brussels just before mid-
night on the evening of 30 June 1995. The 
talks, which began early last year, had been 
progressing relatively well until EU ministers 
sat down to discuss funding for the eighth 
European Development Fund. Initial 'offers' 
from the EU Member States revealed major 
divergences among the contributing coun-
tries. Some sought a real terms increase, oth-
ers were happy to maintain the level of fun-
ding and others still demanded reductions. 
Following strenuous efforts by the French 
Presidency, a compromise acceptable to all 
the Union countries was reached at the 
Cannes Summit of European Heads of 
Government. The EU leaders agreed to pro-
pose an 8th EDF of ECU 13.307 bn (com-
pared with ECU 10.8 bn for the 7th EDF). Al-
though the ACP 'bid' was for considerably 
more, they have lost little time in approving 
the deal. 
A few outstanding substantive issues, notably 
as regards trade cooperation, were also set-
tled at the Brussels meeting, allowing the 
closure of the talks to take place just minutes 
before the French Presidency came to an 
end. 
Overall, the Financial Protocol for the second 
five-year period of Lomé IV sets aside the 
sum of ECU 14.625 billion. This includes the 
above EDF figure and the funds to be made 
available through the European Investment 
Bank. This represents a nominal increase of 
almost 22% on the previous protocol (ECU 12 
billion). 
More detailed information about the out-
come of the negotiations will be provided in 
the next issue of The Courier. Later in the 
year, once the changes to the Convention 
and the Financial Protocol have been signed 
by the contracting parties, we will be devot-
ing a complete number to the revised Con-
vention. This will include the full treaty text, 
and comment and analysis from the some of 
the key players. S.H. 
Corrigendum 
Danielle Sepúlveda 
In issue number 150, we omitted to provide 
biographical information about one of the 
contributors to the Dossier on Refugees. 
Danielle Sepúlveda, who wrote 'Challenging 
the assumptions of repatriation' (page 83 of 
the issue), is a Visiting Study Fellow at Oxford 
University's Refugee Studies Programme and is 
undertaking a doctorate in philosophy within 
the University's Faculty of Anthropology and 
Geography. 
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The new CDI Directorate 
and its Priorities 
The European Union and the ACP Group of States (Africa - Caribbean - Pacific) have 
officially appointed Mr Surendra SHARMA (Fiji) as Director of the Centre for the Devefapment 
of Industry and Mr Fernando MATOS ROSA (Portugal) as Deputy Director. Their terms 
of office began on May 1st 1995, for a period of five years. Mr Sharma was formerly 
Deputy Director of the CDI. 
he new team chosen to lead the 
CDI under the second financial 
protocol of Lomé IV combines long ex-
perience within the CDI itself with a 
sound know-how acquired in the field of 
industrial cooperation during previous 
professional careers (see page 2). 
The new Directorate intends to 
debureaucratise, speed up and 
intensify CDI's actions and 
interventions in favour of ACP 
countries. Priority during the second 
financial protocol of Lomé IV will also 
be given to: 
I. Better coordination with the other 
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Enlarging the CDI's ACP network: 
agreement with the "Forum Secretariat 
n May 3rd last, the new Direc-
tor of the CDI, Mr Surendra 
Sharma, signed a collaboration 
agreement with the "Forum Secre-
tariat", a regional cooperation body 
bringing together 15 States in the Pa-
cific area, eight of which are mem-
bers of the Lomé Convention. Like 
the agreements of the same kind al-
ready signed with African and Car-
ibbean countries, this closer rela-
tionship with the Forum is aimed at 
stepping up the number of partner-
ships between EU companies and 
firms in the Pacific area by creating 
synergies right across the range of 
company services offered by the two 
organisations. 
Mr Surendra Sharma, Director of the CDI (2nd on the left in the foreground) signs the 
CDI-Forum Secretariat agreement with Dr William Sutherfond, Deputy Director of the 
Forum (sitting next to him). On the far right, Mr Fernando Matos Rosa, Deputy Direc-
tor of the Centre and on the far left Mr Daniel Nairac, Head of the Centre's "Projects and 
ACP Network" Division. Standing behind them, Mr Peter Ailing, Geographical Officer 
for the Pacific, and Mr Kaninda Mbayi, in charge of communications. 
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couraging the development of the pri-
vate sector in ACP countries. 
2. Better targeting of activities which 
will more clearly benefit from the as-
sistance offered by the European 
Union. 
3. Concerted efforts to ensure a greater 
awareness within the EU of industrial 
cooperation possibilities in the ACP 
countries. 
4. The urgent creation of a network of 
contacts within the new EU Member 
States so as to promote the emergence 
throughout the European Union of val-
id partners for ACP companies, as re-
gards both technical know-how and in-
vestments. 
5. The establishment of an inventory of the 
technical skills available and used in the 
ACP countries and the EU Member 
States, in order to achieve a fairer balance 
in the resources applied in the activities 
carried out or cofinanced by the CDI. 
Redeployment of the CDFs 
operational services 
ne of the consequences of the pri-
orities adopted by the new CDI Di-
rectorate is the strengthening of the team 
of Geographical Officers (I) in the "Pro-
jects and ACP Network Division" ("PD" 
for short), so as to enable them to mon-
itor dossiers in greater detail and, there-
fore, to ensure that efforts are more con-
centrated on countries which have 
themselves defined industrial develop-
ment as a priority. The PD officers will 
also be mainly responsible for supervising 
the development of the Centre's concrete 
actions and interventions in favour of ACP 
countries, in close cooperation with the 
CDI's local correspondents and antennae. 
For its part, the Technical Services and Eu-
ropean Network Division (2) - or the "TD" 
- will concentrate on four operational tasks: 
- The sectoral services, responsible for 
collecting and disseminating the entire 
technical evaluation and advice capacity 
which the Centre is constantly acquiring 
within a selection of key sectors for the 
industrialisation of the ACP countries - es-
pecially through a highly efficient network 
of associated experts and consultants. 
These services will work in close cooper-
ation with the Geographical Officers in 
charge of the intervention dossiers. 
- The financial resources service, whose 
job is to establish project feasibility stud-
ies, particularly within the framework of 
requests for venture capital financing sub-
mitted to the EIB or other EU or ACP fi-
nance institutions with which the CDI 
closely cooperates. 
- The European network service, which 
develops and manages the active cooper-
ation that the CDI maintains with differ-
ent partner institutions throughout the 
European Union. 
- The Forums - ACP/EU Industrial Part-
nership Meetings - Publications service, 
which will deal more particularly with the 
organisation and follow-up of CDI partic-
ipation in the Industrial Forums held in the 
various ACP regions, together with the 
different ACP/EU Industrial Partnership 
Meetings that the Centre regularly organ-
ises. It will also pursue the policy of pub-
lishing technical or practical information 
guides meeting the concrete needs of 
businessmen wishing to cooperate in ACP 
and EU countries alike. 
(1) 18 Officers manage the project dossiers, split up 
into six major geographical areas: West Africa I Cen-
tral Africa I East Africa I Southern Africa I Carib-
bean I Pacific. 
(2) This name replaces the former designation 
"Interventions and European Network Division" 
(ID). 
Mr Surendra Sharma 
Director o f the CDI 
■ The new Director, aged 45, was first 
of all a specialist in taxation. Assigned for 
15 years to the Fijian Tax Revenue De-
partment - where he rose to be Deputy 
Commissioner - he took part in the re-
shaping of his country's legislation in this 
field (in conjunction with the legal service 
of the International Monetary Fund) and 
formed part of the negotiating team ap-
pointed to conclude tax conventions. He 
also held special responsibilities within 
the context of the computerisation of the 
tax administration. 
Before becoming Deputy Director of the 
CDI in 1990, he was for four years the 
Director and Chief Executive of the Fiji 
Trade and Investment Board. There he in-
troduced an in-depth programme to re-
structure incentives and rationalise ad-
ministrative formalities, and established 
an intensive programme for the promo-
tion of trade and investment aimed at 
making it easier for industrial companies 
to set up in a new tax free zone. 
M. Fernando Matos Rosa 
Deputy Director of the CDI 
■ Mr Matos Rosa, aged 50, spent 17 years 
in the world of business, as an executive 
and then as managing director of compa-
nies in the capital goods and industrial en-
gineering sector. In particular, he estab-
lished factory design and construction 
activities in Africa, Europe and the Mid-
dle East. 
On the CDI staff for eight years, he has 
mainly been responsible for setting up the 
CDI's European network, based on some 
thirty cooperation agreements signed by 
the Centre with national and regional in-
stitutions for industrial promotion and in-
vestment. For several years now, this net-
work has allowed the cofinancing of a 
substantial proportion of the Centre's 
interventions (25% in 1994). For over a 
year, Mr Matos Rosa coordinated the 
CDI's activities in Southern Africa, a re-
gion where South Africa's appearance on 
the economic scene has opened up prom-
ising prospects for the future. 
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ACP Companies in 
the Limelight 
Now of world renown, the International Fair of Carrara, in Italy, is one of the leading events 
in the marble and granite industry. Thanks to the CDI and the support ofIMM
(1), 12 African 
companies and 7 Caribbean firms - followed up by the Centre since the ACP/EU Industrial 
Partnership Meeting in Trinidad and Tobago and the Mining Forum in Lusaka (Zambia) in 
December 1994 - were able to attend this Fair last May and present the geological riches of their 
regions: marble and granite which was of great interest to the European enterprises which were present. 
Attractive and 
competitive products 
The African and Caribbean companies 
had a stand of 50 m
2, sponsored by the 
Centre, on which they displayed panels 
presenting their projects and displayed 
samples of their marble and granite. The 
materials on show could be divided into 
three main groups: 
■ the first group comprised the blue 
granite of Malawi (8000 US$/m
3), the 
"Portoro" marble (2000 US$/m
3) of 
the Dominican Republic and the pink 
and green marble of Sudan (300 
US$/m
3); 
■ in the second group, two varieties 
seemed to be of particular interest to 
the Europeans: the blackgranite of An-
gola, Suriname, Tanzania and Zimbab-
we (500 to 800 US$/m
3) and the white 
marble of Zambia (300 to 400 US$/m
3); 
■ in the third group were the red gran-
ite of Ghana, the pink granite of Bot-
swana and Tanzania, the green granite 
of Namibia and the pinkand beige mar-
ble of the Dominican Republic, more 
common products but ones which 
could find an export niche if their price 
is sufficiently competitive. 
A video produced by IMM also showed 
ACP visitors the new technologies being 
used in this sector, with the information 
available being completed by various doc-
— 
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Vieiv of the stand sponsored by the CDI, where the 19 ACP companies invited were able to display 
samples of their products. 
uments produced by the Centre. 
This participation by the ACP countries 
in question was a great success. Of the 
19 companies which were present, 17 
considered that they had attained the ob­
jectives which they had set themselves in 
going to Carrara. 
According to Mr Sid Boubekeur, who is 
responsible for this sector within the 
Centre's Technical Services and EU Net­
work Division, "this event will have ena­
bled the participating companies to gain 
a knowledge of the trends on the Euro­
pean market, of marble and granite pric­
es and, above all, of the cost of the pro­
duction and processing technologies 
available, because ACP countries often 
place orders for equipment with middle-
(1) Intemazionale Marmi e Macchine Cañara, 
an Italian consultancy specialising in the promo-
tion of ornamental stone. 
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Whilst at the Fair, the ACP entrepreneurs visited the largest marble quarry iti 
Carrara and three production companies in the region. 
men applying a series of accumula­
tive commissions, thus excessively 
increasing ex-works prices". 
The ACP entrepreneurs also took 
advantage of their trip to visitan im­
portant marble quarry in Carrara 
("Gioia"), together with three com­
panies processing products from 
the region ""Red Graniti", "Doga-
nella Graniti" and "Dimonelli"), 
which gave them a clearer knowl­
edge of the technologies used in Ita­
ly, especially for the production of 
standardised blocks and tiles of 
marble and granite. 
Spin-offs and 
cooperation prospects 
In any case, the presence of ACP 
producers in Carrara confirmed 
that there is a demand for their 
marble and granite resources, par­
ticularly from Southern Africa, on a 
European market that is not only 
growing constantly but also re­
structuring and keen to obtain its 
raw material supplies directly from 
new sources. 
As regards the spin-offs generated 
by their participation, the ACP 
companies will be able to rely on 
different forms of support from the 
Centre, in the pursuit of their ob­
jectives: geological studies, feasibil­
ity studies, technical and marketing 
assistance, etc. Four African com­
panies have already decided to 
create a trade association to pro­
mote their region's marble and 
granite. 
Furthermore, cooperation could 
be established to develop a pro­
gramme for the promotion of the 
stone industry in these regions 
(market potential surveys, bro­
chure setting out the products avail­
able for processing and the existing 
ACP companies in this sector, etc.). 
Contact: CDI - Sid Boubekeur -
Sectoral Officer in the Technical 
Services and European Network 
Division. Tel. (32-2) 679.19.28. Fax 
(32-2) 679.26.03 
CI 
Market 
on 
The CDI organised another "ACP-'Ί­
α market s fot for which West Africa 
fruit. Following the now classica 
entrepreneurs from the region an Ρ 
method whose application to this 
his meeting, inaugurated by the 
Côte d'Ivoire Minister for Indus-
try, Mr Angora Kakou, in the presence 
of the European Commission represen-
tative in Abidjan Mr Francisco da Camar-
ra and of Mr Fernando Matos Rosa, Dep-
uty Director of the CDI, brought 
together 18 ACP companies from Benin, 
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nige-
ria and Togo (see box) and 16 Europe-
an firms from Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Eu-
ropean and African consultants, along 
with members of the local CDI anten-
nae and officers from the CDI in Brus-
sels, directed and organised this busy 
week of work and contacts. 
Good preparation 
This one week required six months of 
preparations. "It is essential to be well ac-
quainted with the partners who are go-
ing to meet, to be sure that something 
will actually happen", observes Hamed 
Sow, CDI Geographical Officer for West 
Africa. "Our antennae on the spot con-
ducted the preliminary investigations. Ex-
perts with substantial experience in the 
sector then visited the African countries 
concerned in order to select companies 
likely to arouse the interest of potential 
partners in Europe. And vice versa in the 
EU countries: another team of experts 
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niches for products based 
African tropical fruit 
\ W'Industrial Partnership Meeting" in the Côte d'Ivoire from May 28th to June 3rd last. On the agenda: 
cabas resources that have so far been exported very little to the European market, namely processed tropical 
¡^set-up for this type of meeting developed by the Centre over the last three years, carefully selected 
mfi'om Europe spent several days exploring the ways and means of cooperating together. A pragmatic 
Sictor could not fail to produce "fruitful" results... 
set about choosing companies whose ac-
tivities could lead to the establishment of 
privileged links with SMEs in this sector 
in West Africa". 
The commercial outlets for tropical fruit 
are by no means limited to the consump-
tion of fresh products but are also to be 
found in a large number of agri-foodstuffs 
subsectors: juices, drinks, pastry prod-
ucts, confectionery, jams, apéritifs, ice 
creams, sorbets, flavourings, essential oils, 
etc. At the moment, the main sources of 
supply for this market are Asia (Taiwan, 
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, India 
and Indonesia) and Latin America (Brazil 
and Argentina). African companies only 
have a marginal place on the market and 
are faced with competition from firms 
with a sound technological experience 
and a well-established control over ex-
port logistics. 
For Claude Faigon (expert from ICEA 
Entreprises/France), the best card to 
play by companies from the African con-
tinent is that of "market niches", which 
can be found "away from the competi-
tion imposed by dominant origins and 
companies". In a sector with a wide po-
tential, these specialised market slots, 
well-suited to the size of African com-
panies, can take various forms. Europe 
is looking for biological products as in-
gredients in, for example, muesli, and 
top-of-the-range beverages such as di-
rect juices (pressed and packaged on the 
spot, and much appreciated in France 
and Southern Europe) or IQF quick-
frozen pieces of fruit which are being 
used more and more by restaurants. 
Claude Faigon also underlines the value 
for companies that may opt for such 
market slots of negotiating with "small 
importers who are themselves follow-
ing a niche strategy away from the ma-
jor supply flows passing through the 
ports of Northern Europe and who are 
interested in new or innovative top-
quality products..." 
One Europe, 
several markets 
In this field, according to Jean-Marie Del-
chambre, Head of the CDI's Technical 
Services and EU Network Division (TD), 
"we do not have one European market 
but several national markets, and even 
these have their regional differences. Eat-
ing and drinking habits vary from the 
North to the South of France or Italy... 
So African companies must not think in 
terms of finding a place on the European 
market as such. They need specific part-
ners. And in the same way, the latter must 
find specific African contacts..." 
"It is very difficult for a European to set 
off overnight to explore the African mar-
ket," Hamed Sow continues. "Thanks to 
our targeting, visits to sites, business dis-
cussions and this initiative of spending a 
week together, links are forged and peo-
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pie come to appreciate each other. All the 
Europeans present told us that they had 
established at least one major contact -
which would certainly be followed up. 
They would never have been able to meet 
fifteen or so carefully preselected African 
companies in just a few days in any oth-
er way..." 
Broad representation of 
the sector in Europe 
Among these Europeans, the CDI had 
made sure that there were representa-
tives from most European countries even 
though the venue was a French-speaking 
region. ForTommy Pedersen, responsible 
for the fruit sector within the Centre's 
"TD" Division "it was one way in partic-
ular of breaking with the facile habit 
among West African countries of seek-
ing out only French-speaking partners, 
whilst for some of them it is perhaps 
much more advantageous to work with 
a potential British or Danish partner..." 
Tropical fruit sector in 
the Gulf of Guinea
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BEN N 
Pineapples and citrus fruit grown in the 
south of the country and mangoes in the 
north. Also production of bananas, avo-
cados and guavas. Apart from the 
industrial-scale cultivation of pineapples 
(exports of 2,600 tonnes a year) and cit-
rus fruit, the other crops are grown by 
traditional small-scale methods for sale 
on the local market. Processing indus-
try embryonic. Company: Agri-Maxi -
Cotonou - 1,250 tonnes of pineapples, of 
which 1,000 tonnes for export in 1995 -
Pineapple alcohol. 
CAMEROON 
Favourable agro-ecological conditions 
for a wide variety of fruits, substantial 
agronomic research, industrial cultiva-
tion (bananas) developed by multina-
tionals (220,000 tonnes a year export-
ed), programme to promote 
pineapple-growing by small farmers. 
Around twenty processing SMEs (fruit 
drinks) recently created (domestic mar-
ket). Companies: Camfruits - Akwa 
Douala - Semi-crystallised fruit - desiccated 
coconut. Under development: desiccated 
banana I National Beverage Cy -
Douala - Ice creams, sorbets, drinks I Si-
traf - Maroua - Drinks based on guava and 
mango I Soc. Agro-industrielle et 
Fruitière de l'Ouest - Bafoussam - Pulp 
of guava and passlon fruit, nectar (guava, 
passion fruit, pineapple) ISARFA - Sang-
mellma - Craft jams (local market). 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Diversified production and numerous 
modern farms: fresh and processed 
products (fruit juices, essential oils, etc.). 
Many SMEs with a good development 
potential. Leading African country for 
exports of pineapples, bananas and des-
iccated coconut. Companies: COCI -
Sassandra - Exports (especially to Europe) 
of essential oils, concentrated juices, dried 
peel I Fruidis - Katouko Ayera - Distilling 
of tropical fruit alcohol (2001 /day) and fruit 
juices I Les Vergers d'Assé - Abidjan -
fresh pineapple, orange and grapefruit juice 
(100%) - Nectars of various tropical fruits 
I Plantivoire -Abidjan - Essential oils (ber-
gamot, bitter orange, lemon) - Quick-frozen 
concentrated lemon juice (45 ° Brix) I 
SAFCO - Tlassalé - Canned pineapple -
Pure pineapple juice and frozen concentrat-
ed pineapple juice - Frozen tropical fruit 
pulp - Substantial exports to Europe. 
GHANA 
Pineapples, citrus fruit, mangoes, papay-
as and avocados for local markets. A gov-
ernment export programme encourag-
es opening up to other markets. Not 
insignificant industrial potential if a cer-
tain amount of assistance was received 
(technology, quality, marketing, etc.). 
Companies: Akramang-Accra- Exports 
of pineapples and mangoes (fruit and fruit 
juice - capacity 1,5001 /day) I Astek Fruit 
- Accra - Fresh fruit juice and concentrated 
juice (pineapple, orange, grapefruit and 
mango). 1994 production: 5 million litres I 
Rush Farms and Processing Indus-
tries - Accra - Fruit-based drinks (orange 
and lemon) and ginger - Fruit alcohol. 
NIGERIA 
Company: CHI - Lagos - Fruit juices and 
drinks (mango, pineapple and orange). 
Quick-frozen fruit exported to Europe. 
TOGO 
Mostly peasant smallholdings and a few 
modern farms with a highly diversified 
production. Main product: mango. 
Large-scale exports limited to fresh 
pineapple. Companies: Kellam - Lomé -
Pineapple juice and nectar, mango, custard-
apple, guava and papaya nectar - ginger 
and bissap drinks I SAFLEG - Organic 
dehydrated fruit. 
(*) For each country, the companies mentioned 
are those that were invited to the Grand Bereby 
meeting (Cote d'Ivoire) 
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Over the course of a week, these di-
rect contacts between buyers and 
producers allowed the demand 
among European consumers to be 
defined, together with the adjust-
ments that African countries might 
have to make to their products in or-
der to satisfy this demand. The rep-
resentatives of the EU companies 
were able to see the manufacturing 
processes in operation. They had 
brought samples with them to be 
tested, specifying their requirements 
as regards a possible partnership. 
CDI follow-up 
"On this basis, extensive technical as-
sistance will develop in which the 
CDI will continue to be involved", 
adds Jean-Marie Delchambre. "We 
shall be monitoring the trial orders 
and, if necessary, we could establish 
more general marketing activities... 
This kind of sectoral approach allows 
us to identify a problem from a glo-
bal viewpoint. Nor do we limit our-
selves to the companies which took 
part in the meeting, since we then in-
form the whole European sector of 
the results obtained. In other fields 
and other regions in which we have 
been operating, we have seen many 
companies gradually becoming inter-
ested in the results of this type of 
meeting. We know the sectors con-
cerned and are able to provide ap-
propriate responses. The knock-on 
effects of this kind of action, in which 
the CDI plays a pivotal role, are con-
siderable." 
Exchanges and 
requirements 
In addition, these meetings are also 
a source of exchanges of ideas, not 
only between Europeans and Afri-
cans but also between Africans 
themselves. For instance, a Ghanaian 
company importing fruit alcohol 
from the United States realised that 
they were about to start manufactur-
ing the same product in the Côte 
d'Ivoire and Benin. Another entre-
preneur, who during the manufactur-
ing process dumped all the fruit pulp 
in the river, learnt from an Italian in-
dustrialist that it was possible to use 
this "waste" as animal feed. 
European demand was clearly spec-
ified: there is no point in manufactur-
ing hyper-sweet crystallised fruit for 
populations that swear by light prod-
ucts, and why not step up the pro-
duction of alcohol-free champagnes, 
which are consumed not only on 
Moslem markets but also by a whole 
European clientele alerted to the 
dangers of drinking and driving? 
In conclusion, the key words of the 
Meeting were quality, consistency 
and reliability. Aware of these re-
quirements, the African companies 
would like to set up a regional asso-
ciation of fruit processors. As for the 
Europeans, they did not really come 
back with the feeling that they had 
been away on holiday. "We have met 
companies that we want to work 
with", said Didier Bougeard (Navim-
pex/France), spokesman for the Eu-
ropean entrepreneurs, in his closing 
speech at this Meeting. "Everyone is 
unanimous," he went on, "in answer-
ing 'yes' without hesitation to the 
question of whether they would take 
part in a future meeting of this kind 
in other ACP areas..." 
Contact: CDI - Hamed Sow - Geo-
graphical Officer for West Africa 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 18 24 - Fax: (32-2) 
679 26 03 
ACP NETWORK 
■ Côte d'Ivoire : A group of economic 
operators in the Côte d'Ivoire - compris-
ing the main banks (BICICI, BIAO, SGBCI 
and Banque Atlantique), the Chamber of 
Trade and Industry of the Côte d'Ivoire and 
SME promotion and support associations 
(FNICI, MPME and AIMPE) - created a 
structure on May 26th 1995 called "Appui 
et Services aux Entreprises" (ASE). 
ASE aims to help three main target groups: 
• existing SMIs, as regards restructuring-
rehabilitation, diversification of products, 
markets and exports, and development 
with or without external partners; 
• promoters of projects to set up SMIs; 
• industrial companies suitable for privat-
isation, when the use of its services seems 
appropriate. 
The support and services to be provided by 
ASE to these target groups will be focused 
on three stages in project implementation: 
definition and studies, mounting the finan-
cial package, start-up and development. 
The ASE promoters wanted it to be a pri-
vate company, especially in their search for 
optimal management efficiency. Butthey are 
all aware that the aim of the structure is pri-
marily to help promotors and businessmen 
in the Côte d'Ivoire wishing to set up pro-
jects. Consequently, this initiative is also be-
ing backed by various development co-
operation bodies. Some of them are 
envisaging being shareholders in the new 
structure, whilst also providing subsidies. 
Such is the case with the AGCD, which 
could be joined by further bodies like the 
BOAD and the CFD. Finally, some other aid 
institutions are also contemplating the pro-
vision of subsidies to support ASE actions 
in favour of SMEs. 
These include the European Commission, 
the ACDI (Agence Canadienne de 
Développement: Industriel) and, of course, 
the CDI. 
So that ASE can benefit from the CDI's ex-
perience, its board members have just 
placed the management of the structure in 
the hands of the Centre. To this effect, a 
management contract was signed on May 
26th 1995 in Abidjan between the Chair-
man of the ASE Board of Directors and the 
CDI Directorate, represented by Mr Fer-
nando Matos Rosa (Deputy Director). 
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EU NETWORK 
■ Italy. As from July 1995, 
the ICE (Italian Foreign 
Trade Institute) and the CDI 
are to cofinance a campaign 
to promote industrial part-
nerships between Ethi-
oplan/Eritrean and Italian 
SMEs. 
■ NGOs. Mr Kabale Bi-
mole, expert with a group of 
Belgian NGOs, has been sec-
onded to the CDI for a 12-
month period starting on 
March 1st 1995. Initially, his 
task will be to collect details 
on European and ACP 
NGOs with experience in 
micro-companies and ap-
propriate technologies. He 
will also study the possibil-
ities of access by NGOs to 
assistance from the CDI. 
SECTORAL 
ACTIVITIES 
■ Itech'Mer - Lorient 
(France): participation 
by African professionals 
from the lake-fishing sec-
tor. In line with the policy 
pursued by the CDI on be-
half of the fishing industry, 
the lake-fishing sector has 
been identified as a field 
where the EU market with 
its high demand for such 
products represents a prom-
ising development potential. 
The CDI has taken the initia-
tive of inviting to the 
Itech'Mer Fair in Lorient 
from September 20th to 
23rd 1995 a selection of en-
terprises in the African 
Lakes region (especially pro-
jects already supported by 
the Centre in Zimbabwe and 
Uganda) and in the Niger 
Delta. The African produc-
ers have two key products to 
offer in particular - Nile 
perch and tilapia, the excel-
lent quality of which is as yet 
largely unknown on the Eu-
The new Joint Executive Board of the 
CDI at the ACP House 
The new Joint Executive Board of the CDI held its first meeting on 29 and 30 june 1995 
at the ACP House. 
Among the Board's six members, four (Mr Antonio de Almeida Matos (Mozambique), 
Mr Hans J. Keil (Western Samoa), Prof. Venant P. Kinzonzi (Zaire) and Dr Ferruccio Sarti 
(Italy)) were appointed in April 1995 by decisions of the ACP-EC Committee on Industrial 
Cooperation. The two other members (Mr Wilhelm Α. de Jonge (Netherlands) and Dr 
Ulf R. Siebel (Germany)) ensure continuity from the former Board. 
At the first meeting, the Board elected Mr Antonio Almeida Matos as Chairman, and 
Dr Ulf R. Siebel as Vice-Chairman (seated from left to right in the photo). 
Standing between Mr Surendra Sharma, Director and Mr Fernando Matos 
Rosa, Deputy Director, from the left to the right : Mr Wilhem A. de Jonge, 
Dr Ferrucio Sarti and Mr Hans J. Keil. 
Professor 
Venant P. Kinzonzi 
ropean market. This is why 
it is so important for them 
to attend this event in Lori-
ent, where all the most mod-
ern processing techniques 
adapted to the demands of 
the European market are on 
display and where buyers 
from all the leading Europe-
an supermarket chains get 
together. 
D ARY 
Next ACP/EU Industrial 
Partnership Meetings 
organised by the CDI 
♦ Wood Industries in the 
Caribbean. Paramaribo, Su-
riname - September 25th -
28th 1995 
Contact: CDI - Jordi Tio 
Rottlan - Sectoral Officer, 
Technical Services and Euro-
pean Network Division 
(TD). 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 24 
Fax: (32-2) 679 26 03 
♦ Footwear manufacture in 
Southern Africa. Botswana -
October 16th -21st 1995 
Contact: CDI - Mrs Ac-
quali Dodet Malenge - Geo-
graphical Officer, Projects 
and ACP Network Division. 
Tel.: (32-2)679 19 07 
Fax: (32-2) 679 26 03 
Partnership is a publication 
of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), 
created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention. 
' Responsible Editor: 
Mr. Surendra Sharma, Director of the CDI, 
Avenue Herrmann Debroux 52, B-l 160 Brussels, Belgium. 
' Coordination: 
Mr. K. Mbay, CDI Communication and External Relations Officer 
Tel. : (32-2) 679 19 61 · Fax : (32-2) 675 26 03 
! Editing and production: European Service Network - Brussels 
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ICÃCP 
EC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EC since 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.); 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to:: 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Union 
G 12 4-14 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
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Al Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2Ai Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3E Conservation and extension 
A3F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B 
A5C 
A5D 
A5E 
A5F 
A5G 
A5H 
A5I 
A6 
A6A 
A6B 
A6Bi 
A6C 
A6Ci 
A6D 
A6E 
A6F 
A6G 
A6H 
A6I 
A6J 
A7 
A7A 
A7B 
A7C 
A7D 
A7E 
A7F 
A8 
A8A 
A8B 
A8C 
A8D 
A8E 
A8F 
A8G 
A8H 
A8I 
A9 
A9A 
A9B 
A10 
Industrial development banks 
Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
Export promotion 
Trade, commerce and distribution 
Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous-
ing) 
Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog-
raphy 
Other insurance and banking 
Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
Education 
Primary and secondary education 
University and higher technical institutes 
Medical 
Teacher training 
Agricultural training 
Vocational and technical training 
Educational administration 
Pure or general research 
Scientific documentation 
Research in the field of education or training 
Subsidiary services 
Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
Health 
Hospitals and clinics 
Maternal and child care 
Family planning and population-related 
research 
Other medical and dental services 
Public health administration 
Medical insurance programmes 
Social infrastructure and social wel-
fare 
Housing, urban and rural 
Community development and facilities 
Environmental sanitation 
Labour 
Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
Environmental protection 
Flood control 
Land settlement 
Cultural activities 
Mult ¡sector 
River development 
Regional development projects 
Unspecified 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Health project «Post-emergency». 
15 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, 
supply of medicines, health projects in 
Luanda, fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ANG 7007 A7 
Artisanal fisheries in Namibe. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry for Fisheries. Estimate 
10.400 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and boats, T.A., training, line of credit. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG 6032(7) A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Tchivinguiro 
Institute. Estimated total cost 9 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG 7014 A6b 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
Upgrading and expansion of Antigua 
Hotel Training Centre. Construction of 
and equipment for part new and part re-
novated and upgraded facilities. Estimated 
cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design 
and supervision, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 7001 A6d 
BARBADOS 
Upgrading of Fishing Facilities at 
Consett Bay and Skeete's Bay. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries. Total cost 1.789 mECU. EDF 
1.546, local 0.243 mECU. Off-shore con-
struction works (dredging, improvement of 
the existing jetty, anchorage, channel (mar-
kers) and on-shore works (improvement of 
the access road, construction of a terminal, a 
parking and paved area, electricity supply 
installation). Works by restr. tender after 
prequalification. Final design: short-list to 
be done. 6th and 7th EDF.Project in exe-
cution. 
EDF BAR 6007 A3d 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hi-
lacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated 
cost 17 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93 
km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, 
geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6017 A2d 
Rural structures programme in 
Mono Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Plan et de la Restructuration Economique. 
6.500 mECU. Work construction, rehabili-
tation of water systems, roads, schools, 
markets, warehouses, Works by ace. tender, 
supplies by local manufacturers. T.A., evalu-
ation. Participation NGO AFVP (F). Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
May 95. 7 th EDF. 
EDF BEN/6003/001  A3a 
BURKINA FASO 
Health rehabilitation in the pro-
vinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke, Rutana, 
Ruyigi and Cankuzo. 5.500 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A. and evaluation. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7003 A7 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modern earth-road. Super-
vision: short-list done. Estimated cost 
13.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 95-96. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 25 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-
up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7200/002 A1c 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Cereals. 6.100 mECU. 
Support for institutional reform, works, 
supply of equipment, T.A., lines of credit. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7009 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Environment. Estimated 
cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, 
soil management and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7010 A3a 
Support project for fight against 
AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth.: Ministèrede 
la Santé. 1.350mECU. Rehabilitation works, 
supply of equipment, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7013 A7b,c 
Periodical maintenance programme. 
Ouagadougou-Ghana, Bobo-Côte 
d'Ivoire, and Bobo-Mali. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated 
total cost 30 mECU. Works, supervision, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6017 A2d 
Support project for the reform of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé - Direction des 
Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPh) and 
CAMEG. 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 8th 
EDF. 
EDF BK 7017 A7c 
BURUNDI 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Works, sup-
plies, T.A., training and awareness-raising. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-enter-
prises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare 
technical dossiers, management follow-up. 
T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
Support programme for the National 
Authorising Officer. Resp. Auth. : Ordon-
nateur National. Estimated cost 1.570 
mECU. Supply of equipment. T.A., training, 
evaluation, support mission.Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7014 A1c 
CAMEROON 
Integrated rural development pro-
gramme in the North-East and North-
west Benoué regions. Resp. Auth. : Min-
istère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du 
Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 7200/001 A1c 
Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: 
MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3.500 mECU. 
Preservation and improvement of the social-
economic situation around Lake Lagdo. 
Project on appraisal. 7 th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/002 A3a 
Protection and sanitation for 
Kousseri town. Kousseri road net-
work. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 
4 mECU. Dyke rehabilitation works along 
the Logoni river, road works and rain water 
drainage. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6022 A8g, A9a 
Access road to the Tikar Plain. Resp. 
Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 14.232 
mECU. Road works over the Kakar-Sabon-
gari-Atta-Sonkolong road. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6037 A2d 
Tikar Plain development. Resp. Auth. : 
MINAT. Estimated total cost 8 mECU. 
Social-economic improvement. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6004 A3a 
CAPE VERDE 
Rural electrification - Praia. Resp. 
Auth. : Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 
1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equip-
ment for the electrification of 3 centres in 
'rural Praia'. (Diesel power station and LT/ 
MT distribution network). Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7005 A2ai 
Solar Regional Programme. 3rd part. 
Resp. Auth.: Cellule nationale de réalisation 
du P.R.S. Estimated cost 0.507 mECU. 
Construction, rehabilitation, equipment, 
support mission, awareness-raising. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7006 A2b, A3e 
Road infrastructure improvement in 
the Santiago, São Nicolau and Maio 
islands. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Infra-
structures et des Transports - Direction 
Générale des Infrastructures. 3.090 mECU. 
Works by ace. tender. Work supervision 
short-list done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing April-May 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CV 7003 A2d 
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Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. 
foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
CA 7200 A1 c 
Support for the agricultural produc-
tion and for rural centres self-pro-
motion. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agric-
ulture et de l'Elevage. 8.500 mECU. Works 
by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. 
evaluation, audit, training and follow-up. 
Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6005/001 A3a 
Support for Primary Health Cares in 
the Basse-Kotto region. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé, Publique et de la 
Population. 1.800 mECU. Buildings, wa-
rehouses, Health centres, medical equip-
ment, vehicles, medicines, T.A. evaluation, 
■k training. Date financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CA 7004 A7, A8 
Rural road maintenance in the Cen-
tral-Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère des Transports, des Travaux Publics, 
de l'Habitat et de l'Aménagement. 1.750 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 240 km rural roads. 
Works, supply of equipment, T.A. evalu-
ation. Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6005/002 A2d 
Support for the transport sectoral 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Transports et desTravaux Publics. Estimated 
cost 50 mECU. Road rehabilitation. Works, 
supervision, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6008 A2d 
CONGO 
COMOROS 
Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement— Direc-
tion Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 
mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further 
investigations, tender dossier and works 
supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d 
Development of cultivation for 
export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 
mECU. Vanilla and improvement ofquality 
(laboratory, management, marketing). 
Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversifi-
cation. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7004 A3a 
Support for the establishment o f the 
'Centre National de l'Artisanat Ca-
morien'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eco-
nomie, du Plan, de l'Industrie et de l'Arti-
sanat. 0.300 mECU. Works, equipment and 
T.A. Project on apparaisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM (REG) 6502/001 A4d 
Support for the Health Development 
National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction 
and rehabilitation works, T.Α., training, 
supply of equipment and medicines. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7005 A7 
Support for population and housing 
general census. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Economie et du Plan-Centre National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. EDF 
part 0.500 mECU. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Date financing june 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7008 A1g,h 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Support programme for the 'pineap-
ple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. 
EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation 
Centrale des Producteurs - Exportateurs 
d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. 
Works, supplies, T.A., training, studies, line 
of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6016 A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 
mECU. Hard currency allowance to import 
ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. 
* foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF 7200/002 A1c 
Irrigated rice-growing areas in the 
Central and Northern Central regions. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 
15.700 mECU. Infrastructure, organization, 
training. Works, supply of vehicles, equip-
* ment, Τ.Α., studies, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 5021/001 A3a 
Support for the establishment of a 
service company. Resp. Auth. : Ministère 
de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Estimated 
total cost 5 mECU. Support structure for 
SME's. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7012 A5d,e 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase IV. Estimated 
cost 20.500 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7200/003 A1c 
CHAD 
Re-launch of the fishing sector. Es-
timated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study: 
short list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7011 A3a 
River Chart embankment protection. 
Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve 
living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 5027 A8f,g 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project suspended. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Health training programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique et des 
Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. TA., schol-
arships, seminars, training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e 
Construction of a laboratory for 
water and soil analysis. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dév. Rural. 
0.115 mECU. Works and supply of equip-
* ment. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7005 A3e,i 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Geological and mining development 
programme. 23 mECU. Studies, program-
mes management, works, T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e 
Los Toros Hydroelectric project. 
Construction of a hydroelectric power 
station. Civil works, supply of electrome-
chanical and hydromechanical equipment. 
Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 
Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7005 A2ai 
Support programme for the private 
sector. Estimated total cost 7 mECU. EDF 
4.2 mECU, local 0.950 mECU, local private 
sector and SME'S 1.4 mECU, C.D.I. 0.450 
mECU. EDF part: line of credit and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing May 95. 7th EDF. 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
bn appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming. 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
Rural development programme in 
the South-East. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ERITREA 
Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 
mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary 
services, water supply and demobilization of 
soldiers. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ERY 7255 A7,A8 
ETHIOPIA 
Strengthening of water supply and 
sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: 
Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. 
Supply of metering and control equipment. 
T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c 
Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa -
Modjo - Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: 
Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 
mECÜ. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7005 A2d 
Wildlife conservation in Southern 
Ethiopia. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, 
rehabilitation, equipment, T.A. and training. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7011 A3c,d,e 
Social Rehabilitation Programme. 
EDF 6.868 mECU. Rehabilitation of health 
(including water and sanitation) services 
and of agri-pastoral activities. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7012 A3-A7-A8 
IV  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian 
nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 
mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. 
and supply of equipment. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7255/001 A8b,e 
SM E development programme. Es-
timated total cost 25 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7003 A5 
GABON 
Mining development programme 
and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère des Mines, de l'Energie et des Re-
ssources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 
mECU. Works by direct labour and int. 
tenders. Equipment by int. tender, T.A., 
follow-up and evaluation. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF/SYS/GA 9999 A4a 
Rural water supply and micro-pro-
jects in 3 provinces. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de l'Eau et de l'Energie. 8.600 mECU. 
300 new wells and rehabilitation of 210 
existing water points. Drinking water for 
Haut-Ogooué, Ngounié and Woleu-Ntem 
provinces. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., 
■*· training, follow-up. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GA 601 5 A2b 
GAMBIA 
General Import Programme. Support 
for Structural Adjustment. Hard cur-
rency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GM 7200/002 A1c 
GHANA 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipment. 
T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GH 7003 A6 
Western Region Agricultural De-
velopment Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture. 15 mECU. T.A., 
buildings and training, supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH A3a 
Lomé IV - Microprojects prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance & 
Economic Planning. 7 mECU. T.A., transport 
equipment, materials and supplies. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH A3a 
Protected Area Development in 
South Western Ghana. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Land and Forestry. 5 mECU. T.A., 
buildings, equipment and supplies. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF GH 7005 A3a 
Woodworking Sector Development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Econ-
omic Planning. 4.5 mECU. Equipment, T.A., 
overseas training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDFGH A3c 
Transport Infrastructure Prog-
ramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Roads & Highways. 70 mECU. Works, 
supplies, supervision, training. Project on 
appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDFGH A2d 
General Import Programme III. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic 
Planning. 32.2 mECU. T.A. for monitoring. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDFGH A1c 
University Link. University of Ghana 
-Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Education. 1.2 mECU. T.A., 
equipment, scholarships, evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDFGH 7101/001 A6b 
GRENADA 
Microprojects programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Gren-
ville Section of the Eastern Main Road 
- Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. 
Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply 
of equipment for repairs. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7002/001 A2d 
GUINEA 
Development of secondary towns. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement 
du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Build-
ings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. 
and training, management, work super-
vision, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b 
Information System for the National 
Programme to Support Food Security. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agriculture et des 
Ressources Animales. 1.600 mECU. Supply 
of equipment, permanent T.A. follow-up, 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF QUI 7004 A3a 
General Import Programme. Support 
for Structural Adjustment. 19 mECU. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7200 A1c 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Support project to improve land 
resources. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. 1.260 mECU. Technical 
actions to prepare the creation of a land 
registry. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7012 A1f 
João Landim bridge construction. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimated cost 23 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7013 A2d 
Livestock development. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 
1.200 mECU. Zootechnical actions, privatis-
ation, veterinary profession. Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 5007/003 A3a 
T.A. to the National Authorising Officer's 
Cabinet. Resp. Auth.: NAO 0.473 mECU. 
*T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
FED GUB 7001/001 A1c 
Support to create environmental 
legislation. Resp. Auth. : National Council 
for Environment. (CNA) 0.500 mECU. T.A., 
seminars, training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 7011 A8f 
Conservation and rational use of 
fragile ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Secré-
tariat d'Etat au Tourisme, Environnement et 
Artisanat. 1.350 mECU. Buba region and 
Cufada region. Works, supply of equipment 
and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7011 ¡001 A8f 
GUYANA 
Development of small business 
credit initiative. Phase II. 0.700 mECU. 
Project in execution.6th EDF. 
EDF GUA 7001/001 A5 
Pouderoyen water supply system. 
Resp. Auth.: Guyana Water Authority 
(GUYWA). 6 mECU. Raw water supply, 
treatment process, storage reservoirs, site 
work, transmission main, distribution main, 
T.A., supervision, evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 
95. 7th EDF. 
EDF G UA 7003 A2b 
HAITI 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Finances. 23 mECÚ. General Import 
Programme with negative list. Different T.A. 
with individual experts. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF HA 7200 A1c 
JAMAICA 
Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning In-
stitute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex 
Institution and Coordination and Monitor-
ing Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. 5th, 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF J M 5020 A4,A5 
Institutional strengthening prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : National Water Com-
mission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF JM 7005 A8a,b,c 
Agricultural sector support prog-
ramme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Agriculture - Rural and agriculture dev. 
Auth. (RADA). 5 mECU. More sustainable 
farming systems, soil conservation, reaffor-
estation and community education. Works, 
supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF JM 7004 A3a 
KENYA 
Strengthening of STD and HIV/AIDS 
Programme in Nairobi and Mombasa. 
Special Treatment Clinic (STC) in Nairobi 
and the Ganjoni clinic at Mombasa. 1.577 
mECU. Works, supply of equipment by int. 
tender, T.A. training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF K E 08000 A7b,c 
Farming in tsetse infested areas. 
Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. Refine 
the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and 
develop better technologies to prevent 
infections. Monitor the environmental 
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EDF KE 7011 A3a 
Emergency Repair of Nairob-Mom-
basa Road. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Public 
Works and Horning (MoPW&H). 1.966 
mECU. Works, by ace. tender. Supervision. 
Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7010/001 A2d 
KIRIBATI 
Airport development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. 1.200 * 
mECU. Upgrading of airport operations and 
security in Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton 
atolls. Small scale building works and minor 
supplies with associated training and short-
* term expertise. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF Kl 7005 A2d 
LIBERIA 
Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Mon-
rovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water 
and power supply systems, restoration of 
basic health and school facilities, distri-
bution of seeds and tools, improved access 
to isolated regions, assisting the re-integ-
ration of ex-combatants and returning re-
fugees. Implementation by local NGOs and 
European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF LBR 7001 A1c 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MAI 5001/001  A3a 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7200  A1c 
MADAGASCAR 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimate 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supervision. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7004 A2d 
Support programme to rehabilitate 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 
17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabili-
tation, small hydraulic works. Social infra-
structure rehabilitation. Technical expertise 
study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, 
supervision and control, evaluation. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7009 A2, A8 
Bemaraha Project. 2nd phase. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère d'Etat au Dév. Rural. 0.700 
mECU. Training and awareness-raising for 
the protection of cultural and environmental 
wealth of the 'Tsingy de Bemaraha' region. 
Classified world property site by Unesco. 
Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April-
May 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7020 A3a 
MALAWI 
Poverty alleviation programme-
Pilot project Agroforestry. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock De-
velopment MOALD. 1 mECU. Sustainable 
land utilisation on catchment area level 
achieved and water supply and sanitation at 
household and village level improved. 
Equipment and T.A. T.A.: short-list done. 
Poverty Alleviation Programme-Ag-
roforestry component. Resp. Auth.: 
MOALD. Estimated total cost 47 mECU. 
EDF 22 mECU, local 2 mECU, counterpart 
funds from food aid 94 23 mECU. Water 
supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. 
and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 5001/002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
1995. Estimated cost 26.100 mECU. Gen-
eral Import programme. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing June 95. 
7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7200 A1c 
Information, education and com-
munication population programme. 
Resp. Auth. : NAO-Ministry for Women and 
Children's Affairs, Community and Social 
Services - Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. 
Increase awareness and promote behaviour 
change as regards reproductive health, 
including disease prevention. Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAI 6009/001 A7b,c 
MALI 
Support to develop rural credit. Resp. 
Auth.: Banque Nationalede Développement 
Agricole. BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. 
and line of credit, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a 
Better use of surface waters in the 
5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: 
Gouvernorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. 
Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, 
T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training, 
research. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6005/002 A3a 
Support for the programme for the 
rehabilitation and maintenance of 
priority roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Equipement et de Transport. Estimated cost 
43.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and strengthen-
ing of 380 kms of bitumenised roads 
(Ségou -Koutiala- Burkina Border-Ouan-
Sévaré) and strengthening of 1 80 kms of the 
Diéma-Didiéni road. Supervision. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7004 A2d 
Support for the decentralisation 
programme. Estimated cost 0.600 mECU. 
T.A., studies, communication campaigns, 
equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7009 A1 b 
Support for 'Credit Initiative - S.A.'. 
Resp. Auth.: Crédit Initiative S.A. under 
control of Ministère des Finances. Estimated 
cost 3 mECU. Credit to S M E's, management, 
project studies. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/006 A4d,c-A5 
Support for the Ministry of External 
Affairs. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur 
National. 0.300 mECU. Support for the 
ACP/EC cooperation unit and for the deleg-
ation for African integration. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6007/001 A1c 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme 95-96. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère des Finances et du Commerce. 
Estimated cost 25 mECU. General Import 
Programme with negative list. T.A. foreseen. 
Support for HIV/AIDS programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Santé - Centre 
National de Transfusion Sanguine (CNTS). 
1.410 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, 
T.A., training T.A. : CRTS Anger (F). Medical 
equipment, equipment procured by CRTS 
Anger (F). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7015 A7b,c 
MAURITANIA 
Second Road Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 
mECU. Supply of equipment and materials 
by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d 
National measures to support the 
Solar Regional Programme. Estimated 
cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works 
(tanks, wells, pipes) and awareness-raising, 
training and follow-up for the recipient 
communities, works and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6116/001 A2a,ai,b 
Aleg lake region economic develop-
ment. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural 
et de l'Environnement. Estimate 3 mECU. 
Irrigation in 2.000 ha. Works, studies, 
evaluation, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF.Date foreseen for financing April-May 
95. 
EDF MAU 7014 A3 
Support for farmers in Gorgol and 
Trarza regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Développement Rural et de l'Environne-
ment. 1 mECU. Equipment, T.A. evaluation, 
follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7015 A3a 
Coordination Unit for programme 
financed by the European Union. Resp. 
Auth.: Ordonnateur National and Head of 
the Delegation of the E.U. 0.500 mECU. 
•k Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007/003 A1c 
S.N.I.M. rehabilitation and rational-
isation. Resp. Auth.: SNIM - Soc. Nat. 
Industr. et Minière. Estimated total cost 58 
mECU. Nouadhibou port dredging, supply 
of specialized equipment for mining. Works, 
* supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU-SYSMIN 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the rural 
and economic development of the 
Tagant region. Resp. Auth. : Ministère du 
Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. 0.700 
mECU. Works, supply of equipment, ΤΑ. 
Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7007 A3a 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for -k EDF MAS 7004 
MAURITIUS 
National solid waste management 
project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environ-
ment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU. Construction of a fully 
enginered landfill to cater for about 6001 of 
solid waste per day. Works and supplies by 
int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 6017 A8b,c,f 
AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Health. 0.423 mECU. Prevention of 
sexual transmission, maintenance of safe 
blood supply, rationalisation of patient 
management. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
A7b,c 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY MOZAMBIQUE 
Socio-economic reintegration of 
young people. Estimated cost 1.950 
mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7017 A8b 
Supply of voting material. Estimated 
cost 13 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7004/001 A1c 
Rehabilitation of the rural health 
system. Estimated cost42 mECU. Rehabili-
tation and renovation of 7 rural hospitals and 
2 health centres. Supply of essential medi-
cines and equipment, T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7018 A7a,e 
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7200  A1c 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6001  A1c 
NAMIBIA 
Namibia Integrated Health Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health and 
Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastruc-
tures, equipment, training and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1 st 
half 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7007 A7 
Expansion of NBC transmitter net-
work and production facilities for 
educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Es-
timated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, 
local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment, technical training and technical con-
sultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7005 A6i 
Rural Development Support Pro-
gramme for the Northern Communal 
Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. 
Strengthening of the agricultural extension 
service, training of extension officiers and 
establishment of a rural credit system. 
Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agric-
ultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7011 A3a 
Rural towns sewerage schemes. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government 
and Housing. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7015 A8c 
NIGER 
Road infrastructures and telecom-
munications. 40 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-
Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecom-
munications: earth station in Arlit and 
administrative centre in Niamey. Works and 
supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c 
Integrated development programme 
in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, 
Tadressand Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environ-
nement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, de la 
Santé Publique et de l'Education Nationale. 
18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, 
drilling, supply of equipment, T.A, training, 
evaluation and follow-up. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7012 A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 
20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in exe-
Decentralized cooperation prog-
ramme. Rural development and creation of 
private companies. 1.5 mECU. Works, sup-
•k pi ies and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NIR 7013 A3,A5 
Fishery development in the southern 
Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under 
control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de 
l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 0.500 
mECU. Professional sector organisation, 
strengthening of fish marketing. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7014 A3a 
Environmental protection prog-
ramme in the lower Tarka Valley. Es-
timated total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecol-
ogical and economical destruction of the 
zone. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6002/002 A3a 
NIGERIA 
Human resources development. Insti-
tutional support for community develop-
ment and vocational training. Estimate 17 
mECU. Supplies, T.A. training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7006 A6b,c,d 
Management Support Unit. Technical 
and logistic support to the National Author-
izing Officer — NAO's office in order to 
improve procurement, monitoring and finan-
cial management of EDF programmes. 1.980 
mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7011 A1c 
Basic health care programme. Es-
timated total cost 2 mECU. Improve provi-
sion of primary health care. Preparation of 
Health Master Plans. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7010 A7b 
Drugs demand reduction prog-
ramme. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. 
Improved health of young people. Reduc-
tion in drug abuse usage. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7013 A7e 
AIDS programme - Phase II. Estimated 
total cost 2 mECU. Improved health care 
provision, to reduce incidence of AIDS. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7014 A7b,c 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of 
Education (NDOE) and Commission for 
Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: 
building renovation, university construction, 
rehabilitation works, works supervision, 
scholarships, training. Works for the un-
iversity by int. tender. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b 
Environmental Monitoring of 
Mining. Resp. Auth. : Dept. of the Environ-
ment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. 
T.A. for 30 man/months and technical 
consultancies. Training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7001 A4a 
E.U. Programme Management Unit 
in support of the National Authorising 
Officer (NAO). Estimated cost 1.200 
mECU. T.A., training and auditing. Project 
ENB High School Emergency Up-
grading Programme. 2 mECU. Enlarge-
ment of existing schools. Works by ace. 
tender. Supply of equipment, T.A. Date 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 7004 A6a 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development pro-
gramme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of 
credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, studies. 
Health centres, clinics, medical equipment 
and consumables, training, information. T.A. 
to the Direction Régionalein St-Louis and to 
the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. 
■ Drainage network, sanitation. Environ-
mental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. 
Study of a water-engineering scheme in 
Podor. Works by ace. tender. Supplies by int. 
tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a 
Support for the economic develop-
ment of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 
mECU. Line of credit for SM E's and support 
for artisanal fisheries. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a 
Support for market-gardening 
exportsector. 1 mECU. Establishment of a 
Guarantee Fund, support and T.A. for pro-
fessional organisations, air-freight program-
ming. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7008 A5d 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme with negative list. Estimated total 
cost 20.1 00 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on 
• appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7200/002 A1c 
SIERRA LEONE 
Improvement of Freetown - Conakry 
road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Re-
construction of about 120 kms of road from 
Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in 
Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7004 A2d 
Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) 
support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 
22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's man-
agement capacity, support maintenance 
operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, 
provide training and equipment to enable 
¡ocal private contractors to increase their role 
in road works. Rehabilitation works, equip-
ment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SL 7002 A2d 
SOMALIA 
Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF SO 6029 
SURINAME 
Rice research and breeding station. 
Resp. Auth.: Suriname National Rice In-
stitute (SNRI). 3.215 mECU. Construction 
of research facility, laboratory, research, field 
equipment, office and transport equipment, 
T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. 
T.A. short-list done. Works by ace. tender, 
supplies by int. tender. Project in ex-
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EDF SUR 60002 
Tourism development programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Suriname Tourism Foundation. 
Estimated total cost 0.745 mECU. Insti-
tutional strengthening, statistics and re-
search, product upgrading and develop-
ment, tourism awareness programme, mar-
keting and promotion, human resource 
development. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SUR 7003 A5c 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
(N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years 
to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SW 7001 A1f 
Science and Mathematics Advice 
and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. 
Auth. : The University of Swaziland - Train-
ing Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and materials by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SW 6101/7 A6b 
Rural dams rehabilitation and con-
struction project (Phase II). EDF es-
timated part 1.993 mECU. Works, T.A. and 
supervision, training, surveys. Project in 
execution.7th EDF. 
EDF SW 6012/001 A3a 
ment Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Im-
A3a provement of forest conservation and use. 
Supplies, T.A., studies, training, manage-
ment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7018 A3c 
Support for the Ministry of Works, 
Communication and Transport. 1.900 
mECU. T.A., studies and training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7019 A1c 
Support for coffee research. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated 
total cost 1.98 mECU. T.A. and supply of 
equipment for the research centres, training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001/002 A3a 
Road rehabilitation and mainten-
ance (Ruvuma and Iringa Regions). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports and 
Communications. Estimated total cost 15 
mECU. EDF 12 mECU, local 3 mECU. Road 
rehabilitation, support to regional and dis-
trict engineers'offices, training of local 
contractors. T.A. and supplies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7011 A2d 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6002/7002  A3a 
TOGO 
Educational project AIDS/STD. 
PhaseII. Resp. Auth.: Ministèrede la Santé. 
0.625 mECU. Training, pedagogical equip-
-k ment, supplies audit, T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TO 7003 A7b,c 
TANZANIA 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
4 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
• T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabili-
tation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. Estimated cost 35 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza se-
werage system (main works). Design study 
ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6021 A2d 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and 
Minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipment, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b 
Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 
Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, 
treatment, storage and distribution. Works, 
equipment, design and supervision. Short-
list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7009 A2 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of 
Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200/002 A1c 
Assistance for the 1994-95 electoral 
process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. 
Supply of voting material and equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7017 A1c 
Ruvuma-Mbeya Environmental Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Develop-
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
Upgrading Neiafu Harbour. Improved 
harbour access, wharf functions and moor-
ing facilities. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TG 6002 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Training project for young farmers 
(AYTRAP). Assistance for the young far-
mers to create rural enterprises. Estimated 
cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 
mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF TR 7002 A3a 
TUVALU 
Outer Island Primary School Re-
habilitation. Estimated total cost 0.300 
mECU. To improve the physical state of the 
primary school facilities on the outer islands, 
Nukufetau and Vaitupu. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TV 7004 A6a 
UGANDA 
Smallholder Tea Development Pro-
gramme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda 
Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 
mECU. Increase in the production and 
quality, management improvements, infra-
structure development, institutional and 
financial sustainability, environment conser-
vation and regional development. Works, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Support to the Uganda Investment 
Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 7005 A5e 
Road maintenance programme in the 
South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works. 22 mECU. Works, supplies and 
supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF UG 7004 A2d 
Animal water supply in Karamoja. To 
establish water retaining structures in selec-
ted strategic areas. 1.950 mECU. Works, 
equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7008 A2b 
ZAIRE 
Temporary assistance programme 
for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabili-
tation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 
mECU. To ensure that the health-care 
services that are still operating survive. 
Implementation by NGOs and local organi-
zations. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b 
ZAMBIA 
Reorganisation and restructuring of 
the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of National Parks and Wildlife services. 
Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d 
Rehabilitation of main runway at 
Lusaka International Airport. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Transport. Estimated cost 
5 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG-ROR 7319-ZA A2d 
Feeder roads rehabilitation prog-
ramme. 5 mECU. To rehabilitate rural feeder 
roads in the central and copperbelt pro-
vinces. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6027 A2d 
Editing and printing of geological 
maps. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines. 
Estimated total cost 0.950 mECU. To pro-
duce 20 geological maps and 10 structural 
maps. To assist with training the Zambian 
geological survey department. T.A.: a full-
time cartographer for 2 years and a geolog-
ical map editor for 1 year. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 5029 A1 g 
Support for the development of the 
crafts sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Community Development and social ser-
vices. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. 
Training for technical skills and management 
prevision of grants and loans for tools, 
materials, transport. Supplies and T.A. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7004 A4d 
Management training for the minis-
tries of health and education. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministries of Health and Education. 
Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF 1 
mECU, local 0,200 mECU. T.A. multi-
sectoral : management/administration, plan-
ning, accounting-training. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7003/001 A6/A7 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Forestry management for sus-
tainable woodfuel production in 
Zambia (along the railway line). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Estimated 
total cost 2 mECU. Training, supply of 
equipment, studies and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7009 A3c 
ARUBA 
NETHERLANDS 
ARUBA 
ANTILLES 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Construction of a vocational train-
ing centre for apprentices. Estimated 
total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 
• mECU. Works by ace. tender. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7002 A6d 
ZIMBABWE 
OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
land use and health programme. Resp. 
Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the stan-
dard of living of rural populations. Conserva-
tion and improved utilisation of the wildlife 
resources, support to agriculture and im-
provement of social infrastructure. Road 
network, water, sanitation, building of a 
district hospital, equipment and supplies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZI M 6004/7002 A3a 
Support for the Faculty of Vete-
rinary Science of the University of 
Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Vete-
rinary Science. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehic-
les and equipment. T.A., University link, 
fellowships, scholarships. For Zimbabwe 
and SADC region. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZI M 5004/7001 A6b 
Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. 
Increase of wildlife population, particularly 
of endangered species: black and white 
rhino — tourism development, works, sup-
plies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f 
Gokwe north and south rural water 
supply and sanitation project. 6.100 
mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-
points, new domestic water-points, latrines, 
maintenance, health education, T.A., train-
ing, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZI M 7001 A2b 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Support for the Public Library in 
Curaçao. Resp. Auth.: Public Library Cu-
raçao. Estimation 0.650 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NEA 7003 A6g 
T.A. for managerial training. EDF 
1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private 
and public executives and will advise com-
panies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6006 A6b 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
Water and sewerage in Providen-
ciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
3.700 mECU. Watersupply works and pipes. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TC 7001 A8b,c 
ST. HELENA 
Wharf improvement project. Resp. 
Auth.: Public Works + Service. Department. 
Estimated total cost 1.743 mECU. To in-
crease the safety and efficiency of James-
town Port by upgrading wharf facilities for 
passenger and cargo handling. Works, sup-
plies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SH 7001 A2d 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). 
EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7001 A2d 
Construction of territorial road n° 1 
in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and re-
habilitation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF WF 7003 A2d 
Regional Projects 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 20 mECU. To establish three manage-
ment units, 10 bridges and 20 observation 
posts with their equipment. Building and 
rehabilitation of administrative, technical 
and social buildings, tracks and bridges. 
T.A., training and studies. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth. : 
Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU, Widening 
of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, 
offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 
5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Tourism development programme. Bibliographic Fund. Resp. Auth.: Bibli-
Estimated total cost 6-6.5 mECU. EDF 4-5 ographic Fund-Maputo. 2.500 mECU. De-
mECU, local 0.100 mECU, local private velopment of human resources. Editing, 
sector 1.400 mECU. Training, T.A., market- circulation, reading promotion. T.A. and 
ing in Europe. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. • evaluation. Projectin execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7835 A5c EDF REG 7901/008 A6g,i 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
UCAC - Central Africa Catholic Un-
iversity. EDF 1.800 mECU. Support for the 
Ekounou Campus in Yaoundé. Road works 
and distribution networks, student house 
• building. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7204 A6b 
CIESPAC - Public Health Education 
Centre in Central Africa. 1.900 mECU. 
Student accomodation, equipment, scholar-
ships, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7205 A6b 
ECOFACII - Forest ecosystems. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Plan. République du 
Congo. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. 
To develop national and regional capacities 
for good management of forest resources. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6203/001 A3c 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF I.O.C. -
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
Technical cooperation framework 
programme. 1.800 mECU. T.A., auditing 
and evaluation, equipment, training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7501 A1b 
Integrated Regional Programme for 
Trade Development. (PRIDE). Resp. 
Auth.: I.O.C. Secrétariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. 
Equipment. T.A., training, management. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7503 A5 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CBI 
Support for the Technical Working 
Groups and Policy Implementation 
Committees under the Initiative to 
facilitate Cross-Border Trade, Invest-
ment and Payments in Eastern and 
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 
(CBI). To improve regional economic co-
herence in the areas of trade, investment and 
macro-economic policies. Estimated total 
cost 2 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 70012/001 A5c 
Standardization and quality assur-
ance. Resp. Auth.: COMESA Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). 
Estimated total cost 2.543 mECU. To de-
velop harmonized standardization and 
quality control practices. T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7321 A5e 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF 
ECOWAS 
Guarantee Fund for Private Invest-
ments - Financing in Western Africa. 
FGIPAO - Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee 
Fund to cover partially credit risks given by 
the Courier no. 152 — july-august 1995  IX banks to the private sector. Total estimated 
cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU - Others: 
France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks 
(E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7115 A5 
Consumer price index in the UEMOA 
countries. Resp. Auth.: EUROSTAT & 
EUROCOST 1.620 mECU. T.A., training, 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG/ROC/7106/001 Ale 
BURKINA FASO - CAPE VERDE -
GAMBIA-MALI-MAURITANIA-
NIGER - SENEGAL - CHAD 
Regional environmental training and 
information programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Institut du Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. 
training, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 
95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6147/001 A6/A8 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A. 
Regional integration in East and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA 
Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). 
Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. 
Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7316 A1b 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Pacific regional agricultural pro-
gramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum 
Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement 
and dissemination of selected crops, agricul-
tural information and techniques to farmers. 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6704/001 A3a 
Cyclone Warning System Upgrade. 
Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Project 
coordinator at the Tropical Cyclone Warning 
Centre in Nadi-Fiji: 1.950 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, T.A., training evalu-
ation. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7709 A8g 
SADC 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5412/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6 
Regional training programme for 
food security. Resp. Auth. : Food Security 
Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) 
in Harare. 5 mECU. Training andT.A. Supply 
of equipment by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci 
S.I.M.S.E.C. - SADC Initiative for 
Mathematics and Science Education 
üöoperation. To establish a professional 
unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information 
exchange, teacher training curriculum de-
velopment, staff development, research 
cooperation and support for teachers' or-
ganisations. Project on appraisal. 5 mECU. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6428 A6b 
Wildlife Management Training Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland 
Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. 
Staff training, equipment and teaching 
materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f 
SADC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU —TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth.: Ministèrede I'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
KENYA - UGANDA - TANZANIA 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research 
Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in 
Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research 
Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., 
supplies, training, monitoring and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5316/001 A3d 
CARIBBEAN REGION 
Regional Tourism Sector Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 12.8 
mECU. Marketing, Promotion, Education, 
Training, researcri and statistics, product 
development and protection of cultural 
heritage. Works, equipment and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
May 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7601/001 A5c 
Regional Trade Sector Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 14 mECU. 
Access of Caribbean firms to identified 
markets, strengthen the competitiveness of 
export oriented firms, improve the avail-
ability of trade information and support 
institutional development. Supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing May 95.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7601/002 A5d,e 
Caribbean Examinations Council 
(CXC) - Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Registrar of CXC in Barbados. 
2.500 mECU. T.A., external consultancies, 
equipment. Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7603 A6a 
University level programme. Resp. 
Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a 
critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at 
masters degree level in development econ-
omics, business administration, public 
administration, agricultural diversification, 
natural resources, management and archi-
tecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., 
scholarships. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7604 A6b 
Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: 
S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other 
action necessary for the creation of the 
Caribbean Postal Union. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7605 A2c 
Caribbean Telecommunication 
Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 
mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the 
C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation 
on Telecommunication within the Cariforum 
member states. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 7605/001 A2c 
Regional Airports Project. Resp. 
Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 2 mECU. Upgrading 
of equipment and improvement of training of 
staff. Improved safety and air navigation 
standards in two airports in Suriname and 
one in Guyana. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 7605/002 A2d 
Caribbean Regional agriculture and 
fisheries development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 22.2 mECU. 
Creation of an agricultural credit revolving 
fund, research and training activities to 
support commercial opportunities, establ-
ishment of an information network and 
subprogrammes in the fisheries, livestock 
and rice subsectors. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. and programme management short 
studies. Credit Fund. Project in exec-
ution.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7606 A3a 
Education policy and dialogue. Resp. 
Auth.: Cariforum S.G.. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for 
regional common policies in three education 
areas: basic education, technical and vo-
cational training, language teaching. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7607 A6a,d 
Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. 
Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural 
identity and foster mutual knowledge of the 
rich cultural panorama. Restoration of build-
ings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic 
fields and management. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7610 A8i 
Tertiary level programme. Estimated 
total cost 5 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level 
education and teacher training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6628/001 A6b 
Cariforum Regional Environment 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 
Estimated total cost 11 mECU. Environ-
mental management action, programme for 
protected areas and community develop-
ment, management and expansion of marine 
and coastal park and protected areas. Ter-
restrial parks. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7613 A8f 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materials to finish 100,000 
social housing units. 70 mECU. hard 
currency allowance to cover CIF imports. 
Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (C.P.A.). Special accounts in the Central 
Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by 
a positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
parts). 1st int. tender launched. Project in 
execution. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
Support for the Algerian rural 
sector. 30 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM AL A3a 
EGYPT 
Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme. PSDP. 25 mECU. Improvement 
of performance of private companies in 
domestic, regional and international mar-
kets. Business support programme. Inform-
ation, T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. 
Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 898/94 A5 
Veterinary Services Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Reclamation (MDALR). 20 mECU. 
Line of credit training, T.A., equipment. 
Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 932/94 A3a 
Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Con-
tingency Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian 
Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), Min-
istry of Environment for Israel and Aqaba 
Ports Authority for Jordan with a rep-
resentative from the EC. EC 2.900 mECU, 
Egypt 0.200 mECU. Procurement of the 
equipment, development of local infrastruc-
ture, training and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 1171/94 A8f 
JORDAN 
Support for Structural Adjustment. 
Phase III. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM JO 279/95 A1c 
MALTA 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre, integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d 
MOROCCO 
Support for the Agricultural De-
velopment Fund. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et de la Mise en Valeur 
Agricole (NAMVA) - Caisse Nationale du 
Crédit Agricole (CNCA). 50 mECU. Line of 
credit and training, information, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 
SEM MOR 930/94 A3a, A5a 
Support for Mother and Child Care. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
9 mECU. Works by int. tender, studies, T.A., 
evaluation. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MOR 930/94 A7b 
Private sector development prog-
ramme. 30 mECU. Provision of consul-
tancy and training services to private enter-
prises delivered through a business centre in 
Casablanca 'Euro-Maroc Enterprise' staffed 
by expatriate and local consultants. A small 
office will also be established in Tangiers. 
Credit line for small enterprise creation in 
north Morocco. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 
95. 7th EDF. 
SEM MOR 299/95 A4/A5 
SYRIA 
Banking Sector Support Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Syrian Central Bank 
(SCB) and the Commercial Bank of Syria 
(CB). 4.5 mECU. Supply of T.A., computer 
equipment, training monitoring and evalu-
ation. Major equipment by int. tender. 
Project in execution. 
SEM SYR 899/94 A1 
Demographic sector programme in 
Syria. 2 mECU. Provision of quality Mother 
and Child Health/Family Planning services, 
population and housing census, strengthen-
ing civil registration system. Project in 
execution. 
SEM SYR 890/94 A7c 
Private Sector Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Syrian-European Business Centre. 7 
mECU. To improve the performance of 
indigenous business in local, regional and 
international markets. Establishment of the 
SEBC. T.A., monitoring, evaluation and 
audit. Project in execution. 
SEM SYR 1189/94 A5d,e 
TURKEY 
Vocational training programmes for 
tourism and mining. EC contribution 5.4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programme to broaden relations be-
tween EC and Turkey. EC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Gaza City solid waste disposal -
completion. Resp. Auth.: Municipality of 
Gaza City. EC contribution 5 mECU. Provi-
sion of technical services and supply of 
rolling stock and equipment. T.A. and 
* training. Project in execution. 
SEM OT/95/02 A8b,c,f 
Programme of institutional ca-
pacity-building for the Palestinian Au-
thority. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Authority 
with the European Commission Represen-
tative to the Occupied Territories and the 
European Commission T.A. Office. E.C 
contribution 2.500 mECU. Provision of 
assistance to seven Ministries. T.A., supply 
• of equipment training. Project in exe-
cution. 
SEM OT/95/03 A1c 
Municipal Support Programme, 
Gaza and West Bank. EC Contribution 25 
mECU (Budget 95: 10 mECU - Budget 96 : 
15 mECU) Municipal infrastructure rehabili-
tation and expansion within the road, water 
supply, building and sewage sectors. Supply 
of equipment for infrastructure maintenance 
and solid waste management. Municipa-
lities: Rafah, Khan Younis, Gaza, Hebron, 
Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin. T.A. will 
include full-time secondment in 95/96 and 
half time in 97 of municipal engineers with a 
project manager and short-term specialist 
input. Works by ace. tender. T.A. : short lists 
to be done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 95/96 - 300/95 A1c 
Gaza Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Health. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. To 
meet the final completion date of January 
96, further financing is urgently required. 
This financing will cover the execution of the 
utility connections, the remaining construc-
tion works, the provision of the main medical 
equipment and T.A. for the initial operation. 
Operation initially by UNRWA. Expatriate 
T.A. : short list to be done. Medical equip-
ment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 302/95 A7a 
Private Sector Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Palestinian Business Services Centre 
(PBSC) in Ramallah. EC contribution 6 
mECU (1995 Budget 3 mECU - 1996 
Budget 3 mECU). Programme of consulting 
information and training services. Consult-
ing services by EC consultants. T.A.: short 
lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 95/96-342/95 A4,A5 
EGYPT - PALESTINE - JORDAN -
ISRAEL 
Middle East Peace Projects. 33 mECU 
(Budget 95: 13 mECU, Budget 96: 20 
mECU). Planning and consulting support 
measures for major regional investments: 
water infrastructure projects on the Jordan 
and Yarmouk, development of Gulf of Aqaba 
area, transport infrastructure and the inter-
connection of electricity grids, integrated 
economic development of Gaza, Sinai and 
parts of Israel. Regional veterinary cooper-
ation and the establishment of an integrated 
water data system. Feasibility studies, de-
tailed plans, engineering designs. T.A. by 
restricted tender or direct agreement. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
May 95. 
SEM REG 95-96/298-95 A9a,b 
m\ u La ■ f^ a 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
ARGENTINA 
Integrated development Ramon 
Lista. EC contribution 5.500 mECU. T.A. 
Support for indigenous populations. Project 
on appraisal Date foreseen for financing 
April 95. 
ALA ARG B7-3010/94/152 A3a 
BANGLADESH 
New Options for Pest Management 
(NOPEST). Resp. Auth.: CARE Ban-
gladesh 6 mECU. To motivate and assist 
32,000 farmers in rice growing areas of 
Mymensingh and Cornilla districts. Training, 
equipment, T.A. by CARE, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9431 A3a 
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Ministry of Development and En-
vironment. T.A. to support the execution of 
programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/42 A3a 
Rural development in the Mitzque 
and Tiraque valleys. 13 mECU. Different, 
T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement of 
cultivated soils. Project on appraisal.Date 
foreseen for financing April 95. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/49 A3a 
Support for export promotion. 0.980 
mECU. T.A. and training for 30 Bolivians 
trade representatives. Establishment of 2 
trade promotion offices in Europe. Inform-
ation data system. Project in execution. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/52 A5d 
Support for artisanal fisheries and 
acquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 
4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
• for financing 2nd quarter 95. 
ALA BOL B7-3010-94/53 A3a 
Job promotion. 3 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/25 A5 
Seeds integrated development pro-
ject. 5 mECU. Increase of the national 
productivity by improvement of seed quality. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/070 A3a 
BRAZIL 
Cooperation for quality improve-
ments in the industrial sector. EC 
contribution 0.400 mECU. T.A. Short-list to 
be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BRA B7-3011 -94/65 A4g 
Action group for telecommuni-
cations. Studies, seminars. Short-lists to be 
done. 0.570 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing September 95. 
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/125 A2c 
Support for underprivileged popu-
lations in RioandSao Paulo regions. 10 
mECU. Housing, health, education, training, 
support for micro-enterprises. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Nov-
ember-December 95. 
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/115 A8c 
CAMBODIA 
Support for the agricultural sector 
and primary education. EC contribution 
49.800 mECU. Supply of equipment, dif-
ferent T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CAM 94/14 A3a 
CHILE 
Study to create a technological 
centre in Santiago. 0.500 mECU. Short-
list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CHI B7-3011-94/172 A6b 
COLOMBIA 
Basic social services in Ciudad Bo-
livar. 8 mECU T.A. to the local services. 
Training. Project in execution. 
ALA COL B7-3010/94/101 A8b 
Support for the creation of basic 
technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 
ALA COL B7-3011 /94/41 A5c 
ECUADOR 
Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. 12 
mECU. T.A., training, supply of équipement. 
Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/44 A3a 
Environmental impact of oil exploi-
tation in the Amazone region. 7.313 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/130 A8f 
Ministry of External Relations mod-
ernization. 0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA ECU B7-3011 /94/1 61 A1 c 
Improvement of crop production and 
use of phytogenetics products. 0.995 
• mECU. Training research promotion, 
T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/103 A3a 
EL SALVADOR 
Health and basic health programme 
in the western region. EC participation 
10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health 
centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Projet 
in execution. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/93/91 A7c 
Training in the géothermie energy 
sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. 
Project in execution. 
ELS B7-3011/94/36 A2a 
Support for the Informal Sector. 
Phase II. EC contribution 7 mECU. Project 
in execution. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/94/83 A5e 
Support for agricultural reform. 
0.975 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/95/06 A3a 
Institutional support forthe national 
academy of public security. 0.950 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. Short-list to be done. 
ALA ELS B7-5076/94/194 A1c 
Support for the productive process 
in the San Vicente department. 13 
mECU. T.A., line of credit, integration of ex-
servicemen. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing September-October 95. 
ALA SLV/B7-3010/95/88 A9b 
appraisal. 
ALA GUA B7-3011 /94/01  A5d,e 
GUATEMALA 
Programme to help street children in 
Guatemala City. EC contribution 2.5 
mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/109 A8e 
Support for the informal sector. 
7.500 mECU. T.A. training, line of credit. 
Project in execution. 
ALA G UA B7-3010/94/47 A5 
Rural development programme in 
the Totonicapan Department. EC con-
tribution 7.500 mECU. Works, supplies, line 
of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/81 A3a 
Rural Development in Baja Verapaz. 
EC contribution 8 mECU. Works, supplies, 
line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/89 A3a 
Rural Development in Alta Verapaz. 
EC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies, 
line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/90 A3a 
Export strengthening towards Euro-
pean Union. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on 
Episcopal Conference and Broad-
casting Institute. 0,890 mECU. Training 
and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/95 A5g,A6 
Self-sustained development prog-
ramme in the Atitlan Lake valley. Phase 
II. 8.800 mECU. T.A., support to small-
farmers, handicraft and environment. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
October 95. 
ALA GTM/B7-3010/95/85 A3a 
HONDURAS 
Programme to help street children. 
EC contribution 0.600 mECU. T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA HON B7-3010/94/118 A8e 
Programme to support SME's and 
farmers in the Olancho area (PRO-
LANCHO). Resp. Auth.: National Planning 
Ministry (SECPLAN). EC contribution 
9.860 mECU. Supply of equipment by int. 
tender, T.A., monitoring. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA HON B7-3010/94/124 A3a 
National Centre for Market and 
Trade Promotion. 0.900 mECU. T.A., 
studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd half 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3011/95/077 A5e 
Support for vocational training. 5 
mECU. T.A. to improve technical training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st quarter 96. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/79 A6d 
T.A. to promote specific projects for 
electricity production. 0.700 mECU. T.A. 
for management. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing end 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/80 
T.A. to develop the institutional 
programme for a legal framework and 
energy saving. 0.500 mECU. To develop a 
specific programme for efficiency and 
energy saving. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/81 A2ai 
Support for production in the Copàn 
and Sta Bàrbara zones. 7 mECU. T.A. for 
production, line of credit, local management 
and organization. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 1st quarter 96. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/116 A3a 
INDIA 
Transfer of Technologies for Sus-
tainable Development (BAIF). Resp. 
Auth.: NABARD — National Bank for 
Agricultural and rural Development. Project 
management BAIF (Indian NGO) EC contri-
bution 1 9.5 mECU. Wasteland development, 
Wadi programme, sericulture, cattle de-
velopment, T.A., training, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IN 94/32 A3a 
Saline Land Reclamation in Mahar-
ashtra. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation 
Department's Khar Lands Development 
Circle (KLDC) EC contribution 15.5 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IN 94/27 A3a 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY INDONESIA 
EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Sup-
port Programme. Resp. Auth. : Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning - Ministry of Forestry. EC contri-
bution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and 
monitoring. T.A. for detailed forest survey 
and mapping, training. Integrated Radio 
Communication Systems: T.A. for instal-
lation and training. Short-lists done. Project 
in execution. 
ALA IND 9242 A3c 
EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: 
Forest Fire Prevention and control in 
South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning Ministry of Forestry. EC contri-
bution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment 
of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 
pilot projects for fire management units and 
equipment. Short-list done. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA IND 9212 A3c 
Gunung Leuser development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Indonesian Plan-
ning Ministry-BAPPENAS. EC contribution 
32.5 mECU. Works, infrastructures, supply 
of equipment, T.A. training, monitoring 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IND 94/26 A3a 
MEXICO 
Improving living conditions for 
children and young people. 0.800 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA MEX B7-3010/95/23 A8c 
NICARAGUA 
TROPISEC — Development of small 
rural production in the dry tropical 
zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/93/144 A3a 
Urban water supply and sewerage. 
Resp. Auth.: Instituto Nicaragueuse de 
Acueductos y Alcantarillados (INAA). EC 
contribution 11 mECU. Three drinking water 
supply projects in Chichigalpa, Masatepe — 
two towns in the Pacific region and 
Camoapa. Two sewerage networks plus 
provisional basic drainage in the towns of El 
Viejo and Jinotepe. Works, equipment, T.A. 
monitoring and evaluation. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/94/1 23 A2b 
Roads and bridges rehabilitation. 2.6 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/94/123 A2d 
Roads rehabilitation. 4 mECU. Project 
in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-5076/94/144 A2d 
Support for underprivileged child-
ren. 0.857 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/94/167 A8c 
Housing construction in Managua. 9 
mECU. Works, supervision, equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing November 95. 
ALA NIC IB7-3010/95 / 90 A8a 
Support for vocational training. 
5.200 mECU. To improve technician and 
teacher training. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing November 95. 
ALA NIC/B7-3010/95/109 A6c 
PAKISTAN 
Post-flood rehabilitation and pro-
tection project. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road 
works, dam construction. Works by ace. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PK 94/04 A8g 
PANAMA 
Support for rural SME's in the cen-
tral region. 5 mECU. Supply of T.A. and 
line of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/137 A3a 
PARAGUAY 
Durable development of the Para-
guayan Chaco (protection of the in-
digenous zones and ecosystem). EC 
contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 
ALA PAR 93/40 A3a 
PERU 
Support for export promotion. EC 
contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-list 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/93/175 A5d 
Coica valley development prog-
ramme. EC contribution 5 mECU. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Short-list to be done. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/33 A3a 
Women in rural situations. EC contri-
bution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho re-
gions. Improvement of the women's con-
ditions. Social services. Project in execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/106 A3a 
Vocational training programme. 9 
mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications 
for non qualified young people. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/55 A6d 
Street children. 7 mECU. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/127 A8c 
Framework programme for vo-
cational, technological and pedago-
gica/training. 7 mECU. To improve secon-
dary education quality and support teacher 
training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PER/B7-3011 ¡95/004 A6c 
Sustainable development of the 
Manu National Park and Biosphere 
Reserve. 6.600 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA PER/B 7-5041 /95/128 A8f 
PHILIPPINES 
Rural integrated development pro-
gramme in the Aurore zone. EC contri-
bution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9326 A3a 
Tropical forest protection in Pa-
lawan. EC contribution 17 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9337 A3a 
URUGUAY 
Integrated development programme 
for rural communities. 5.150 mECU. T.A. 
and housing construction for poor families. 
Project in execution. 
ALA URU B7-3010/94/39 A3a 
Cooperation Programme for Arom-
atic Plants and Essential Oils. 1 mECU. 
T.A. for production development, indus-
trialisation and commercialization. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
October 95. 
ALA URY/B7-3011/95/72 A3a 
VENEZUELA 
Support for the establishment of the 
National Centre for Energy and En-
vironment. EC contribution 1 mECU. T.A., 
local services, training, seminars. Short-list 
to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA VEN B7-3011/94/1 5 A2a,A8f 
Social Structural Adjustment in 
Venezuela. Resp. Auth.: The Foundation 
set up to oversee the Experimental Vo-
cational Training Centre. Estimated total 
cost 12.2 mECU. EC contribution 5.3 mECU, 
Provincial Government of Guipúzcoa 
(Spain) 0.959 mECU, local 5.941 mECU. EC 
contribution. Equipment and furniture by int. 
tender. T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN B7-3011 /94/112 A6d 
PETARE PROJECT - Fight against 
drugs. 0.998 mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN B7-5080/94/113 A8c 
B.I.C. Barquisimeto. 0.500 mECU. T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA VEN B7-3011/94/99 A5d 
Support for the Health Sector. 9 
mECU. Improvement of the health systems, 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Nov-
ember 95. 
ALA VEN¡B7-3010195/56 A7e 
Articulation and development of 
social economy. 8 mECU. T.A. training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing November 95. 
ALA VENIB7-3010/95/57 A5f 
VIETNAM 
T.A. programme for transition to 
market economy. EC contribution 16 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VIE 9336 A1 b 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Cooperation programme with Euro-
pean Union towns, regions and local 
collectivities. 4 mECU. T.A., training. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA AM L B7-3010/94/168 A5 
Fight against cancer. 10 mECU. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 
ALR B7-3010/95/03 A7 
B.I.D. Special fund for small produc-
tion projects. 15 mECU. T.A. in the 
framework of B.I.D. activities. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Sep-
tember 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/113 A5b 
ALURE: Optimum use of energy re-
sources. 7 mECU. Support Unit-financing 
of action to modernize institutions and 
specialized companies. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing September 95. 
ALA ALRIB7-3011/95/42 A2a,i 
AL-INVEST - Consolidation phase. 
41 mECU. Liberalization of the economic 
structures and market integration. (Com-
mercial exchanges promotion, technology 
transfer, direct investments, joint-ventures). 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing October 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3011/95/138 A5e 
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Latin American countries. 4 mECU. T.A. 
in the framework of B.I.D. activities. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
September 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/114 A5b 
ANDEAN PACT 
Programme to eradicate foot and 
mouth disease. EC contribution 1.800 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/63 A3a 
T.A. programme for customs. 5 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st 
quarter 1995. 
ALA-AND B7-3011/94/163  A1b 
Support for the Tribunal A. de Car-
tagena. 0.617 mECU T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA REG AAN B7-3011 /94/51 A8b 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES 
EUROTRACE. 0.500 mECU. Compute-
rized system and data bank for external trade 
and commerce. Project in execution. 
ALA REG AMC B7-3011 /94/1 51 A5c 
Sustainable development prog-
ramme in rural border zone. 11.160 
mECU. Regional programme to exchange 
experiences in sustainable development, 
project promotion. T.A. monitoring supply of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG AMC B7-5041 /1 /94/17 A3a 
Development aid to the indigenous 
populations in Central America. EC 
contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipment. Project in execution. 
ALA REG ACR/B7-3010/93/172 A3a 
SOUTHERN AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES 
Pilcomayo River. 0.850 mECU. Study. 
Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG AMS B7-3010/94/147 A2d 
DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6 
Luanda CP. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103 
Telex 2327 OELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
BP. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 315 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 D EC EC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
Β.P. 103, Bujumbura 
Tel. 3426/3892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
Β.P. 847, Yaoundé 
Tel. (237)2013 87-20 33 67 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
C.P. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238)61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Fax(236) 616535 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
B.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEGFED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet, 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent, Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 2615 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel.251-1-61 2511 
Telex 217 38 DELEGEUR — ET 
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE 
Fax (241 ) 736554 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 227777 — 228769 — 226860 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL 
Fax (220) 226219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K. I.A. -Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, C.P. 359, 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245) 25 10 71 /25 10 27/ 
251469/251471-72 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 25 10 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section— B 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Tel. (224) 41 49 42 
Fax (224) 41874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse brave n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
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P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1 -809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEGEC JA 
Fax (1 -809) 9246339 
Kenya 
"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21-712860-712905/06 
Telex 22483 DELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 716481 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100. Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266—310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor 
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax (231 ) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B.P. 746. Antananarivo 
Tel. 24216 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO 
Fax(223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Ilôt V, Lot 24 
B.P. 213. Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN -
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61/63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61 /686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306 —MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe— MAPUTO 
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-491716 — 1-49 02 71 
1 -49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue, 154 
Windhoek 
Tel.: 264-61-220099 
Fax 264-61 23 51 35 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Abuja 
Tel 09/5233144/46 
Telex 0905/91484 
Fax 09-5233147 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag, GPO. Suva, Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 3718 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515, Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 23 13 34 - 23 47 77 -
23 79 75 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399. Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL— FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 —DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
EC Somalia Unit 
Union Insurance House- 1st floor 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 30475 Nairobi 
Tel.: (254-2)712830-713250/251 
Fax (254-2) 710997 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road, Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax(597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61 /62 
Telex 41 353 DELCOM EUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51 ) 46724 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lome 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA 
Fax (256-41) 233708 
Zaire 
71, Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000, Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Los Angeles Boulevard 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 - 25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1 ) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
Construction House (6th floor) 
110, Leopold Takawira Street 
Harare 
Tel. (263-4) 70 71 20/139 - 75 28 35 -
72 21 37-70 71 43 
Telex 24811 Deleur ZW 
Fax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG. Smith Blvd. 50. (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel. 297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ —ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue.PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tel. (357-2)36 92 02 
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2)36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. (20-2) 340 83 88 
340 7409 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
341 93 93 — 340 11 84 — 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St.. 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
AI Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11-4008. Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31 /32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa The Vines'. 51 
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front, Ta'Xbiex-Malta 
Tel. : (356) 34 48 91 -93-95, 345111 
Telex: (356)910 EC MLA 
Fax (356) 34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 7612 17/7612 46/7612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
Rue Chakib Arslan 
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus 
Tel. (963-11) 3327640/641 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Fax (963 11 ) 3320683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene. 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
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Argentina 
Plaza Hotel. Florida 1005, Buenos Aires 
Tel.: (54-1) 312 60 01/09 
Telex: 22488 PLAZA AR 
Telefax: (54-1) 3132912 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7. Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel.8847 30-31-32 
Telex 642501, CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A— Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1)532 43 42 
Colombia 
Calle 97 n" 22-44 
94046 — 14 Bogota 8 
Tel. <57-1 ) 236 90 40/256 48 28/256 84 77 
Fax (57-1) 610 00 59 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centra Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
65 Golf Links 
New Delhi 110003 
Tel. 462 92 37/38 
Telex 61315 EUR-IN 
Fax 462 92 06 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21 ) 570 6075 
Korea 
ICON Building 
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1-ga 
Choong-Ku 
Seoul 100-691 - Korea 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5).540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3. Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. (92-051)21 18 28 
Fax (92-051 ) 82 26 04 
Peru 
B.P. 180 792, LIMA 18 
Manuel Gonzales Olaechea 247 
San Isidro, Lima 27 
Tel. (5114) 41 58 27/32-403097 
Telex 21085 PE-COMEU 
Telefax (51-14) 41 8017 
Philippines 
Salustiana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 104, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 81 2 66 86 - 812 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Fax (66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Boulevard Artigas 1257 
CP 11200 Montevideo 
Tel.: (598) 2.40 75 80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-41 20 08 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1 -809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House. 2nd floor, Frederick St 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex ;Έ_ΞίΞ0 NS 310 
' Eyre I-*-.· 
PO. Boar 907 
Belize Cüy Setze 
Teil.. (SOI-2) 72786 and fax 
Telex HOS CEC BZ 
Grenada 
-.·-.- bald Avenue 
P.O. Box 5. St George's, Grenada. West Indies 
Tel (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA 
(Atm. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 
São Tomé & Principe 
BP. 132—Sao Tomé 
Tell. (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telte«: 224 (Mfeøfed ST 
Fa* (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé 
Tel. (248)32 39 40 
Fax (248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n°5-CP0 
Nuku Alofa 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Fax 23869 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023, 
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Fax (685)24622 
Commission of the 
European Union 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15, KuleliSokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATB E TR 
Fax (90-312) 437 79 40 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Union 
Delegation in the 
South African Republic 
2, Greenpark Estates 
27, George Storrer Drive Groenkloof, Pretoria 
0181 South Africa 
Tel.: (0027-12)46 43 19 
Fax (0027-12) 46 99 23 
XVI OW&mtOHM. SUMMARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Can we improve The Courier? 
Yes, but we need your help ! 
Dear reader. 
The Courier editorial team makes every effort to provide you with information which is as complete and 
accurate as possible about relations between the ACP countries and the EU, and to present it in an appealing 
manner. 
It is sometimes difficult to achieve the right balance : meeting 'academic' standards while at the same time 
staying accessible and interesting to as many people as possible. 
The last time we sought the views of our readers was in 1986. To enable us to provide you with a magazine 
which is, as far as possible 'made to measure' we have prepared a questionnaire which is attached to this letter. 
We would be grateful if you could fill it in and return it to us. This will help us to get an up-to-date picture of our 
readership. 
Thank you for your help. Simon Horner, 
Editor. 
M. Simon Horner 
Editor 
The ACP-EU Courier 
G1 -1/276 
200, Rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Bruxelles 
BELGIQUE 
Please mark the circles which correspond with your views 
1 Are you a subscriber to The Courier? 
(subscription is free) 
yes 
no 
2 If the answer is yes, how long have you been a 
subscriber? 
2 months 
6 months 
1 year 
2 years or more 
3 If the answer is yes, to how many other people 
do you pass your copy of The Courier on 
a O 
b O 
c O 
d O 
a O 
b O 
been a 
a O 
b O 
c O 
d O 
«vei aye s 
none 
one 
two or three 
more than three 4 If you are not a subscriber, how do you gain 
access to The Courier? 
via the EU delegation in your country 
the library of an educational institution 
a friend 
a public office 
a private company 
an association 
by some other means 
5 Do you read The Courier: 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
regularly 
frequently 
occasionally 
never 
a O 
b O 
c O 
d O 
6 When did you receive this issue of The Courier? 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
later than this 
7 Do you think that the layout of The Courier: 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
encourages you to read it 
discourages you from reading it 
is neither encouraging nor discouraging 
a O 
b O 
c O 
12 Artides in The Courier are generally: 
too long 
not long enough 
of the right length 
a 
b 
O 
O 
o 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
13 When looking at The Courier, do you read: 
all the articles 
most of the articles 
several articles 
a few articles 
the occasional article 
14 Which sections do you find most interesting? 
(please do not mark more than 5 sections) 
Meeting Point 
ACP 
Country Report 
Europe 
Dossier 
Close-up 
Developing World 
Culture and Society 
CTA Bulletin 
Publications 
News Round-up 
CDI Partnership 
Operational Summary 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
I 
n 
O 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
8 The Courier's cover is usually : 
attractive 
forbidding 
unattractive 
neutral 
a O 
b O 
c O 
d O 
9 The way in which The Courier is printed means 
that it can be read : 
easily 
more or less easily 
with difficulty 
a O 
b O 
c O 
10 The page layout of The Courier means that it 
can be read : 
easily 
more or less easily 
with difficulty 
a O 
b O 
c O 
15 How sufficient is the amount of space allocated 
to each of these sections ? : 
Meeting Point 
ACP 
Country Report 
Europe 
Dossier 
Close-up 
Developing World 
Culture and Society 
CTA Bulletin 
Publications 
News Round-up 
CDI Partnership 
Operational Summary 
16 How sufficient is the information provided by 
The Courier on the following subjects?: 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
m 
Suffi-
cient 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Insuf-
ficient 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
0 
11 Looking for an article in The Courier is: 
easy a O 
more or less easy b O 
difficult c O 
ACP Countries 
EU Member States 
EU Institutions 
ACP-EU Cooperation 
a 
b 
c 
d 
Suffi-
cient 
O 
O 
o 
o 
Insuf-
ficient 
O 
o 
o 
o a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
O 
O 
O 
o 
o 
17 As regards information concerning relations 
between the ACP and the European Union, The 
Courier is: 
your only source of information 
your main source 
an important source among others 
a secondary source 
insignificant as a source of information 
18 You, personally, find The Courier useful (more 
than one box may be marked): 
in your job a O 
when preparing for examinations/tests b O 
for your personal information c O 
with regard to practical aspects of your d O 
private life 
19 Do you find the information provided by The 
Courier (mark one option in each section): 
very useful 
useful 
not very useful 
useless 
always objective 
usually objective 
usually subjective 
always subjective 
22 To meet your expectations. The Courier would 
have to (more than one box may be marked) : 
a.i 
a.ü 
a.iii 
a.iv 
b.i 
b.ii 
b.iii 
b.iv 
O 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
remain as it is 
change its style 
deal with additional topics 
if so, what are they? 
deal with fewer subjects 
if so, which subjects should be omitted? 
a O 
b O 
c O 
O 
change its approach 
change its page layout 
e 
f 
O 
O 
23 Please give the names of other periodicals 
which you read: 
a 
b 
c 
24 What other types of media do you use 
regularly ? 
local radio a O 
national radio b O 
international radio c O 
national television d O 
international television e O 
20 On the whole, do you consider the articles in 
The Courier to be (mark one option in each 
section) : 
too technical 
at the right technical level 
not technical enough 
too intellectual 
too shallow 
well balanced 
a.i 
a.ii 
a.iii 
b.i 
b.ii 
b.iii 
O 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
21 Do you consider The Courier's style to be : 
pleasant 
simple 
sophisticated 
stiff 
dry 
erudite 
pedantic 
educational 
original 
academic 
technocratic 
journalistic 
a 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
j 
k 
I 
m 
yes 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
no 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
more or 
less 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o Level of education : 
Reader's Profile 
Town and country of residence : 
Nationality : 
Professional activity: 
Public servant (not including education) 
primary or secondary school teacher 
teacher in higher education 
trade 
industry 
finance/banking 
consultant 
craftsman 
agricultural worker 
other (please specify) 
No profession 
Retired 
a.i 
a.ii 
a.iii 
b.i 
b.ii 
b.iii 
b.iv 
b.v 
b.vi 
b.vii 
c 
d 
O 
O 
O 
o 
0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
primary 
secondary 
higher technical 
university 
post-graduate 
no qualifications 
Sex: 
male 
female 
Age: 
less than 20 
between 20 and 30 
between 30 and 40 
between 40 and 50 
between 50 and 60 
over 60 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
a 
b 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
O 
O 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o Evolution des 
systèmes agraires 
des oasis de 
Γ Adrar 
mauritanien 
(Evolution of agrarian systems in 
the Adrar oases in Mauritania) 
Marie-Laure Gibaud and Pascale 
Le Roy: 20, rue Larrey, F-75005 
Paris. Report on a study carried 
out in Mauritania, April-August 
1994. 120pp. 
The text may be consulted at the 
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In the following summary, the 
authors of the report examine 
the future of the Adrar oases in 
the Mauritanian Sahara region. 
Enduring traditions 
The Adrar region in Mauritania, 
the Adrar Tmar ('the mountain 
of the dates' in Berber) is the 
country's centre for the date-
palm crop and the fiefdom of the 
Moorish tribes. Traditionally, the 
oases in this region were merely 
staging posts for the nomadic 
stockmen and the great trans-
Sahara merchant caravans. Only 
the lower social castes (slaves and 
emancipated sharecroppers) 
worked there throughout the 
year, the nobles staying only for 
the date-harvest period known as 
the guetna. Today, the oases still 
enjoy a prestigious, romantic 
image amongst Mauritanians, 
representing an area for rest and 
barter. 
Even after the colonial period 
(1921-1960), Moorish society still 
bore the marks of its nomadic, 
tribal culture and it still operates 
largely on a system of trade 
based on payment in kind. 
Repercussions of drought on the 
production system 
The period of drought which 
began in 1970, and is still causing 
acute problems, affected an en-
vironment already weakened by 
the intensification of agricultural 
activities, linked with the former 
French presence. It considerably 
hastened the trend away from a 
nomadic lifestyle and accelerated 
the rural exodus. A number of 
proprietors affected by the drop 
in yields were obliged to free 
their slaves, who were replaced 
by paid workers or sharecroppers. 
The dual constraint of a drop in 
the water table (from two to fi-
ve metres, depending on the 
oasis) and the need to reduce 
manpower costs contributed to 
the rapid development of the use 
of motohsed pumps for water 
extraction. This constituted an 
additional financial demand and, 
in this context, market gardening 
was encouraged by international 
projects and government actions. 
Unfortunately, despite the efforts 
made to group communities to-
gether in cooperatives, producers 
in the Adrar region suffer from 
the fact that the area is very iso-
lated. The sight of oases which 
specialised too soon in vegetable 
production and are currently se-
riously threatened by over-exploi-
tation led a number of villages to 
reject intensive methods and seek 
alternative solutions such as the 
development of tourism during 
the guetna. 
Agriculture on a 'drip feed' 
Nowadays, traditional agricultural 
methods at the oases do not pro-
duce sufficient surplus to renew 
production capital. Agriculture 
survives, therefore, only by virtue 
of non-agricultural local activities 
and, above all, through the rep-
atriation of assets and money 
sent by rich and noble urbanised 
merchants and officials who orig-
inally came from the region. 
Most people have their inherited 
palm groves maintained by a 
sharecropper when there is no 
family member left in Adrar to 
do the job, and visit only during 
the period of guetna. To keep 
these workers on their land, it is 
obviously in their interest to offer 
them the opportunity to carry 
out market-gardening activities. 
Given the low level of income 
obtained by the sharecroppers, 
their continuation appears to be 
at risk and this forces proprietors, 
unwilling to take on higher man-
power costs, to sell their palm 
groves. The properties would 
probably be bought up by a 
second type of absentee prop-
rietor which appeared in the 
1980s and who combines profit 
with traditional leisure pursuits, 
investing on a massive scale in 
highly lucrative intensive date 
production. 
Agriculture and social Inertia 
The permanent population at the 
oases consists mainly of prop-
rietors of small multi-purpose 
food-producing gardens. These 
people are often of lower caste, 
old stockmen ruined by the 
drought and sharecroppers and 
workers mainly from the families 
of emancipated slaves who did 
not previously receive payment. It 
is difficult, these days, for these 
people to gain access to property 
ownership owing to the increase 
in land prices. 
The two criteria differentiating 
those involved in farming, namely 
the level of non-agricultural re-
sources and inherited means of 
production, are thus largely det-
ermined by their inherited social 
status. It is this which offers them 
mobility, a range of customers 
and the opportunity to have 
access to powerful interdepen-
dent networks. These in turn, 
condition their capacity to mobil-
ise funding, international finance 
and information on new tech-
niques, market status, etc. 
Which social groups hold the key 
to the future of the Adrar 
oases ? 
Will the small market gardeners 
be able to benefit from effective 
and long-lasting supply and mar-
keting networks enabling them 
to release the funds they need to 
remain at the oases? 
Given the results obtained by the 
urban producer-proprietors, will 
other entrepreneurs make a con-
tribution to increasing national 
date production by investing in a 
palm grove in Adrar? 
Will the proprietors who are 
more interested in receiving tour-
ists in the guetna period be cap-
able of competing with the spa 
resorts which are increasingly 
popular with the younger gener-
ation ? 
The future of the oases undoub-
tedly depends on rational water 
management to preserve the 
fragile oasis ecosystem and on 
development support carefully 
adapted to the physical and 
human characteristics which differ 
from one oasis to another. ■■ 
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Belize may not be very well known, 
but it has some surprises in store for 
those take the trouble to learn about it 
- including a beautiful landscape, an 
unconventional history, relative 
economic prosperity and a well-
established democratic tradition 
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